xxxx - agreed changes

Compromise amendment 1

covers the entire text and all amendments tabled

[clean and with adjusted numeration]

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

on the security of energy supply in the EU
(2025/XXXX(INI))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 194 thereof,

– having regard to Council Directive 2009/119/EC of 14 September 2009 imposing an obligation on Member States to maintain minimum stocks of crude oil and/or petroleum products[1],

– having regard to the Commission communication of 28 May 2014 entitled 'European Energy Security Strategy' (COM(2014)0330),

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2017 concerning measures to safeguard the security of gas supply and repealing Regulation (EU) No 994/2010[2],

– having regard to Directive (EU) 2019/944 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on common rules for the internal market for electricity and amending Directive 2012/27/EU[3],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2019/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on the internal market for electricity[4],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2019/941 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on risk-preparedness in the electricity sector and repealing Directive 2005/89/EC[5],

– ***having regard to the Commission communication of 11 December 2019 entitled 'The European Green Deal'***

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[1] OJ L 265, 9.10.2009, p. 9, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2009/119/oj.
[2] OJ L 280, 28.10.2017, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2017/1938/oj.
[3] OJ L 158, 14.6.2019, p. 125, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2019/944/oj.
[4] OJ L 158, 14.6.2019, p. 54, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2019/943/oj.
[5] OJ L 158, 14.6.2019, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2019/941/oj.

– having regard to the Commission communication of 8 July 2020 entitled 'Powering a climate-neutral economy: An EU Strategy for Energy System Integration' (COM(2020)0299),

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1153 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 July 2021 establishing the Connecting Europe Facility and repealing Regulations (EU) 1316/2013 and (EU) No 283/2014[6],

– ***having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1119 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 2021, establishing the framework for achieving climate neutrality and amending Regulations (EC) No 401/2009 and (EU) 2018/1999 ('European Climate Law');***

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2022/869 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2022 on guidelines for trans-European energy infrastructure, amending Regulations (EC) No 715/2009, (EU) 2019/942 and (EU) 2019/943 and Directives 2009/73/EC and (EU) 2019/944, and repealing Regulation (EU) No 347/2013[7],

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 18 May 2022 entitled 'EU external energy engagement in a changing world' (JOIN(2022)0023),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 18 May 2022 entitled 'REPowerEU Plan' (COM(2022)0230),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 18 October 2022 entitled 'Digitalising the energy system – EU action plan' (COM(2022)0552),

– ***having regard to the EU-NATO Task Force final assessment report on the resilience of critical infrastructure, June 2023***

– ***having regard to Directive (EU) 2023/1791 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 September 2023 on energy efficiency and amending Regulation (EU) 2023/955 (recast)***;

– ***having regard to the Annual Report 2023 by the Euratom Supply Agency***;

– ***having regard to Directive (EU) 2023/2413 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 October 2023 amending Directive (EU) 2018/2001, Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 and Directive 98/70/EC as regards the promotion of energy from renewable sources, and repealing Council Directive (EU) 2015/652 (the Renewable Energy Directive),***

– Directive (EU) 2024/1788 and Regulation (EU/2024/1789) on the internal markets for renewable gas, natural gas and hydrogen, (recast)

– ***having regards to Regulation on methane emissions reduction in the energy sector***

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[6] OJ L 249, 14.7.2021, p. 38, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1153/oj.

[7] OJ L 152, 3.6.2022, p. 45, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/869/oj.

(EU/2024/1787)

– ***having regard to Directive (EU) 2024/1711 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 amending Directives (EU) 2018/2001 and (EU) 2019/944 as regards improving the Union's electricity market design,***

– ***having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1747 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 amending Regulations (EU) 2019/942 and (EU) 2019/943 as regards improving the Union's electricity market design (Electricity Market Design (EMD) Regulation***),

– ***having regard to EU parliament resolution 2024/2885(RSP) entitled 'EU actions against the Russian shadow fleets and ensuring a full enforcement of sanctions against Russia'***

– ***having regards to report "Safer Together – Strengthening Europe's Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness" (Niinisto report), 30 October 2024,***

– having regard to Special Report 09/2024 by the European Court of Auditors entitled 'Security of the supply of gas in the EU',

– having regard to the Commission communication of 29 January 2025 entitled 'A Competitiveness Compass for the EU' (COM(2025)0030),

– ***having regard to the Joint communication of 21 February 2025 entitled 'EU Action Plan on Cable Security',***

– ***having regards to the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions entitled 'Action Plan for Affordable Energy' (COM/2025/79),***

– ***having regard to the Commission and High Representative joint communication of 26 March 2025 entitled "Preparedness Union Strategy" (JOIN(2025)130),***

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas energy security is a key building block of a resilient, ***sustainable*** and competitive economy; ***whereas reliable and affordable energy supplies are essential for economic growth, industrial productivity and societal well-being;***

B. ***whereas in times of a general security crisis and the need for preparedness against defence challenges, securing energy supply constitutes a priority;***

C. ***whereas despite potential for developing domestic clean and renewable energy sources*** the EU imports more than 60 % of its energy, ***including 90% of its gas and 97% of its oil***[8], leaving it vulnerable to ***potential*** energy supply disruptions, ***price volatility and external pressures***;

[8] Questions and Answers on REPowerEU: Joint European action for more affordable, secure and sustainable energy https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_22_1512

D. ***whereas the EU holds potential for the development of renewable resources, and since the publication of Commission's last Energy Security Strategy in 2014, the production of homegrown renewable energy has grown substantially - wind power by 98%, solar PV 314%, solar thermal 22%, ocean energy 244%; whereas, over the same period, the EU's domestic fossil fuel production has declined, with coal production falling by 53%, oil by 31%, and gas by 73%;***

E. ***whereas with a renewable energy-dominated grid, Europe will need over 100 GW of new clean firm power capacity by 2035 to ensure reliability, energy security and lower costs[9];***

F. ***whereas the gap between energy production and EU demand negatively affects the EU's trade balance, with energy imports amounting to €427 billion in 2024—down from a peak of €602 billion in 2022—for coal, oil, and gas[10];***

G. ***whereas a number of Member States are demonstrating commitment to expanding nuclear energy as a pillar of their energy strategies and advancing their nuclear power projects;***

H. ***whereas the diversification of energy sources contributes to the EU's open strategic autonomy, energy security, and resilience against external supply disruptions;***

I. whereas ***renewable and clean*** domestic energy production, energy efficiency, ***and energy saving*** measures ***applied across entire value chain*** decrease reliance on external energy sources and enhance the security of energy supply***; whereas EU policies for energy efficiency are yielding structural results, with energy demand peaking in 2006 and declining by 20% in 2023[11], highlighting energy efficiency as the most cost-effective way to reduce emissions, enhance competitiveness, to make energy consumption more affordable and to improve energy security;***

J. ***whereas Member States have differing conditions in terms of natural and geographical characteristics, energy supply, security, sources, and policies;***

K. ***whereas the Russian Federation has for decades weaponised its oil, coal, nuclear and gas supplies to the European Union in order to create disunity among Member States and, since the summer of 2021, to generate inflation and weaken European resolve to support Ukraine in its just fight for freedom; whereas Russia Russia's war against Ukraine started in 2014; whereas Russian has been carrying out an illegal, unprovoked and unjustified full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine since 24 February 2022***; whereas the EU Member States agreed in the Versailles Declaration[12] to reassess how to ensure the security of their energy supplies and to phase out their dependency on Russian gas, oil and coal imports 'as soon as possible' ***by, among others, speeding up the development of renewables and production of***

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[9] https://www.catf.us/2023/11/24-7-carbon-free-energy-europe-secure-clean-electricity-around-clock/?utm

[10] Report on energy prices and costs in Europe COM (2025) 72 final (p. 13). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52025DC0072

[11] Primary and final energy consumption in the European Union, European Environment Agency, https://www.eea.europa.eu/en/analysis/indicators/primary-and-final-energy-consumption/primary-and-final-energy-consumption-1?activeTab=6fbd444d-c422-4a78-8492-fd496bd61b7a

[12] See https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/54773/20220311-versailles-declaration-en.pdf.

their key components and accelerating the reduction of EU overall reliance on fossil fuels, taking into account national circumstances and Member States' choices of their energy mix; whereas the REPowerEU plan put forward a set of actions to stop importing Russian fossil fuels by 2027 ***at the latest***;

L. whereas while ***most of*** Russian oil and coal imports have been sanctioned, Russian gas ***and nuclear*** imports have ***regrettably*** remained outside of the EU's sanctions regime amid concerns over security of supply;

M. ***whereas the share of Russian pipeline gas, both LNG and from pipelines, in total EU energy imports has significantly decreased from 45% in 2021 to approximately 19% in 2024***; ***whereas EU imports of Russian fossil fuels in the third year of the invasion surpass financial aid (EUR 18.7 bn in 2024) sent to Ukraine that year[13]; whereas in total, since the beginning of the war, Russia earned EUR 206 billion in revenue from fossil fuel exports to the EU***; ***whereas global fossil fuel exports constitute the single largest source of revenues for the Russian Federation, amounting to 250Bn€ per year in 2024[14] - equivalent to 160% of the Russian military budget for this year[15];***

N. ***whereas of the 100 reactors in use in the European Union, 18 reactors located in five EU countries are of Russian or Soviet-design and have varying levels of built-in reliance on Rosatom which poses a particular vulnerability to European energy security; whereas in 2024, around 23% of the whole EU demand for uranium conversion services was satisfied from Russia and in uranium enrichment services Russia covered almost 24% of EU needs;***

O. ***whereas Russia has been circumventing sanctions through the shadow fleet, which transports oil to willing buyers under false flag or no flag and with serious environmental risks; whereas Member States have yet to implement effective measures against sanctions evasion through the shadow fleet adopted by the Council in 15th sanctions package***;

P. ***whereas the European Parliament in its November 2024 resolution called on the EU and its Member States to ban all imports of Russian energy, including LNG and nuclear, to require that ships exporting LNG from Russia be banned from entering EU ports and to refrain from concluding any new agreements with Rosatom or its subsidiaries***;

Q. ***whereas the absence of an updated robust EU energy security strategy is adversely affecting businesses, industries and households; whereas, among other contributing factors, this has led to a sharp rise in energy poverty with nearly one in ten households (10.6%) unable to adequately heat their homes in 2023[16], an***

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[13] https://energyandcleanair.org/publication/eu-imports-of-russian-fossil-fuels-in-third-year-of-invasion-surpass-financial-aid-sent-to-ukraine/

[14] See: Center for Research on Energy and clean Air - EU imports of Russian fossil fuels in third year of invasion surpass financial aid sent to Ukraine

[15] See: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute - Preparing for a Fourth Year of War: Military Spending in Russia's Budget for 2025 | SIPRI

[16] See: 10.6% of EU population struggled to keep homes warm - News articles - Eurostat

increase from 6.9% in 2021[17];

R. ***whereas attacks against critical energy infrastructure can lead to loss of power with effects simultaneously in several Member States, substantial economic damage, undermine public security and have implications for defence capability of the Union; whereas cyberattacks have inundated Europe's energy sector since Russia's invasion of Ukraine; whereas the Baltic Sea's critical energy infrastructure is under regular attacks from Russia; whereas increasingly growing number of incidents of perimeter harassment against offshore energy infrastructure is a serious concern;***

S. ***whereas NATO's role in energy security was first defined at the 2008 Bucharest Summit and has since been strengthened; whereas NATO is strengthening the security of critical infrastructure to prevent sabotage, including through a recently launched initiative, Baltic Sentry; whereas NATO is supporting national authorities in enhancing their resilience against energy supply disruptions that could affect national and collective defence;***

T. ***whereas the integration of the Baltic States' electricity systems into the continental European network in February 2025 is a critical step for enhancing their energy security, since this eliminates reliance on the Russian-controlled grid, thereby reducing geopolitical vulnerabilities and strengthening the resilience of the Baltic region***;

A new vision for energy security in a changing global landscape

1. ***Recalls that the Environmental European Agency defines energy security as "the availability of energy at all times in various forms, in sufficient quantities, and at reasonable and/or affordable prices"***; considers that a comprehensive approach to energy security should take into account the physical ***infrastructure*** dimension, the ***availability, reliability, stability and*** affordability of supplies, ***and their*** sustainability, and should place emphasis on the geopolitical and ***climate*** dimension;

2. ***Stresses that energy security is a cross-sectoral issue that underpins the functioning of all critical sectors, making it indispensable for economic stability, public safety, and national resilience; underlines that integrating energy security considerations into relevant policies and their underlying impact assessments is crucial for enhancing the coherence, consistency, and overall effectiveness of EU policymaking;***

3. Emphasises that the current geopolitical situation and ***continued perilous dependencies in energy supplies*** underscore the need to revise the understanding of energy security and ***recognises*** that the resilience of energy systems, understood ***as ability to anticipate, withstand, adapt to, and quickly recover from possible disruptions,*** is now a strategic imperative;

4. Stresses that as the energy system continues to decarbonise, the share of renewables

[17] See: Key figures on European living conditions – 2024 edition

increases and electrification advances, ***well-functioning and integrated energy market***, ***energy efficiency,*** integration of flexibility sources ***(electricity and heat storage, hydrogen, comprehensively developed and resilient infrastructure, demand response),*** and sufficient dispatchable capacity will be crucial ***to successfully manage the intermittency of renewable energy sources and unlock the full potential of the energy transition;***

5. Highlights that energy security cannot work without adequacy; notes that 'the scarcity issues tend to shift from the peripheral areas of Europe in 2025 to the central parts of the continent by 2033'[18]; ***believes that capacity remuneration mechanisms play a structural role in securing dispatchable back-up capacity to ensure adequacy during peak times or periods of supply shortages and in helping to incentivise needed investments in generating capacity that market signals, relying solely on infrequent scarcity price hours, may fail to justify; underlines the need to ensure that the mechanisms are open to different types of resources (such as demand side, energy savings, aggregation, storage units and cross-border resources) capable to provide needed services, such as flexibility, do not create undue market distortions nor limit cross zonal trade and reflect the compatibility with a future decarbonised electricity system, including through coherence with defined emissions limits defined in art. 22 of EMD; recalls that remuneration for capacity mechanisms is only for their availability;*** stresses the urgent need ***to simplify and streamline their approval processes, as requested by Electricity Market Design Revision, while giving due consideration to the specific problems of the electricity market in the respective Member States in the Commission's approval process; notes the Commission report on the assessment of possibilities of streamlining and simplifying the process of applying a capacity mechanism (COM/2025/65) and ongoing works on the Clean Industrial Deal State Aid Framework (CISAF) with concrete proposals to accelerate the approval process***; ***notes that while the balancing market provides essential short-term services, it is not yet investment-friendly and calls therefore on the Commission to develop incentives to build the flexible assets that balancing markets urgently need***;

6. Stresses that decarbonisation ***should*** take into account the specificities of Member States ***and their regions, including Europe's outermost territories***, ***and just transition regions their level of access to different types of clean energy sources,*** the needs of their industries and the vulnerability of their citizens in order to ensure a just transition that maintains energy security by ***creating synergies between*** climate ambitions, ***geographical and natural conditions***, social and economic realities~~;~~

7. Notes the need for a broader approach to ***non-fossil*** flexibility and ***energy*** storage that incorporates molecules and heat; highlights the potential of district heating systems that can use thermal storage to reduce the temperature of the loop and incorporate waste heat, solar, ***geothermal*** and other ***renewable sources***, ***where appropriate using natural gas and biomass in a transition period; draws attention to the important role that the optimal use of high-efficiency cogeneration, in line with EED, can play in contributing to the balancing of the electricity grid and for the competitiveness of some industrial sectors, especially those that do not have***

[18] European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E), 'European Resource Adequacy Assessment', December 2023.

alternatives to produce affordable heat for their industrial processes; stresses the need to modernise and expand district heating grids to this end;

8. ***Emphasises that technological neutrality plays a key role in enhancing the security of energy supply while avoiding lock-in effects and fostering sustainability, economic efficiency and just transition; recalls the need to invest in a diverse portfolio of clean technologies that allow regions to adopt technologies best suited to their needs in a cost-effective way, making energy more affordable and accessible***;

9. ***Notes*** that the Draghi report[19] highlights ***that decrease of fossil fuels import dependency would enhance EU competitiveness, the affordability and security of supply***; ***notes that currently natural gas is a component of the EU energy security, with demand of 320 bcm in 2024, and IEA forecasts indicating a moderate demand of 260 bcm annually by 2035[20], while REpower scenario projected possible demand reduction of 184 bcm by 2030, implying around 50% natural gas demand slash in less than 5 years, compared to 2022 demand of 356 bcm***; ***recalls Draghi's proposal*** to establish a ***comprehensive*** strategy for natural gas ***managing it during the transition and securing its supplies*** that should guide infrastructure ***choices***, international partnerships and legislation; notes, with concern, that inconsistent policies on natural gas have weakened the trading position of EU companies, leaving them exposed to global spot market prices and ***potentially*** creating a gap between what the EU has contractually secured and what will be imported over time;

10. Stresses that ***the development of*** nuclear energy remains ***a national prerogative in the framework of EU law; notes that for those Member States that choose it in their energy mix, nuclear can have*** an important role to play in an integrated energy system with increasing penetration of renewables; ***notes that a number of Member States see a*** need to support the development ***and deployment of existing and*** new generation of nuclear technologies, ***as well as the entire nuclear fuel cycle***, that will contribute to building a competitive technological supply chain in the EU so as to ensure open strategic autonomy; ***stresses the importance of assessing full cost of the entire nuclear energy life cycle, including construction, operation, security, environmental and health impacts, waste management and decommissioning***; ***notes existing and continuing reliance on foreign providers, with approximately 97% of the EU's natural uranium supply in 2022 coming from overseas sources[21] and stresses the need for diversification of sources of supply of uranium and nuclear fuel and to follow the recommendation Euratom Supply Agency in develop reliable supply chains to meet the growing demand for nuclear and new nuclear technologies; notes in this regard the EIB recent decision to renew its support for strengthening European uranium enrichment capacities***; ***underlines that SMRs and AMRs have the potential to enhance energy security by providing low-carbon power, however notes that the technology is not yet fully developed; and welcomes the announced assessment of the possibility of streamlining of licensing practices for new nuclear energy technologies such as SMRs***;

11. ***Recognises that renewable energy constitutes an enabler of energy autonomy and***

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[19] See https://commission.europa.eu/topics/eu-competitiveness/draghi-report_en.

[20] IEA 2024 World Energy Outlook, EC 4Q 2024 Gas Market Report.

[21] Euratom Supply Agency Annual Report 2023.

long-term security of supply; ***stresses that renewables are essential to deliver energy security as they already constitute the main source of homegrown energy for the European Union; highlights the importance of maximizing the use of existing renewable capacities, particularly by tackling the issue of curtailment, with grid congestion in the EU curtailed over 12 TWh of renewable electricity in 2023, causing additional 4.2 million tons of CO_2 emissions[22]; notes that renewables already helped to reduce EU dependence on Russian gas as they accounted for 25% of the energy and 45% of the electricity, consumed in the European Union; reaffirms the importance of sustained EU support for the development and deployment of already established renewable technologies, such as solar, windpower, geothermal and heat pumps; reiterates the necessity of policy and investment support in development of less developed or emerging sectors, to accelerate the deployment of the renewable technologies that are the most relevant given their national and local considerations:*** such as ***innovative*** geothermal ***technologies***, biomethane, ***solar thermal***, marine energy, ***tidal energy, osmotic energy, concentrated solar power***; ***expresses concern that, without targeted support policies, some innovative technologies may fail to reach commercialisation in a timely manner, and therefore calls on Member States to support their research, demonstration, market adoption, and scale-up; calls on the Commission to present an investment plan for those renewable technologies;***

12. ***Notes in particular the potential of geothermal energy, estimated at 5-10 GW by 2035 at a capacity factor of 80-90%, highlights the vast untapped resources in certain EU regions, and calls on Commission to deliver on Parliament call to support development of geothermal energy, including through establishment of risk mitigation instruments***

13. ***Asks IEA to provide an analysis to assess the possibilities of use of EU natural gas resources***; ***notes that the EU domestic natural gas production dropped by more than a third between 2020 and 2023 and this decline is expected to continue with no significant near-term increase in the production of green gases, including biogas and biomethane in the EU; notes Draghi's report highlights that while progressively decarbonising and moving to hydrogen and green gases in line with RED III and REPowerEU, as a transitional measure, domestic production of natural gas - where deemed justified by individual Member States - could also play a role contributing to security of supply and avoiding exposure to negative geopolitical developments;***

14. ***Highlights that diversification is vital to mitigate the risk of supplier dominance in a changing geopolitical context; believes the EU needs to strengthen international partnerships with reliable*** suppliers of ***energy, raw materials and clean tech components in all regions of the world, and in particular*** with ***countries of*** the European Economic Area;

15. ***Underlines that enhancing energy security necessitates a holistic approach, notably through improving energy efficiency in key end-use energy sectors, such as buildings and industry, and promoting energy savings, boosting investment in***

[22] ACER, Transmission capacities for cross-zonal trade of electricity and congestion management in the EU. 2024 Market Monitoring Report, p. 52.

research and development, and ensuring meaningful citizen participation, all of which are essential to achieving a resilient, sustainable, and inclusive energy system;

16. ***Calls on the Commission to be mindful of future military capability and mobility needs in the development of the EU energy system; notes with concern that the EU is highly import-dependent for crude oil and petroleum products; calls on the Commission to prepare a comprehensive strategy on liquid fuels in order to ensure their readily available access by military in a situation of crisis, and to reduce dependencies on vulnerable import chains and unreliable producers, particularly thorough development of advanced synthetic fuels (such as SAF, e-fuels) in Europe;***

17. ***Draws attention to recommendation of Niinisto report on the need of further work on priority dual-use transport corridors for civilian and defense-related logistical needs, and the extension of fuel supply chains for the armed forces along these corridors, as well as stockpiling and strategic reserves of energy, that could be particularly relevant for the regions with insufficiently developed pipeline infrastructure and fuel storage; calls in this respect on the Commission to review Oil Stocks Directive in the light of recent geopolitical shifts and the needs of military enabling in order to strengthen energy security and resilience against emerging military risks;***

18. ***Acknowledges the rapidly accelerating energy demand driven by the digital sector, particularly the substantial energy requirements of data centres and artificial intelligence systems; stresses that this trend highlights the urgent need for robust energy efficiency policies and underscores the importance of the EU proactively pursuing sustainable, forward-looking solutions to meet this growing demand while safeguarding the resilience of its energy system;***

A resilient energy infrastructure

19. Notes that infrastructure bottlenecks impede the benefits of sector integration and aggravate the threats to energy security; underlines the importance of investing in new energy networks, ***including cross-border interconnectors and offshore grids,*** and optimising existing infrastructure ***to increase capacity using grid-enhancing technologies (GETs) while reducing new infrastructure needs, in order to enable the integration of renewables and other new generation facilities, closing price gaps, improving the overall system efficiency and enabling solidarity among the Member States in the event of energy crisis; emphasises the need for technically sound infrastructure planning that takes into account geographical and natural characteristics while ensuring long-term viability and avoiding the creation of stranded assets***;

20. ***Calls on the Commission to urgently assess areas where interconnectors are insufficient to achieve the current 15% interconnection target as set out in Regulation (EU) 2018/1999; stresses the importance of Projects of Common Interest (PCIs) in facilitating the efficient and secure flow of electricity across Member States and regions, thereby strengthening cross-border integration and***

energy solidarity within the EU; ***acknowledges the role Connecting Europe Facility for Energy (CEF-E) in completion of above investments and reiterates its call to significantly increase its funding when proposing the next multiannual financial framework***;

21. ***Calls on Member States to accelerate permitting procedures for electricity installations and networks; notes that excessively long permitting procedures could create legal uncertainty, undermining resource adequacy by delaying the implementation of critical projects—whether for repowering or revamping existing generation sites, or for developing transmission, distribution, or storage infrastructure; welcomes the positive progress made regarding provisions adopted in the latest revision of the Renewable Energy Directive and the Emergency Regulation on Permitting to accelerate, streamline and simplify permit-granting procedures***;

22. ***Recalls that climate change continue to worsen, placing increasing stress on the energy system due to extreme weather events, such as heat waves, leading to thermal power plant shutdowns, droughts reducing generation output and severe storms, floods and fires damaging electricity grids and gas pipelines***; stresses that the impact of climate change on generation assets, networks and consumption patterns should be better integrated into the modelling and preparedness of energy infrastructure; ***emphasizes the need for resilient energy system planning, incorporating climate-adaptive strategies such as advanced cooling technologies, grid flexibility, decentralized renewable generation, and strengthened infrastructure protections; highlights the importance of integrating a climate-proofing plan, grounded in an initial risk-based assessment, into energy projects from the earliest stages of development***

23. ***Calls on the Commission to build on the Directive (EU) 2022/2557 on the resilience of critical entities by facilitating its full and harmonized implementation through the provision of best practices, guidance materials and methodologies, and cross-border training activities and exercises to support Member States, competent authorities and critical energy entities;***

24. Emphasises the need to invest in the protection and ***resilience*** of energy infrastructure against ***man-made threats, such as*** military, ***hybrid***, and cyber attacks; ***expresses concern about recent sabotages in the Baltic Sea and calls for stronger EU level action to protect EU's critical energy infrastructure, including cross-border connections with third countries, such as subsea pipelines and cables, offshore wind farms and interconnections, designed to support the most impacted Member States, and complement national measures***; ***welcomes in this regard the Joint Communication on the EU Action Plan on Cable Security;***

25. ***Notes that decentralization of the energy system, that both strengthens resilience and facilitates the energy transition, increased diversity of sources and autonomy, reduces reliance on centralized power plants, minimises outage risks, enhance grid stability, and enables quicker recovery from disruptions; at the same time emphasises that the greater number of remote and dispersed sources of energy, energy storage and new connections require enhanced measures to ensure robust infrastructure protection***;

26. ***Calls on the European Commission to learn the lessons from the war in Ukraine, particularly the critical role of electricity interconnection, micro-grids, distributed solar power, wind power, and battery storage in ensuring greater resilience of the electricity grid against military attacks, including cyberattacks, drones, and missiles***; ***commends Ukraine's sustained efforts to maintain the functionality and safety of its energy system in the face of Russia's war of aggression, and underscores that supporting Ukraine also entails helping to safeguard the soundness of its national electrical grid***;

27. Notes, with concern, that small distributed energy resources (DERs) connected to the internet, such as inverters, are not covered by ***appropriate conformity assessment procedures under*** cybersecurity legislation, ***such as Cyber Resilience Act***, ***and since they can be remotely controlled and their software updated by the manufacturer, which in many cases are non-trusted vendors,*** they could give them control over EU electricity grids; ***urges the European Commission to establish mandatory risk assessments for DERs based on country of origin, ensuring that devices controlled from jurisdictions with potential security concerns are subject to strict oversight, and localization requirements; calls for enhanced resilience in European supply chains by promoting EU-based manufacturing of DERs and fostering alliances with trusted international partners***; ***highlights the need for an adequate number of professionals specialised in cybersecurity and close coordination among Member States to address these vulnerabilities;***

28. ***Calls on energy companies managing critical infrastructure to work closely with the European Cyber Security Agency and equip themselves with the most advanced cyber security tools; considers that cooperation with NATO in the field of cyber security should be strengthened in order to counter hybrid threats to Europe's energy security***;

29. ***Notes that the Members States need to do utmost to increase its resilience which encompasses the ability to prevent, protect against, respond to, resist, mitigate, absorb, accommodate and recover from incidents, taking into full account the interdependence of the EU energy market and the potential domino effect that infrastructure failures in one country may have across the Union; underlines in particular the need to strengthen the recovery aspect, that could be achieved through efficient European repair and response mechanism and national and regional operational plans, that could serve as important element of deterrence strategy***; ***notes the importance of EU solidarity in responding to potential infrastructure incidents, ensuring coordinated action and mutual support among Member States***;

30. ***Reminds that energy infrastructure constitutes a particularly sensitive sector in need of protection against foreign interests***; urges the Member States, ***and Commission,*** to address security risks associated with foreign investment in and acquisitions of energy infrastructure; ***expresses concerns about a series of potentially sensitive foreign investments, particularly in grids; welcomes in this regard the ongoing revision of Foreign Investment Screening Regulation, as a timely step to adopt a stringent strategic approach to the development and oversight of -European energy infrastructure***;

31. Stresses that energy security should include the supply of key ***clean*** technologies,

components and critical raw materials ***and notes the need for their diversified sourcing***; calls for increased support for the EU's grid manufacturing industry ***as a strategic pillar of the energy transition, with particular emphasis on ensuring a fair and competitive regulatory environment for European manufacturers, while exploring the potential for local content requirements to strengthen energy security, supply chain resilience, and industrial competitiveness***; ***calls for an update of the Public Procurement Framework to simplify and reduce the administrative burden for grid operators to access the needed grid technologies;***

32. ***Emphasises the importance of integrating circularity principles into the design of critical infrastructure and equipment, and calls for increased support for their implementation, with the goal of reducing the EU's dependence on imports of foreign raw materials and enhancing resource efficiency;***

Phase out of Russian energy supplies

33. ***Highlights that the challenges posed by a lack of solidarity in the EU and the prioritisation of particular interests by some Member States have taught the whole continent the dangers of dependence on the unreliable energy supplier weaponising energy exports; underlines that the lessons learned from Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine need to be at the core of the EU future actions particularly highlighting the critical importance of a united European response to eliminate perilous dependencies in energy supplies;***

34. ***Underlines that the EU has made advances in reducing its energy dependence thanks largely to the REPowerEU plan and 16 sanction packages, leading to imports of Russian gas (pipeline & LNG) to fall from 45% of total EU gas imports in 2021 to 19% by 2024;***

35. Expresses ***deep*** concern that the EU ***still maintains*** its reliance on Russian gas ***and, moreover, has recently seen an increase***, ***with imports rising by 18% in 2024 and their continued growth in 2025***;[23] ***notes that in 2024 alone, Member States purchased an estimated EUR 7 billion worth of Russian LNG and since the Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the EU has imported oil and gas from Russia for more than EUR 200 billion totally[24] fuelling Russia's war machine;***

36. ***Welcomes the publication of a*** roadmap for phasing out Russian energy imports, ***which*** must pave the way for their definitive end as soon as possible;

37. ***Welcomes the stepwise prohibition of Russian gas imports proposed by the Commission; Stresses the need of introduction of the EU ban on all Russian natural gas imports by 2027 at the latest, with new contracts and existing spot contracts already by the end of 2025; insists that Members States, including those currently benefiting from targeted derogations for Russian oil imports, should ultimately phase them out by 2027 at the latest; welcomes the upcoming legislative***

[23] Changed to more recent data -> The final push for EU Russian gas phase-out, "Ember", 27 March 2025,
[24] https://energyandcleanair.org/financing-putins-war/

proposals in this regard and calls on the Commission to explore the use of all available transitional instruments leading to the end of Russian fossil imports by 2027, such as the introduction of a regular quota system for Russian gas imports into the EU and the introduction of a ceiling price for Russian LNG, after previous assessment of market and price impacts; ***calls on the Commission to provide EU companies with effective and legally sound toolkit to facilitate their efforts to break out of long-term contracts with Russian suppliers without incurring penalties;***

38. ***Calls on the Member States to include gas deliveries for the EU from the Yamal LNG and Arctic2 LNG terminals in the scope of the EU sanctions and the respective sanctioning the singular fleet of ice-class LNG carriers linked to the Yamal LNG project; notes, that sanctioning LNG carriers would be highly effective, as the number of ice-class LNG carriers in the world is limited; stresses that above actions would require adequate assessment of legal and economic impacts on European companies concerned and ensure their ability to exit contracts***;

39. ***Commends the inclusion of the nuclear supply chain in the roadmap; notes with concern that Russian nuclear fuel remains present in the EU market, including through indirect supply chains, and in 2023, 23,5% of the uranium consumed in the EU came from Russia and 30,1% of the enrichment of uranium used in EU's nuclear fleet was done by Russia; notes that while domestic providers are ramping up capacity at their European facilities to meet increased demand, as utilities proactively move away from Russian supply, clear policy decisions are urgently required at the EU and national level to address the above vulnerabilities in nuclear supply chain; calls therefore for-support for projects within the Union that contribute to greater autonomy and security of nuclear fuel supply;***

40. Expresses concern that official data does not provide a complete picture of Russian energy imports ***and their final destination***, as relabelled Russian oil and gas continue to enter the EU market; notes with regret that this ***in some cases*** occurs with ***acquiescence of state actors involved***;

41. Agrees that an adequate assessment of the ***amount*** of Russian energy imports is a prerequisite for phasing out this dependency; ***regrets the continued whitewashing of Russian energy imports and stresses the need for a greater transparency in the EU energy market; calls on Member States to publish data on the origin of Russian imported, exported and consumed gas, and urges to apply all means against whitewashing of Russian energy imports; notes that relevant reporting obligations laid down under the Regulation on methane emissions reduction in the energy sector can contribute to this purpose***;

42. ***Welcomes the upcoming proposals for transparency, monitoring and traceability mechanisms, as the effective implementation of sanctions depends on compatible control mechanisms in all Member States***; ***commends the urgent need*** to develop a ***legal*** mechanism to ensure the transparency and traceability of natural gas originating in Russia and exported to the EU as liquefied natural gas and by pipeline, and eventually to cover oil imports; ***stresses that this mechanism should be extended to energy imports from other destinations in the future***; considers that the mechanism would require cooperation between various services, including EU competition services, ***ACER*** and national customs authorities; ***asks the Member***

States to consider strengthening the criminal investigation powers ***of national custom authorities to ensure effectiveness of the above mechanism and introducing sufficiently deterrent measures and fines, such as adequate financial penalties*** for sanctions evasion;

43. ***Stresses the need to adopt a legal*** framework for diversification, requiring each Member State to prepare in ***a coordinated manner***, ***through appropriate competent authorities,*** an exit plan for Russian energy sources and to ***support and oversee*** the preparation ***and implementation*** of ***specialised*** exit plans at the level of ***undertakings active in their respective energy sectors***; ***considers that these plans should include domestic production and demand reduction dimensions***;

44. Condemns ***strongly*** the calls for a return to Russian energy imports as part of the peace settlement in Ukraine; ***firmly reject the idea of possible certification of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline and insists on the complete decommissioning of Nord Stream pipelines***; warns against the EU falling back into dependency on an unreliable suppliers and calls on the Commission ***and the Member States*** to develop safeguards against this, such as a countersignature by the Commission on any potential contracts with Russia or the mandatory use of the AggregateEU platform for this type of purchase;

45. ***Reminds that energy is a fundamental necessity; emphasizes that phase-out of Russian energy imports must be a collective effort, ensuring that no Member State, company or household is left behind; emphasizes that Member States are not equally positioned to phase out Russian energy imports in the same manner, and therefore urges strong solidarity among them, alongside appropriate support measures from the Commission to ensure a fair and coordinated transition***;

46. ***Notes that in the near term there is the need to replace phase-out Russian energy imports with reliable third-country sources and urges therefore the Commission to propose measures ensuring their sufficient substitution from trusted partners; stresses however, that Russian energy supplies should not be replaced by new dependencies in supplies, therefore in the long term, energy imports should be progressively reduced through effective measures to support decarbonisation, electrification and energy efficiency and energy savings, in the sectors where it is possible and cost-efficient, as well as through the development of domestic production of energy in line with the REPowerEU plan;***

47. ***Emphasizes that energy dependence on Russia should not be either replaced by new dependencies on individual suppliers of energy technologies, components or critical raw materials;***

Revision of security of supply framework

48. ***Welcomes the upcoming revision of Security of Supply architecture including Gas Security of Supply Regulation and the Electricity Risk Preparedness Regulation, and other relevant legislations;*** considers that the ***new EU*** security of supply architecture should reflect ***such fundamental shifts*** as ***increasing*** cross-sectoral integration of the energy system, the new geopolitical landscape, the profound

changes in supply routes, ***impact of climate change as well as changes in maturity of energy technologies reflected in shifts of levelised costs of energy and opportunities this present for energy transition***;

49. ***Highlights that energy efficiency plays a critical role in enhancing the security of energy supply by reducing overall energy demand, lowering dependency on energy imports, and increasing system resilience;*** considers that the new security of supply framework ***should*** be broadened to reflect a new way of looking at the security of energy supply based not only on energy sources, but also on ***energy efficiency first principle***, ***energy savings, cost efficiency***, as well as ability to produce different types of energy domestically; ***notes that while in near term the Union should concentrate on effective, solid and without loopholes weaning of Russian energy imports, including through securing alternatives supplies from reliable partners and better use of existing infrastructure, while in parallel continuing to develop domestic alternatives to imported energy products, where possible; stresses, nevertheless, the imperative to develop a future-proof security of supply architecture that systematically reduces dependence on external actors, notably by advancing energy efficiency, promoting energy savings, enhancing circularity, and ensuring the sustained growth of homegrown clean energy production and well-protected decentralised energy infrastructure***;

50. Emphasises the need to prioritise the ***resilience of energy infrastructure*** drawing on the ***lessons learned from Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, the targeted attacks on its energy systems and the benefits of decentralised energy systems***; considers that new energy assets should be 'resilient by design', including to possible military threats ***and extreme weather events***;

51. Stresses the need for greater cooperation ***of all actors*** on the resilience of energy infrastructure to both climate impacts and human-caused threats; ***insists that the protection of this infrastructure requires stronger involvement of governments, including through public-private partnerships***; ***welcomes in this regard the Niinistö report recommendation to engage with the private sector in institutionalising de-risking efforts, cross-sector stress tests and proactive security measures; asks the Commission to ensure that such cooperation is reflected in plans covering incident management and recovery, and subject to regular exercises***; ***notes that the Union's preparedness strategy includes actions to strengthen public-private partnerships and calls on the Commission to further develop relevant specific measures for the energy sector in the review of the SoS;***

52. Notes the need to accommodate ***in the SoS architecture*** the integration of renewable and low-carbon gases, such as biomethane and hydrogen; ***recalls that the Hydrogen Strategy already recognized the role of renewable and low-carbon hydrogen production can play in providing flexibility and storage in an integrated energy system with high share of renewables; calls on the Commission to recognize the complementarities between hydrogen and electricity in the future Electrification Action Plan, in line with energy sector integration, and to set clear conditions for the ramp up of hydrogen to contribute to the energy transition, particularly in hard to abate sectors***;

53. Stresses the need to include affordability risks in national risk assessments; calls for transparency on the implementation of national risk-preparedness measures to

increase trust between the Member States; notes ***the advantages of greater coherence*** on protected consumer categories ***(consistent categories and gradation of disconnection priority for grid users)*** to allow coordinated consumer load-shedding plans to be defined; ***including plans to support vulnerable households affected by or at risk of energy poverty during energy crisis****;*

54. ***Highlights the need for a unified, resilient and strategically coordinated energy policy***; emphasises that ***as the EU energy markets become more integrated***, energy security is increasingly becoming a shared responsibility of the Member States ***requiring solidarity and coordination, in order to prevent unilateral actions that could undermine the security of the entire EU***; ***warns that a unilateral decision by a single actor to enter into a harmful energy agreement with a third country could expose the whole EU to renewed energy crises, price volatility and geopolitical pressures***~~;~~

55. Notes the need for stronger coordination between ***Member States*** on the ***decommissioning of aged generation units with cross-border impact as well as*** on withdrawal from the system of generation capacity ***to ensure that alternative installations have been completed and are in operation*** as this affects the availability and affordability of energy in neighbouring countries;

56. ***Underlines that data-driven technologies should positively impact on energy security management; recognises the importance of comprehensive energy information and data for identifying and responding to evolving energy security threats and for infrastructure planning, and calls for improved coordination in the collection of such information and data***;

57. ***Calls on the European Commission to include into security of supply proposal technical provisions for the standardisation and interoperability of critical components of the EU energy system, particularly electricity transformers, to ensure that lack of standardisation does not hinder European solidarity;***

58. ***Welcomes the establishment by ENTSO-E of a new Task Force on the Security of Critical Infrastructure, aimed at analysing and proposing recommendations on the topic of security of critical infrastructure; stresses the importance of incorporating lessons learned from Ukraine's experience, including the valuable expertise of the dedicated unit within the Ukrainian Transmission System Operator (TSO) tasked with identifying and mitigating threats to critical infrastructure; calls on the European Commission to collaborate closely with ENTSO-E in delivering a comprehensive and systemic assessment of threats to the EU electricity grid, to be completed by 2026.***

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59. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission