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**DRAFT CRISIS MANAGEMENT CONCEPT (CMC) FOR A POSSIBLE EU NON-EXECUTIVE
CSDP MILITARY ASSISTANCE MISSION IN SUPPORT OF UKRAINE**

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On 6 September 2022, the Political and Security Committee (PSC), following an informal meeting of the EU Defence Ministers on 30 August 2022, tasked the EEAS to develop a Crisis Management Concept (CMC) in view of a CSDP non-executive Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM).

Russia's unprovoked and unjustified attack on Ukraine on 24 February 2022 and the ongoing war of aggression triggered a strong response by the EU and likeminded countries, including significant support to the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF). This support comprises a range of support measures, including the donation of military equipment as well training to the UAF and intelligence sharing.

After months of relative stagnation, the conflict dynamics changed in early September 2022. The successful counter-offensive by UAF on multiple fronts, while encouraging does not yet represent a turning point. An essential contribution to progress has been the considerable military assistance that Ukraine has received from the EU, its Member States and other partners, mainly the US and the UK. Given the high-intensity combat actions, UAF's ability to generate, train and replace manpower may determine the future of war.

The needs of Ukraine, particularly in relation to training and equipping the UAF, are significant and increasing. Existing international measures and efforts are not sufficient, and needs may soon exceed existing capabilities. Not enhancing the support to Ukraine now would leave the UAF short of vital training for its personnel during a critical period of the war.

The proposed Mission, if launched swiftly, can provide a platform upon which the EU can garner and gather support from its Member States and collectively make a positive difference to the outcome of the war. EUMAM would contribute significantly to enhancing the military capacity and resilience of the UAF in order to support Ukraine in its struggle against Russia.

The Mission would support the UAF through providing training in response to most urgent Ukrainian needs in the domains of: (i) basic training, collective sub-unit and unit manoeuvre,

organisation and tactics, (ii) medical, logistics and basic combat engineering, (iii) combined arms instructors training (light infantry basic skills) for Territorial Defence Forces of the UAF, (iv) cyber security and cyber defence and (v) Radiation, Chemical, Biological and Nuclear (CBRN) protection, (vi) equipment maintenance and repair training.

Given the fact that Russia's war of aggression is taking place on the European continent, the gravity of which is having significant geopolitical, economic and humanitarian effects, an EU response must be commensurate with the gravity of the situation. This in practice demands an ambitious, durable, robust and extensive EU military intervention. Consequently, EUMAM would have to train very large numbers of UAF personnel in a variety of domains of military functions. Depending upon the offers made by Member States, this would require training in many locations throughout the EU.

Given the exceptional circumstances resulting from Russia's war of aggression and as long as those prevail, the Mission would conduct its activities on the territory of EU Member States. A central pillar of training would be established within an EU Member State. It would be commanded by the MPCC as OHQ and by an EU Combined Arms Training Command (CAT-C) as FHQ. It is assumed that the bulk of training would take place in the central pillar Member State. Basing training centres, particularly in case of collective training, in an EU Member State neighbouring Ukraine, could significantly reduce the supply routes from Ukraine for the recruits and trainees and the return delivery to the front line of the war.

A modular and scalable approach would allow for broad EU Member States' engagement with decentralised modular delivery of specialised training taking place in their territory, concurrently with that being delivered in the central pillar Member State.

One of the guiding principles of EU planning and executing of the Mission would be to eliminate the risk of unwanted duplication with other ongoing or planned training initiatives and to ensure coherence and complementarity of efforts and mutual reinforcement.

International Humanitarian Law, Human Rights and gender equality values and principles would be fully integrated into all aspects of operational planning, training and reporting of EUMAM.

EEAS(2022)1329

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It is recommended that:

- The PSC agree with the CMC in view of the establishment of a non-executive CSDP military assistance Mission in support of Ukraine – to be named EUMAM Ukraine – with an initial duration of two years, and forward it to the Council for approval, via COREPER;
- The PSC consequently invites all concerned to take the necessary steps to establish EUMAM Ukraine as a matter of urgency;
- The EU Mission Commander be appointed by the Council Decision establishing EUMAM Ukraine, in accordance with the standing planning and conduct arrangements for EU non-executive military CSDP missions (Council Decision (EU) 2017/971 of 8 June 2017);
- The EU Combined Arms Training Commander be proposed and swiftly endorsed by the EUMC with a view of his/her appointment by the Council Decision establishing EUMAM Ukraine;
- On the basis of the relevant provision in the Council Decision establishing EUMAM Ukraine, PSC invite third states to participate in EUMAM Ukraine and agrees that the EEAS starts to engage with potential contributors once the Mission is established.

BACKGROUND

1. On 11 August 2022, a ministerial-level meeting of the Northern European Defence Allies of Ukraine took place in Copenhagen. The Conference addressed the most pressing needs of Ukraine.
2. On 30 August 2022, the Minister of Defence of Ukraine addressed the EU Defence Ministers at the Foreign Affairs Council in Prague and requested support for the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF). Subsequently, the High Representative outlined the proposal of establishing an EU military assistance Mission.
3. Subsequently, on 6 September 2022, the EEAS was tasked by the PSC to develop a CMC in view of the establishment of a non-executive CSDP military assistance Mission for Ukraine.
4. From 7 to 14 September 2022, an EEAS Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) was conducted from Brussels through live and virtual meetings with the Ukrainian civilian and military authorities and other critical stakeholders.
5. On 8 September 2022, a meeting of the Ukraine Defence Contact Group took place in Ramstein, where the EU assistance to the UAF was discussed and high level bilateral meetings between the EEAS and Ukrainian authorities were conducted.
6. On 13 September a meeting of the Copenhagen Conference Group took place in a virtual format, as a follow up to the conference held on 11 August. The EEAS presented the main parameters of the envisaged CSDP Mission in support of UAF.
7. This CMC, developed according to the Crisis Management Procedures, presents the recommendations for a possible CSDP military non-executive Mission in support of Ukraine.

I. SITUATION

General

8. Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine is a fundamental challenge to the international legal order. It is imposing considerable human suffering and high material costs on Ukraine, and has wide-ranging repercussions for the EU and the whole world. The strategic objective of the EU is to restore a just and lasting peace and stability on the European continent as soon as possible. To this end, the EU will support Ukraine to defend itself against Russia's aggression, as much as needed and for as long as it takes. The EU will also continue imposing a high cost

on Russia, urging Russia to immediately and unconditionally cease its military actions and withdraw all its troops and equipment from the entire territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders. The EU closely coordinates its response to Russia's war of aggression and support to Ukraine with its transatlantic and other like-minded partners. In its response to Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, the EU will continue to preserve its unity and demonstrate strategic initiative and autonomy, including in terms of military assistance to Ukraine.

Political Situation

9. Despite the enormous challenge posed by Russia's full-scale invasion, Ukraine's institutions continue to operate and have demonstrated remarkable resilience. Ukraine's President Zelenskyy enjoys strong popular support and the government's line is supported by most political forces, including the opposition. Public administration continues to work and deliver services at all levels, including at local level. The parliament continues to adopt key legislation and reforms.
10. The status of EU candidate country granted to Ukraine by the European Council in June is a solid anchor to Ukraine's European path and has created a strong momentum and support for reforms in Ukraine. The candidate status also gives the EU a strong leverage to promote such reforms.
11. Six months into Russia's war of aggression, Ukrainians are ever more determined to recover their national territory in full. Opinion polls indicate that an overwhelming majority of Ukrainians oppose any territorial concessions, think that their country is going in the right direction and that Ukraine will win the war.
12. On the diplomatic side, peace negotiations are stalled. Russia has not engaged genuinely in negotiations and remains determined to undermine Ukraine's statehood and independence. Ukraine has set a return to the 23 February line – and more recently Russia's complete withdrawal from Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders – as a precondition to negotiate. Ukraine is wary of any compromise agreement that would lead to an unstable ceasefire, also considering the strong public opposition to any territorial concessions.
13. Ukraine is also negotiating security guarantees with its partners. Ukrainian demands from the guarantors a multi-decade sustained investment in Ukraine's defence capacities and

capabilities, weapons transfers, intelligence support, as well as military training Missions. Ukraine considers that such guarantees may be possibly included in a future peace process.

Military Situation

14. The conflict dynamics changed in early September after months of relative stagnation. The counter-offensive that started late August by the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) on multiple fronts is showing how difficult it is for the Russian Armed Forces (RUAF) to hold along a very long frontline with its current resources. In the north-east, the UAF were able to exploit the opportunity provided by RUAF's redeployment to the south to launch a counter-offensive, break Russian lines, and regain considerable territory. In the south, the UAF's actions continue to be directed at progressively degrading RUAF's logistics and communication lines and dividing its forces, with the goal to force them to retreat east of the Dnipro River. The outcome of the counter-offensive should be assessed in the longer run, but the UAF have taken the strategic initiative by counter-attacking and using longer-range weapons.
15. An essential condition for such progress has been the considerable military assistance Ukraine has received from the EU, its Member States and other partners, including provision of equipment, specialised training to use the new weapon systems, and intelligence sharing. Thanks to the long-range artillery received from its partners, the UAF also continues to conduct effective strikes targeting Russian military infrastructure as well as partisan actions across all Ukrainian territories under Russia's military control, including deep into the illegally annexed Crimea. The UAF will need continued military assistance to resupply and to consolidate recent and possible future territorial gains.
16. Looking at possible future scenarios, Ukraine's counter-offensive, while encouraging, does not yet represent a turning point. On the one hand, Russia's objective of subjugating Ukraine has not changed and a prolonged war of attrition is likely to continue. Russia is likely to respond to Ukraine's counter-offensive by attempting an escalation. It intensified and will likely continue indiscriminate attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure, which are unlikely to alter Ukraine's determination to continue fighting but can inflict considerable harm. Russia will also continue to bet on Ukraine's economic degradation and to use asymmetric pressure such as food and energy prices as well as disinformation to erode the support of Ukraine's partners. Russia may also resort to partial or full-scale mobilisation, which would however take time before yielding tangible results, if any. The use of tactical

nuclear weapons is assessed as unlikely but remains a possibility. However, with estimated casualties of more than 100,000 servicemen, 50% of RUAF armoured capability and 20% of artillery engaged in combat, RUAF's morale and capabilities appear to be degraded to a point that it is unlikely to launch large offensives in the foreseeable future.

17. On the other hand, Ukraine's counter-offensive demonstrates the effectiveness of Ukraine's military and military intelligence, as well as its ability to use effectively the military assistance received from the EU and other partners. This may point to the possibility of faster progress by Ukraine to repel Russia's aggression, although a complete liberation of Ukraine's territory or a return to the 23 February line remains unlikely in the short term.

Ukrainian Armed Forces

18. Since the start of Russia's full scale invasion, the UAF have demonstrated their ability to withstand large-scale attacks and inflict significant losses on RUAF with flexible operational skills. Ukraine was able to absorb considerable military assistance received from its partners and rapidly and effectively introduce the new weapon systems. The UAF have proven to be highly resilient and adaptable.
19. Six months into a war of attrition, however, the UAF have suffered considerable casualties. They need to continuously regenerate not only their equipment but also their manpower. In terms of equipment, the high-intensity combat actions as well as Russia's attacks against Ukraine's military industrial complex have rendered the UAF highly dependent on sustained external military aid.
20. Regarding manpower, Ukrainian casualties have likely been substantial during the war, with more than 10,000 troops killed in action according to official reports. The ratio is likely at least three wounded for every killed in action, and conducting offensive operations will foreseeably increase the casualty rate.
21. Ukraine will almost certainly continue to need considerable long-term support and assistance. In a prolonged war of attrition, UAF's ability to generate, replace and train manpower will determine the future of the war. Even in the most optimistic scenario of Ukraine prevailing and repelling the aggression, the EU will need to continue investing considerable resources in the long term to uphold the development and reconstitution of Ukraine's military capacities and capabilities, for the country to be able to deter and respond to possible future resumption of RUAF military offensives.

22. Security and defence cooperation between Ukraine and the EU predates Russia's full scale invasion. Prior to the war, the EU has considered supporting Ukraine to reform its **Professional Military Education (PME)** system, and Member States had agreed in principle to support Ukraine in this field. Ukraine still considers this area of support to be relevant. Since 2014, Ukraine has accelerated the transformation of its Armed Forces in line with Western standards. Ukraine would welcome the EU having a leading role in promoting a successful and sustainable reform of the PME system.
23. The 2014 EU-Ukraine Association Agreement covers the reform in the defence sector and states that "the Parties shall intensify their dialogue and cooperation [...] in the area of foreign and security policy", including CSDP, and that "the Parties shall explore the potential of military-technological cooperation." The EU has closely followed the reform of procurement in the defence sector and promoted the adoption of a law on defence procurement in July 2020. In October 2021, a law on corporatisation of state-owned defence industry entered into force.
24. A possible EU military assistance Mission would further increase the EU's ability to support Ukraine on reforms in the defence sector. It would also complement the support already provided by the civilian EU Advisory Mission Ukraine (EUAM), which focuses on the reform of Ukraine's civilian security sector.

II. ENGAGEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

EU Political action

25. Since the start of Russia's full scale invasion of Ukraine, the EU has been unwavering in its commitment to help Ukraine exercise its inherent right to self-defence against the Russian aggression and to build a peaceful, democratic and prosperous future. The European Council has resolutely condemned Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine and repeatedly urged Russia to immediately and unconditionally withdraw all its troops and military equipment from the entire territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders.
26. Furthermore, the EU and Member States have paid numerous high-level visits to Ukraine, including by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, the President of the European Parliament, the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, as well as various Commissioners. On 23 June 2022, the

European Council has decided to grant the status of candidate country to Ukraine. On 5 September 2022, the 8th EU-Ukraine Association Council took place in Brussels, to review the remarkable progress Ukraine achieved despite very challenging circumstances on the implementation of Commission recommendations on candidate status, as well as further progress in sectorial files falling under the scope of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement.

27. The EU is providing substantial political, military, financial and humanitarian support to Ukraine, as well as imposing a high cost on Russia through unprecedented sanctions. The EU has so far mobilised EUR 9.5 billion for Ukraine. In addition, the EU will soon disburse EUR 5 billion in macro-financial assistance loans and EUR 500 million in budget support. Discussions are ongoing on an additional EUR 3 billion grants this year, and a reflection has started on financial support to Ukraine for 2023. Work continues to establish the Reconstruction Platform, with its secretariat to be co-led by the EU and Ukraine, as well as the Rebuild Ukraine Facility as the EU's main financial instrument for reconstruction, in cooperation with donor partners.

Existing EU and other actors engagement in support of UAF

28. The EU has adopted five successive support packages for the delivery of defensive military equipment to support the UAF on 28 February, 23 March, 13 April, 23 May, and 21 July for a total amount of EUR 2.6 billion.
29. On 26 February 2022 a **Clearing House Cell (CHC)** was established at the EU Military Staff to monitor Member States' and partner countries' offers in support of the UAF. The CHC main aims are to (1) support the applicability of **the European Peace Facility (EPF)** support, (2) facilitate international coordination and (3) provide an assessment based on the state of assistance. The CHC has established links – through an EU liaison officer – with the International Donors Coordination Centre (IDCC) in Wiesbaden, currently led by a British Brigadier General.
30. Since the start of Russia's war of aggression, EU Member States provided priority military equipment and weapons as requested by Ukraine in substantial numbers under the EPF. The overall amount of Member States assistance is significantly greater, including provided on a bilateral basis.

31. EU Member States are involved in providing training to the UAF on a bilateral basis, which is coordinated by International Donor Coordination Cell (IDCC). Most of this training relates to the military equipment donated to UAF. The EU Member States have been involved in training the UAF *inter alia* on SCAN EAGLE drones, field artillery training, CBRN, Irregular Warfare, EOD and Mine Awareness, ASPIDE (SPADA) Operator and Maintainer, NASAM Air Defence and InfraRed Imaging System (IRIS-T).
32. **The role of the International Donor Coordination Cell (IDCC)** is to coordinate, cohere and ensure the delivery of multinational military aid capabilities to Ukraine. The IDCC's main aims are to (1) establish and maintain a robust, agile and flexible, multi-modal and multi-nodal enterprise that ensures an enduring ability to support military aid to Ukraine, (2) coordinate and cohere the flow of military aid from donor nations, through the network, into Ukraine, (3) develop and maintain linkages into Ukraine to understand Ukrainian priorities and to ensure that integrated and supported military aid capabilities are delivered. The IDCC is a 'one stop shop' for coordination of equipment donations as well as of training provision by 40 participating states. The IDCC has established a good overview of training activities, not only by EU Member States who participate in it, but also by other partners such as the UK and the US.
33. The **United States** is by far the biggest donor of security assistance to Ukraine, having committed approximately \$12.9 billion since the beginning of the invasion in different forms (presidential drawdowns of equipment drawn from US military stocks, direct financial aid to Ukraine for weapons purchases, funds for NATO allies to backfill their donations of weapons and ammunition to Ukraine). The US committed \$3.8 billion to reinforce NATO's eastern flank and enhanced its force posture (permanent basing, rotational presence, investments in military infrastructure) in the region. It also enabled the transfer of air defence systems by some EU Member States and donated High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) to the UAF. On 9 May, President Biden signed into law the Ukrainian Democracy Defence Lend-Lease Act to facilitate the process of sending military aid to Ukraine and neighbouring countries. Domestically, there has been broad bipartisan support in the US both for the provision of assistance to Ukraine and the need to avoid direct military intervention.
34. The US has been providing training and advice to the UAF since 2014, with a focus on leadership training. Since the start of the war, the training focus is on the new arms and

systems with the associated tactics and techniques that make those weapon systems more effective. The training includes maintenance and logistics to ensure the systems stay operational. Most of the US training is conducted in US bases and training facilities in Germany. US Department of Defence Joint Staff is working on guidance to US EUCOM to develop a training plan for Ukraine, which then must be coordinated with Allies and partners also involved in training activities. The US training will focus on new (US) arms and equipment and on further leadership training.

35. The **United Kingdom** with partners is providing advanced tactical basic training for the UAF in the UK. Operation INTERFLEX is a UK-led major training programme to train and drill the UAF using British Army expertise, allowing them to accelerate their deployment, rebuild their forces, and scale-up their resistance against Russian invaders. UK is presently internationalising this training program which includes some EU Member States and possibly more in the future. International partners are also invited to host programmes, if the offer is accepted by Ukraine. The new programme trains the UAF outside of the country. The battle-winning skills taught during the earlier seven-year programme contributed to enable UAF to launch a strong defence against Russia's invasion. UK training is based on two principles: survivability and lethality. The training is meant to give sufficient skills to trainees to survive the first month of their deployment and learn other necessary warfighting skills: 'survive to adapt'.
36. **Canada** has provided training and advice to the UAF since 2014 with a focus on leadership training. Operation UNIFIER, launched in response to a Ukrainian request, is the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) Mission in support of the UAF. The operation focuses on building UAF capability and capacity to repel the Russian invasion. The CAF coordinates its efforts with other partners, most notably UK and US. Since August 2022, CAF personnel have been deployed to the UK to resume their training of Ukrainian recruits. Currently, Canada is coordinating its UNIFIER training efforts with the UK under the UK-led Op INTERFLEX.

III. OBJECTIVE OF THE PROPOSED EU ACTION

Risks

37. The proposed EU CSDP action would become a part of a significant international effort in support of the UAF. The risks should thus be defined through the prism of the joint efforts.

Not providing sufficient support to the UAF, in terms both of quality and quantity, could mean the difference between Ukraine winning or losing the war. The latter would have devastating consequences for the stability of the EU and would pose an existential threat to its Member States.

38. The speed with which the EU action would take place, is crucial. The needs of Ukraine for assistance to its Armed Forces are significant and increasing. Existing international support measures and efforts are not sufficient and the needs of Ukraine exceed the existing capabilities. The risk of not further enhancing the support to Ukraine now would leave the UAF short of vital training for its personnel during a critical period of the war.
39. The EU not contributing to help Ukraine exercising its inherent right of self-defence against the Russian aggression and defending its territorial integrity and sovereignty could constitute a risk for the EU Member States' own security.
40. There is the risk that the deployment of an EU military assistance Mission is seen by Russia as an escalatory move. This risk, however, is mitigated by the fact that the proposed Mission would not constitute a direct involvement by the EU and its Member States in the conflict. The Mission would rather bring coherence and expand the scope of training initiatives already conducted by Member States. In addition, the Mission would not operate in Ukraine's territory, as long as the exceptional circumstances resulting from the war prevail. An appropriate strategic communication campaign would further mitigate this risk. At the same time, deploying a Mission would send an additional signal to Russia that the EU decisively stands by Ukraine's side, with a possible impact on Russia's calculations and ability to continue its war of aggression.

Added-value of the CSDP action

41. Establishing a CSDP military assistance Mission could represent a structured EU response to urgent as well as longer-term training needs and offer a predictable and sustainable platform to support the UAF in a wide area of domains. It could build on existing training initiatives by EU Member States already underway and help sustain and coordinate those efforts.
42. The proposed EU military assistance Mission (EUMAM), if delivered swiftly, can garner and gather support from all Member States and collectively make a positive difference to the outcome of the war. The EU can call upon 27 Member States, all with high standard defence

forces, to contribute resources and advice and which have considerable high and low intensity war-fighting capabilities.

43. Training modules could be organised in the EU Member States. Moreover, basing training centres in EU Member States neighbouring Ukraine could significantly reduce the supply routes from Ukraine for the recruits and trainees and the return delivery to the front line of the conflict in Ukraine. Existing networks with Ukraine can be enhanced further to ensure delivery of training and trainees and would have synergistic effects.
44. The EU already has an activated Operations Headquarters (OHQ) with the MPCC (although it would need to be swiftly reinforced for the purpose of EUMAM) and other HQs within its Member States capable of command and control of training and the coordination of equipment delivery.

EU Political Objective

45. The European Council in its conclusions of 24 February 2022 reiterated “its unwavering support for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders.”
46. The European Council in its conclusions on 23-24 June 2022 further stated that “the European Union remains strongly committed to providing further military support to help Ukraine exercise its inherent right of self-defence against the Russian aggression and defend its territorial integrity and sovereignty. To this end, the European Council calls on the Council to swiftly work on a further increase of military support.”
47. The Mission would contribute to implementing these objectives.

EU Strategic Objective

48. The EU military assistance Mission would contribute to enhancing the military capacity of the UAF in order to support Ukraine in its struggle against Russia’s war of aggression. Given the exceptional circumstances resulting from that war and as long as those prevail, the Mission would conduct its activities in the territory of EU Member States.
49. The CSDP Mission would be one of the tools of the EU Integrated Approach in providing support to the Ukraine and the UAF.

IV. DESCRIPTION OF A POSSIBLE CSDP MISSION

Overview of needs

50. The scope of the EUMAM mandate depends primarily on the absorption capacity of the UAF and their detailed requests. The EU priority is to respond to UAF declared urgent needs. However, the EU is committed to support the Ukrainian authorities over the long-term and this will require engagement through CSDP, which may be modest at the outset but be sufficiently flexible to adapt to greater UAF needs as the war in Ukraine continues and evolves.
51. While coordination and synchronisation would be a part of its mandate, limiting the role of the CSDP Mission to only that or focusing it exclusively on specialised trainings would limit the scope of the Mission and compromise EU ambition. One of the guiding principles of EU planning would be to eliminate the risk of unwanted duplication and to ensure complementarity of efforts and mutual reinforcement through an extensive consultation and coordination process with all relevant stakeholders involved in the training of the UAF. However, given the magnitude of the Ukrainian needs there is ample room for complementarity of the training offers.
52. EUMAM should adapt to collaborate with partners and avoid unnecessary duplication in the pursuit of the collective goal and objectives outlined by the Ukrainian authorities and agreed by EU Member States and consulted with our partners.
53. A non-paper submitted by Ukraine on 11 September 2022, expressing its most urgent needs, broadly reinforces what had been outlined by Minister of Defence Reznikov at the informal defence meeting in Prague on 30 August 2022. The content of the non-paper was further elaborated in subsequent working level meetings between the Ukrainian delegation in Brussels and the EEAS, and confirmed in a meeting between the EEAS and Deputy Minister of Defence Polishchuk on 14 September 2022. These requests include the following:

Individual and collective training

The individual and collective training of up to 9 Brigades (up to 36 Battalions) from platoon level training through company level to battalion level training.

Specialised Training

- Medical

- (i) Training of medical personnel (specialists with medical education, up to 300 people) on Courses,
- (ii) Advanced Trauma Life Support (doctors); Prehospital Trauma Life Support (nurses, paramedics); Damage Control Resuscitation (medical personnel);
- (iii) Mass Casualty (medical personnel, combat medics); Medical Evacuation (medical personnel, combat medics); Aeromedical Evacuation (medical personnel, combat medics).
- (iv) Collective training of medical units and Special training of combat medics – up to 800 people.
- (v) Battalion medical centre and medical stations (medical company) of a brigade (regiment).
 - Logistics
- (vi) Specialists in logistics (planning and tracking of the operational situation in terms of logistics support) up to 250 people and training of users of relevant software.
 - Radiation, Chemical, Biological protection
- (vii) Training of the RC intelligence specialists in the conduct of RC intelligence (observation) – 360 people.
- (viii) Collection, data processing, analysis and forecasting of the CBRN situation – 70 people;
- (ix) Selection, storage, transportation of samples – 430 people.
- (x) Training of RCB protection specialists, decontamination of equipment, buildings, roads – 340 people, sanitary treatment of the personnel, including the seriously injured – 80 people. Preparation for CBRN analysis and forecasting of the situation using CBRN analysis software.
 - Engineering support
- (xi) Basic sapper course – 300 people (at the same time – up to 60 people) for mobilized personnel covering; explosive substances and means of detonation; fire and electrical methods of detonation; undermining of structural elements; structures of mines and engineering ammunition, as well as their installation; engineering reconnaissance; ammunition produced by the USSR and Russia; basics of demining.
 - Cyber security/Cyber defence

EEAS(2022)1329

Limited

- (xii) Professional training of communication specialists (up to 900 people) on the following areas; tactical protected radio communication (up to 180 people); satellite Communication systems (up to 180 people); active network equipment (up to 180 people); deployment of structured cable networks (up to 180 people); IP telephony (up to 180 people).
- Combined arms instructors training
- (xiii) Combined arms instructors training (Light infantry basic skills) for the Territorial Defence Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (up to 100 people).
- Equipment maintenance and repair training
- (xiv) Training of Ukrainian engineering/ mechanical technicians for field maintenance and repair in the field.

Mission

54. The EU military assistance Mission would support the UAF through providing training in response to the Ukrainian needs. In this manner, the Mission would contribute to enhancing the UAF ability to regenerate its forces and effectively conduct operations with an aim to restore Ukraine's territorial integrity and sovereignty.

Assumptions

55. The planning assumptions for the delivery of EUMAM are that:
- The EU receives a formal request by the Ukrainian authorities;
 - EU Member States agree the proposed mandate and the Council adopts the Decisions establishing and launching the Mission;
 - The provision is made of the targeted training personnel by the Ukrainian authorities;
 - An offer of training base(s) or modular/ component functions and the provision of training personnel by EU Member States and non-EU partners;
 - There is political control and strategic direction by PSC and the MPCC acts as the Mission HQ (OHQ level);
 - An EU Combined Arms Training Command (CAT-C) (FHQ level) is offered by an EU Member State;

- The bulk of the Mission's overall training activities will be provided in the central pillar Member State;
- There are administrative arrangements between the relevant Ukrainian authorities, host Member State(s) and the Mission on the status applicable to Ukrainian military personnel training in one or a number of Member States e.g. in relation to the provision of life support for trainees, discipline and code of conduct amongst others;
- EU and international partner solidarity is ensured at the political and operational levels for the duration of the action and until the desired end-state is achieved.

Mission Concept

56. Subject to a formal request by the Ukrainian authorities, the EU would establish and launch a non-executive CSDP military assistance Mission (EUMAM) in support of Ukraine. The Council Decision establishing the Mission should provide that the Director of the MPCC will be the Mission Commander. The Mission will be under direct political control and strategic direction of the PSC and would provide training to UAF personnel in the domains of; (i) collective sub-unit and unit manoeuvre, organisation and tactics, (ii) medical, logistics and basic combat engineering, (iii) combined arms instructors training (Light infantry basic skills) for the Territorial Defence Forces of the UAF, (iv) cyber security and cyber defence; (v) CBRN protection and (vi) equipment maintenance and repair training.
57. As long as the exceptional circumstances resulting from the war prevail, the Mission would be located and operate in EU Member States' territory. It will coordinate the provision of training outlined in a subsequent Mission Plan (MPLAN).
58. The overall concept for the CSDP Mission is based on a centralised model with a CAT-C provided by a central pillar Member State. This CAT-C would be subordinate to the MPCC but share the coordination and synchronisation role with the OHQ to alleviate extra burden on the MPCC and to provide a direct link with the Ukrainian authorities (based ideally on an already developed and fully functioning network). This would build confidence and reassure the UAF that there would be little disruption to existing procedures and processes.
59. The centralised concept is for an ambitious EU CSDP engagement starting swiftly and modestly and developing over time to meet the pressing and considerable needs of the UAF. A modular and scalable approach would allow for broad EU Member States engagement with

modular delivery of training taking place in their territory, concurrently with that being delivered in the central pillar Member State.

60. All planning and conduct would take place in accordance with the EU crisis management procedures. Close coordination would be ensured with the Ukrainian authorities and other international donors.
61. A central pillar of training would be established within an EU Member State and led by a CAT-C subordinate to the MPCC. The CAT-C would be based on an existing HQ structure within that EU Member State and the majority of its staff would be from that Member State. Support and reinforcements to the CAT-C would come from a number of EU Member States.
62. It is envisaged that the bulk of training would take place in the central pillar Member State and that provision of equipment for training and life support is provided by the host country with costs for training reimbursed to the host country as outlined below in this CMC.

Military objectives

63. Potential objectives for EUMAM could be:
 - Provide training to UAF personnel at the individual as well as the collective level, at basic, advanced and specialised levels: in junior leadership from section/squad and platoon level up to sub-unit (company) and unit (battalion) levels including operational training and preparation of units and sub-units in collective manoeuvre and tactics up to battalion level, including advice on the planning, preparation and conduct of live firing exercises.
 - Provide coordination and synchronisation of Member States' activities in support to the delivery of training support to the UAF in domains yet to be determined but which may include, for example training on artillery systems.
 - Provide Combined arms instructors training (Light infantry basic skills) for the Territorial Defence Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (up to 100 people).
 - Provide training of medical personnel (up to 300 people) on advanced trauma life support, prehospital trauma life support, damage control resuscitation, mass casualty, medical evacuation, aeromedical evacuation; special training of combat medics (up to 800 people); collective training of medical units.

EEAS(2022)1329

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- Provide professional training for specialists in logistics (planning and tracking of the operational situation in terms of logistics support, up to 250 people); training of relevant software.
- Provide professional training of communication specialists (up to 900 people) on the following areas; tactical protected radio communication (up to 180 people); satellite Communication systems (up to 180 people); active network equipment (up to 180 people); deployment of structured cable networks (up to 180 people); IP telephony (up to 180 people).
- Provide training for basic engineer sappers for mobilized personnel covering; explosive substances and means of detonation; fire and electrical methods of detonation; undermining of structural elements; structures of mines and engineering ammunition, as well as their installation; engineering reconnaissance; ammunition produced by the USSR and the RF; basics of demining.
- Provide training of intelligence specialists in the conduct of RC intelligence (observation and collection), data processing, analysis and forecasting of the CBRN situation, selection, storage and transportation of samples, training of RCB protection specialists, decontamination of equipment, buildings, roads, sanitary treatment of personnel, including the seriously injured and preparation for CBRN analysis and forecasting of the situation using CBRN analysis software.
- Provide training of Ukrainian military mechanical technicians on the maintenance and repair of specific equipment in the field.

Integration of International Humanitarian Law, Human Rights and gender equality policies

64. International Humanitarian Law, Human Rights and gender equality would be fully integrated into all aspects of operational planning, training and reporting of EUMAM. The Mission's training for troops must include at the tactical level focus on International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, including the protection of civilians, children affected by armed conflict, gender equality and UNSCR1325.

Mandate evaluation, benchmarking and reporting

65. In order to demonstrate tangible progress in the support to the UAF, concrete and measurable milestones should be developed by the OHQ and CAT-C in subsequent planning documents. Both input (numbers trained in which areas and to what level) and output (the effect of training, integration and conduct into the combat forces of the UAF) should be reported.
66. A Strategic Review would be conducted by the EEAS and submitted to the PSC three months before the end of mandate. Regular reporting by the OHQ and EEAS services to the PSC would take place as necessary but at least on a monthly basis.

Desired End-State

67. The desired End-state is that, in those functional areas where EUMAM is contributing to the training of the UAF, Ukraine is capable of autonomously conducting combat operations to the desired effect of defending its territorial integrity and sovereignty.

Duration

68. The initial mandate for the Mission would be two years from the launching of the Mission.

EU Exit / Transition Strategy

69. The exit strategy for EUMAM Ukraine would depend on the evolution of the war but would be based on the needs and capabilities of the UAF. Should the conditions permit, modules or component elements of the CSDP action could be withdrawn or reduced over time as UAF develops in strength and success on the battlefield. The flexibility of the CSDP action is founded on the concept of scalable modules/components, which underpin the Mission and would be overseen and dictated through decisions taken by the PSC on advice from the MPCC in close coordination with other services within the EEAS.

Identified challenges related to CSDP action for Ukraine

70. The recruitment of available trainees within the requisite timelines could prove a particular coordination and provision burden on the UAF at a time of intense warfighting. The understanding is that there is a large pool of potential recruits but organising and transporting them to the training sites would be complex. For already trained or specialised personnel, releasing them from combat duties would also be burdensome. In particular, both junior and senior commanders are essential to the war effort *in situ* in Ukraine.

71. Coordination and synchronisation would be crucial. The needs of the UAF are substantial; there are already many donors of equipment and training, and trust between donors and their Ukrainian counterparts is based on deed rather than word. The proposed EUMAM would be new to the landscape and so should establish itself as a credible partner to the UAF authorities and other partners as rapidly as possible.

V. ORGANISATION FOR THE POSSIBLE CSDP MISSION

Command and control

72. Given the fact that the Russia's war of aggression is taking place on the European continent, the gravity of which is having significant geopolitical, economic and humanitarian effects, an EU response must be commensurate with the gravity of the situation. This in practice demands an ambitious, durable, robust and extensive EU military intervention. Consequently, EUMAM would have to train very large numbers of UAF personnel in a variety of domains of military functions. Depending upon the offers made by Member States, this would require training in many locations throughout the EU.
73. Given the exceptional circumstances resulting from Russia's war of aggression and as long as those prevail, the Mission would conduct its activities on the territory of EU Member States. A central pillar of training would be established within an EU Member State. It would be commanded by the MPCC as OHQ and by an EU Combined Arms Training Command (CAT-C) as FHQ. It is assumed that the bulk of training would take place in the central pillar Member State.
74. The command and control arrangements and distribution of HQ functions for EUMAM would therefore need to meet the unique challenges, the scale and variety of which is unprecedented in CSDP. They would need to be adapted accordingly.
75. Under the responsibility of the Council and of the High Representative, the Political and Security Committee would exercise the political control and strategic direction of EUMAM Ukraine.
76. The Council Decision establishing the Mission would provide that the Director of the MPCC is the EUMAM Ukraine Mission Commander. The MPCC will be the static command and control structure at the military strategic level.

77. A Combined Arms Training Command (CAT-C) would be established within the central pillar Member State. Given the scale and complexity of its functions, it would likely be much larger than normal FHQs and would need substantial reinforcements from other EU Member States. The command and control status of training and HQ staff offered to the OHQ or CAT-C by other EU Member States would be outlined in the MPLAN and must be agreed by the offering Member States and the Mission. In principle, and subject to such agreement, specific terms proposed by the offering EU Member States or partners would apply to those staff made available to the OHQ and/ or CAT-C.
78. The chain of command of this CSDP training Mission would be tailored to the specific tasks and size of the Mission. A Combined Arms Training Commander, responsible to the Mission Commander, would be appointed by the Council Decision establishing EUMAM Ukraine.

Location of the Mission

79. As long as the exceptional circumstances from the war prevail, the Mission would be located in the territory of EU Member States.
80. Liaison officers from EUMAM could be located in the EUCOM/ IDCC and possibly in the EU DEL in Kyiv.

EU Coordination and Synchronisation

81. Both the OHQ and the CAT-C would have coordination functions, the precisions of which would be specified in the MPLAN.
82. Close cooperation and coordination would be maintained between the OHQ and the Head of the EU Delegation in Kyiv, as specified in the MPLAN.

Coordination and Cooperation with External Partners

83. Close coordination would take place between the OHQ and CAT-C and the International Donor Coordination Centre (based in Wiesbaden) and the EUCOM Control Centre Ukraine (ECCU) at Ramstein Air Base. An EU military representative is currently based in the IDCC and consideration to enhance this presence should be made.

VI. ADMINISTRATION AND RESOURCES FOR THE POSSIBLE CSDP MISSION

Legal framework

84. Ukraine has requested military assistance from the EU in various meetings at the political and technical levels. It is anticipated that Ukraine will formally confirm this request.
85. Based on an official request from Ukraine for military assistance from the EU, a Decision establishing EUMAM Ukraine would be adopted by the Council on the basis of Articles 42 and 43 TEU.
86. Given the exceptional circumstances resulting from Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine and as long as those prevail, the Mission would operate in the European Union, with the objective of contributing to increasing the capacity of Ukraine's Armed Forces to respond to Russia's aggression in Ukraine's territory.
87. In the territory of the EU Member States, the Mission and its personnel would be covered by the EU SOFA. Moreover, pursuant to Article 3(2) of the Council Decision¹ establishing the EPF, the Mission would be exempted from customs duties and taxes on its purchases in the EU.
88. The Mission would as necessary enter into arrangements with the relevant authorities of each host Member State and/or Ukraine, to set out the practical modalities for the presence and activities of the Mission and the status of Ukrainian military personnel in the host Member States. These would notably address, for Ukrainian military personnel, issues relating to real life support, discipline, applicable law, liability, as well as compensation for damages. Such arrangement may build, as appropriate, on the EU SOFA or on existing arrangements between host Member States and Ukraine.

Participation of third states in the Mission

89. Third states which have concluded a framework agreement with the EU² for their participation in EU military operations and Missions may participate in the Mission, following acceptance

¹ OJ L 102, 24.3.2021, p. 18.

² Albania, Australia, BiH, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Georgia, Iceland, Jordan, Montenegro, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Serbia, Turkey, Ukraine, Vietnam. The framework participation agreement with the USA provides only for the provision by the USA of civilian personnel, units and assets to EU crisis management operations.

of their proposed contribution by PSC. Other third states may conclude with the EU an ad hoc participation agreement for this Mission, upon approval by the Council of an authorisation to open the negotiation and, later, of an authorisation to sign the agreement.

90. The EU SOFA, in accordance with its Article 19(7), can be made applicable to the personnel and assets contributed by a third state to the Mission.

Financing

91. The common costs of the military Mission would be funded in full compliance with the Council Decision³ establishing the European Peace Facility (EPF).
92. The costs funded in common without any specific decision other than on the budget, given the specificities of the Mission, would be limited to its headquarters, medical services, facilities and evacuations for the Mission's personnel and a few menial costs such as identification and markings. Some of those costs for HQs ("transport/travel within the theatre of operations", "barracks and lodging/infrastructure"), and Role 2/ Role 3 medical services are funded in common only in the theatre of operations: an agreement would be needed that the list of common costs for HQs listed in the EPF Decision would apply to this Mission.
93. It can be assumed that, as usual in other Missions, the Mission's personnel, notably the trainers, would be supported mostly by the States which are sending them. Their accommodation on training facilities and their real life support, notably food, would best be supplied by each host Member State. The EPF Committee could as usual set up a system of Nation Borne Costs to ensure that the sending States pay for the goods and services, notably food, used by the personnel they have sent. It could also decide, if necessary, that certain costs, such as the refurbishment of barracks for the trainers, would be common costs for this Mission.
94. It can also be assumed that Ukraine would fund the remuneration and transportation at least to its border of the trainees. It can also be expected that host Member States can provide and fund wholly or for the most part accommodation infrastructure for the trainees and training infrastructure.
95. However, this Mission would entail specific costs falling under two major categories:

³ OJ L102, 24.3.2021, p. 14.

EEAS(2022)1329

Limited

- a) Support to the trainees (transportation from the Ukrainian border to the training facilities, and, on the training facilities: real life support, notably food; transport on and around site; medical support and evacuations; possibly accommodation refurbishment and furniture);
 - b) The training activities (running costs: fuel, ammunition, maintenance of vehicles used in training; equipment, where not provided by Ukraine: military fatigues and boots, sportswear, sleeping bags and tents, arms, possibly simulators; possibly additional training infrastructure; interpreters). The equipment for training mentioned here would usually remain on the training sites for successive cohorts of trainees, rather than be taken to Ukraine by trainees who complete their training cycles, although there may be exceptions (e.g. fatigues and boots).
96. The number of trainees is expected to be much higher and the type of training much more demanding than in other EU military training Missions. In addition, unlike for EUTMs so far, the country of origin of the trainees would not be hosting the training and not be in a position to support the trainees or the training itself.
97. It would be inefficient to leave such costs to the host Member States: the number of trainees would then be limited to what the Member States making available training sites and training modules can afford on a national basis. The EU's added value in this endeavour would be much greater if it could mobilize the full financial power of all its Member States towards this common effort. The Mission can then have a greater magnitude and effect. It would also be fair to the Member States which would make available training sites to support Ukraine, but also, ultimately, to preserve the security of Europe as a whole.
98. In order to keep both the decision-making process and the implementation of the project as simple as possible, it would be preferable to organize and fund all the items necessary to the trainees and to the training, other than those funded by Ukraine and the host Member States, in one single process, namely under the Mission.
99. Such items would be physically supplied on each training site by the host Member State. The host Member State or the Mission could, however, arrange that a Member State procure some items (e.g. equipment for training, such as simulators) for several host Member States. Voluntary contributions and donations are also possible, although support to the trainees and training activities cannot rely on intermittent supplies. The Mission would reimburse the host

Member States (and where applicable other States) for the items they provided which would fall under common costs – in the same way it would normally pay suppliers to the Mission.

100. Such a setting would be neutral for Member States compared to a combination of an assistance measure and the Mission: the same amounts would be funded under the EPF by the Member States based on the GNI key. In this particular case where no implementing actor is needed, the simplicity of one single process maximizes the chances of starting the training effort quickly.
101. In order to ensure that the Mission’s financial setting would allow it to implement its mandate efficiently and swiftly, and so that the Council has full clarity on the main parameters of the Mission when it adopts a Decision to establish it, this Decision should set out that, due to the Mission’s exceptional needs and features, the costs for supporting the trainees and the training activities listed in paragraph 95 would be funded in common for this Mission (its central pillar and its modules). Such a Council Decision would be based on Art 44(6)⁴ of the EPF Decision.

Possible Assistance Measure(s)

102. In parallel, the EPF would continue to fund under Assistance Measures the provision by Member States of military equipment to Ukraine – with the exception of the equipment necessary to the training which, as explained above, for reasons of simplicity and efficiency, should be reimbursed as common costs by the Mission to the Member States concerned.
103. The maintenance and repair of military equipment donated to Ukraine, if it takes place in military sites and is dispensed by military trainers, should be provided under the Mission and be funded as such. Where it takes place in factories and does not require the deployment of EU military personnel – if requested by Ukraine – it could be funded by an Assistance Measure if the Council so decides.

Possible other tasks

104. An EU contribution to the reform of the Professional Military Education (PME) of Ukraine’s Armed Forces could be considered at a later stage.

⁴ Art 44(6) of the EPF Decision : « The Council may determine in decisions establishing or extending operations that certain incremental costs, in addition to those qualifying as common costs at the time, shall be regarded as common costs for a given operation.” In the EPF Decision, the word “operation” means “EU military operation or Mission”.

Information Strategy

105. A Strategic communication plan (STRATCOM) would be developed once the Mission is established and during the subsequent operational planning phase when the main objectives, themes and messages would be agreed. EEAS Headquarters and the EU Delegation in Kyiv would be closely consulted on this strategy.
106. The Plan would be built and focused around the main objective of the military assistance Mission, which is to enhance Ukraine's capacity to defend its territorial integrity.
107. The main purpose of the communication strategy would be that the Mission is understood, accepted and supported, in Brussels, in the Member States' capitals and in other contributing countries, in Ukraine, as well as by international partners.
108. It would also anticipate for possible Mission support activities related to foreign information manipulation and interference, including on disinformation.

VII. RECOMMENDATIONS / NEXT STEPS

It is recommended that:

- The PSC agree with the CMC in view of the establishment of a non-executive CSDP military assistance Mission in support of Ukraine – to be named EUMAM Ukraine – with an initial duration of two years, and forward it to the Council for approval, via COREPER;
- The PSC consequently invite all concerned to take the necessary steps to establish EUMAM Ukraine as a matter of urgency;
- The EU Mission Commander be appointed by the Council Decision establishing EUMAM Ukraine, in accordance with the standing planning and conduct arrangements for EU non-executive military CSDP missions (Council Decision (EU) 2017/971 of 8 June 2017);
- The EU Combined Arms Training Commander be proposed and swiftly endorsed by the EUMC with a view of his/her appointment by the Council Decision establishing EUMAM Ukraine;
- On the basis of the relevant provision in the Council Decision establishing EUMAM Ukraine, PSC invite third states to participate in EUMAM Ukraine and agree that the EEAS starts to engage with potential contributors once the Mission is established.