

| AM | Group | Original text CA 1 | |
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| | | <p>1. Notes the stable EIB Group financial performance in 2024; stresses that success must be measured by demonstrable economic outcomes, not merely volumes signed;</p> <p>If adopted, the following AMs will fall: 43, 44 (Greens) 45 (PfE), 46, 49 (S&D), 47 (EPP), 48 (TheLeft);</p> | |
| 43 | Renew | <p>1. Notes the stable EIB financial performance in 2024; <i>notes the EIB’s net surplus of EUR 3.1 billion and the EIB’s IFRS consolidated result of EUR 3.38 billion in 2024, with reserves above EUR 59 billion;</i> stresses <i>nevertheless that financial performance should</i> be measured <i>against evidence of policy additionality, value for money and measurable outcomes;</i></p> | <p>1. Notes the stable EIB Group financial performance in 2024 and <i>the consolidated results</i> in 2024, <i>amounting to EUR 3.38 billion (43, 46);</i> stresses <i>that preserving the EIB’s AAA credit rating must remain a primary objective</i> of the Bank’s governance; <i>stresses that the EIB’s ‘AAA’ rating is a strategic asset that enables the EIB to ensure favourable financing conditions; (AM45, AM49);</i> stresses that success must <i>continue to, and increasingly, (AM46, AM47)</i> be measured by demonstrable economic <i>and policy (AM48)</i> outcomes, not <i>by (AM44)</i> merely volumes signed <i>and that financial performance should also be measured against evidence of policy additionality, value for money and measurable outcomes (AM43);</i> reminds that also <i>simplified procedures should be periodically submitted to independent review (AM66)</i></p> |
| 44 | Greens | <p>1. Notes the stable EIB Group financial performance in 2024; stresses that success must be measured by demonstrable <i>results and impacts, including contribution to EU climate, cohesion and innovation objectives, and by sound financial management,</i> not merely <i>by</i> volumes signed;</p> | |
| 45 | PfE | <p>1. Notes the stable EIB Group financial performance in 2024; stresses <i>that preserving the EIB’s AAA credit rating must remain a primary objective of the Bank’s governance; underlines</i> that success must be measured by demonstrable economic outcomes, not merely volumes signed;</p> | |

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| 46 | S&D | 1. <i>Welcomes the EIB Group consolidated results in 2024, amounting to EUR 3.38 billion</i> ; stresses that success must <i>continue to</i> be measured by demonstrable economic outcomes, <i>such as the quality employment creation</i> ; | | |
| 47 | EPP | 1. Notes the stable EIB Group financial performance in 2024; stresses that success must <i>continue to</i> be measured by demonstrable economic outcomes, not merely volumes signed; | | |
| 48 | TheLeft | 1. Notes the stable EIB Group financial performance in 2024; stresses that success must be measured by demonstrable economic <i>and policy</i> outcomes, not merely volumes signed; | | |
| 49 | S&D | <i>1 a. Stresses that the EIB’s ‘AAA’ rating is a strategic asset that enables the EIB to ensure favourable financing conditions and take greater risks in funding public interest projects compared to private commercial banks; underlines that the rating stems, among other reasons, from the fact that the EIB has been responsive to EU policy objectives, notably by becoming a ‘climate bank;</i> | | |
| 66 | Greens | <i>4 a. Notes that more than half of operations are now assessed through simplified technical due diligence processes; stresses that simplification must not weaken environmental, social, governance or financial risk scrutiny, and calls</i> | | |

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| | | <i>for periodic independent review of the simplified procedures;</i> |
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| AM | Group | Original text CA 2 | |
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| <p>2. Notes with concern that the portion of payments overdue by more than 90 days tripled, totalling EUR 281.3 million at the end of 2024 and representing 0.06 % of the total loan portfolio (compared with EUR 82.4 million or 0.02 % at the end of 2023); highlights that these increases in non-performing exposures and overdue payments significantly exceed the 2 % growth in the overall loan portfolio;</p> | | | |
| <p>If adopted, the following AMs will fall: 50, 51 (Green) 52 (Renew), 53 (The Left) 54 (Pfe);</p> | | | |
| 50 | Greens | <p><i>1 a. Notes that impaired loans increased to 0.6% of the portfolio and that payments overdue by more than 90 days tripled in 2024; calls on the EIB to provide enhanced sectoral and geographical risk reporting and to strengthen early-warning and provisioning mechanisms in view of its intention to expand higher-risk operations;</i></p> | <p>2. Notes with concern that the portion of payments overdue by more than 90 days tripled, totalling EUR 281.3 million at the end of 2024 and representing 0.06 % of the total loan portfolio (compared with EUR 82.4 million or 0.02 % at the end of 2023) and, even <i>acknowledging</i> that they <i>remain very low by banking standards, invites the EIB to explain the underlying causes and to report on corrective measures taken (AM50, AM51, AM52, AM53); stresses that any increase in non-performing exposures must be carefully monitored in order to safeguard the Bank's financial stability and credit standing (AM54)</i>; highlights that these increases in non-performing exposures and overdue payments significantly exceed the 2 % growth in the overall loan portfolio;</p> |
| 51 | Greens | <p>2. Notes with concern that the portion of payments overdue by more than 90 days tripled, totalling EUR 281.3 million at the end of 2024 and representing 0.06 % of the total loan portfolio (compared with EUR 82.4 million or 0.02 % at the end of 2023); highlights that these increases in non-performing exposures and overdue payments significantly exceed the 2 % growth in the overall loan portfolio; <i>calls on the EIB to provide Parliament with a breakdown by sector, country and instrument, an explanation of drivers, and a time-bound mitigation plan, including enhanced early-warning, provisioning and recovery measures;</i></p> | |
| 52 | Renew | <p>2. Notes with concern that the portion of payments</p> | |

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| 53 | TheLeft | <p>overdue by more than 90 days tripled, totalling EUR 281.3 million at the end of 2024 and representing 0.06 % of the total loan portfolio (compared with EUR 82.4 million or 0.02 % at the end of 2023); <i>acknowledges</i> that these <i>ratios remain very low by banking standards, and invites the EIB to explain the underlying causes and report on corrective measures taken;</i></p> <p><i>2 a. Welcomes the EIB Group's new commitment to expand its portfolio, and stresses that other public banks such as the EBRD have maintained their AAA status while having higher loan loss ratios than the EIB; suggests that decreasing the EIB's risk-aversion will allow for unblocking of financing of socially and environmentally beneficial projects that would not attract private investments otherwise; warns nevertheless on the need to improve scrutiny of the financial performance of corporate counterparts;</i></p> | | |
| 54 | PfE | <p><i>2 a. Stresses that any increase in non-performing exposures must be carefully monitored in order to safeguard the Bank's financial stability and credit standing;</i></p> | | |

| AM | Group | Original text (PR) | | CA 3 |
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| | | <p>3. Notes that in 2024 the EIB approved 38 operations under InvestEU, <i>utilising</i> EUR 1.7 billion of the EU guarantee; stresses that the InvestEU programme should be assessed according to the quality of its interventions and their measurable impact rather than merely the quantity of funding deployed; insists that reporting must shift focus from input-based metrics to impact-based indicators demonstrating genuine economic outcomes;</p> <p>If adopted, the following AMs will fall: 55 (The Left) 56 (ECR) 59 (Greens); 57 (Renew) 58 (EPP)</p> | | |
| 55 | TheLeft | <p>3. Notes that in 2024 the EIB approved 38 operations under InvestEU, <i>using</i> EUR 1.7 billion of the EU guarantee; stresses that the InvestEU programme should be assessed: <i>1) according to the quality of its interventions in streamlining sustainability considerations into private investments; 2) according to access to finance for final beneficiaries, 3) according to the measurable impact of projects</i> rather than the quantity of funding deployed <i>and the leverage effect</i>; insists that reporting must shift <i>its</i> focus from input-based metrics to impact-based indicators demonstrating genuine economic outcomes <i>as well as the environmental and social performance of completed operations; recalls that, currently, there are no verifiable measurement frameworks for assessing outcomes of projects funded under InvestEU;</i></p> | <p>3. Notes that in 2024 the EIB approved 38 operations under InvestEU, utilising EUR 1.7 billion of the EU guarantee; insists that reporting must <i>complement</i> input-based metrics <i>with (AM58, AM57)</i> impact-based indicators demonstrating genuine economic outcomes <i>and include additionality assessment and ex post analysis of potential crowding-out, including for operations implemented through financial intermediaries (AM59); calls for a performance-based budgeting approach where capital allocations and strategic priorities are evaluated based on proven efficiency, return on investment, and genuine value for money in addition to the compliance with predetermined percentage targets (AM56);</i></p> | |
| 56 | ECR | <p>3. Notes that in 2024 the EIB approved 38 operations under InvestEU, utilising EUR 1.7 billion of the EU guarantee; stresses that the InvestEU programme should be assessed according to the quality of its</p> | <p>3a. Stresses that the InvestEU programme should <i>also</i> be assessed according to the quality of its interventions and their measurable impact <i>and not only</i> the quantity of funding</p> | |

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| | | <p>interventions and their measurable impact rather than merely the quantity of funding deployed; insists that reporting must shift focus from input-based metrics to impact-based indicators demonstrating genuine economic outcomes; <i>calls for a performance-based budgeting approach where capital allocations and strategic priorities are evaluated based on proven efficiency, return on investment, and genuine value for money rather than mechanical compliance with predetermined percentage targets;</i></p> <p>3. Notes that in 2024 the EIB approved 38 operations under InvestEU, utilising EUR 1.7 billion of the EU guarantee; <i>notes further that the European Investment Fund signed 197 transactions under InvestEU in 2024, mobilising EUR 9.03 billion of the EU guarantee, representing the larger share of total InvestEU deployment; welcomes this combined Group performance;</i> stresses that the InvestEU programme should be assessed according to the quality of its interventions and their measurable impact <i>in addition to</i> the quantity of funding deployed; insists that reporting must <i>incorporate</i> impact-based indicators demonstrating genuine economic outcomes <i>alongside volume metrics;</i></p> | <p>deployed; <i>recalls that, currently, there are no verifiable measurement frameworks for assessing outcomes of projects funded under InvestEU (AM55);</i></p> | |
| 57 | Renew | <p>3. Notes that in 2024 the EIB approved 38 operations under InvestEU, utilising EUR 1.7 billion of the EU guarantee; <i>notes further that the European Investment Fund signed 197 transactions under InvestEU in 2024, mobilising EUR 9.03 billion of the EU guarantee, representing the larger share of total InvestEU deployment; welcomes this combined Group performance;</i> stresses that the InvestEU programme should be assessed according to the quality of its interventions and their measurable impact <i>in addition to</i> the quantity of funding deployed; insists that reporting must <i>incorporate</i> impact-based indicators demonstrating genuine economic outcomes <i>alongside volume metrics;</i></p> | | |
| 58 | EPP | <p>3. Notes that in 2024 the EIB approved 38 operations under InvestEU, utilising EUR 1.7 billion of the EU guarantee; insists that reporting must <i>complement</i> input-based metrics <i>with</i> impact-based indicators</p> | | |

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| 59 | Greens | <p>demonstrating genuine economic outcomes;</p> <p>3. Notes that in 2024 the EIB approved 38 operations under InvestEU, utilising EUR 1.7 billion of the EU guarantee; stresses that the InvestEU programme should be assessed according to the quality of its interventions and their measurable impact rather than merely the quantity of funding deployed; insists that reporting <i>include harmonised impact</i> indicators, <i>a transparent additionality assessment and an ex post analysis of potential crowding-out, including for operations implemented through financial intermediaries</i>;</p> | | |
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| AM | Group | <p data-bbox="398 213 577 240">Current text</p> <p data-bbox="398 268 1944 336">4. Notes that the fragmented EU funding landscape leads to inefficiencies; stresses that cutting bureaucracy is essential to restoring competitiveness;</p> <p data-bbox="398 411 1518 443">If adopted, the following AMs will fall: 61 (The Left) 62, 68 (Renew); 63 (Greens);</p> | | CA4 |
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| 61 | TheLeft | <p data-bbox="398 523 1120 959">4. Notes that the fragmented EU funding landscape leads to inefficiencies; stresses that <i>making the bureaucracy system more efficient and investing in digital tools can contribute to making EU SMEs more competitive, provided that such simplification does not undermine transparency and accountability; reiterates that competitiveness is also a result of less inequality, the creation of good jobs, green and efficient public services, fully-funded public education, research and innovation programs, and a truly just transition with carbon-neutral technologies;</i></p> | <p data-bbox="1137 523 1783 1070">4. Notes that the fragmented <i>and complex (AM63)</i> EU funding landscape leads to inefficiencies; stresses that cutting bureaucracy is essential to restoring competitiveness and that <i>simplification should reduce administrative burden without weakening audit trails, transparency or anti-fraud controls (AM63)</i>; notes <i>the EIB's 'Time to Market' assessment simplification efforts; calls on the EIB to publish annual key performance indicators on approval and to demonstrate measurable reductions in administrative burden for applicants, particularly SMEs and mid-caps (AM62 and AM68):</i></p> | |
| 62 | Renew | <p data-bbox="398 1038 1093 1214">4. Notes <i>the EIB's 'Time to Market' assessment simplification efforts; calls on the EIB to publish annual key performance indicators on approval and to demonstrate measurable reductions in administrative burden for SMEs and mid-caps;</i></p> | | |
| 63 | Greens | <p data-bbox="398 1262 1120 1366">4. Notes that <i>complexity in</i> the EU funding landscape <i>can create</i> inefficiencies; stresses that <i>simplification should reduce administrative burden</i></p> | | |

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| 68 | Renew | <p><i>without weaking audit trails, transparency, social and environmental safeguards or anti-fraud controls;</i></p> <p><i>4 b. Calls on the EIB to continue digitalisation efforts and publish measurable targets for further time-to-market reductions;</i></p> |
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| AM | Group | Original text | CA 5 |
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| | | <p>5. Calls on the EIB to expand nuclear energy financing and evaluate all low-carbon projects against objective criteria including life-cycle carbon intensity and grid stability, without discriminating between technologies; stresses that Member States retain the sovereign right to determine their energy mix;</p> <p>If adopted, the following AMs will fall: 69, 76 (The Left) 70 (Renew) 71 (Greens) 72 (S&D) 73 (EPP) 75 (ECR);</p> | |
| 69 | TheLeft | <p>5. Calls on the EIB to <i>finance only energy solutions with low carbon footprint and no negative environmental drawbacks</i>, and evaluate all low-carbon projects against objective criteria including life-cycle carbon intensity and grid stability, without discriminating between technologies; stresses that Member States retain the sovereign right to determine <i>the sources of</i> their energy supply; <i>underlines that the financing allocated to the green transition should not be diverted to non-sustainable and dangerous energy sources such as fossil-fuel-sourced hydrogen, nuclear power, and biogas</i>;</p> | <p>5. Calls on the EIB to evaluate all low-carbon projects <i>including nuclear (AM70)</i>, against objective <i>and transparent (AM70)</i> criteria, including life-cycle carbon intensity, grid stability <i>and cost-effectiveness (AM70) applying technological neutrality (AM73 and AM70) while focussing on strategic cross-border projects to increase the EU-added value (AM 73)</i>; <i>notes that the EIB invested over EUR 27 billion in energy transition and security in 2024, including renewables, grids and storage (AM70)</i>; calls on the EIB to prioritize <i>energy efficiency and cost-efficiency while fully respecting (AM71)</i> Member States' sovereign right to determine their energy mix, <i>(AM76)</i></p> |
| 70 | Renew | <p>5. <i>Notes that the EIB invested over EUR 27 billion in energy transition and security in 2024, including renewables, grids and storage</i>; calls on the EIB to evaluate all low-carbon <i>energy</i> projects, <i>including nuclear</i>, against objective <i>and transparent</i> criteria <i>such as</i> life-cycle carbon emissions, grid stability <i>and cost-effectiveness</i>; stresses that <i>the technology-neutral approach must remain consistent with the EU's climate objectives and the Paris Agreement</i>;</p> | <p><i>5a. Expresses concerns regarding the disproportionate environmental, social, and governance (ESG) reporting requirements imposed on EIB lending clients; warns that excessive disclosure obligations deter economically viable projects and create</i></p> |

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| | | | <i>competitive disadvantages for European businesses; calls on the EIB to review its ESG reporting requirements with a view to ensuring proportionality (AM75);</i> |
| 71 | Greens | 5. Calls on the EIB to <i>strengthen energy security financing in line with the Paris Agreement and the EIB Climate Bank Roadmap, prioritising energy efficiency, demand reduction, grids, storage, renewables and cost-efficiency; insists on robust assessment of life-cycle impacts and avoidance of lock-in risks, while fully respecting Member States' right to determine their energy mix;</i> | |
| 72 | S&D | 5. <i>Considers that the EIB should continue to evaluate clean energy financing and all low-carbon projects against objective criteria including life-cycle carbon intensity and grid stability, without discriminating between technologies;</i> | |
| 73 | EPP | 5. Calls on the EIB to <i>apply technological neutrality in their energy financing; stresses that Member States retain the sovereign right to determine their energy mix, but that the EIB should focus on strategic cross-border projects to increase the EU-added value;</i> | |
| 75 | ECR | <i>5 a. Expresses concern regarding the disproportionate ESG reporting requirements imposed on EIB lending clients; warns that excessive disclosure obligations deter economically viable projects and create competitive disadvantages for European businesses; calls on the EIB to review its ESG</i> | |

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| | | <i>reporting requirements with a view to ensuring proportionality;</i> |
| 76 | TheLeft | <i>5 b. Reiterates that true energy security can be achieved only through investment into public renewable energy infrastructure; emphasises that creating additional dependencies on fossil fuels and imports from third countries will undermine the EU's energy, climate, economic and geopolitical security; reaffirms the need for Member States to reassert democratic control and public ownership of their own energy infrastructure and supply;</i> |

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| 80 | TheLeft | <p>6. <i>Condemns the expansion of the EIB Group’s contribution to Europe’s defence sector; notes with concern that in 2025 the Bank has increased investment in the sector by up to four times compared to the previous year; stresses the importance of the EIB Group’s contribution to Europe’s peace and security, through its support for initiatives to strengthen the EU’s cybersecurity infrastructure and disaster preparedness; stresses that more funding should be provided to projects promoting sustainable social and economic development; underlines that security and defence remain a national competence, and that diverting EU funding to defence, especially</i></p> | <p>6. Stresses the importance of the EIB Group’s contribution to Europe’s peace, defence (AM81) and security, as set out in the white paper for European Defence – Readiness 2030, through its support for initiatives that enhance the Union’s strategic autonomy and resilience, (AM81) strengthen the EU’s defence industry, improve cybersecurity infrastructure and promote innovation in critical defence technologies by providing funding and leveraging private investment;</p> |

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| 81 | EPP | <p><i>without sufficient parliamentary scrutiny, violates Article 3(1) of the Treaty on European Union and the Lisbon Treaty, which affirm its commitment to promoting peace and well-being;</i></p> <p>6. Stresses the importance of the EIB Group’s contribution to Europe’s <i>defence</i> and security, as set out in the white paper for European Defence – Readiness 2030, through its support for initiatives <i>that enhance the Union’s strategic autonomy and resilience</i>, strengthen the EU’s defence industry, improve cybersecurity infrastructure and promote innovation in critical defence technologies by providing funding and leveraging private investment;</p> | <p>6 a. Notes the EIB Board decision of 21 March 2025 to broaden the EIB Group's eligibility criteria for security and defence investments, limiting excluded activities, in accordance with the proposals approved by EU leaders at the European Council on 6 March (AM82 and AM83);</p> | |
| 82 | S&D | <p>6 a. Recognizes the EIB Board decision of 21 March 2025 to broaden the EIB Group's eligibility criteria for security and defence investments, limiting excluded activities, in accordance with the proposals approved by EU leaders at the European Council on 6 March, and that the EIB’s current EUR 8 billion Strategic European Security Initiative (SESI) will be integrated into a permanent, cross cutting public policy objective, complementing the existing public policy goals;</p> | <p>7. Welcomes the EIB’s continued and enhanced role in strengthening Europe’s security through targeted investments in both defence and civilian infrastructure, in line with the EU’s broader goals of promoting innovation and enhancing the Union's security; stresses that the EIB should keep investing in a safe and secure Europe (AM85), supporting the European defence technological and industrial base (AM86) and the provision of products, services, and technologies that bolster Europe’s defence capacities, research and development, and innovation (AM85, AM86, AM87); calls for the further adjustment of the scope of eligible investments to meet the ambitious role to contribute to Europe’s defence and security (AM85);</p> | |
| 83 | S&D | <p>6 b. Takes note of the EIB Boards decision of 21 March 2025 that there will be no fixed ceiling for security and defence investments, with funding amounts to be determined annually in the EIB Group Operational Plan;</p> | <p>7a. Notes the strong increase in EIB security and defence financing from EUR 0.5 billion in 2023 to EUR 1.04 billion in 2024, and the further scale-up in 2025 (AM86) and points</p> | |

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| 84 | S&D | <i>Deletion §7</i> | | | |
| 85 | EPP | <p>7. <i>Welcomes the EIB’s continued and enhanced role in strengthening Europe’s security through targeted investments in both defence and civilian infrastructure, in line with the EU’s broader goals of promoting innovation and enhancing the Union’s security; Stresses that the EIB should keep investing in a safe and secure Europe, by supporting products, services, and technologies that bolster Europe’s defence capacities, research and development, and innovation, with the exception of weapons and ammunition; Stresses the EIB should focus on 1) Research, Development and Manufacturing, 2) Cybersecurity and Cyber Defence, 3) Critical and Military Infrastructurure, 4) Military Mobility, 5) Space; calls for the further adjustment of the scope of eligible investments to meet the ambitious role to contribute to Europe’s defence and security;</i></p> | <p><i>out that EIB’s current EUR 8 billion Strategic European Security Initiative (SESI) will be integrated into a permanent, cross cutting public policy objective, complementing the existing public policy goals (AM82), removing predefined ceilings for security financing and allowing for increased and flexible support in line with EU Council priorities (Rapporteur); calls for a dedicated annual reporting annex to Parliament on security and defence operations, including additionality, implementation speed, procurement safeguards, integrity controls and risk-sharing arrangements (AM86);</i></p> | | |
| 86 | Renew | <p>7. <i>Stresses that the EIB should be able to fund all types projects supporting the European defence technological and industrial base; notes the strong increase in EIB security and defence financing from EUR 0.5 billion in 2023 to EUR 1.04 billion in 2024, and the further scale-up in 2025; calls for a dedicated annual reporting annex to Parliament on security and defence operations, including additionality, implementation speed, procurement safeguards, integrity controls and risk-sharing arrangements;</i></p> | <p><i>7 a. Invites the EIB to further strengthen synergies with investments in defence financed by the EU Budget, aligning more closely with EU-wide initiatives; emphasizes to the EIB the need to ensure that its investments complement broader EU defence policy goals and contribute to achieving economies of scale in European defence capabilities (AM89);</i></p> <p><i>7 b. Notes the significant expansion of EIB support for security and defence operations (AM90); Stresses that any potential expansion of EIB support in the security and defence domain must be subject to</i></p> | | |

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| 87 | TheLeft | <p>7. <i>Calls on the EIB Group to remain consistent with its commitment not to finance projects related to weapons and ammunition, as set out by its list of excluded activities; reiterates that the EIB is currently prohibited from providing direct financing to weapons and ammunition projects;</i></p> | <p><i>strict transparency, accountability and human-rights safeguards, clear exclusion criteria, end-use monitoring, and regular reporting to Parliament (AM88, AM90);</i></p> | |
| 88 | Greens | <p>7. <i>Stresses that any potential expansion of EIB support in the security and defence domain must be subject to strict transparency, accountability and human-rights safeguards, clear exclusion criteria, end-use monitoring, and regular reporting to Parliament;</i></p> | <p>8. <i>Calls on the EIB to identify barriers impeding defence and border protection investments that strengthen the Union’s resilience and security while ensuring compliance with EU law, democratic oversight (AM95); stresses that removing obstacles is essential for tangible security outcomes; recalls that any allocation of funds by the European Investment Bank (EIB), through InvestEU and other financial instruments for defence purposes and for investments in critical technologies, must fully respect the national security interests of the European Unions’ Member States; underlines that the competent audit authorities and bodies of the European Institutions ought to deliver thorough and continuous audit controls to third entities, and third countries that are beneficiaries of European union funding, and deliver investments, and projects in the defence field, to ensure the transparent use of the Union funding; stresses that the outcome of such investments and projects must not undermine the national security interests of the Member States of the European Union (AM94); calls on the EIB to expand its</i></p> | |
| 89 | EPP | <p>7 a. <i>Invites the EIB to further strengthen synergies with investments in defence financed by the EU Budget, aligning more closely with EU-wide initiatives; emphasizes to the EIB the need to ensure that its investments complement broader EU defence policy goals and contribute to achieving economies of scale in European defence capabilities;</i></p> | | |
| 90 | Greens | <p>7 a. <i>Notes the significant expansion of EIB support for security and defence operations; calls for mandatory human rights due diligence, end-use monitoring mechanisms, and detailed annual reporting to Parliament on the nature, beneficiaries and safeguards applied to such operations;</i></p> | | |
| 91 | EPP | <p>7 b. <i>Calls on the EIB to expand its focus on enhancing regional security and resilience; emphasises the</i></p> | | |

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| 92 | S&D | <p><i>important role of the EIB can play in the creation of an infrastructure that supports regional security and fosters greater cooperation between EU Member States in energy and defence matters;</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Deletion §8</i></p> | <p><i>focus on enhancing regional security and resilience; emphasises the important role of the EIB can play in the creation of an infrastructure that supports regional security and fosters greater cooperation between EU Member States in energy and defence matters (AM91);</i></p> | |
| 93 | TheLeft | <p>8. Calls on the EIB to identify <i>risks associated with defence and border protection investments; stresses that relaxing financing rules for defence and border protection investment might contribute to serious security risks and legal uncertainty by creating an undesirable long-term economic incentive to provoking and prolonging conflicts and, potentially, becoming responsible for or complicit with human rights and international law violations; encourages the EIB to interpret the concept of security in a way that is more aligned with the everyday concerns of the majority of European people, and to focus its mandate to funding projects that guarantee security, such as climate disaster and public health preparedness, mass investment in creating affordable housing and ending homelessness, investing in economic sectors that create permanent, quality jobs, financing social projects that foster cohesion, and, in general, funding economic projects that guarantee long-term economic stability;</i></p> | <p>9. Welcomes the strong and (AM99 and AM100) structured cooperation with the NATO Innovation Fund to ensure synergies and avoid the duplication of efforts, particularly in scaling up technologies where private capital is insufficient;</p> | |
| 94 | EPP | <p>8. Calls on the EIB to identify barriers impeding defence and border protection investments; stresses that removing obstacles is essential for tangible security</p> | | |

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| 95 | Greens | <p>outcomes; <i>Recalls that any allocation of funds by the European Investment Bank (EIB), through InvestEU and other financial instruments for defence purposes and for investments in critical technologies, must fully respect the national security interests of the European Unions' Member States. Underlines that the competent audit authorities and bodies of the European Institutions ought to deliver thorough and continuous audit controls to third entities, and third countries that are beneficiaries of European union funding, and deliver investments, and projects in the defence field, to ensure the transparent use of the Union funding. Stresses that the outcome of such investments and projects must not undermine the national security interests of the Member States of the European Union;</i></p> <p>8. Calls on the EIB to identify barriers impeding <i>legitimate</i> investments <i>that strengthen the Union's resilience and security while ensuring compliance with EU law, democratic oversight, and robust due-diligence requirements;</i></p> | | |
| 96 | TheLeft | <p><i>8 a. Strongly regrets that the final beneficiaries of EIB financing can be involved in arms production and sale, effectively lifting the EIB from the responsibility to perform due diligence monitoring in financing chains; underlines that this provision renders the stated exclusion of weapon financing misleading; expresses strong reservations about tying the EU's economic and industrial growth to weapons and ammunition production, effectively creating the need</i></p> | | |

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| | | <p><i>for violence and conflict to continue in order for a war-based economy to be sustainable in the long term; urges the EIB to suspend all funding to the military sector and to divert it to projects that contribute to achieve the EU's environmental, social, economic, cohesion, and peace objectives;</i></p> | | |
| 98 | TheLeft | <p>9. Stresses <i>that</i> the cooperation with the NATO Innovation Fund <i>exposes the EU to serious security risks; condemns the EU's lack of political will to develop an independent security agenda detached from NATO;</i></p> | | |
| 99 | S&D | <p>9. <i>Welcomes the</i> structured cooperation with the NATO Innovation Fund to ensure synergies and avoid the duplication of efforts, particularly in scaling up technologies where private capital is insufficient;</p> | | |
| 100 | EPP | <p>9. <i>Welcomes the strong and</i> structured cooperation with the NATO Innovation Fund to ensure synergies and avoid the duplication of efforts, particularly in scaling up technologies where private capital is insufficient;</p> | | |

| AM | Group | Original text CA 7 | |
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| <p>Investments in areas of national competence</p> | | | |
| <p>10. Recalls that housing challenges should be addressed primarily at local or national level; questions whether EIB financing of purely local housing projects without a cross-border dimension represents genuine value for money;</p> | | | |
| <p>If adopted, the following AMs will fall: 101, 102, 136 (Renew) 103, 107 (S&D) 104, 108, 109, 111, 112, 152 (The Left) 105 (Greens) 106 (EPP) 110 (ECR)</p> | | | |
| 101 | Renew | <i>Deletion subheading</i> | |
| 102 | Renew | <i>Deletion §10</i> | |
| 103 | S&D | <p>10. Recalls <i>the EU-wide housing crisis that no longer impacts only the most vulnerable, increasingly placing significant pressure on the middle class as well; is of the opinion that the housing crisis cannot be addressed solely at local or national level; recommends a European response to the housing crisis in order to preserve social and regional cohesion, financial stability, labour mobility and the green transition — all core Union objectives; welcomes the efforts the EIB Group makes to tackle the challenges of housing both at local or national level; believes, therefore, that</i> EIB financing of housing projects represents genuine value for money;</p> | <p>10. Recalls that housing challenges could be more effectively addressed at local or national level; <i>notes the EIB Group efforts in bringing an European added value when tackling the challenges of housing at local and national levels (AM103 and AM105 and 136) by supporting scalable solutions that complement national efforts and deliver measurable outcomes (AM105 and AM136); recognises that investments in housing infrastructure in less developed regions are fully aligned with the mandate of the EIB and with the EIB's Treaty-enshrined objective of promoting economic, social and territorial cohesion by focusing on less-developed regions (AM106 and AM104)</i></p> <p>10a. <i>Notes the EIB's "Action Plan for Affordable and Sustainable Housing" and its commitment to invest in the sector (AM107); acknowledges the EIB Group's</i></p> |
| 104 | TheLeft | <p>10. Recalls that housing challenges should be addressed at local, national, <i>and European</i> level; <i>encourages the EIB to keep</i> financing local</p> | |

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| 105 | Greens | <p>housing projects <i>and contributing to a sustainable economy; acknowledges that, although also a national competence, housing policy is a key component in boosting both social cohesion and economic stability across the EU;</i></p> <p><i>10 a. Notes the scale of the housing affordability crisis and its links to social cohesion and energy poverty; stresses that EIB support can provide European added value where it supports energy-efficient renovation, decarbonisation of buildings, and scalable solutions that complement national efforts and deliver measurable outcomes;</i></p> | <p><i>commitment to increase investments in social infrastructure, including social and affordable housing, as set out in its Strategic priorities 2024-2027 and operational plan 2026-2028 (AM108); notes the potential of targeted EIB support for the renovation of existing housing stock to improve energy efficiency, provided that such operations demonstrate additionality and value for money (AM152);</i></p> <p><i>10 b. Reminds the need for ensuring additionality and complementarity with other public funds and commercial lender while delivering on the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights¹, (AM111 and Rapporteur) including on education, and stresses that EIB involvement should be limited to projects with demonstrable value for money, such as cross-border research infrastructure or skills programmes addressing EU-wide labour market gaps (AM110); insists that</i></p> | |
| 106 | EPP | <p><i>10 a. Recognises that in line with EIB's Treaty-enshrined objective of promoting economic, social and territorial cohesion, by focusing on less-developed regions, such investments in housing infrastructure in less developed regions are fully aligned with the mandate of the EIB and should continue to be pursued;</i></p> | | |

¹ European Parliament resolution of 28 February 2024 on the financial activities of the European Investment Bank:

7. Calls on the EIB to support projects that deliver on the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights and the UN Sustainable Development Goals, and that enhance social inclusion and the reduction of inequalities in line with the environmental and social standards; calls on the EIB to expand its role in assessing and addressing investment gaps in social infrastructure and welfare, such as affordable and energy efficient social housing, public healthcare, utilities, public transport, sustainable transport, culture and education, while ensuring additionality and complementarity with other public funds and commercial lenders; invites the EIB to increase the weighting of social benefits in project appraisals in order to provide long-term affordable solutions, in the context of a cost of living crisis and the challenges for households in the European Union arising from the overall economic outlook; asks the EIB to enhance risk taking for projects providing essential services with long-term clear and measurable benefits; calls on the EIB to give financial priority to projects involving vulnerable or marginalised people, especially young people, and citizen-led projects, whenever possible;

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| 107 | S&D | <p><i>10 a. Welcomes the EIB's "Action Plan for Affordable and Sustainable Housing" and its commitment to invest EUR 10 billion to help bridge the investment gap in the sector;</i></p> | <p><i>EIB financing must not be a substitute for national education budgets;</i></p> | |
| 108 | TheLeft | <p><i>10 b. Welcomes the EIB Group's commitment to increase investments in social infrastructure, including social and affordable housing, as set out in its Strategic priorities 2024-2027 and operational plan 2026-2028; encourages the EIB's growing role in financing the construction and renovation of social housing, especially in developing regions most affected by the consequences of the green and digital transitions, complementing national resources;</i></p> | | |
| 109 | TheLeft | <p><i>10 c. Urges the EIB to support EU-wide projects for housing renovations, in order for the housing stock to be energy-efficient and as secure as possible from the threats posed by natural disasters, helping residents living in safe homes and reducing their energy bills;</i></p> | | |
| 110 | ECR | <p><i>10 a. Recalls that education policy is primarily a national competence under the Treaties; stresses that EIB involvement in education should be limited to projects with demonstrable value for money, such as cross-border research infrastructure or skills programmes addressing EU-wide labour market gaps; insists that EIB financing must not substitute for national education budgets and should demonstrate</i></p> | | |

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| 111 | TheLeft | <p><i>genuine additionality;</i></p> <p>10 a. Reiterates the message of the European Parliament resolution of 28 February 2024 on the financial activities of the European Investment Bank, calling on the EIB to support the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights;</p> | | |
| 112 | TheLeft | <p>10 d. Calls on the EIB to invest in social projects aimed at supporting the integration of migrants in society, through improving migrants' access to public services - including education, healthcare, housing, public transport, and welfare - and to legal employment and trade union advice; stresses the need for the EIB to allocate more funding to humanitarian aid to alleviate the harsh living conditions of migrants and refugees; underlines that such targeted investments will contribute to enhancing social cohesion, and contribute to social policy and economic objectives;</p> | | |
| 136 | Renew | <p>14 a. Recalls that housing challenges can be addressed primarily at local or national level; underlines, however, that EIB support can provide clear EU added value where it improves affordability, energy efficiency, urban resilience and social cohesion, or where it helps scale investment through standardised instruments;</p> | | |

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| 152 | TheLeft | <p><i>15 f. Observes with great concern that 10% of Europeans cannot pay their rent or mortgage on time; notes that in cities such as Lisbon, the average monthly rent exceeds the average monthly salary; notes that the housing crisis affects the whole EU, particularly in metropolitan areas; welcomes the EIB's decision to contribute 6 billion euro to the European Affordable Housing Plan; notes, however, that more investment is needed to renovate existing buildings to make them energy efficient and to make the 11 million vacant homes available to those who need them; urges the EIB to support renovation and construction projects for sustainable, safe, and affordable public and social housing; warns against channelling funds to the construction and real estate sectors without strong binding social and environmental conditionalities; urges the Commission to take stock of the tragic experience of former Member State the United Kingdom, in which limiting the budgets of local authorities and reducing the administrative burden and safety requirements for construction companies has led to businesses evading basic building safety standards, causing, in 2017, a fire that resulted in the entirely avoidable deaths of 72 residents living in the Grenfell Tower in London;</i></p> <hr/> | | |
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| | | <p>11. Emphasises that the EIB must target genuine market failures and that its investments must not serve as substitutes for private capital or national budgets; stresses that protecting the competitive market environment is essential;</p> <p>12. Notes the findings of European Court of Auditors Special Report 07/2025 regarding insufficient additionality; warns of the danger of crowding out private investment; calls for quantitative risk thresholds and ex post crowding out assessments;</p> <p>If adopted, the following AMs will fall: 113, 120 (The Left) 114, (Pfe) 115, 122 (S&D) 116, 117, 119, 121 (EPP) 123 (ECR)</p> | |
| 113 | TheLeft | <p>11. Emphasises that the EIB must target genuine market failures and that its investments must not serve as substitutes for private capital or national budgets; stresses that <i>any investments made to support start-ups and scale-ups must include the prohibition of moving capital to third countries; underlines that funding provided to start-ups and other businesses must result in a benefit to the community where the project is developed, with clear value in terms of quality jobs created, environmental sustainability, and long-term economic viability;</i></p> | <p>11. Emphasises that the EIB must target genuine market failures, <i>funding projects that the private sector alone would not finance, or would only finance under less favourable conditions;</i> stresses that <i>EIB investments must not replace (Rapporteur) private capital or serve as a substitute for national recurring budgetary expenditure (AM116);</i> stresses that protecting the competitive market environment is essential;</p> |
| 114 | PfE | <p>11. Emphasises that the EIB must target genuine market failures and <i>prioritise support for SMEs, mid-caps, start-ups and scale-ups that enhance Europe's long-term competitiveness;</i> stresses that its investments must not serve as substitutes for private capital or national budgets; <i>underlines that creating a business friendly, competitive market environment and strengthening the</i></p> | <p><i>11 a. Stresses the critical role of European large companies in Europe's economic structure, particularly those operating in essential sectors such as energy, defence and infrastructure; calls for a balanced approach that ensures the EIB continues to support large European companies in securing investment capital for major</i></p> |

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| | | <i>European industrial capacity and innovation ecosystems is essential for economic sovereignty and competitiveness;</i> | | |
| 115 | S&D | 11. Emphasises that the EIB must target market failures and that its investments <i>should complement and leverage</i> private capital or national budgets <i>towards public interest projects that contribute to achieving the strategic priorities of the EU</i> ; stresses that protecting the competitive market environment is essential, <i>while also contributing to European integration, social and regional cohesion, and the fair green and digital transitions;</i> | | |
| 116 | EPP | 11. Emphasises that the EIB investments must not <i>substitute recurring budgetary expenditure</i> ; stresses that protecting the competitive market environment is essential; | | |
| 117 | EPP | <i>11 a. Stresses the critical role of European large companies in Europe's economic structure, particularly those operating in essential sectors such as energy, defence and infrastructure; calls for a balanced approach that ensures the EIB continues to support large European companies in securing investment capital for major projects and research and development initiatives, thereby enhancing Europe's global competitiveness;</i> | | |
| 119 | EPP | <i>11 b. Encourages the EIB to continue its role in improving access to finance for small and medium-sized enterprises, which often face barriers to funding from traditional financial</i> | | |
| | | | | <p><i>projects and research and development initiatives, thereby enhancing Europe's global competitiveness (AM117) and economic sovereignty (AM114);</i></p> <p><i>11 b. Encourages the EIB to continue its role in improving access to finance for small and medium-sized enterprises (AM119), start-ups and scale-ups enhancing Europe's long-term competitiveness (AM114), which often face barriers to funding from traditional financial institutions, providing targeted financing to ensure enough resources to grow and thrive; welcomes and calls for the constant expansion of the number of partner institutions to reach a wide geographical and sectoral coverage (AM119); calls on the EIB to increase the share of financing directed towards competitiveness-enhancing investments, particularly in strategic sectors such as advanced manufacturing, digital technologies and energy resilience (Rapporteur);</i></p> <p>12. Notes the findings of <i>the (AM120) European Court of Auditors Special Report 07/2025 confirming the relevance of EFSI support, but also that its additionality was not sufficiently demonstrated and that the Commission did not verify the crowding-out</i></p> |

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| | | <i>institutions, providing targeted financing to ensure enough resources to grow and thrive; welcomes and calls for the constant expansion of the number of partner institutions to reach a wide geographical and sectoral coverage;</i> | | |
| 120 | TheLeft | 12. Notes the findings of <i>the</i> European Court of Auditors Special Report 07/2025 regarding insufficient additionality <i>of the Bank's investments; stresses that the same concerns might also be raised about the EIB's operations under InvestEU; warns of the danger of the Bank's poor additionality in implementing the upcoming Invest EU Instrument in the European Competitiveness Fund; calls on the EIB to uphold a clear definition of additionality, and commit to ensure that the Bank's use of public guarantees is tied to increasing investments where no forms of private sources are available;</i> | | |
| 121 | EPP | 12. Notes the findings of European Court of Auditors Special Report 07/2025 <i>confirming the relevance of EFSI support, but also that its additionality was not sufficiently demonstrated and that the Commission did not verify the crowding-out effect of EFSI;</i> calls for ex post crowding out assessments; | | |
| 122 | S&D | 12. Notes the findings of European Court of Auditors Special Report 07/2025 regarding insufficient additionality; calls for quantitative risk thresholds and ex post crowding out assessments; | | |
| 123 | ECR | <i>12a. Underlines the risks of crowding out private investments, such as artificially compressing risk premiums, especially in markets such as</i> | | |
| | | | <i>effect of EFSI (AM121); stresses that the same concerns might also be raised about the EIB's operations under InvestEU (AM120); underlines the risks of crowding out private investments, such as artificially compressing risk premiums, especially in markets such as renewable energy, which undermines price signals that guide efficient investment, and could be perceived as a form of greenwashing (AM123); calls for (AM119) ex-post crowding out assessments;</i> | |

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| | | <i>renewable energy, which undermines price signals that guide efficient investment, and could be perceived as a form of greenwashing;</i> | | |
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