



H.E. Mr. Eloy Alfaro de Alba
President of the Security Council
United Nations

Copy to
H.E. Mrs. Kaja Kallas
High Representative and Vice President of the European Union
In her capacity as coordinator of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)

28th August 2025

Excellency,

In accordance with paragraph 11 of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2231 (2015), and each acting individually in our national capacity as participant States to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), France, Germany and the United Kingdom (the "E3") wish to notify the Security Council that, based on clear factual evidence, the E3 believe Iran to be in significant non-performance of its commitments under the JCPOA, and hereby invoke the process known as the "snapback" mechanism.

Since 2019 and as of today, Iran has increasingly and deliberately ceased performing its JCPOA commitments. This includes the accumulation of a high enriched uranium stockpile which lacks any credible civilian justification and is unprecedented for a state without a nuclear weapons programme. Since 2019, the E3 have made exhaustive good faith efforts to resolve the issue of Iran's non-compliance through the relevant processes of the JCPOA and beyond.

Most recently, the E3 offered to agree to an extension of the provisions of UNSCR 2231 should Iran take specific steps to address our most immediate concerns. However, as of today, Iran has not returned to compliance with its obligations vis-à-vis the International Atomic Energy Agency, nor has it reengaged in negotiations with a view to reaching an acceptable diplomatic solution.

The E3 are committed to using every diplomatic tool available to ensure Iran never develops a nuclear weapon. That includes our decision to trigger the "snapback" mechanism today through this notification. The E3's commitment to a diplomatic solution nonetheless remains steadfast. The E3 will fully make use of the 30-day period following the notification in order to resolve the issue giving rise to the notification, in accordance with paragraph 13 of resolution 2231, including to discuss the E3 UNSCR 2231 extension offer.

Iranian non-performance of its commitments under the JCPOA

It has been more than six years since Iran publicly ceased performing its commitments under the JCPOA.

As part of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General's continuous reporting on Iran's implementation of its JCPOA commitments since 2015, Iran's persistent and increasing non-performance has been detailed since July 2019.

Since 2019 Iran has, inter alia, exceeded the limits it freely committed to in the JCPOA on enriched uranium, heavy water, and centrifuges; ceased allowing the IAEA to conduct JCPOA verification and monitoring activities; and abandoned the implementation and ratification of the Additional Protocol to its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. These actions contravene Iran's commitments set out in Annex I to the JCPOA.

As per the Director General's reports, issues that the E3 determine to constitute Iran's significant non-performance of its JCPOA commitments include, but are not limited to:

1. **Iran significantly exceeded the maximum allowed uranium stockpile** of 300 kg of UF₆ enriched up to 3.67%, in non-compliance with paragraph 56 and 57 of Annex I to the JCPOA.
By way of comparison:
 - 1.1 IAEA report dated 11 November 2019: Total enriched uranium stockpile at 372.3kg of UF₆ and enrichment level at 4.5%;
 - 1.2 IAEA report dated 31 May 2025: Total enriched uranium stockpile of 8413.3 kg of UF₆ and enrichment level up to 60%, including
 - 5508.8kg of UF₆ enriched up to 5%,
 - 274.5kg of UF₆ enriched up to 20%, and
 - 408.6kg of UF₆ enriched up to 60% - representing over nine Significant Quantities, defined by the IAEA as the amount for which the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear explosive device cannot be excluded.
2. **Iran restarted prohibited uranium enrichment activities** at Fordow, in non-compliance with paragraph 45 of Annex I to the JCPOA:
 - 2.1 IAEA report dated 11 November 2019: Iran had restarted uranium enrichment activities at Fordow;
 - 2.2 IAEA report dated 31 May 2025: Iran started feeding the two IR-6 cascades producing UF₆ enriched up to 60%.
3. IAEA report dated 31 May 2025: **Iran ceased to allow the IAEA to perform JCPOA-related verification and monitoring activities**, in non-compliance with paragraph 15 of the JCPOA.
4. IAEA report dated 31 May 2025: **Iran ceased to implement the Additional Protocol and modified Code 3.1 of Iran's Subsidiary Arrangement to its Safeguards Agreement** in contravention of paragraph 13 of the JCPOA.
5. **Iran exceeded the maximum allowed heavy water stockpile** of 130 metric tonnes of nuclear grade heavy water, in non-compliance with paragraph 14 of Annex I to the JCPOA:
 - 5.1 IAEA report dated 11 November 2019: Iran exceeded the 130 metric tonne limit and in February 2020 stock of heavy water was 132.7 metric tonnes;
 - 5.2 IAEA report dated 31 May 2025: The IAEA reported that it had lost continuity of knowledge on the heavy water stockpile more than four years ago.
6. **Iran exceeded the limits on nuclear R&D activities**, in non-compliance with paragraphs 31 to 43 of Annex I to the JCPOA as well as the separate R&D plan:

6.1 IAEA report dated 11 November 2019: Several cascades of advanced centrifuges had been installed and were being tested with uranium;

6.2 IAEA report dated 31 May 2025: Accumulation of enriched uranium of up to 2% at Natanz through cascades of inter alia 28 IR-5 centrifuges, testing of 49 IR-6 centrifuges.

7. **Even prior to strikes in June 2025, the IAEA had lost continuity of knowledge regarding several parts of Iran's programme, including the production and inventory of centrifuges.** Today, and as reported by the IAEA on 31 May 2025, **the IAEA is not able to provide assurance of the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme.** Furthermore, the full extent of Iran's currently operational enrichment capacity cannot be verified unless and until Iran allows the IAEA to resume inspections of its enrichment facilities, as per its legal obligations.

Iran's actions contradict the overarching purpose of the JCPOA. Paragraph ii. of the JCPOA states: "The full implementation of this JCPOA will ensure the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme." Iran's actions stand in stark contrast to an exclusively peaceful use of its nuclear energy.

Iran's accumulation of 60% highly enriched uranium has no credible civilian justification; the IAEA's 31 May 2025 report stated Iran was the only country in the world without nuclear weapons producing and accumulating uranium up to 60%.

Good faith efforts by E3

Iran's non-performance notwithstanding, the E3 have consistently upheld their commitments under the terms of the JCPOA.

As JCPOA participants, the E3 have consistently and in good faith sought to resolve with Iran issues with respect to Iran's non-compliance under the JCPOA, and have undertaken every effort to preserve the integrity of the JCPOA, as paragraph 10 of UNSCR 2231 (2015) encourages the JCPOA participants to do.

Since May 2018 and the decision by the United States to end participation in the JCPOA, the E3 have worked tirelessly to preserve the agreement. Following Iran's announcement in May 2019 that it would cease to implement part of its commitments, we have sought to persuade Iran to change course. The E3 have worked hard to address Iran's concerns and bring it back into compliance with the provisions of the nuclear agreement.

On 14 January 2020, the E3 triggered the Dispute Resolution Mechanism set out in paragraph 36 of the JCPOA and referred this matter to the Joint Commission under the Dispute Resolution Mechanism (DRM).¹ On the same date the JCPOA Coordinator issued a statement expressly acknowledging that the matter had been referred to the DRM process.² This was the first ever referral to the DRM process and the first such statement of acknowledgement issued by the JCPOA Coordinator.

The E3 pursued this course in good faith and in the sincere hope of finding a way forward to resolve the impasse through constructive diplomatic dialogue, while preserving the agreement and remaining within its framework. Pursuant to our referral in January 2020, JCPOA participants agreed that more time was needed due to the complexity of the issues involved, and the timeline was therefore

¹ Letter by the Foreign Ministers of the France, Germany and the United Kingdom to the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and to the Secretary-General of the EEAS, Referral of Iran's Non-Compliance to the Joint Commission – Activation of the Dispute Resolution Mechanism, dated 14 January 2020.

² Statement by High Representative Borrell as Coordinator of the Joint Commission of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on the Dispute Resolution Mechanism, dated 14 January 2020.

extended. On 26 February 2020, a Joint Commission was convened “as a follow-up to the statement of the High Representative of 24 January 2020”. According to the Coordinator’s Statement the meeting registered the JCPoA Participants’ “serious concerns. . . regarding the implementation of Iran’s nuclear commitments under the agreement”.³

This was more than five years ago.

Since then, the Joint Commission has reviewed these issues regularly and extensively. The E3 solicited a ministerial meeting to review progress of the dispute resolution process, as stated in E3’s public statement on 19 June 2020. Meetings of the Joint Commission were convened on 1 September 2020, 16 December 2020 and 21 December 2020 at Ministerial Level, to address nuclear as well as sanctions lifting issues under the agreement.

The E3 also engaged in serious and comprehensive negotiations in 2021 and 2022 that could have remedied Iran’s non-compliance with its JCPoA commitments and could have allowed a return of the United States to the JCPoA. We regret that Iran twice rejected the viable solutions tabled by the JCPoA Coordinator in March and August 2022.

The E3’s further efforts, including seven rounds of meetings with Iran at official and ministerial levels over the course of the last year, including in support of negotiations between Iran and the United States, has unfortunately not led to Iran addressing our concerns.

Following these exhaustive diplomatic efforts, before the termination of provisions of UNSCR 2231 (2015), the E3 have therefore decided to notify the Security Council of Iran’s significant non-performance of its JCPoA commitments pursuant to paragraph 11 of UNSCR 2231 (2015) and to thereby trigger the process known as “snapback”.

Conclusion

The E3 reiterate our continuing commitment to a diplomatic solution that prevents Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. We did not participate in the planning or execution of any military action against Iran.

The international community faces serious ongoing concerns regarding the lack of credible assurances that Iran’s nuclear programme is peaceful. The E3 are upholding our responsibilities as JCPoA participants and to the international community, by doing our part to ensure that the Security Council continues its consideration of Iranian non-proliferation for as long as is necessary.

Therefore, the E3 notify the Security Council of Iran’s significant non-performance of its commitments under the JCPoA, hereby engaging the process known as the “snapback” mechanism.

The E3 recall that pursuant to paragraph 12 of UNSCR 2231 (2015), if the Security Council does not adopt a resolution under paragraph 11 of UNSCR 2231 (2015) to continue in effect the termination in paragraph 7 (a) of UNSCR 2231 (2015), then effective midnight Greenwich Mean Time after the thirtieth day after this notification to the Security Council, all of the provisions of resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1929 (2010) that have been terminated pursuant to paragraph 7 (a) of UNSCR 2231 (2015) shall apply in the same manner as they applied before the adoption of UNSCR 2231 (2015), and the measures contained in paragraphs 7, 8 and 16 to 20 of UNSCR 2231 (2015) shall be terminated.

Pursuant to paragraph 13 of UNSCR 2231 (2015), the E3 will continue to strive to resolve the issue of Iran’s significant non-performance, and affirm that if this issue is resolved before the end of the 30-

³ EEAS, JCPOA: Chair’s Statement following the meeting of the Joint Commission, dated 26 February 2020.

day period specified in paragraph 12 of UNSCR 2231 (2015), the E3 will inform the Security Council accordingly.

We therefore urge Iran to engage in constructive diplomacy to resolve the concerns associated with its nuclear programme.

We would be grateful if the present letter could be circulated today as an official document of the Security Council.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurance of our highest consideration.



Jean-Noël BARROT

Minister for
Europe and
Foreign Affairs



David LAMMY

Secretary of State
for Foreign,
Commonwealth and
Development Affairs



Johann WADEPHUL

Federal Minister
for Foreign
Affairs