

AM	Group	Original text	CA9
		<p>13. Notes that EIB loans entail higher administrative burdens than commercial loans; calls on the EIB to publish plans to reduce constraints;</p> <p><b>If adopted, the following AMs will fall: 125 (S&amp;D); 126 (The Left) 127 (Renew) 128 (ECR) 129 (EPP);</b></p>	
125	S&D	<p>13. Notes that EIB loans <i>requirements differ from</i> commercial loans; calls on the EIB to publish plans to <i>optimise and consolidate current and future EIB processes and mandates to enhance synergies, effectiveness and efficiency; calls on the Commission and the EIB to assess how to speed-up the EIB's time-to market as well as to simplify financing mandates and reporting requirements without compromising on auditing standards;</i></p>	<p>13. Notes that EIB loans entail <i>sometimes (AM129)</i> higher administrative burdens than commercial loans; <i>warns that excessive reporting requirements make EIB financing less attractive for the private sector and may deter economically viable projects (AM128);</i> calls on the EIB to publish plans to reduce constraints; <i>calls on the Commission and the EIB to assess how to speed-up the EIB's time-to market as well as to simplify financing mandates and reporting requirements, without compromising on auditing standards (AM125); asks the Bank to publish on market-gap evidence and ex post outcomes, on administrative simplification, processing times and documentation burden, in light of the EIB Group's digitalisation and 'Time to Market' initiatives (AM127);</i></p>
126	TheLeft	<p>13. Notes that EIB loans entail higher administrative burdens than commercial loans; calls on the EIB to publish plans to reduce <i>unnecessary bureaucracy without reducing the need for high reporting standards, including by implementing partners and financial intermediaries, to ensure measurable impact; reiterates that the EIB operates on a not-for-profit basis, and therefore should not aim to compete with commercial banks;</i></p>	
127	Renew	<p>13. Calls on the EIB to publish <i>segmented additionality benchmarks for SMEs, mid-caps, start-ups and scale-ups, including risk-sharing</i></p>	

		<p><i>intensity, market-gap evidence and ex post outcomes; further calls for annual reporting on administrative simplification, including processing times and documentation burden, in light of the EIB Group's digitalisation and 'Time to Market' initiatives;</i></p>		
128	ECR	<p>13. Notes that EIB loans entail higher administrative burdens than commercial loans; <i>warns that excessive reporting requirements make EIB financing less attractive for the private sector and may deter economically viable projects;</i> calls on the EIB to publish plans to reduce constraints;</p>		
129	EPP	<p>13. Notes that EIB loans entail <i>sometimes</i> higher administrative burdens than commercial loans; calls on the EIB to publish plans to reduce constraints;</p>		

AM	Group	Current text	CA 10
130	S&D	<p><b><i>Strengthening the role of the EIB in the</i></b> areas of cohesion, climate, digitalisation and environmental sustainability</p>	<p>14. Stresses that reporting based on volume measures outputs and not results; calls <b><i>on the EIB to continue, and even increase, the use of (AM133 and AM134 and Rapporteur)</i></b> results-oriented indicators such as CO2 emissions avoided <b><i>and long-term private-sector jobs created (AM135)</i></b> per euro invested; advocates benchmarking against comparable interventions;</p> <p><b><i>14a.</i></b> Stresses that <b><i>climate and sustainability</i></b> reporting <b><i>must be</i></b> based on <b><i>verifiable</i></b> outputs and <b><i>outcomes (including emissions reductions, resilience gains and leverage effects), supported by coherent portfolio methodology and independent evaluation (AM132);</i></b></p> <p><b><i>14 b.</i></b> <b><i>Notes the EIB Group’s record cohesion financing of EUR 38.3 billion in 2024,</i></b></p>
	Greens	Policy areas of cohesion, climate, digitalisation, <b><i>just transition,</i></b> and environmental sustainability	
	Renew	14. <b><i>Welcomes the increase in sustainability-related financing to approximately 57 % of total EIB Group funding in 2024;</i></b> stresses that <b><i>climate and sustainability</i></b> reporting <b><i>must be</i></b> based on <b><i>verifiable</i></b> outputs and <b><i>outcomes (including emissions reductions, resilience gains and leverage effects), supported by coherent portfolio methodology and independent evaluation</i></b>	
	S&D	14. Stresses that reporting based on volume measures outputs and not results; calls <b><i>on the EIB to continue to use</i></b> results-oriented indicators such as CO2 emissions avoided <b><i>or quality jobs created</i></b> per euro invested; advocates benchmarking against comparable interventions;	
	EPP	14. Stresses that reporting based on volume measures	

		outputs and not results; calls <i>on the EIB to continue to use</i> results-oriented indicators such as CO2 emissions avoided per euro invested; advocates benchmarking against comparable interventions;		
135	TheLeft	14. Stresses that reporting based on volume measures outputs and not results; calls for results-oriented indicators such as CO2 emissions avoided per euro invested <i>or jobs created</i> ; advocates benchmarking against comparable interventions;	15.	<i>representing 48 % of total EU financing; calls on the EIB to publish region-by-region impact data to allow effective scrutiny; (AM138)</i>
138	Renew	<i>14 b. Welcomes the EIB Group’s record cohesion financing of EUR 38.3 billion in 2024, representing 48 % of total EU financing and exceeding the 45 % target set in the Cohesion Orientation 2021–2027; notes that lending to less developed regions reached EUR 20 billion (23 % of EU financing); calls on the EIB to maintain or increase this performance and to publish region-by-region impact data to allow effective scrutiny;</i>		
139	ECR	15. <i>Calls on the EIB to increase transparency regarding its cross-cutting objectives by distinguishing clearly between targets mandated by EU regulations and those initiated by the Bank itself; requests a detailed breakdown of how different targets compete for resources; warns that the continuous accumulation of overlapping mainstreaming targets risks creating a mathematically impossible portfolio composition; calls on the EIB to transparently report on the trade-offs between competing policy goals; reiterates that mainstreaming objectives should be</i>		<i>15a. Calls on the EIB Group and the EIF to support investments in cybersecurity, surveillance and digital technologies (AM148 and AM 150), to make Europe more resilient while bolstering existing</i>

		<i>evaluated for their genuine impact rather than mechanical compliance with predetermined percentage targets; notes that, given the current geopolitical context and security challenges facing Europe, defence and security investments, including support for external border protection infrastructure, should be prioritised when rebalancing the Bank's portfolio composition;</i>	<i>cooperation mechanisms and protecting essential services (AM151);</i>	
140	Renew	15. Warns that the continuous accumulation of overlapping mainstreaming targets, <i>if not operationalised through coherent portfolio methodology, risks internal inconsistency and weak accountability;</i>		
141	S&D	15. <i>Recommends ensuring coordination and coherence of important mainstreaming targets in order to safeguard a sound and balanced portfolio composition;</i>		
143	Greens	<i>15 a. Stresses the need for rigorous environmental and social due diligence in all EIB operations, including supply-chain risk assessment and biodiversity safeguards; calls for strengthened monitoring of compliance throughout the lifecycle of financed projects;</i>		
148	S&D	<i>15 a. Calls on the EIB to support the technological transformation of European companies, as well as the development of digital skills among employees, entrepreneurs, and society at large;</i>		
150	Greens	<i>15 b. Calls on the EIB Group and the EIF to ensure that investments in cybersecurity, surveillance and digital technologies are subject to robust human rights due diligence and do not contribute to violations of fundamental rights,</i>		

		<i>including through intermediated equity investments;</i>		
151	S&D	<i>15 b. Calls on the EIB to support the strengthening of cybersecurity capacities in the EU, in order to make Europe more resilient while bolstering existing cooperation mechanisms and protecting critical entities and essential services;</i>		

AM	Group	Original text (PR)	CA 11
<p><i>The EIB's activities outside the EU</i></p> <p>16. Insists that lending to non-EU countries be made conditional on cooperation with the EU on migration management, including readmission;</p> <p>17. Emphasises that robust anti-fraud measures are essential to ensure taxpayers' trust in EIB investments and its continued support for Ukraine; calls for rigorous audit standards; maintains that the EIB should have unrestricted oversight of all its investments outside the EU;</p> <p><b>If adopted, the following AMs will fall: 155, 160, 161, 162, 163, 170 (Greens) 156, 169, 181 (Renew); 157, 164, 173, 183 (The Left) 158, 171, 172, 184 (S&amp;D) 159, 165 (EPP); 166, 167, 168, 182 (ECR)</b></p>			
155	Greens	<i>Deletion §16</i>	16. Insists that <i>level of (AM159)</i> lending <i>outside the Union (AM156)</i> be subject to robust safeguards on transparency, anti-fraud, sanctions compliance, human rights and the rule of law, as well take into account cooperation on return agreements, and remain consistent with Union external policy objectives; calls for strengthened ex ante and ex post controls, including traceability of final beneficiaries (AM156), for robust anti-corruption measures and for greater or equivalent transparency (AM160, AM163), ex-ante impact assessment (AM162) and full public accountability (AM161) in all EIB operations outside the EU(AM162);
156	Renew	16. <i>Notes that EIB Global signed EUR 8.4 billion in 2024, representing approximately 9.5 % of total financing; stresses that EIB lending outside the Union be subject to robust safeguards on transparency, anti-fraud, sanctions compliance, human rights and the rule of law, and remain consistent with Union external policy objectives; calls for strengthened ex ante and ex post controls, including traceability of final beneficiaries;</i>	16. Insists that <i>level of (AM159)</i> lending <i>outside the Union (AM156)</i> be subject to robust safeguards on transparency, anti-fraud, sanctions compliance, human rights and the rule of law, as well take into account cooperation on return agreements, and remain consistent with Union external policy objectives; calls for strengthened ex ante and ex post controls, including traceability of final beneficiaries (AM156), for robust anti-corruption measures and for greater or equivalent transparency (AM160, AM163), ex-ante impact assessment (AM162) and full public accountability (AM161) in all EIB operations outside the EU(AM162);
157	TheLeft	16. Insists that lending to non-EU countries <i>should ensure the involvement of local stakeholders and overall added value for local communities; underlines that the EU's investments abroad must uphold the principles of social and environmental sustainability; emphasises that the EIB's financing should not subsidise the expansion of European companies into foreign</i>	16a. <i>Welcomes the adoption, in 2024, of the Ukraine Facility, which follows the EIB's initiative EU for Ukraine (EU4U) and establishes a support mechanism based on Union's budget resources;</i>

		<i>markets;</i>		
158	S&D	16. <i>Welcomes the EIB's role in the Global Gateway as crucial for Europe's global position and for promoting the rules-based multilateral system, democracy, human rights and the rule of law;</i>		<p><i>encourages the Member States to ensure that solid support continues to be provided to the country, in line with its needs; calls on the EIB to ensure the transparency and traceability of its projects in Ukraine; highlights the importance of strengthening the administrative and audit capacity of Ukrainian authorities entrusted with the implementing, monitoring and controlling of the funded actions (AM165 and AM168);</i></p> <p><i>16b. Notes that the EIB has disbursed EUR 2.3 billion in emergency relief and project support to Ukraine since the start of Russia's war of aggression; notes that the EIB's disbursed exposure in Ukraine is predominantly covered by EU guarantees under the EU External Lending Mandate<sup>11a</sup>; highlights that EIB support to the private sector has allowed Ukrainian banks to continue lending to the real economy; notes that the Bank granted financial guarantees on exposures to counterparties located in Ukraine for EUR 500.5 million at end-2024, also fully covered by EU guarantees; remarks that the EIB maintains a local presence in Ukraine and the Kyiv office has been progressively restaffed; reiterates its call on the Bank to provide regular, detailed updates to the budgetary authority and relevant audit bodies regarding the disbursement and implementation of funds covered by EU guarantees (AM166);</i></p>
159	EPP	16. Insists that <i>the level of</i> lending to non-EU countries <i>should also take into account the level of</i> cooperation with the EU on migration management, including readmission;		
160	Greens	<i>16 a. Stresses that EIB operations outside the EU should be guided by EU external action objectives, including sustainable development, poverty reduction, climate resilience and human rights; calls for robust due diligence, anti-corruption measures and transparency, and rejects the use of development finance as leverage for migration management or readmission arrangements;</i>		
161	Greens	<i>16 b. Notes the adoption by the EIB Board of Directors of the EIB Global Strategic Roadmap and its commitment to respect and promote human rights and the rule of law in the projects it supports; stresses the urgent need for systematic ex- ante human rights impact assessments, greater transparency, and full public accountability in all EIB operations outside the EU;</i>		
162	Greens	<i>16 c. Insists that the EIB Group systematically conducts independent ex- ante human rights</i>		

<sup>1</sup> At the end of 2024, total disbursed exposure amounted to EUR 3 227.1 mln (compared with EUR 3 144.3 mln at the end of 2023) and that of this amount, EUR 3 068.1 mln (95%) is covered by EU comprehensive guarantees, EUR 146.6 mln (5%) is covered by EU political risk guarantees and EUR 12.4 mln is covered under risk sharing mandates (compared with EUR 2 962.7 million, or 94%; EUR 166.8 million, or 5%; and EUR 14.8 million, or 1%, respectively, at the end of 2023).

		<i>impact assessments for all projects outside the EU, with meaningful consultations with local communities and civil society actors; calls for these assessments to be publicly available prior to project approval;</i>	
163	Greens	<i>16 d. Calls on the EIB to ensure that projects outside the EU are subject to equivalent transparency, environmental and social standards as those applied within the Union, and to avoid double standards in Environmental Social Governance and human rights safeguards;</i>	<i>16c. Notes that, in 2024, the EIB Group was selected as one of the main implementing partners of the Ukraine Investment Framework, part of the Ukraine Facility under which EUR 50 billion will be allocated by the EU during the 2024-2027 period to finance the Ukrainian state budget, stimulate investment and provide technical support; notes that the framework is composed of guarantees and grants for European and other development finance institutions and that at least EUR 2 billion of the available support is set to sustain EIB lending to the public sector (AM167);</i>
164	TheLeft	<i>16 a. Demands that the EIB does not increase further the debt burden of highly indebted countries around the world;</i>	
165	EPP	<i>16 a. Welcomes the adoption, in 2024, of the Ukraine Facility, which follows the EIB's initiative EU for Ukraine (EU4U) and establishes a support mechanism based on Union's budget resources; encourages the Member States to ensure that solid support continues to be provided to the country, in line with its needs; calls on the EIB to ensure the transparency and traceability of its projects in Ukraine; the importance of strengthening the administrative and audit capacity of Ukrainian authorities entrusted with the implementing, monitoring and controlling of the funded actions;</i>	<i>16d. Reminds that the EIB is committed to prevent and address fraud and corruption in the implementation of the EIB Group projects in Ukraine (AM168); welcomes the EIB's cooperation arrangements with Ukrainian anti-corruption and investigative authorities and invites the EIB to include in its report to Parliament information on integrity safeguards, fraud-risk mitigation and recovery mechanisms for operations linked to Ukraine, while ensuring operational security and confidentiality (AM169); reiterates its call to ensure that deployment of financial assistance is accompanied by effective oversight mechanisms and maintains that on the supported and assisted projects the EIB should have clear unrestricted oversight at all times all its investments outside the EU (AM168 and AM181)</i>
166	ECR	<i>16 a. Notes that the EIB has disbursed EUR 2.3 billion in emergency relief and project support to Ukraine since the start of Russia's war of</i>	

		<p><i>aggression; notes that the EIB's disbursed exposure in Ukraine is predominantly covered by EU guarantees under the EU External Lending Mandate<sup>21a</sup>; highlights that EIB support to the private sector has allowed Ukrainian banks to continue lending to the real economy; notes that the Bank granted financial guarantees on exposures to counterparties located in Ukraine for EUR 500.5 million at end-2024, also fully covered by EU guarantees; remarks that the EIB maintains a local presence in Ukraine and the Kyiv office has been progressively restaffed; reiterates its call on the Bank to provide regular, detailed updates to the budgetary authority and relevant audit bodies regarding the disbursement and implementation of funds covered by EU guarantees;</i></p>	<p><i>16e. Notes the adoption by the EIB Board of Directors of the EIB Global Strategic Roadmap (AM161), the EIB's role in the Global Gateway (AM158) and EIB's partnerships with Team Europe and UN partners to deliver maximum impact on the ground (AM172); calls on the EIB and the Member States to strengthen the role of European promotional banks and other international financial institutions in helping to further leverage public and private investment (AM171); asks the EIB to also focus in its projects outside the EU on highly essential public services (AM173);</i></p>
167	ECR	<p><i>16 b. Notes that, in 2024, the EIB Group was selected as one of the main implementing partners of the Ukraine Investment Framework, part of the Ukraine Facility under which EUR 50 billion will be allocated by the EU during the 2024-2027 period to finance the Ukrainian state budget, stimulate investment and provide technical support; notes that the framework is composed of guarantees and grants for European and other development finance institutions and</i></p>	<p><i>17. Recognises that Ukraine is defending itself against Russia's illegal aggression and that anti-corruption efforts must be pursued to the fullest extent possible while accounting for these extraordinary circumstances; emphasises that robust anti-fraud and anti-corruption (AM183) measures are essential for maintaining taxpayer trust and ensuring continued public support for Ukraine; calls on the EIB to ensure that Ukraine Facility funds are subject to rigorous audit standards; maintains that the EIB should have unrestricted oversight of all its investments outside the EU (AM182);</i></p>

<sup>2</sup> At the end of 2024, total disbursed exposure amounted to EUR 3 227.1 mln (compared with EUR 3 144.3 mln at the end of 2023) and that of this amount, EUR 3 068.1 mln (95%) is covered by EU comprehensive guarantees, EUR 146.6 mln (5%) is covered by EU political risk guarantees and EUR 12.4 mln is covered under risk sharing mandates (compared with EUR 2 962.7 million, or 94%; EUR 166.8 million, or 5%; and EUR 14.8 million, or 1%, respectively, at the end of 2023).

		<i>that at least EUR 2 billion of the available support is set to sustain EIB lending to the public sector;</i>	
168	ECR	<i>16 c. Reminds that the EIB is committed to prevent and address fraud and corruption in the implementation of the EIB Group projects in Ukraine and stresses the importance of strengthening the administrative and audit capacity of Ukrainian authorities entrusted with the implementing, monitoring and controlling of the funded actions; reiterates its call to ensure that deployment of financial assistance is accompanied by effective oversight mechanisms and maintains that on the supported and assisted projects the EIB should have clear oversight at all times;</i>	<i>17a. Calls on the EIB to ensure (AM170), in particular for all its activities outside the Union (Rapporteur), in all agreements with intermediaries, partner institutions and implementing entities, effective access rights for the ECA, OLAF and EPPO, and the availability of audit trails down to the level of final recipients where feasible, in line with Union rules on the protection of the EU's financial interests (AM170);</i>
169	Renew	<i>16 a. Welcomes the EIB's cooperation arrangements with Ukrainian anti-corruption and investigative authorities and civil society partners; invites the EIB to include in its report to Parliament information on integrity safeguards, fraud-risk mitigation and recovery mechanisms for operations linked to Ukraine, while ensuring operational security and confidentiality;</i>	
170	Greens	<i>16 e. Calls on the EIB to ensure, in all agreements with intermediaries, partner institutions and implementing entities, effective access rights for the ECA, OLAF and EPPO, and the availability of audit trails down to the level of final recipients where feasible, in line with Union rules on the protection of the EU's</i>	

		<i>financial interests;</i>		
171	S&D	<i>16 b. Calls on the EIB and the Member States to strengthen the network of European promotional banks and other international financial institutions to help to further leverage public and private investment;</i>		
172	S&D	<i>16 a. Welcomes the EIB's support on sectors such as water supplies, small businesses, renewable energy and energy efficiency as well as partnerships with Team Europe, UN partners and private philanthropies to deliver maximum impact on the ground;</i>		
173	TheLeft	<i>16 b. Asks the EIB to focus its projects outside the EU on the building and maintenance of highly essential public services such as education, health, and transport; demands that the EIB supports first and foremost public services;</i>		
181	Renew	<i>16c. Welcomes the EIB's sanctions compliance programme and calls for regular reporting on sanctions-screening controls and anti-circumvention safeguards in EIB-financed operations; maintains that the EIB should have unrestricted oversight of all its investments outside the EU;</i>		Split vote
182	ECR	<i>17. Recognises that Ukraine is defending itself against Russia's illegal aggression and that anti-corruption efforts must be pursued to the fullest extent possible while accounting for these extraordinary circumstances; emphasises that robust anti-fraud measures are essential for maintaining taxpayer trust and ensuring</i>		

		continued <i>public</i> support for Ukraine; calls <i>on the EIB to ensure that Ukraine Facility funds are subject to</i> rigorous audit standards; maintains that the EIB should have unrestricted oversight of all its investments outside the EU;		
183	TheLeft	17. Emphasises that robust anti-fraud <i>and anti-corruption</i> measures are essential <i>when the EIB makes investments inside and outside the EU</i> to ensure taxpayers <i>can</i> trust EIB investments; calls for rigorous audit standards; maintains that the EIB should have unrestricted oversight of all its investments <i>inside and</i> outside the EU;		
184	S&D	17. Emphasises that robust anti-fraud measures are essential to ensure taxpayers' trust in EIB investments and its continued support for <i>non-EU countries</i> ; calls for rigorous audit standards; maintains that the EIB should have unrestricted oversight of all its investments outside the EU;		

AM	Group	Original text	CA12
		<p data-bbox="432 264 851 296"><b><i>EIB accountability architecture</i></b></p> <p data-bbox="432 328 1973 440">18. Endorses Contact Committee statement CC 1/2025 identifying critical audit gaps; notes the paradox of the EIB’s expanded mandate and restricted audit powers; calls for the involvement of the national supreme audit institutions; reiterates that Treaty change is necessary to give the European Court of Auditors full access to the EIB;</p> <p data-bbox="432 472 2018 767">19. Expresses concern regarding the bankruptcy of Northvolt, despite it having received EUR 942.6 million in EIB lending; notes that similar risks appear to exist with Stegra; calls for the disclosure of the EIB’s risk assessments; demands a review of the lessons learned from the Northvolt case; calls on the EIB to disclose the risk assessment profiles for these and other similar engagements; reiterates its call on the EIB to provide details of the evaluation and decision-making process that took place ahead of the investment in Northvolt AB, and to explain how such a crucial project failed despite the EIB’s claims that it carries out adequate and continuous monitoring of the beneficiaries of its financial support; notes with concern the party-political links between the EIB leadership and an early Northvolt investor and advisor;</p> <p data-bbox="432 799 1962 879">20. Strongly insists on strengthening conflict of interest prevention; calls for stricter cooling-off periods for EIB vice-presidents and clearer rules for their participation in decisions concerning their countries of origin;</p> <p data-bbox="432 911 2029 983"><b>If adopted, the following AMs will fall: 186, 187, 188, 198, 201, 203, 204, 205, 207 (ECR) 189, 200 (S&amp;D) 60, 190, 197, 223_part II (Renew) 191, 195 (EPP) 192, 194, 196, 206, 208 (TheLeft) 199, 202, 209, 210 (Greens)</b></p>	
60	Renew	<p data-bbox="432 1062 1122 1374"><b><i>3 a. Notes with concern that the EIB’s Transparency Policy prevented adequate information disclosure on projects benefitting from the allocation of the EU budgetary guarantee; stresses that confidentiality agreements concluded to safeguard the commercial interests of their promoters ought not undermine the European Parliament’s meaningful oversight over the allocation of</i></b></p>	<p data-bbox="1142 1062 1883 1374"><b><i>17 a. Notes that EIB Group’s current accountability level is consequential of the EIB operating under a dual regime: EU-budget-backed operations are indirectly scrutinised through the Commission, the ECA and the EP discharge, whereas operations financed from the Bank’s own resources coming from EU member states – more than three quarters of EIB lending – fall largely outside systematic external audit and national and</i></b></p>

		<i>the EU budgetary guarantee; calls on the EIB Group to publicly disclose of the annual list of financial intermediaries and final beneficiaries under the InvestEU program;</i>	<i>European parliamentary scrutiny (AM186); notes as well that the EIB is not subject to any external banking supervision, unlike the European Central Bank, which is overseen by the Single Supervisory Mechanism (AM194);</i>	
186	ECR	<i>17 a. Notes that EIB Group's current accountability level is consequential of the EIB operating under a dual regime: EU-budget-backed operations are indirectly scrutinised through the Commission, the ECA and the EP discharge, whereas operations financed from the Bank's own resources coming from EU member states – more than three quarters of EIB lending – fall largely outside systematic external audit and national and European parliamentary scrutiny;</i>	<i>17 b. Observes that the EIB has a dense internal accountability architecture, and an external auditor providing oversight on the Bank operations and accounting system; agrees that such structure is broadly in line with international practice; stresses that, as the EIB's traditional role expands alongside an increasing use of complex financial instruments and blended operations, EIB transparency and disclosure are being frequently questioned, its ethical framework is sub-optimal, reporting to EP is occasional, cooperation with Ombudsman has shifted and ECA's role is limited by the current rules and implementing arrangements; highlights the need of tangible actions by the EIB in addressing this situation, in line with the previous calls included in its resolutions and the availability to dialogue and cooperation expressed by the European budgetary and discharge authority (AM187);</i>	
187	ECR	<i>17 b. Observes that the EIB has a dense internal accountability architecture, and an external auditor providing oversight on the Bank operations and accounting system; agrees that such structure is broadly in line with international practice; stresses that, as the EIB's traditional role expands alongside an increasing use of complex financial instruments and blended operations, EIB transparency and disclosure are being frequently questioned, its ethical framework is sub-optimal, reporting to EP is occasional, cooperation with Ombudsman has shifted and ECA's role is limited by the current rules and implementing arrangements; expresses concerns about the lack of tangible actions by the EIB in addressing this situation, in spite of</i>	<i>18. Recalls (AM191) the findings of the Contact Committee Statement (CC 1/2025), which formally identified critical gaps in the external public audit of the EIB; notes the paradox where the EIB's mandate and EU budget guarantees are expanded, yet audit powers remain restricted; calls on the EIB</i>	

		<i>the many reiterated calls included in its resolutions and the availability to dialogue and cooperation expressed by the European budgetary and discharge authority;</i>	
188	ECR	18. Endorses <i>the findings of the</i> Contact Committee Statement (CC 1/2025), <i>which formally identified critical gaps in the external public audit of the EIB</i> ; notes the paradox <i>where the EIB's mandate and EU budget guarantees are expanded, yet audit powers remain restricted</i> ; calls <i>on the EIB to actively involve national Supreme Audit Institutions to ensure accountability for operations not currently covered by the ECA</i> ; reiterates that <i>a Treaty change is necessary to grant the ECA full and unrestricted access to all EIB operations to align democratic accountability with the EIB's evolving financial exposure</i> ;	<p><i>to actively involve national Supreme Audit Institutions to ensure accountability for operations not currently covered by the ECA (AM188) and to guarantee robust accountability and oversight (AM189), also through regular information-sharing on risk areas and follow-up of audit recommendations (AM190)</i> ; reiterates that <i>a Treaty change is necessary to grant the ECA, in the exercise of its mandate, full and unrestricted access to all EIB operations to align democratic accountability with the EIB's evolving financial exposure (AM188)</i>;</p> <p>19. Expresses concern regarding the bankruptcy of Northvolt, <i>AB, the battery manufacturer who filed for bankruptcy in Sweden on 12 March 2025 after having benefited from a substantial EIB lending package of slightly over EUR 942.6 million, signed as per 2020 as part of the debt financing to expand a gigafactory site</i>; notes that similar risks appear to exist with <i>similar large-scale ventures such as Stegra (H2 Green Steel)</i>; calls for the disclosure of the EIB's risk assessments <b>(AM198)</b> <i>and of the post-operation assessment, including the evaluation of financial exposure and the adequacy of early-warning indicators, as soon as the ongoing processes will allow (AM197)</i>; demands a review of the lessons learned from the Northvolt case; calls on the Commission and the EIB Board of Directors to establish mechanisms for the early detection of systemic risks in flagship investments in order to prevent the recurrence of similar</p>
189	S&D	18. <i>Notes the</i> Contact Committee statement CC 1/2025 identifying critical audit gaps; <i>stresses the need to align and adapt the audit framework to the EIB's expanded mandate, so as to guarantee robust accountability and oversight</i> ; calls for the involvement of the national supreme audit institutions; reiterates that Treaty change is necessary to give the European Court of Auditors full access to the EIB;	
190	Renew	18. Endorses Contact Committee statement CC 1/2025 identifying critical audit gaps; calls for <i>strengthened structured exchanges among the EIB, the ECA and national audit institutions,</i>	

		<i>including regular information-sharing on risk areas and follow-up of audit recommendations; acknowledges</i> that Treaty change is necessary to give the European Court of Auditors full access to the EIB;		
191	EPP	18. <i>Notes</i> Contact Committee statement CC 1/2025 identifying critical audit gaps; notes the paradox of the EIB's expanded mandate and restricted audit powers; reiterates that Treaty change is necessary to give the European Court of Auditors full access to the EIB;		
192	TheLeft	18. Endorses Contact Committee statement CC 1/2025 identifying critical audit gaps; notes the paradox of the EIB's expanded mandate and restricted audit powers; calls for the involvement of the national supreme audit institutions; reiterates that Treaty change is necessary to give the European Court of Auditors <i>and the Ombudsman</i> full access to the EIB;		
194	TheLeft	18 a. <i>Notes that the EIB is not subject to any external banking supervision, unlike the European Central Bank, which is overseen by the Single Supervisory Mechanism; calls on the EU to establish a robust supervisory mechanism for the EIB;</i>		
195	EPP	<i>Deletion §19</i>		
196	TheLeft	19. Expresses <i>deep</i> concern regarding the bankruptcy of <i>Swedish electric battery manufacturer</i> Northvolt, despite it <i>receiving</i> EUR 942.6 million in EIB lending; <i>recalls that the EIB had already allocated 400 million</i>		
				<p>situations; calls on the EIB to disclose the risk assessment profiles for these and other similar engagements, <i>in an appropriately aggregated and confidentiality-compliant manner, including governance, concentration and technology risks (AM199)</i>; reiterates its call on the EIB to provide details of the evaluation and decision-making process that took place ahead of the investment in Northvolt AB, and to explain how such a crucial project failed despite the EIB's claims that it carries out adequate and continuous monitoring of the beneficiaries of its financial support;</p> <p><i>19 a. Calls on the EIB to establish enhanced stress-testing and risk concentration limits for large strategic projects, and to report to Parliament on aggregate exposure to high-risk single borrowers (AM202)</i>;</p> <p><i>19 b. Calls on the EIB to systematically evaluate and publicly report on the incidence of late payments and beneficiary bankruptcies across its lending portfolio; insists that such evaluation should include root-cause analysis to identify whether failures stem from inadequate due diligence, external shocks, or systemic issues in project selection methodologies; stresses that transparent reporting is essential for value for money assessment and for maintaining taxpayer confidence (AM203)</i>;</p>

	<p><i>euro of loans in the previous years; reminds that the EIB's objective for this allocation was to enhance Europe's capacity to produce sustainable batteries for electric vehicles and to contribute to the EU's self-reliance in the automotive sector; observes that the bankruptcy resulted in nearly 6,000 dismissals; strongly condemns the EIB's negligence in its risk assessment and the EIB's failure to impose binding social and environmental conditionalities and to have better oversight over Northvolt's operations; demands full accountability for this significant waste of taxpayers' money and recommends to pursue legal action to recover these funds in order for them to be reallocated to other projects that serve the public interest; notes that similar risks appear to exist with Stegra; demands a review of the lessons learned from the Northvolt case; calls on the EIB to disclose the risk assessment profiles for these and other similar engagements; reiterates its call on the EIB to provide details of the evaluation and decision-making process that took place ahead of the investment in Northvolt AB, and to explain how such a crucial project failed despite the EIB's claims that it carries out adequate and continuous monitoring of the beneficiaries of its financial support; notes with concern the party-political links between the EIB leadership and an early Northvolt investor and advisor; <b>urges the EIB to consider how it</b></i></p>	<p>20. Strongly insists on strengthening conflict of interest prevention <i>in light of recent revolving-door cases and European Ombudsman recommendations</i>; calls for <i>the revision of the code of conduct to enforce</i> stricter cooling-off periods for EIB vice-presidents, <i>empower the Ethics and Compliance Committee to impose risk-mitigating measures, and establish</i> clearer rules for their participation in decisions concerning their countries of origin; <i>underlines recently published information identifying five cases since 2019 of former members of EIB decision-making bodies allegedly involved in revolving-doors situations including a case of an EIB vice-president appointed board member of an entity for which he had signed an EIB loan; notes that the cooling-off period has been extended to 24 months; reminds that Management Committee members are asked to inform the Ethics and Compliance Committee and seek approval for any negotiations regarding prospective employment; shares the view of the European Ombudsman that the role of the EIB Ethics and Compliance Committee should be strengthened; reminds that mitigating measures, such as ring-fencing and cooling-off periods, should be perceived as unquestionable (AM205);</i></p> <p>20a. <i>Stresses a leaked EIB internal audit flagging conflict of interest provisions as 'needing significant improvement,' including failure to cover apparent and potential conflicts; emphasises that declarations of interest by EIB and European</i></p>	
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		<i>can leverage green financing for collective use, rather than private profit;</i>	
197	Renew	19. Expresses concern regarding the bankruptcy of Northvolt, despite it having received EUR 942.6 million in EIB lending; calls <i>on the EIB to complete and publish its comprehensive post-operation assessment, including the evaluation of financial exposure, the adequacy of early-warning indicators, and lessons learned for future appraisals and monitoring of high-risk innovation projects</i> ; calls on the EIB to disclose <i>its risk assessment profile for the Stegra project as soon as ongoing processes allow</i> ;	<i>Investment Fund (EIF) governing and audit bodies are misaligned with other Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) and the European Central Bank (ECB) and must be rectified without delay; underlines the lack of authority, independence and scope of EIB and EIF ethics compliance functions and the risks posed by complex reporting lines exposing sensitive personal data; urges the Bank to align with the Ethics Network of Multilateral Organisations (ENMO) and report on follow-up actions taken (AM207 and AM208);</i>
198	ECR	19. Expresses concern regarding the bankruptcy of Northvolt, <i>AB, the battery manufacturer who filed for bankruptcy in Sweden on 12 March 2025 after having benefited from a substantial EIB lending package of slightly over EUR 942.6 million, signed as per 2020 as part of the debt financing to expand a gigafactory site</i> ; notes that similar risks appear to exist with <i>similar large-scale ventures such as Stegra (H2 Green Steel)</i> ; calls for the disclosure of the EIB's risk assessments; demands a review of the lessons learned from the Northvolt case; calls on the EIB to disclose the risk assessment profiles for these and other similar engagements; reiterates its call on the EIB to provide details of the evaluation and decision-making process that took place ahead of the investment in Northvolt AB, and to explain	<i>20b. Is aware that Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 does not formally apply to the EIB and that EIB Transparency Policy, based on the “presumption of disclosure”, is intended to operate separately from, but aligned to, such regulation (AM209 and Rapporteur); calls on the EIB, in the context of its 2026 Transparency Policy review, to limit the exceptions to the “presumption of disclosure” to the strictly necessary and justified cases (AM60, AM210 and Rapporteur and AM223); calls on the EIB to publish more detailed minutes of its Board of Directors’ meetings, including voting records and project-specific justifications, while respecting legitimate confidentiality where necessary (AM209 and AM223);</i>

		<p>how such a crucial project failed despite the EIB's claims that it carries out adequate and continuous monitoring of the beneficiaries of its financial support; notes with concern the party-political links between the EIB leadership and an early Northvolt investor and advisor;</p>		
199	Greens	<p>19. Expresses concern regarding the bankruptcy of Northvolt, despite it having received EUR 942.6 million in EIB lending; notes that similar risks appear to exist with Stegra; calls for the disclosure of the EIB's risk assessments; demands a review of the lessons learned from the Northvolt case; calls on the EIB to disclose the risk assessment profiles for these and other similar engagements; reiterates its call on the EIB to provide details of the evaluation and decision-making process that took place ahead of the investment in Northvolt AB, and to explain how such a crucial project failed despite the EIB's claims that it carries out adequate and continuous monitoring of the beneficiaries of its financial support; <b><i>calls on the EIB to publish, in an appropriately aggregated and confidentiality-compliant manner, the methodology and key assumptions used in its risk assessments for large strategic projects, including governance, concentration and technology risks, and to strengthen its disclosure and accountability standards for similar high-risk exposures;</i></b></p>		
200	S&D	<p>19. Expresses concern regarding the bankruptcy of Northvolt, despite it having received EUR</p>		

		<p>942.6 million in EIB lending; notes that similar risks appear to exist with Stegra; calls for the disclosure of the EIB's risk assessments; demands a review of the lessons learned from the Northvolt case; calls on the EIB to disclose the risk assessment profiles for these and other similar engagements; reiterates its call on the EIB to provide details of the evaluation and decision-making process that took place ahead of the investment in Northvolt AB, and to explain how such a crucial project failed despite the EIB's claims that it carries out adequate and continuous monitoring of the beneficiaries of its financial support;</p>		
201	ECR	<p><i>19 a. Maintains that the expansion of the gigafactory site was expected to increase the annual output capacity for battery production and was of strategic importance for global competitiveness, hence questions whether the due diligence process adequately assessed the risks inherent in scaling up unproven technologies; regrets, however, EIB lack of action and lack of information about the action to be launched to clarify the extent of the financial exposure and the possible damage; reiterates its call on the Commission and on the EIB Board of Directors to launch an in-depth internal review without undue delay to verify the financial damage, the reasons for and the background to the failure of this flagship project and to learn from this experience in order to prevent the recurrence</i></p>		

		<i>of a similar situation or enable the early detection thereof;</i>		
202	Greens	<i>19 a. Notes that the Northvolt operation was considered high-risk at approval stage and required EU guarantee support; calls on the EIB to establish enhanced stress-testing and risk concentration limits for large strategic projects, and to report to Parliament on aggregate exposure to high-risk single borrowers;</i>		
203	ECR	<i>19 b. Calls on the EIB to systematically evaluate and publicly report on the incidence of late payments and beneficiary bankruptcies across its lending portfolio; insists that such evaluation should include root-cause analysis to identify whether failures stem from inadequate due diligence, external shocks, or systemic issues in project selection methodologies; stresses that transparent reporting is essential for value for money assessment and for maintaining taxpayer confidence;</i>		
204	ECR	<i>19 c. Reminds that the lack of synchronization between the EIB Exclusion Procedures and the Commission's Early Detection and Exclusion System (EDES) is liable to result in lack of effectiveness and efficiency of the measures; notes with concern that full equivalence is not yet in place, allowing entities excluded for misconduct in EIB own-resource projects to potentially participate in EU-funded projects, and vice versa; reiterates</i>		

		<p><i>its call on the EIB Group and the Commission to cooperate in identifying potential gaps and proposing remedies; calls on both to accelerate efforts towards reciprocal recognition of exclusion decisions where the legal basis permits; asks the EIB to report more comprehensively on the impact of these procedures;</i></p>		
205	ECR	<p>20. Strongly insists on strengthening conflict of interest prevention <i>in light of recent revolving-door cases and European Ombudsman recommendations</i>; calls for <i>the revision of the code of conduct to enforce</i> stricter cooling-off periods for EIB vice-presidents, <i>empower the Ethics and Compliance Committee to impose risk-mitigating measures, and establish</i> clearer rules for their participation in decisions concerning their countries of origin; <i>underlines the recently published investigation that identifies five cases (since 2019) of former members of EIB key decision-making bodies involved in revolving doors scandals and never sanctioned by the Bank, as well as the case (dating back to December 2024) of an EIB vice-president appointed board member of an airport for which he had signed as EIB representative a loan for controversial expansion project, who appeared also as co-founder of a start-up beneficiary of EIB advisory and financial assistance; notes that the cooling-off period has been extended to 24 months; reminds that Management</i></p>		

		<p><i>Committee members are asked to inform the Ethics and Compliance Committee and seek approval for any negotiations regarding prospective employment; shares the view of the European Ombudsman that the role of the EIB Ethics and Compliance Committee should be strengthened; reminds that mitigating measures, such as ring-fencing and cooling-off periods, should be perceived as unquestionable;</i></p>		
206	TheLeft	<p>20. Strongly insists on strengthening <i>the prevention of</i> conflict of interest; calls for stricter cooling-off periods for EIB <i>presidents, vice-presidents, and managers</i>, and clearer rules for their participation in decisions concerning their countries of origin;</p>		
207	ECR	<p>20 a. <i>Stresses a leaked EIB internal audit flagging conflict of interest provisions as 'needing significant improvement,' including failure to cover apparent and potential conflicts; emphasises that declarations of interest by EIB and European Investment Fund (EIF) governing and audit bodies are misaligned with other Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) and the European Central Bank (ECB) and must be rectified without delay; underlines the lack of authority, independence and scope of EIB and EIF ethics compliance functions and the risks posed by complex reporting lines exposing sensitive personal data; urges the Bank to align with the Ethics Network of Multilateral</i></p>		

		<i>Organisations (ENMO) and report on follow-up actions taken;</i>		
208	TheLeft	<i>20 d. Notes with concern that the EIB 2025 internal audit report on personal conflict of interest identified significant deficiencies in the application of ethics considerations in decision-making, inadequacy and incompleteness of reported cases, insufficient provisions on cooling-off periods and external activities, and lack of preventive and detective controls over the financial transactions of EIB staff members; acknowledges the confidential nature of this report; urges the EIB to make all information on conflicts of interest available to the public and to urgently fill gaps in the current ethics framework;</i>		
209	Greens	<i>20 a. Calls on the EIB to improve its institutional transparency by publishing more detailed minutes of its Board of Directors' meetings, including voting records and project-specific justifications, while respecting legitimate confidentiality where strictly necessary</i>		
210	Greens	<i>20 f. Notes that Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 does not formally apply to the EIB; calls on the EIB, in the context of its 2026 Transparency Policy review, to align its access-to-documents regime functionally with Regulation 1049/2001, limiting refusals to strictly necessary and justified exceptions;</i>		
223	Renew	<i>21. Notes the EIB efforts to improve documentation of decision-making, including indication of required majorities where</i>	<b>Split vote on 223 here goes Part II</b>	

		<p><i>applicable</i>; regrets that Parliament's <i>requests for fuller project-level transparency and more systematic follow-up remain only partially addressed</i>; calls on the EIB, in the context of the planned 2026 review of its Transparency Policy, to align more closely with the principles of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001, while respecting legitimate banking confidentiality; stresses that interinstitutional agreement is essential for predictable cooperation;</p>		
AM	Group	<p><b>New text</b> <span style="float: right;"><b>CA13</b></span></p> <p><i>About the accountability architecture</i></p> <p><b>If adopted, the following AMs will fall: 179, 180, 193, 215, 216, 217, 218, (Greens) 181, 185 (Renew) 153, 212, 219, 220, 221, 226 (The Left) 213, 214 (ECR) 225 (EPP)</b></p>		
153	TheLeft	<p><b>15 g.</b> <i>Observes that, in 2020, the EIF, which belongs to the EIB Group, provided venture capital for Israeli spyware company Paragon Solutions through an Israeli venture capital fund; notes that investigative reports and the PEGA parliamentary committee inquiry have concluded that Paragon spyware has been used for years by several European governments to break into the devices of journalists and political activists; expresses strong disappointment over the EIB decision not to sanction the recipients of its funding, who have been found guilty of breaches of national, humanitarian, and international</i></p>	<p><b>20c.</b> <i>Notes the increasing number of cases handled by the EIB Complaints Mechanism (113 cases in 2024, 104 in 2023 and 97 in 2022); stresses that the Complaints Mechanism remains a self-referential dispute-solving process fully embedded in the Bank's structure at the cost of its independence, whose findings are subject to review and approval by the same management structures that it is supposed to scrutinise; notes that appointments are made internally without external oversight; regrets that it does not report individual cases to the Board of Directors but only aggregate summaries in biannual reports; calls on the EIB to reform the Complaints Mechanism to</i></p>	

		<i>law, and not to hold them accountable; demands that the EIB improves or applies more efficiently its screening procedures in the future;</i>	<i>ensure genuine independence and external accountability (AM193, AM212 and AM213);</i>
179	Greens	<i>16 b. Notes with concern that the EIB's autonomous exclusion system and the Commission's Early Detection and Exclusion System (EDES) are not fully equivalent and do not operate with automatic reciprocity; calls on the Commission and the EIB to develop a joint roadmap for operational alignment, including standard evidence-sharing, reciprocal follow-up procedures, and annual reporting on cases transmitted between both systems, or failing that, to report on the number and outcome of cases processed through the expedited procedure;</i>	<i>20d. Notes the increased workload of the Investigative Division (IG/IN) in 2024 (244 new allegations, 49 referrals to OLAF and EPPO); regrets that the IG/IN annual report continues to lack adequate information on the financial magnitude, affected funds and mandates, project types, mitigating measures, and Member States concerned; invites again the EIB Inspector General and the Head of Division IG/IN to improve data quality and engage with Parliament to better contribute to protect the involved financial interests, pursuing a proper balance between transparency and confidentiality; stresses that such reporting should include root-cause analysis to identify whether failures stem from inadequate due diligence, external factors or systemic issues in project selection (AM214);</i>
180	Greens	<i>16 f. Notes that exclusions under the EIB autonomous exclusion list and the Commission's Early Detection and Exclusion System (EDES) are not automatically reciprocal; calls for formalised procedures ensuring systematic cross-recognition of exclusion decisions where legally possible;</i>	<i>20e. Welcomes the EIB Group's cooperation with OLAF, EPPO and Europol and notes the reported 29 referrals to OLAF and 20 referrals to EPPO in 2024; welcomes the EIB's interest in gaining access to the Commission's ARACHNE risk-scoring tool; calls on the Commission to facilitate such access without delay, in order to strengthen fraud detection and prevention across all EIB operations (AM185);</i>
181	Renew	<i>16 c. Welcomes the EIB's sanctions compliance programme and calls for regular reporting on sanctions-screening controls and anti-circumvention safeguards in EIB-financed operations; maintains that the EIB should have unrestricted oversight of all its investments outside the EU</i>	<i>20f. Notes with concern that the EIB's autonomous exclusion system and the Commission's Early</i>
185	Renew	<i>17. Welcomes the EIB Group's cooperation with</i>	

		<i>OLAF, EPPO and Europol and notes the reported 29 referrals to OLAF and 20 referrals to EPPO in 2024; welcomes the EIB's interest in gaining access to the Commission's ARACHNE risk-scoring tool; calls on the Commission to facilitate such access without delay, in order to strengthen fraud detection and prevention across all EIB operations;</i>	<i>Detection and Exclusion System (EDES) are not fully equivalent and do not operate with automatic reciprocity (AM179); calls on the EIB to fully align its Exclusion Policy with the Commission's Early Detection and Exclusion System in terms of decision-making standards, results and remedies, including systematic cross-recognition of exclusion decisions where legally possible (AM225 and AM180); reiterates its call on the EIB Group and the Commission to cooperate in identifying the potential gaps and proposing remedies, including an expedited procedure to enforce EIB exclusion decisions via the Early Detection and Exclusion System (AM225 and AM179);</i>
193	Greens	<i>18 a. Stresses the importance of the independence and effectiveness of the EIB Complaints Mechanism; calls for enhanced transparency regarding complaints received, their resolution and implementation of recommendations, and for strengthened cooperation with the European Ombudsman;</i>	
212	TheLeft	<i>20 a. Strongly insists on a very thorough review of the Complaints Mechanism of the EIB; demands for the President of the Complaints Mechanism to be chosen from professionals outside the institution; asks for a larger budget for the Mechanism and full independence of its members, meaning that direct contact between the Board and the President of the Mechanism should happen without any interference by EIB management and legal services; requires the EIB to maintain and apply a red list of promoters who have breached previous EIB rules, and that they are not be able to access EIB investments for a minimum of 5 years;</i>	<i>20g. Welcomes the EIB's sanctions compliance programme and calls for regular reporting on sanctions-screening controls and anti-circumvention safeguards in EIB-financed operations (AM181); calls on the EIB Group to improve screening procedures for equity investments made through financial intermediaries, including venture capital funds (AM153);</i>  <i>20h. Notes that on 10 June 2024 the EIB published an Annex XII to the Staff Rules, titled "Framework for recognition of trade unions at the European Investment Bank" notes the EIB's ongoing efforts regarding (AM221) staff well-being including mental health, and equal opportunities (AM215,</i>
213	ECR	<i>20 c. Notes the increasing number of cases handled</i>	

		<p><i>by the EIB Complaints Mechanism (113 cases in 2024, 104 in 2023 and 97 in 2022); stresses that the CM remains a self-referential dispute-solving process fully embedded in the Bank's structure at the cost of its independence, whose findings are subject to review and approval by the same management structures that it is supposed to scrutinise; notes that appointments are made internally without external oversight; regrets that it does not report individual cases to the Board of Directors but only aggregate summaries in biannual reports; calls on the EIB to reform the Complaints Mechanism to ensure genuine independence and external accountability;</i></p>	<p><b>AM219 and AM218); calls on the EIB to strengthen diversity and inclusion policies, including measures addressing disability inclusion and equal opportunities (AM218); reminds the importance of fair geographical representation and gender balance in recruitment and management positions, while reaffirming merit-based selection as the primary criterion and asks the EIB to report on geographical and gender representation at all levels (AM216 and AM217);</b></p> <p><b>20i. Reminds the importance of whistleblower protection and strong anti-corruption prevention framework (AM220 and AM226);</b></p>
214	ECR	<p><i>20 b. Notes the increased workload of the Investigative Division (IG/IN) in 2024 (244 new allegations, 49 referrals to OLAF and EPPO); regrets that the IG/IN annual report continues to lack adequate information on the financial magnitude, affected funds and mandates, project types, mitigating measures, and Member States concerned; invites again the EIB Inspector General and the Head of Division IG/IN to improve data quality and engage with Parliament on safeguarded financial interests, pursuing a proper balance between transparency and confidentiality; stresses that such reporting should include root-cause analysis to identify whether failures stem from inadequate due diligence, external shocks, or systemic issues in project</i></p>	

		<i>selection;</i>		
215	Greens	<i>20 b. Calls on the EIB Group to strengthen measures to safeguard staff well-being, including the prevention of harassment and psychosocial risks, transparent career progression rules and independent mediation mechanisms; calls for anonymised reporting to Parliament on staff turnover, absenteeism, and internal grievance procedures;</i>		
216	Greens	<i>20 d. Calls on the EIB to ensure a fair geographical balance in recruitment and management positions reflecting the diversity of the Union, while fully respecting merit-based selection principles; requests transparent reporting on nationality distribution across grades and management levels;</i>		
217	Greens	<i>20 c. Notes the importance of achieving gender balance at all hierarchical levels of the EIB Group, particularly at senior management and Board level; calls on the EIB to publish annually disaggregated data on gender representation, recruitment, promotions and pay differentials, and to adopt measurable targets to address imbalances;</i>		
218	Greens	<i>20 e. Calls on the EIB to strengthen diversity and inclusion policies, including measures addressing disability inclusion and equal opportunities, and to report annually on progress achieved;</i>		
219	TheLeft	<i>20 f. Notes with deep concern that the EIB reported two cases of employee suicides between 2013 and 2020; calls on the EIB to introduce robust</i>		

		<i>mental health support mechanisms, and to improve the Bank's workplace culture; calls for a thorough investigation into these cases to ascertain if they are related to issues regarding their working conditions;</i>		
220	TheLeft	<i>20 b. Expresses concern over the alleged corruption case of a former EIB president who reportedly approved 1 million euro of exit pay and closure of several disciplinary files regarding a former employee of theirs; welcomes the EIB's decision to lift the immunity of the suspects to enable an investigation by EPPO; awaits the results of the EPPO investigation; urges the EIB to introduce a strong anti-corruption framework to prevent future cases of misconduct;</i>		
221	TheLeft	<i>20 e. Notes that on 10 June 2024 the EIB published Annex XII to the Staff Rules, titled "Framework for recognition of trade unions at the European Investment Bank"; expresses concern that the threshold for recognition of trade unions is 7% of EIB employees, making it difficult for EIB employees to unionise; calls on the EIB to improve its rules regarding the recognition of trade unions and to engage with trade unions demands;</i>		
225	EPP	<i>21 a. Calls on the EIB to fully align its Exclusion Policy with the Commission's Early Detection and Exclusion System in terms of decision-making standards, results and remedies; reiterates its call on the EIB Group and the Commission to cooperate in identifying the</i>		

		<i>potential gaps and proposing remedies, including an expedited procedure to enforce EIB exclusion decisions via the Early Detection and Exclusion System;</i>		
226	TheLeft	<i>21 a. Notes with concern anonymous reports made by EIB staff regarding the obfuscation of information on 47 misconduct cases in the Ethics and Integrity Report published by the EIB on 3 December 2025; recalls that, according to an internal survey conducted in 2023, 50% of EIB employees fear repercussions for whistleblowing; calls on the EIB to introduce robust whistleblower protection and transparency measures;</i>		
AM	Group	<p><b>Original text</b> <span style="float: right;"><b>CA14</b></span></p> <p><i>Transparency, scrutiny and oversight</i></p> <p>21. Regrets that the EIB failed to follow up on Parliament’s annual report on its financial activities in 2023<sup>1</sup> ; stresses that interinstitutional agreement is essential for predictable cooperation;</p> <p><sup>1</sup> European Parliament resolution of <b>28 February 2024 on</b> the financial activities of the European Investment Bank – annual report 2023 (OJ C, C/2024/6742, 26.11.2024, ELI: <a href="http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6742/oj">http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6742/oj</a>).</p> <p><b>If adopted, the following AMs will fall: 222, 227, 229, 230, 231, 232 (ECR) 224 (S&amp;D) 228 (The Left) 223 Part I (Renew)</b></p>		
222	ECR	21. Regrets <i>the delay of</i> the EIB <i>in providing</i> follow up <i>to the</i> Parliament’s annual report on <i>the control of</i> its financial activities <i>for the</i>	<i>21a. Acknowledges that the main relevant audit tasks are entrusted to the EIB Audit Committee; believes that the participation of qualified external</i>	

223	Renew	<p><i>year 2023<sup>1</sup>; which is traditionally provided in line with a practice established in many previous years; stresses that more structured and predictable cooperation would be beneficial to both parties; maintains that a memorandum of understanding or an interinstitutional agreement is essential for establishing such a cooperation on information, exchange, hearings and follow-up that would make it tangible the practices already in large measure established with the Bank; welcomes the EIB's declared availability to engage in a dialogue to ensure that cooperation is based on predictable institutional commitments rather than on informal arrangements; reiterates its call for rapidly finalising such arrangement; calls exploring further ways for a better coordination between the EP, national parliaments and Supreme Audit Institutions and for an enhanced exchange with civil society and academia which would foster greater transparency;</i></p> <p><sup>1</sup> European Parliament resolution of 6 May 2025 on the control of the financial activities of the European Investment Bank – annual report 2023 (2024/2052(INI))  <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-10-2025-0076_EN.html">https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-10-2025-0076_EN.html</a></p> <p>1. <i>Notes the EIB efforts to improve documentation</i></p>	<p><i>representatives, in specific Audit Committee tasks, could enhance the objectivity of the Audit Committee's analyses (AM227);</i></p> <p>21b. <i>Notes that transparency and access to information have improved in recent years, such as efforts to improve documentation of decision-making, including indication of required majorities where applicable (AM223); observes that project-level disclosures and traceability remain uneven, especially for operations involving financial intermediaries and complex guarantee structures; calls on the Bank to better align its internal indicators with EU-wide sustainability standards (for instance, to fill the discrepancy between the EIB's Climate Action Ratio and EU Green Asset Ratio metrics); reminds that adequate reporting is a necessary pre-condition to transparency and regrets that reporting to the EP relies on voluntary and occasional appearances by the EIB President, either in Plenary or on Committee with sectorial competences (AM229);</i></p> <p>21c. <i>Notes the findings of the 2025 DFI Transparency Index, which indicate that the European Investment Bank (EIB) scores below peer multilateral development banks such as the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and African Development Bank on overall transparency metrics; recognises, however, the EIB's significant strengths identified in the November 2025 'Behind the Billions'<sup>1a</sup> report, which labels</i></p>	
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		<p><i>of decision-making, including indication of required majorities where applicable; regrets that Parliament's requests for fuller project-level transparency and more systematic follow-up remain only partially addressed; calls on the EIB, in the context of the planned 2026 review of its Transparency Policy, to align more closely with the principles of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001, while respecting legitimate banking confidentiality; stresses that interinstitutional agreement is essential for predictable cooperation;</i></p>	<p><i>the Bank's disclosure as 'good practice' for providing nearly complete traceability of its climate finance; emphasises that the EIB should now leverage its demonstrated leadership in data coverage to provide the granular impact data and standardised methodologies required to verify the effectiveness and value for money of its investments (AM230);</i></p>
224	S&D	<p>21. <i>Recalls the importance of ensuring proper follow-up on Parliament's annual report on the control of the financial activities of the European Investment Bank Group; stresses that interinstitutional agreement is essential for predictable cooperation; welcomes in this sense the progress made in the negotiations on the interinstitutional agreement and calls for its swift conclusion in order to make cooperation more fruitful, structured and intensive;</i></p>	<p><sup>1a</sup> <a href="https://www.publishwhatyoufund.org/app/uploads/dlm_uploads/2025/11/Behind-The-Billions-November-2025.pdf">https://www.publishwhatyoufund.org/app/uploads/dlm_uploads/2025/11/Behind-The-Billions-November-2025.pdf</a></p> <p>21d. <i>Is aware that EIB loans are not subject to the same visibility obligations as grant beneficiaries; asks, however, the EIB to ensure that the applicable contractual and legal frameworks foresee the clear display, in all projects financed with support from the Bank, that they are funded with the support of citizens of the EU Member States, thereby enhancing public awareness of the tangible benefits delivered by European investment and strengthening taxpayer confidence in the use of public resources (AM231);</i></p>
227	ECR	<p>21 a. <i>Acknowledges that the main relevant audit tasks are entrusted to the EIB Audit Committee; believes that the participation of qualified external representatives, in specific Audit Committee tasks, could enhance the objectivity of the Audit Committee's analyses;</i></p>	<p>21e. <i>Reiterates its observations on the importance of fully implementing a policy on tax fraud, evasion and avoidance; welcomes the testing of a new Tax Integrity Risk Rating Tool in 2024 to assess tax risks in projects and looks forward to assessing the Group-wide implementation in 2025; maintains its call on the EIB to refrain from funding</i></p>
228	TheLeft	<p>21 b. <i>Welcomes the Ombudsman's conclusions, published on 20 November 2023, that urge the EIB to proactively publish the Environmental</i></p>	

		<i>and Social Data Sheets ahead of the approval of loans, in order to allow the general public to participate in meaningful assessments of EIB financing; commends the EIB's decision to proactively publish environmental information on projects funded outside the EU; calls on the EIB to improve transparency with regards to all its loans;</i>	<i>beneficiaries or financial intermediaries which have been found to be, or are at high risk of being, involved in tax malpractices and underlines that double taxation of cross-border investments, as well as complex tax environments, constrain investments (AM232);</i>
229	ECR	<i>21 b. Notes that transparency and access to information have improved in recent years, but observes that project-level disclosures and traceability remain uneven, especially for operations involving financial intermediaries and complex guarantee structures; calls on the Bank to better align its internal indicators with EU-wide sustainability standards (for instance, to fill the discrepancy between the EIB's Climate Action Ratio and EU Green Asset Ratio metrics); reminds that adequate reporting is a necessary pre-condition to transparency and regrets that reporting to the EP relies on voluntary and occasional appearances by the EIB President, either in Plenary or on Committee with sectorial competences;</i>	21. Regrets <i>the delay of the EIB in providing</i> follow up to the Parliament's annual report on <i>the control of</i> its financial activities <i>for the year 2023</i> <sup>1</sup> ; <i>which is traditionally provided in line with a practice established in many previous years</i> ; stresses that <i>more structured and predictable cooperation would be beneficial to both parties</i> ; maintains that <i>a memorandum of understanding or an interinstitutional agreement is essential for establishing such a cooperation on information, exchange, hearings and follow-up that would make it tangible the practices already in large measure established with the Bank</i> ; welcomes the <i>EIB's declared availability to engage in a dialogue to ensure that cooperation is based on predictable institutional commitments rather than on informal arrangements</i> ; reiterates its call for <i>rapidly finalising such arrangement</i> ; calls exploring further ways for a better coordination between the EP, national parliaments and Supreme Audit Institutions and for an enhanced exchange with civil society and academia which would foster greater transparency (AM222, AM224);
230	ECR	<i>21 c. Notes the findings of the 2025 DFI Transparency Index, which indicate that the European Investment Bank (EIB) scores below peer multilateral development banks such as the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and African Development Bank on overall transparency metrics; recognises,</i>	

		<p><i>however, the EIB's significant strengths identified in the November 2025 'Behind the Billions'<sup>1a</sup> report, which labels the Bank's disclosure as 'good practice' for providing nearly complete traceability of its climate finance; emphasises that the EIB should now leverage its demonstrated leadership in data coverage to provide the granular impact data and standardised methodologies required to verify the effectiveness and value for money of its investments;</i></p> <p><i>1a</i></p> <p><a href="https://www.publishwhatyoufund.org/app/uploads/dlm_uploads/2025/11/Behind-The-Billions-November-2025.pdf">https://www.publishwhatyoufund.org/app/uploads/dlm_uploads/2025/11/Behind-The-Billions-November-2025.pdf</a></p>	<p><sup>1</sup> European Parliament resolution of 6 May 2025 on the control of the financial activities of the European Investment Bank – annual report 2023 (2024/2052(INI))  <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-10-2025-0076_EN.html">https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-10-2025-0076_EN.html</a></p>	
231	ECR	<p><i>21 d. Is aware that EIB loans are not subject to the same visibility obligations as grant beneficiaries; asks, however, the EIB to ensure that the applicable contractual and legal frameworks foresee the clear display, in all projects financed with support from the Bank, that they are funded with the support of citizens of the EU Member States, thereby enhancing public awareness of the tangible benefits delivered by European investment and strengthening taxpayer confidence in the use of public resources;</i></p>		
232	ECR	<p><i>21 e. Reiterates its observations on the importance</i></p>		

		<p><i>of fully implementing a policy on tax fraud, evasion and avoidance; welcomes the testing of a new Tax Integrity Risk Rating Tool in 2024 to assess tax risks in projects and looks forward to assessing the Group-wide implementation in 2025; maintains its call on the EIB to refrain from funding beneficiaries or financial intermediaries which have been found to be, or are at high risk of being, involved in tax malpractices and underlines that double taxation of cross-border investments, as well as complex tax environments, constrain investments;</i></p>		
AM	Group	<p><b>Original text</b></p> <p><i>Follow-up on Parliament's recommendations</i></p> <p>22. Calls for timely follow-up on: (a) investment impact; (b) conflict of interest prevention; (c) transparency; (d) this resolution;</p> <p><b>If adopted, the following AMs will fall: 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239 (ECR)</b></p>		CA15
233	ECR	<p>22. <i>Urges the EIB to timely follow up the recommendations issued by Parliament, to report on the outcomes achieved and on the impact of the actions taken to implement its priorities and the EU's policies, having special regard to:</i></p>	<p>22. <i>Urges the EIB to timely follow up the recommendations issued by Parliament, to report on the outcomes achieved and on the impact of the actions taken to implement its priorities and the EU's policies, having special regard to:</i></p>	
234	ECR	<p>(a) <i>impact (economic, environmental and social) of its investment strategy and results achieved in contributing to the balanced and steady development of the internal market in the</i></p>	<p>(a) <i>impact (economic, environmental and social) of its investment strategy and results achieved in contributing to the balanced and steady development of the internal market in the interests of the Union;</i></p>	

		<i>interests of the Union;</i>		
235	ECR	<i>(b) actions adopted to enhance the prevention and countering of conflicts of interest, fraud, corruption and other potential forms of misconduct;</i>	<i>(b) actions adopted to enhance the prevention and countering of conflicts of interest, fraud, corruption and other potential forms of misconduct;</i>  <i>(c) new measures to strengthen transparency;</i>  <i>(d) measures to strengthen support for SMEs and eligible economic operators during the implementation of EU policies;</i>	
236	ECR	<i>(c) new measures to strengthen transparency;</i>		
237	ECR	<i>(d) measures to strengthen support for SMEs and eligible economic operators during the implementation of EU policies;</i>		
238	ECR	<i>(e) follow-up on the calls and requests adopted via the present resolution;</i>		
239	ECR	<i>22 a. Measures to strengthen support for SMEs and eligible economic operators during the implementation of EU policies;</i>		

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AM	Group	<i>All citations - original text</i>		CA16
1	TheLeft	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– <i>having regard to the EIB Investment Report 2024/2025 – Innovation, integration and simplification in Europe, published on 5 March 2025,</i></li> <li>– <i>having regard to European Court of Auditors Special Report 07/2025 of 19 March 2025 on the European Fund for Strategic Investments,</i></li> <li>– <i>having regard to statement CC 1/2025 of the Contact Committee of the Supreme Audit Institutions of the European Union of 30 September 2025 on the external public audit of the European Investment Bank,</i></li> <li>– <i>having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,</i></li> <li>– <i>having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0000/2026),</i></li> </ul>	<p><b>If adopted, the following AMS will fall: 1, 3, 6 (The Left) 5, 7 (S&amp;D)</b></p>	
3	TheLeft	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– <i>having regard to the EIB Transparency Policy, as approved on 17 November 2021, and amended on 16 July 2025,</i></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– <i>having regard to the European Investment Bank Group ('EIB Group') Activity Report 2024 of 30 January 2025 entitled 'Priorities for prosperity' (Rapporteur)</i></li> </ul>	
5	S&D	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– <i>having regard to European Court of Auditors Special Report 07/2025 of 19 March 2025 on the European Fund for Strategic Investments, and the Opinion 01/2026 published on 12 January 2026,</i></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– <i>having regard to the EIB Board's decision of 21 of March 2025,</i></li> </ul>	
6	TheLeft	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– <i>having regard to the EIB Operational Plan 2026-2028, published on 29 January 2026,</i></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– <i>having regard to the EIB Investment Report 2024/2025 of 5 March 2025 'Innovation, integration and simplification in Europe', and to the Investment Report 2023/2024 'Transforming for competitiveness', published on 7 February 2024, (Rapporteur)</i></li> </ul>	
7	S&D	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– <i>having regard to the EIB Group's Strategic Roadmap 2024-2027,</i></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– <i>having regard to the EIB Group report on the implementation of the EIB Group Transparency Policy in 2023, published on 1 July 2024, (Rapporteur) and to the EIB Transparency Policy, as approved on 17 November 2021, and amended on 16 July 2025 (AM1)</i></li> </ul>	

			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– <i>having regard to the ‘EIB Group 2024-2027 Strategic Roadmap’ of 21 June 2024, (AM7 and Rapporteur)</i></li> <li>– <i>having regard to the EIB Global Impact Report 2023/2024 of 13 June 2024, (Rapporteur)</i></li> <li>– <i>having regard to Council Decision (EU) 2025/504 of 11 March 2025 amending Protocol No 5 on the Statute of the European Investment Bank<sup>3</sup> (Rapporteur)</i></li> <li>– <i>having regard to the EIB Group Security and Defence Industry Action Plan presented at the Economic and Financial Affairs Council meeting in Luxembourg on 12 April 2024, (Rapporteur)</i></li> <li>– <i>having regard to the EIB Group Operational Plan 2024-2026 of 9 February 2024 and to the EIB Group Operational Plan 2025-2027 of 30 January 2025 (AM6 and Rapporteur),</i></li> <li>– <i>having regard to the EIB Group’s third annual report on EIB Group activities in EU cohesion regions of 15 July 2024, (Rapporteur)</i></li> <li>– <i>having regard to the EIB Board’s decision of 21 of March 2025 (AM5) to broaden the EIB Group’s eligibility criteria for security and defence investments, limiting excluded activities, in accordance with the proposals approved by EU</i></li> </ul>	
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<sup>3</sup> OJ L, 2025/504, 14.3.2025, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2025/504/oj>.

			<p><i>leaders at the European Council on 6 March 2025 (Rapporteur);</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>– having regard to the Commission communication of 19 March 2025 entitled ‘Savings and Investments Union – A Strategy to Foster Citizens’ Wealth and Economic Competitiveness in the EU’ (COM(2025)0124), (Rapporteur)</i></li> <li><i>– having regard to the EIB Group Complaints Mechanism Report 2024, published on 10 June 2025, (Rapporteur)</i></li> <li><i>– having regard to the EIB Audit Committee Annual Reports for the year 2024 published on 12 September 2025, (Rapporteur)</i></li> <li><i>– having regard to the EIB Group report of 26 June 2024 entitled ‘EIB Group support for EU businesses: Evidence of impact in addressing market failures’, (Rapporteur)</i></li> <li><i>– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 5 March 2024 entitled ‘A new European Defence Industrial Strategy: Achieving EU readiness through a responsive and resilient European Defence Industry’ (JOIN(2024)0010), (Rapporteur)</i></li> </ul>	
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			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– <i>having regard to European Court of Auditors Special Report 22/2024 entitled ‘Double funding from the EU budget’, (Rapporteur)</i></li> <li>– <i>having regard to European Court of Auditors Special Report 07/2025 entitled ‘The European Fund for Strategic Investments’(Rapporteur)</i></li> <li>– <i>having regard to the European Investment Bank Group Risk Management Disclosure Report 2024 published on 8 August 2025 , (Rapporteur)</i></li> <li>– <i>having regard to the EIB Investigations Activity Report 2024 4 published on August 2025 (Rapporteur)</i></li> <li>– <i>having regard to the joint communication of 19 March 2025 from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy entitled ‘Joint White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030’ (JOIN(2025)0120), (Rapporteur)</i></li> <li>– <i>having regard to the ‘EIB Group’s contribution to the European Union’s 2021 - 2027 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) - A synthesis of evaluative evidence’ published in July 2025, (Rapporteur),</i></li> <li>– <i>having regard to the study by the European Commission published on 11 January 2024</i></li> </ul>	
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			<p><i>entitled ‘Access to equity financing for European defence SMEs’<sup>4</sup> (Rapporteur)</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– having regard to the EIB Investment Report 2024/2025 – Innovation, integration and simplification in Europe, published on 5 March 2025,</li> <li>– having regard to European Court of Auditors Special Report 07/2025 of 19 March 2025 on the European Fund for Strategic Investments, <i>and the Opinion 01/2026 published on 12 January 2026, (AM3)</i></li> <li>– having regard to statement CC 1/2025 of the Contact Committee of the Supreme Audit Institutions of the European Union of 30 September 2025 on the external public audit of the European Investment Bank,</li> <li>– <i>having regard to the report of 17 April 2024 by Enrico Letta entitled ‘Much more than a market’, (Rapporteur)</i></li> <li>– <i>having regard to the report of 25 April 2024 by Christian Noyer entitled ‘Developing European capital markets to finance the future’, (Rapporteur)</i></li> </ul>	
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<sup>4</sup> European Commission: Directorate-General for Defence Industry and Space, *Access to equity financing for European defence SMEs*, Publications Office of the European Union, 2024, <https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2889/698738>.

			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– <i>having regard to the report of 9 September 2024 by Mario Draghi entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’, (Rapporteur)</i></li> <li>– <i>having regard to the press statement by the President of the Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, on the defence package (Rearm Europe plan) of 4 March 2025, (Rapporteur)</i></li> <li>– <i>having regard to its resolution of 12 March 2025 on the white paper on the future of European defence<sup>5</sup>,(Rapporteur)</i></li> <li>– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,</li> <li>– having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A..-...../2026),</li> </ul>	

<b>AM</b>	<b>Group</b>	<b>Original text</b>	<b>CA17</b>	
		<p>A. whereas the European Investment Bank (EIB) Group’s core mission is to boost economic growth in the EU; whereas its investments should address genuine market failures;</p> <p>B. whereas social policy areas are primarily national competences; whereas EIB financing cannot be used as a substitute for national budgets and must demonstrate genuine additionality;</p>		

<sup>5</sup> Texts adopted, P10\_TA(2025)0034.

		<p>C. whereas the depth and quality of Parliament’s oversight of the EIB’s financial operations should be in line with the intensity of EIB-Commission cooperation, which has become very significant;</p> <p>D. whereas the EIB is owned by the Member States, with its EUR 248.8 billion in subscribed capital representing taxpayer liability; whereas EIB borrowing does not appear in national debt statistics; whereas this off-balance-sheet nature makes rigorous efficiency standards and external audit essential; whereas the expansion of the EIB’s mandate must be matched by the strengthening of external audit arrangements;</p> <p><b>If adopted, the following AMs will fall: 8, 9, 32, 35, 37, 40, 42 (ECR) 10, 18, 24, 27, 36 (The Left) 11, 15, 28 (EPP) 12, 17, 26, 30, 34, 38, 41 (Greens) 13, 16,, 21, 22, 23, 25 (S&amp;D) 14, 19 (Renew)</b></p>	
8	ECR	-A. <i>whereas the EIB Group includes the EIB and the European Investment Fund (EIF), the former standing as the world largest multilateral financial institution, entirely owned by the Member States;</i>	Aa. <i>whereas the EIB Group includes the EIB and the European Investment Fund (EIF), the former standing as the world largest multilateral financial institution, entirely owned by the Member States (AM8); whereas the activities of a public bank should be to tackle clear market failures (AM9) and investment gaps (AM14) where private finance is lacking (AM9) ;</i>
9	ECR	-A a. <i>whereas the activities of a public bank should be to tackle clear market failures where private finance is lacking;</i>	
10	TheLeft	A. <i>whereas the European Investment Bank (EIB) Group is tasked with contributing to the balanced and steady development of the economy of the Union; whereas the Bank should operate on a not-for-profit basis and finance projects that foster social and territorial cohesion, innovative projects, and projects of common interest which cannot be entirely financed by individual Member States, and support the achievement of Union’s policies and actions;</i>	A. <i>whereas the European Investment Bank (EIB) Group should, according to the Treaty provisions, contribute the balanced and steady development of the internal market in the interest of the Union (AM10, AM11); whereas its investments should focus on projects delivering demonstrable additionality and value for money (AM12, AM36) and aiming at developing the internal market, or projects of common interest which cannot be entirely financed by the means available in a Member State (AM11, AM10);</i>
11	EPP	A. <i>whereas the European Investment Bank (EIB) Group should, according to the Treaty</i>	

		<i>provisions, contribute the balanced and steady development of the internal market in the interest of the Union; whereas its investments should focus on projects aiming at developing of the internal market or projects of common interest which cannot be entirely financed by the various means available in a Member State;</i>	B. whereas EIB financing <i>should complement, not replace,</i> national budgets and <i>private finance</i> (AM17) <i>and respect the subsidiarity principle</i> (AM19) <i>in particular in those policy areas of primarily national competences; whereas it must provide clear</i> (AM17) <i>EU added value</i> (AM19) <i>and demonstrate measurable results</i> (AM17) <i>of genuine additionality;</i>	
12	Greens	A. whereas the European Investment Bank (EIB) Group's core mission is to <i>support the Union's policy objectives as laid down in the Treaties, including sustainable development, economic, social and territorial cohesion and the transition to climate neutrality;</i> whereas <i>EIB interventions</i> should address genuine market failures <i>and deliver demonstrable additionality and value for money;</i>	<i>Ba. whereas the EIB Group contributes to the promotion of economic, social and territorial cohesion in the Union and supports the implementation of measures outside the EU that support the development cooperation policy of the Union</i> (AM15, AM12, AM13);	
13	S&D	A. whereas the European Investment Bank (EIB) Group's core mission is to boost <i>Europe's potential in terms of jobs and growth;</i> whereas its investments should address market failures <i>while fostering European integration, social and regional cohesion, and the fair green and digital transitions;</i>	<i>Bb. whereas the Letta and Draghi reports on the future of the European Union call for strengthening the EU's competitiveness, emphasize the vital role of market integration and underscore the need to accelerate both public and private investment to build a stronger Europe</i> (AM22); <i>whereas the EIB has a key role, in particular through the EIF, in supporting small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), enhancing their ability to access financial markets</i> (AM23); <i>whereas the EIB's role in housing should be assessed against additionality criteria and complement national efforts rather than substitute them</i> (AM20);	
14	Renew	A. whereas the European Investment Bank (EIB) Group's core mission is <i>foster European integration, promote the development of the EU and support EU policies in over 160 countries around the world ;</i> whereas its investments should address genuine market failures <i>and investment gaps</i>		
15	EPP	<i>Aa. whereas the EIB Group contributes to the</i>		

		<i>promotion of economic, social and territorial cohesion in the Union and supports the implementation of measures outside the EU that support the development cooperation policy of the Union;</i>	<i>Bc. whereas the EIB's AAA credit rating constitutes a strategic asset for the European Union and its Member States (Rapporteur);</i>
16	S&D	<i>B. whereas EIB financing has a proven capacity to support, together with national budgets, the social sector, including housing, health and education, thereby tackling unemployment, poverty, and social exclusion; whereas the EIB Group's Strategic Roadmap 2024-2027 identifies social infrastructure as a key cross-cutting priority;</i>	<i>Ca. whereas this report focuses on the control dimension of EIB activities, assessing value for money, accountability and the sound management of EU resources (AM32); whereas the continuous expansion of the EIB's mandate and the increase in EU budget guarantees backing the Bank's operations make it legitimate and necessary for the level of external scrutiny to grow correspondingly (AM40);</i>
17	Greens	<i>B. whereas EIB financing should complement, not replace, national budgets and private finance, and should be directed to areas where it provides clear European added value, additionality and measurable results, including through well-designed social investment and cohesion-relevant projects;</i>	<i>C. whereas democratic accountability must keep pace with the Bank's evolving role; (AM40) whereas the depth and quality of Parliament's oversight of the EIB's financial operations should be in line with the intensity of EIB-Commission cooperation, which has become very significant; whereas the EIB's growing role should be accompanied by greater democratic accountability and transparency (AM25); whereas increased parliamentary scrutiny would enhance EIB's democratic accountability (AM24) and this requires transparent reporting, audit access and structured follow-up to Parliament's recommendations (AM26);</i>
18	TheLeft	<i>B. whereas articles 151 and 153 of TFEU mandate the Union to support and complement the activities of the Member States in matters of social policy;</i>	
19	Renew	<i>B. whereas in areas which are primarily of national competence EIB support should respect the subsidiarity principle and be justified by EU added value;</i>	
21	S&D	<i>Bb. whereas the EIB Global lending arm, which was launched in 2022, is of key importance in terms of Europe's position in the world;</i>	<i>Cb. whereas effective whistleblower protection (AM34) and investigative journalism contribute to fraud prevention and to the pursue of sound financial</i>

22	S&D	<i>Bc. whereas the Letta and Draghi reports on the future of the European Union call for strengthening the EU's competitiveness, emphasize the vital role of market integration and underscore the need to accelerate both public and private investment to build a stronger, more secure, autonomous, and fair Europe;</i>	<i>management, because enhance transparency and public scrutiny (AM27);</i>
23	S&D	<i>Bd. whereas the EIB has a key role, through the EIF, in supporting small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), enhancing their ability to access financial markets;</i>	D. whereas the EIB is owned by the Member States, with its EUR 248.8 billion in subscribed capital representing taxpayer liability; whereas EIB borrowing does not appear in national debt statistics; whereas this off-balance-sheet nature makes rigorous efficiency standards and external audit essential; whereas the expansion of the EIB's mandate must be matched by the strengthening of external audit arrangements;
24	TheLeft	C. whereas the depth and quality of Parliament's oversight of the EIB's financial operations should be in line with the intensity of EIB-Commission cooperation, which has become very significant; <i>whereas more robust measures are needed to enhance democratic accountability of the EIB particularly through increased parliamentary scrutiny;</i>	<i>Da. whereas the EIB Group has internal mechanisms for accountability, which are, however, not a substitute for independent external democratic control and oversight by the European Court of Auditors (AM35);</i>
25	S&D	C. <i>whereas the EIB's growing role should be accompanied by greater democratic accountability and transparency;</i> whereas the depth and quality of Parliament's oversight of the EIB's financial operations should be in line with the intensity of EIB-Commission cooperation, which has become very significant;	<i>Db. whereas, under the current Treaty framework and the EIB Statute, cooperation between the European Investment Bank and the European Parliament in the context of the annual control report is largely based on informal arrangements and established practices rather than on binding institutional obligations (AM37);</i>
26	Greens	C. whereas Parliament's oversight should be <i>commensurate</i> with the <i>EIB Group's increasing role in implementing Union policies and Union-budget backed</i>	<i>Dc. whereas the EIB's business model demands the highest standards of integrity, accountability and transparency (AM28 and AM30), and adequate measures need to be adopted and continuously updated to avoid financing all forms of fraud,</i>

		<i>instruments; whereas this requires transparent reporting, audit access and structured follow-up to Parliament's recommendations;</i>		
27	TheLeft	<i>C a. whereas the involvement of investigative journalists and independent media, civil society organisations, research institutions, and local stakeholders affected by EIB-financed projects is essential to enhance transparency and public scrutiny over EIB activities;</i>		
28	EPP	<i>D a. whereas the EIB's business model demands the highest standards of integrity, accountability and transparency, and adequate measures need to be adopted and continuously updated to avoid financing all forms of fraud, money laundering, terrorism, and organised crime and tax avoidance; whereas the EIB Group possesses a control framework with the aim of preventing and mitigating sanctions risks</i>		
30	Greens	<i>D a. whereas the EIB should apply the highest standards of risk management, transparency and accountability, including disclosure of methodologies for additionality, risk rating and climate impact, and strong safeguards to prevent moral hazard;</i>		
32	ECR	<i>D a. whereas this report focuses on the control dimension of EIB activities, assessing value for money, accountability and the sound</i>		
			<i>money laundering, terrorism, and organised crime and tax avoidance (AM28);</i>	
			<i>E. whereas the EIB plays a key role in advancing the Union's external objectives through its lending activities in third countries, including through EIB Global, launched in 2022, which is to be aligned with Europe's policies and priorities (AM21 and Rapporteur) around the world (AM14); whereas effective cooperation with partner countries on migration management, including readmission and return of migrants who have no legal right to stay in the Union, is a relevant consideration in the context of the EU's external lending framework (AM42)</i>	
			<i>F. whereas staff at all levels of the EIB Group, including senior management and the Board, should be gender and geographically well-balanced, while fully respecting merit-based selection principles (AM38); whereas staff well-being and a transparent and fair human resources framework are material to institutional resilience and integrity (AM41);</i>	

		<i>management of EU resources;</i>		
34	Greens	<i>D b. whereas effective whistleblower protection and a strong internal reporting culture are essential elements of sound financial management and fraud prevention; whereas the credibility of the EIB's governance architecture depends on the independence, accessibility and effectiveness of its whistleblowing mechanisms;</i>		
35	ECR	<i>D b. whereas the EIB Group has internal mechanisms for accountability, which are, however, not a substitute for independent external democratic control and oversight by the European Court of Auditors;</i>		
36	TheLeft	<i>D c. whereas the additionality principle implies that socially, environmentally, and economically desirable investments would not take place without the EIB's contribution; whereas the ECA 07/2025 special report suggest that additionality of the InvestEU allocations cannot be assessed ex-post; whereas the lack of convincing methodology to measure additionality might put in question the rationale of specific investments;</i>		
37	ECR	<i>D c. whereas, under the current Treaty framework and the EIB Statute, cooperation between the European Investment Bank and the European Parliament in the context of the annual control report is largely based on informal arrangements and established practices rather than on binding institutional obligations;</i>		

38	Greens	<i>D c. whereas balanced representation in terms of gender and geographical diversity at all levels of the EIB Group, including senior management and the Board, strengthens institutional legitimacy, risk awareness and decision-making quality;</i>		
40	ECR	<i>D d. whereas the continuous expansion of the EIB's mandate and the increase in EU budget guarantees backing the Bank's operations make it legitimate and necessary for the level of external scrutiny to grow correspondingly; whereas democratic accountability must keep pace with the Bank's evolving role;</i>		
41	Greens	<i>D d. whereas staff well-being, protection against harassment and psychosocial risks, and a transparent and fair human resources framework are essential to ensure institutional resilience, integrity and effective risk management;</i>		
42	ECR	<i>D e. whereas the EIB plays a key role in advancing the Union's external objectives through its lending activities in third countries; whereas effective cooperation with partner countries on migration management, including readmission and return of migrants who have no legal right to stay in the Union, is a relevant consideration in the context of the EU's external lending framework;</i>		