



2025/2069(INI)

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COMPROMISE AMENDMENTS

1 - 13

Draft report

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Findings and recommendations of the Special Committee on the European
Democracy Shield
(2025/2069(INI))

COMPROMISE 1

The role of sanctions in the protection of democracy

Compromise supported by PPE, S&D, Renew, Verts/ALE and replacing Amendment(s) 607, 646, 1309, 1551, 1552, 1553, 1554, 1555, 1556, 1557, 1558, 1560, 1563, 1564, 1565, 1566, 1567, 1569, 1571, 1572, 1573, 1574, 1575, 1576, 1577, 1578, 1579, 1580, 1581, 1583, 1586, 1587, 1588, 1589, 1590, 1593, 1595, 282, 532, 533, 534, 535, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 582

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 78

Motion for a resolution

78. Considers sanctions against **foreign entities, countries or individuals that engage in conduct** aimed at undermining the democratic integrity of the EU or its Member States to be an **important element** of the European Democracy Shield's **objectives**; further stresses that effective sanctions must include a comprehensive set of **activities**, including asset freezing and confiscation, attribution and exposure, cost increases and revenue cuts, bans on imports and exports, the denial of access and other **relevant** restrictive measures;

Amendment

78. Considers sanctions against individuals **and state and non-state entities engaged in actions** aimed at undermining the democratic integrity of the EU or its Member States to be an **essential component** of the European Democracy Shield's **toolbox**; further stresses that effective sanctions must **be adopted based on objective and consistent criteria and must** include a comprehensive set of **measures**, including asset freezing and confiscation, **clear** attribution and **public** exposure, cost increases and revenue cuts, bans on imports and exports, **travel bans**, the denial of access **to EU markets and financial system**, and other **effective, robust and impactful** restrictive measures; **reiterates its call on the Council to gradually transition to qualified majority voting for decisions in areas of the common foreign and security policy such as sanctions**;

Paragraph 79

Motion for a resolution

79. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to regularly and closely assess imposed sanctions in terms of optimal efficiency and possible further expansion, including **secondary** sanctions targeting entities that engage in the

Amendment

79. **Calls for improving the effectiveness and impact of EU sanctions adopted following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, so as to definitively undermine Russia's ability to continue waging its brutal war of aggression and threatening the**

circumvention of sanctions; considers that, particularly in the area of Russian hybrid threats and destabilising activities, the EU should further expand its sanctions regime by targeting the financial and technical enablers that sustain disinformation, cyberattacks and election interference, such as crypto exchanges, advertising networks and hosting providers, while also disrupting Russia's proxy networks in non-EU countries, notably in Africa **and** the Middle East, by imposing sanctions on media outlets, logistics hubs, and Wagner-linked groups that spread anti-EU narratives; considers that to further raise the cost of hybrid aggression, the EU should expand **secondary** sanctions **on non-EU – and** in particular, Chinese – **firms that** facilitate Russian operations, and that it should ban Russian cyber mercenaries from using EU-based services, such as hosting, domain and cloud services, and publicly expose and impose sanctions on EU politicians or lobbyists covertly funded by Moscow;

security of other neighbouring countries; calls on the Commission and the Member States to regularly and closely assess imposed sanctions in terms of optimal efficiency and possible further expansion, including sanctions targeting **individuals and** entities that engage in the **active** circumvention of **the EU** sanctions **against Russia;** considers that, particularly in the area of Russian hybrid threats and destabilising activities, the EU should further expand its sanctions regime by targeting the financial and technical enablers that sustain disinformation, cyberattacks and election interference, such as crypto exchanges, advertising networks and hosting providers, while also disrupting Russia's proxy networks in non-EU countries, notably in Africa, the Middle East **and Latin America**, by imposing sanctions on media outlets, logistics hubs, and Wagner-linked groups that spread anti-EU narratives; considers that to further raise the cost of hybrid aggression, the EU should expand **sanctions targeting non-EU individuals and entities responsible for the active circumvention of** sanctions – in particular, Chinese – **who** facilitate Russian operations, and that it should ban Russian cyber mercenaries from using EU-based services, such as hosting, domain and cloud services, and publicly expose and impose sanctions on EU politicians or lobbyists covertly funded by Moscow;

Paragraph 80

Motion for a resolution

80. Considers that identifying and naming source countries, **rather than** individuals or companies, could be an important step towards acknowledging the problem of clear systematic, multi-layered and often state-sponsored interference that countries such as Russia or Iran are engaging in throughout Europe; welcomes the Commission's decision to list Russia as

Amendment

80. Considers that identifying and naming source countries, **in addition to attributing responsibility to** individuals or companies, could be an important step towards acknowledging the problem of clear systematic, multi-layered and often state-sponsored interference that countries such as Russia or Iran are engaging in throughout Europe; welcomes the

a high-risk third country under the EU's anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing framework, in order to preserve the integrity of the EU financial system; recalls that the new Anti-Money Laundering Regulation will provide *an additional legal basis* for identifying *dangerous* countries, *including those involved in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction*;

Commission's decision to list Russia as a high-risk third country under the EU's anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing framework, in order to preserve the integrity of the EU financial system, *and calls on the Commission to assess whether further listing Belarus would be appropriate, given its risk profile and links to the Russian political and economic structures*; recalls that the new Anti-Money Laundering Regulation will provide *extended possibilities* for identifying *and listing high-risk third* countries; *calls on the Commission, with the assistance of the Anti-Money Laundering Authority (AMLA), to fully use its powers with regard to ensuring the implementation of targeted financial sanctions*;

Paragraph 81

Motion for a resolution

81. Underlines that the effectiveness and credibility of EU sanctions depend on strict and consistent enforcement; *highlights* that the announced revision of the mandate of the European Public Prosecutor's Office (EPPO) offers an opportunity to strengthen its role to include the investigation and prosecution of sanctions violations;

Amendment

81. Underlines that the effectiveness and credibility of EU sanctions depend on strict and consistent enforcement; *calls, therefore, on the Member States to establish a mechanism for the effective monitoring of enforcement activities, including through collaboration with civil society and academia, to improve coordination and to work together on closing loopholes and harmonising procedures*; *welcomes* that the announced revision of the mandate of the European Public Prosecutor's Office (EPPO) offers an opportunity to strengthen its role to include the investigation and prosecution of sanctions violations; *stresses that such a reform should be matched by adequate funding to enable the EPPO to effectively carry out its enhanced responsibilities*;

Paragraph 81 a (new)

81 a. Recalls that the European Union's Anti-Coercion Instrument, which is in place since 2023, provides for a wide range of EU measures that can be taken to counteract third countries' attempts at economic coercion against the Union or a Member State; stresses that the ACI should be part of a proactive escalation strategy to respond to threats targeting European territorial integrity and digital, regulatory, financial or economic sovereignty; reminds that access to the internal market for operators from non-EU countries is subject to compliance with Union law;

Paragraph 82

82. Condemns **Russia's** politically motivated use of 'blacklists' targeting EU citizens, representatives of state authorities and commercial organisations, journalists, civil society actors and political officials, including democratically elected Members of the European Parliament; calls for a more coordinated and resolute EU response to these arbitrary measures, ensuring the protection and security of those blacklisted and providing them with solidarity and the necessary **support**; expresses its full support for all individuals affected;

82. Condemns **the** politically motivated use **by foreign governments, not least Russia**, of 'blacklists', **visa bans and other restrictive or retaliatory measures** targeting EU citizens, representatives of state authorities and commercial organisations, journalists, civil society actors, **humanitarian organisations** and political officials, including democratically elected Members of the European Parliament; **is concerned that such practice, which aims at exerting undue political pressure on the Union's regulatory autonomy and fundamental rights framework, undermines diplomatic norms and the principle of mutual respect between jurisdictions**; calls for a more coordinated and resolute EU response to these arbitrary measures **alongside continued diplomatic efforts**, ensuring the protection and security of those blacklisted and providing them with solidarity and the necessary **assistance**; expresses its full support for all individuals affected; **stresses the need for establishing a system for continuously assessing and informing**

targeted individuals, in particular in relation to the Russian blacklist, including MEPs, their staff, and officials, ensuring transparency and protection;

Recital BD

Motion for a resolution

BD. whereas, ***between 2022 and 2025***, the EU imposed a total of **19** packages of extensive and unprecedented sanctions in response to Russia's military aggression against Ukraine, substantially increasing pressure on the Russian war economy, targeting key sectors such as energy, finance and the defence industry, special economic zones, and enablers and profiteers of its war of aggression, and ending the EU's dependency on fossil fuel imports from Russia; whereas the EU has also adopted sanctions against Belarus, Iran and North Korea in response to their support for Russia's military aggression against Ukraine;

Amendment

BD. whereas ***since 2022***, the EU ***has*** imposed a total of **[20]** packages of extensive and unprecedented sanctions in response to Russia's military aggression against Ukraine; ***whereas those sanctions are aimed at*** substantially increasing pressure on the Russian war economy ***by*** targeting key sectors such as energy, finance and the defence industry, special economic zones, and enablers and profiteers of its war of aggression, and ending the EU's dependency on fossil fuel imports from Russia; whereas the EU has also adopted sanctions against Belarus, Iran and North Korea in response to their support for Russia's military aggression against Ukraine; ***whereas the efficacy of such measures should be strengthened and loopholes allowing for their circumvention should be closed;***

Recital BE

Motion for a resolution

BE. whereas, since 8 October 2024, the EU sanctions framework has ***enabled*** the targeting of a broad range of hybrid activities carried out by Russia, including the undermining of electoral processes and the functioning of democratic institutions, threats against and the sabotaging of economic activities, services of public interest and critical infrastructure, the use of coordinated disinformation and FIMI, malicious cyber activities, the instrumentalisation of ***migrants*** and other destabilising activities; whereas this

Amendment

BE. whereas, since 8 October 2024, the EU sanctions framework has ***been expanded to enable*** the targeting of a broad range of hybrid activities carried out by Russia, including the undermining of electoral processes and the functioning of democratic institutions, threats against and the sabotaging of economic activities, services of public interest and critical infrastructure, the use of coordinated disinformation and FIMI, malicious cyber activities, the instrumentalisation of ***migration*** and other destabilising

framework has already led to the sanctioning of tens of individuals and entities, including Russian oligarchs, propagandists, military intelligence operatives, media outlets and companies, for spreading pro-Kremlin narratives, conducting sabotage and undermining democratic processes; whereas ***related measures now allow*** the EU to include asset freezes, travel bans and the suspension of broadcasting licences, and to prohibit financial and crypto-asset transactions linked to hybrid activities;

activities; whereas this framework has already led to the sanctioning of tens of individuals and entities, including Russian oligarchs, propagandists, military intelligence operatives, media outlets and companies, for spreading pro-Kremlin narratives, conducting sabotage and undermining democratic processes; whereas ***this sanctions regime now allows*** the EU to include asset freezes, travel bans and the suspension of broadcasting licences, and to prohibit financial and crypto-asset transactions linked to hybrid activities;

Recital BF

Motion for a resolution

BF. whereas on 28 December 2024, the Russian Government announced that it had ‘significantly expanded’ its blacklist of EU citizens and officials, including representatives of EU institutions, national governments, law-enforcement agencies and commercial organisations; whereas this blacklist, targeting those who promote democratic values and oppose Russian aggression in Ukraine, seeks to intimidate and silence voices through opaque and arbitrary restrictions, often without any formal notification, justification or right of appeal;

Amendment

BF. ***whereas retaliatory measures including arrest warrants and in-absentia proceedings are commonly used by the Moscow regime against foreign nationals located abroad who are blamed for criticizing its policies or resisting its influence;*** whereas on 28 December 2024, the Russian Government announced that it had ‘significantly expanded’ its blacklist of EU citizens and officials, including representatives of EU institutions, national governments, law-enforcement agencies and commercial organisations; whereas this blacklist, targeting those who promote democratic values and oppose Russian aggression in Ukraine, seeks to intimidate and silence voices through opaque and arbitrary restrictions ***and false legal accusations,*** often without any formal notification, justification or right of appeal; ***whereas such coercion follows a pattern of escalation, beginning with administrative exclusion, progressing to online harassment and culminating in physical threats, surveillance, intimidation of family members, or even violent attacks; whereas the threat of being blacklisted alone may lead European officials to anticipatory self-***

ensorship and refraining from taking political positions; whereas the Moscow regime in parallel maintains lists of Russian citizens as a means of transnational repression;

Recital BF a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

BF a. whereas the Russian blacklist should be recognised as an instrument of hybrid warfare and foreign coercion; whereas an adequate response of the EU should include enhanced intelligence-sharing in the Union, as well as targeted sanctions, such as asset freezes and travel bans, on foreign officials, handlers, and financial facilitators responsible for coercive practices, and disruption of the financial and logistical networks enabling these operations, including cryptocurrency channels;

Recital BF b (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

BF b. whereas the EU has adopted an Anti-Coercion Instrument (ACI) to protect itself and its Member States from economic coercion by third countries;

Or. en

COMPROMISE 2

Protecting critical infrastructure

Compromise supported by PPE, S&D, Renew, Verts/ALE

and replacing Amendment(s) 976, 977, 978, 979, 988, 997 part 2, 1000, 1278, 1279, 1280, 1281, 1288, 1285, 1286, 1289, 1283, 1284, 1287, 1290, 1291, 1292, 1293, 1294, 1297, 1298, 1296, 1295, 1299, 1302, 1307, 1308, 1301, 1300, 1304, 1303, 1305, 1306, 1310, 1312, 1311, 1315, 1318, 1320, 1319, 1313, 1314, 1316, 1317, 1321, 1322, 1323, 1348, 1324, 1325, 1326, 1327, 1328, 1364, 1330, 1335, 1334, 1336, 1332, 1333, 1338, 1339, 1340, 1341, 1342, 1343, 1346, 148, 152, 281, 284, 392, 395, 396, 393, 394, 397, 398, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 409, 408, 407, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 152 B Part 2, 416, 419, 424, 425, 417, 420, 422, 423, 418, 274, 278, 279

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 43

Motion for a resolution

43. Takes the position that protecting the EU and its Member States from both physical and **digital** acts of sabotage targeting critical infrastructure is a vital element in safeguarding democratic resilience; calls for robust preventive measures, strengthened cross-border cooperation and enhanced EU capacity to detect, deter and respond to such hostile activities;

Amendment

43. Takes the position that protecting the EU and its Member States from both physical and **cyber** acts of sabotage targeting critical infrastructure is a vital element in safeguarding democratic resilience; calls for **a proactive strategy to deter threats, the adoption of** robust preventive measures, strengthened cross-border cooperation and enhanced EU capacity to detect, deter and respond to such hostile activities; **emphasises that foreign state-linked ownership of critical infrastructure increase exposure to security risks and warrants enhanced scrutiny, particularly in communications infrastructures, digital infrastructures, undersea cables, energy infrastructures, transport hubs, hospitals and public service infrastructure;**

Paragraph 44

Motion for a resolution

44. Strongly condemns escalatory drone and other airborne incursions targeting and interfering with critical infrastructure, including civil airports,

Amendment

44. Strongly condemns escalatory drone and other airborne incursions targeting and interfering with critical infrastructure, including civil airports,

military bases and energy facilities across the EU, in particular as perpetrated by Russia and Belarus; calls on the Member States to respond in a coordinated, unified and appropriate manner to any breach of their airspace, including through shooting down aircraft, drones and other airborne threats;

ports, military bases, industrial hubs, border management infrastructure and energy facilities across the EU, in particular as perpetrated by Russia and Belarus; calls on the Member States to respond in a coordinated, unified and appropriate manner to any breach of their airspace, including through shooting down aircraft, drones and other airborne threats; **urges the Commission and the Member States to work on knowledge transfer programmes with Ukraine as well as on joint trainings and certification of drone pilots in view of the knowledge acquired in Ukraine about the conduct of modern warfare;**

Paragraph 44 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

44a. Emphasises the strategic role of Union agencies in ensuring the protection of cross-border critical infrastructure within the EU and its Member States, as well as the need to strengthen cooperation on seaports, airports and land border crossings, including through joint vulnerability assessments; draws particular attention to the threats of GPS jamming and spoofing conducted by Russia and Belarus and their potential to disrupt critical infrastructure operations, compromise navigational safety, and undermine the continuity and resilience of essential cross-border services;

Paragraph 45

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

45. Stresses that a range of hybrid activities which Russia has undertaken against the EU amount to state-sponsored terrorism, even if they fall under the threshold of an armed attack; underlines, therefore, the need to apply all available

45. Stresses that a range of hybrid activities which Russia has undertaken against the EU amount to state-sponsored terrorism, even if they fall under the threshold of an armed attack; underlines, therefore, the need to apply all available

legal frameworks for combating terrorism to Russia's hostile activities, which violate EU Member States' territorial sovereignty, undermine the integrity of their institutions and directly threaten the safety of the civilian population; underlines that the EU must urgently transition from defence mode to active deterrence; urges the Member States to evaluate the legal and operational frameworks for proportionate offensive measures targeting the logistical and digital infrastructure behind Moscow's destabilisation activities;

legal frameworks for combating terrorism to Russia's hostile activities, which violate EU Member States' territorial sovereignty, undermine the integrity of their institutions and directly threaten the safety of the civilian population; underlines that the EU must urgently transition from defence mode to active deterrence; urges the Member States to evaluate the legal and operational frameworks for proportionate offensive measures targeting the logistical and digital infrastructure behind Moscow's destabilisation activities; ***notes that Russia is vulnerable to cyber operations as the breach of Russia's Aeroflot by Cyber Partisans BY has demonstrated; underlines Ukraine's extensive experience in inflicting damage to Russian capabilities and the need to accelerate support to Ukraine in strengthening its offensive cyber capabilities;***

Paragraph 46

Motion for a resolution

46. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to establish a ***joint EU*** interpretation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), in order to ensure ***coordinated*** action against hybrid activities ***and*** sabotage in the ***EU's*** maritime areas, notably in the Baltic Sea; ***considers that cross-border coordination can be further improved both at the operational and the financial level; stresses the need for the EU to step up its response to hybrid threats in maritime areas, including those posed by the Russian 'shadow fleet'; underlines that addressing these challenges requires dedicated and sufficient EU funding;***

Amendment

46. ***Emphasises that cross-border coordination in countering hybrid threats in maritime areas should be further strengthened, underpinned by dedicated and adequate EU funding, and that the Union must step up its operational response, particularly to those linked to the Russian "shadow fleet"; calls, in this context, on the Commission and the Member States to establish a coordinated, Union-wide interpretation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in order to ensure coherent action against hybrid activities, acts of sabotage, unreported illegal and unregulated fishing and violations of sovereign rights in the Union's maritime areas, notably in the Baltic Sea, while recalling UNCLOS's objective of ensuring the peaceful use of the seas; further welcomes the Commission Recommendation on secure and resilient***

submarine cable infrastructures and the EU Action Plan on Cable Security; urges the Commission and the Member States to accelerate the implementation of these initiatives by mapping cable infrastructure, developing coordinated risk assessments and stress tests, deploying mitigation measures, and strengthening incident response and repair capacity, including by supporting modular repair equipment, and maintaining strategic stockpiles of essential spare parts;

Paragraph 46 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

46a. *Calls for effective criminalisation and deterrence of hybrid activities and acts of sabotage, including attack on undersea cables and connectors; encourages the Commission and the Member States to learn from the Australian example of establishing so-called cable protection zones, providing legal safeguards and criminalising damage to submarine cables beyond the 12-nautical-mile territorial sea limit, accompanied by active monitoring, surveillance and response in cooperation with relevant third-country partners;*

Paragraph 46 b (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

46b. *Encourages Member States to explore the use of the Proliferation Security Initiative mandate to board vessels linked to such shadow fleets, and calls on the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to play a more active role in scrutinising flag-registry governance within its mutual evaluation and greylisting processes;*

Paragraph 46 c (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

46c. Reiterates European Parliament's call for the establishment of European Maritime Security Hubs in the Black Sea, the North Sea and the Baltic Sea in response to Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine and underlines that such hubs should enhance maritime situational awareness, enable real-time monitoring from space to seabed and strengthen early warning capacities and reactions to the increased threats from the Russian shadow fleet, also with regards to the environmental perspectives, an while ensuring the security of commercial routes; calls on the Commission and the Member states to prevent the fleet from entering European waters and perform their frequent and thorough inspections to make sure they are not violating any laws and do not pose any danger;

Paragraph 47

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

47. **Notes with concern the** existing structural dependencies, through market concentration and foreign control, in the EU's digital infrastructure, **including** operating systems, data centres, semiconductors, AI, cybersecurity, cloud computing and various **digital** platforms and services, **all of which** pose a high risk to democracy, freedom **and** security **within the EU, and to the EU's** competitiveness; calls on the Commission **and the Member States to establish, as a foundational layer, a sovereign EU digital infrastructure with privacy-preserving technologies and an EU application programming interface (API) ecosystem through ambitious, targeted policies that**

47. **Strongly emphasize that** existing structural dependencies, through market concentration and foreign control, **including the dominance of U.S. Big Tech companies,** in the EU's digital infrastructure, **in** operating systems, data centres, semiconductors, AI, **data-driven decision making tools, payment infrastructure,** cybersecurity, cloud computing and various **online** platforms and services pose a high risk to democracy, freedom, security **and** competitiveness **within the EU; regrets the recent incidents, in which Microsoft, Visa and Mastercard suspended services and halted transactions of US sanctioned staff members of the International Criminal**

enhance investment in and the market share of EU companies, leveraging the European supply of clean energy in the development of data centres and cloud infrastructure, including through market-driven initiatives such as joint ventures or federated networks in areas such as AI gigafactories or cloud services;

Court (ICC); highlights in this respect EU's vulnerability to similar external decisions that could disrupt public services and economic activities calls on the Commission to systematically integrate dependency reduction and European industrial capacity-building objectives into the implementation of the European Democracy Shield;

Paragraph 47 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

47a. Considers a resilient, competitive EU digital infrastructure – including secure local data centres, sovereign EU cloud, edge computing capacities, and gigabit networks – as a strategic pillar of digital resilience, ensuring openness, competition, and global interoperability; stresses that such infrastructure should help protect Europeans' sensitive data from risks linked to storage abroad and exposure to non-EU laws, and address complexities around foreign ownership and investment in essential infrastructures, including through digital autonomy stress tests to map dependencies on large commercial tech companies for essential public services; regrets that, after six years of drafting, the European Cybersecurity Certification Scheme for Cloud Services (EUCS) still lacks a certification assurance level enabling European cloud providers to guarantee the highest protection of strategic data against non-European jurisdictions, and underlines that robust cybersecurity certification is essential for the integrity and resilience of digital services underpinning democratic processes; stresses that with the Cloud and AI Development Act and the revised Cybersecurity Act, the work on the EUCS should be resumed; welcomes that the proposal for Cloud and AI Development Act introduces graduated Union

assurance levels, and calls for the highest assurance level to provide effective protection of the most sensitive and strategic data against access under non-EU jurisdictions, while avoiding unnecessary barriers to innovation and investment;

Paragraph 47 b (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

47b. Stresses the need to address risks related to strategic and sensitive network-connected hardware and software components and services capable of remote access, data transmission or system control sourced from high-risk third countries, including China; notes with concern the risks associated with the dominance of Chinese solar inverters and other components, in certain cases placed on the Union market at artificially low prices due to state-backed non-market practices; welcomes, in this context, that the proposed revision of the Cybersecurity Act aims to provide a framework to ban network-connected components capable of remote access, such as inverters, from high-risk suppliers, and that the Strategic Roadmap for Digitalisation and AI in the Energy Sector provides for a risk assessment of solar installations and a review of the energy security-of-supply framework; calls for the swift adoption of these measures to protect critical energy infrastructure from remote manipulation, blackouts and supply-chain risks; calls on the Commission and Member States to promote secure, EU-based and EU-produced alternatives, review current procurement rules to assess if they hinder digital sovereignty, and pursue a comprehensive EU tech sovereignty agenda with clear resilience standards and criteria for developing or procuring technology or digital infrastructure, ensuring that regulatory frameworks,

trade and competition policies effectively prevent unfair market practices and reduce dependencies on non-Union providers; stresses that digital success is driven by competition, openness, and technological excellence, and that the EU should have a strategy to attract, maintain, and retain critical technologies, while taking due account of factors related to foreign acquisitions; reiterates the need to be guided by a buy European policy for critical infrastructure, which should be designed and implemented in a well-balanced and proportionate manner; supports a sovereign EU digital infrastructure with privacy-enhancing technologies and an EU application programming interface (API) ecosystem, leveraging fossil-free energy for data centres and cloud infrastructure, including through market-driven and public-private initiatives, such as joint ventures or federated networks in areas like AI, gigafactories and cloud services;

Paragraph 47 c (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

47c. Welcomes the objectives set out in the European Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA) for extraction, processing, recycling, and mitigation of consumption of CRM and emphasises that, in times of sudden crisis, dependency on Chinese rare earths may prove to be equally damaging as dependency on Russian carbon resources; reiterates the need to fully implement the CRMA, stockpile, recycle, substitute, and accelerate the diversification of critical raw materials from China to more reliable partners, as well as increasing own extraction and processing, and increasing the efficiency of resource use;

Paragraph 47 d (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

47d. Calls for the formal recognition of hack-for-hire as a distinct threat to democratic institutions and processes, that could be better addressed with updates of criminal law definitions; encourages the Commission and the Member States to launch a coordinated international initiative to counter so-called bulletproof hosting providers that knowingly lease infrastructure to cybercriminals, including through the blocking and filtering of abusive autonomous system numbers (ASNs), with a view to effectively limiting the jurisdictions from which such providers are able to operate; highlights the continued risk of trading corporate vulnerabilities on the darknet, exposing digital communication systems and devices to foreign interference;

Paragraph 48

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

48. Highlights the need to ensure greater integration between digital infrastructure, cybersecurity and defence policy to advance the strategic autonomy of the EU, **and** the need to leverage dual-use infrastructure, such as resilient data centres scattered across the EU, to ensure operational continuity in the face of hybrid or wartime threats; highlights, further, the need to increase investments in military mobility and secure communications, including the urgent and prioritised deployment of space-based capabilities such as IRIS², to provide encrypted services for public and defence use;

48. Highlights the need to ensure greater integration **and strategic coordination** between digital infrastructure **deployment, counter-FIMI and disinformation measures**, cybersecurity and defence policy to advance the strategic autonomy of the EU; **underlines** the need to leverage dual-use infrastructure, such as resilient data centres scattered across the EU, to ensure operational continuity in the face of **natural disasters**, hybrid or wartime threats; highlights, further, the need to increase investments in military mobility and secure communications, including the urgent and prioritised deployment of **gigabit networks and** space-based capabilities such as IRIS², to provide encrypted services for public and defence use; **Calls to make these critical**

communications capabilities available to Ukraine and Taiwan;

Paragraph 48 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

48a. Stresses the need to increase investment in secure, interoperable and resilient information-sharing systems and local data centres, which are not subject to extraterritorial legislation; underlines that such investments are essential to ensure faster and more reliable communication between competent authorities at national and Union level, to strengthen protection against cyber-attacks and data breaches, and to guarantee the integrity, availability and confidentiality of sensitive data, including through enhanced cybersecurity capabilities and modern EU digital infrastructure; underlines that redundancies are key to ensure operational security and communication security, such as ground-based secure communication systems, or inertial navigation systems;

Paragraph 49

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

49. Stresses that cybersecurity frameworks such as the NIS2 Directive, the Cyber Resilience Act⁵⁶ and the Cyber Solidarity Act⁵⁷ must work in alignment to support secure-by-design standards and avoid regulatory fragmentation; ***calls***, in this context, ***for a*** revision of ***relevant legislation*** in the ***field*** of cybersecurity, ***and*** underlines ***the need to strengthen existing structures, such as ENISA and the European Cybersecurity Competence Centre;***

49. Stresses that cybersecurity frameworks such as the NIS2 Directive, the Cyber Resilience Act⁵⁶ and the Cyber Solidarity Act⁵⁷ must work in alignment to support secure-by-design standards and avoid regulatory fragmentation; ***takes note***, in this context, ***of the targeted*** revision of ***the NIS2; welcomes the Commission's proposal to significantly strengthen and expand ENISA's operational mandate and resources through the revised Cybersecurity Act; calls for the revision to explicitly include FIMI experts among the stakeholders represented in the ENISA***

Advisory Group; calls on the Commission to secure sufficient funding from the 2028-2034 MFF to ensure that undertakings, especially those in the ICT sector, can afford the additional investments arising from the revision of Cybersecurity Act; underlines further that SMEs need support for compliance in addition to exemptions that should ensure not to weaken their security and by consequence the collective cybersecurity;

⁵⁶ Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2024 on horizontal cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements and amending Regulations (EU) No 168/2013 and (EU) 2019/1020 and Directive (EU) 2020/1828 (Cyber Resilience Act) (OJ L, 2024/2847, 20.11.2024, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2847/oj>).

⁵⁷ Regulation (EU) 2025/38 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 2024 laying down measures to strengthen solidarity and capacities in the Union to detect, prepare for and respond to cyber threats and incidents and amending Regulation (EU) 2021/694 (Cyber Solidarity Act) (OJ L, 2025/38, 15.1.2025, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/38/oj>).

⁵⁶ Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2024 on horizontal cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements and amending Regulations (EU) No 168/2013 and (EU) 2019/1020 and Directive (EU) 2020/1828 (Cyber Resilience Act) (OJ L, 2024/2847, 20.11.2024, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2847/oj>).

⁵⁷ Regulation (EU) 2025/38 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 2024 laying down measures to strengthen solidarity and capacities in the Union to detect, prepare for and respond to cyber threats and incidents and amending Regulation (EU) 2021/694 (Cyber Solidarity Act) (OJ L, 2025/38, 15.1.2025, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/38/oj>).

Paragraph 50

Motion for a resolution

50. Recalls the low level of transposition of the NIS2 Directive; regrets that following the deadline of 17 October 2024, the Commission had to send letters of formal notice to as many as 23 Member States for failing to fully transpose the Directive; urgently calls on the Member States to finalise the transposition of the Directive as soon as possible, given that, at

Amendment

50. Recalls the low level of transposition of the NIS2 Directive; regrets that following the deadline of 17 October 2024, the Commission had to send letters of formal notice to as many as 23 Member States for failing to fully transpose the Directive; urgently calls on the Member States to finalise the transposition of the Directive as soon as possible, given that, at

the end of 2025, more than one year after the deadline, the Directive was yet to be transposed by 10 Member States; welcomes, in this regard, the Commission's pledge to work closely with the Member States to ensure the swift and coherent implementation of the horizontal cybersecurity framework set out in the NIS2 Directive, as well as the Cyber Resilience Act and the Cyber Solidarity Act, as stipulated in the ProtectEU internal security strategy;

the end of 2025, more than one year after the deadline, the Directive was yet to be transposed by 10 Member States; welcomes, in this regard, the Commission's pledge to work closely with the Member States to ensure the swift and coherent implementation of the horizontal cybersecurity framework set out in the NIS2 Directive, as well as the Cyber Resilience Act and the Cyber Solidarity Act, as stipulated in the ProtectEU internal security strategy; ***calls on the Commission and Member States to address the gaps in situational awareness, risk mitigation, and coordinated action across cyber, hybrid, and information threats;***

Recital AG

Motion for a resolution

AG. whereas hybrid attacks targeting critical infrastructure in the EU have become more frequent than ever, with incidents linked to the same malicious actors such as Russia and China, but also Iran and North Korea; whereas these attacks often target essential systems, networks, and facilities that are vital for a society's functioning, including public safety, security, and economic stability; whereas such attacks take various shapes and forms, such as physical sabotage, arson attacks, espionage and signal jamming, as well as cyberattacks and other grey zone activities, all of which demonstrate a coordinated effort to test, disrupt and undermine the EU's security and societal resilience;

Amendment

AG. whereas hybrid attacks targeting critical infrastructure in the EU have become more frequent than ever, with incidents linked to the same malicious ***third-country*** actors such as Russia, ***Belarus*** and China, but also Iran and North Korea; ***whereas, in an increasingly volatile geopolitical environment, the Union must also be prepared for hybrid threats originating from beyond these actors;*** whereas these attacks often target essential systems, networks, and facilities that are vital for society's functioning, including public safety, security, and economic stability; whereas such attacks take various shapes and forms, such as physical sabotage, arson attacks, espionage and signal jamming, as well as cyberattacks and other grey zone activities, all of which demonstrate a coordinated effort to test, disrupt and undermine the EU's security and societal resilience; ***whereas such attacks showcase the need to urgently close vulnerabilities;***

Recital AG a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

AGa. whereas attacks against railway infrastructure endanger the lives and safety of citizens and compromise strategic logistics networks; including the unprecedented act of sabotage targeting Polish railway infrastructure on the strategic Warsaw–Lublin route, intended to cause a railway disaster and potentially resulting in multiple fatalities; whereas Russia’s GRU has directed a sustained campaign of physical sabotage operations across EU Member States, including the 2014 explosion at ammunition depots in Vrbětice (Czechia) and the recent recruitment of Cuban citizens to target critical infrastructure in Lithuania;

Recital AH

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

AH. whereas the Baltic Sea has witnessed an unprecedented rise in the number of disruptions to submarine cables, which are vital for internet connectivity and power supply in the whole Baltic and Nordic region; whereas, since 2023, at least 11 incidents of cable damage have been recorded, suggesting coordinated sabotage;

AH. whereas the Baltic Sea has witnessed an unprecedented rise in the number of disruptions to submarine cables, which are vital for internet connectivity and power supply in the whole Baltic and Nordic region; whereas, since 2023, at least 11 incidents of cable damage have been recorded, suggesting coordinated sabotage; ***whereas the Digital Networks Act (DNA) proposes binding EU-level resilience obligations for submarine cable operators, including mandatory compliance with ICT supply chain security requirements under the revision of the Cybersecurity Act (CSA); whereas Finland is leading the establishment of a new Baltic Sea maritime surveillance centre together with Baltic allies and the Commission aimed at protecting critical undersea; whereas the presence of Russian ships in Irish waters increased noticeably since the beginning of the full invasion of Russia in Ukraine in 2022,***

raising concerns about the security of the important interconnector cables running between Ireland and the UK;

Recital AH a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

AHa. whereas the protection of key maritime choke points contributes to democratic resilience, as hybrid attacks against such nodes can result in severe economic, social and security disruptions; whereas Chinese companies with strong ties to the Chinese Communist Party now hold stakes in more than 30 European naval port terminals, often in close proximity to European military naval bases; whereas in the joint White Paper on European Defence Readiness 2030 the Commission and the EU HR/VP has committed to review existing EU legislation and introduce stricter rules towards the ownership and control of critical transport infrastructure;

Recital AI

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

AI. whereas in recent months multiple airspace violations and unauthorised drone incursions have been reported over several EU Member States and neighbouring NATO allies, including Poland, the Baltic States, Romania, Denmark, Sweden, Germany, Belgium and Norway; whereas a number of these incidents have been clearly attributed to Russian military aircraft and drones, while other incidents, involving unidentified aerial objects, remain under investigation but are widely suspected to form part of the same pattern of hybrid intimidation and destabilisation directed against Europe;

AI. whereas in recent months multiple airspace violations and unauthorised drone incursions have been reported over several EU Member States and neighbouring NATO allies, including Poland, the Baltic States, Romania, Denmark, Sweden, Germany, Belgium and Norway; whereas a number of these incidents have been clearly attributed to Russian military aircraft and drones, while other incidents, involving unidentified aerial objects, ***including so-called 'smuggling balloons' used for cross-border illicit activities,*** remain under investigation but are widely suspected to form part of the same pattern

of hybrid intimidation and destabilisation directed against Europe;

Recital AJ

Motion for a resolution

AJ. whereas several European countries, including France, Estonia, Germany, Czechia and Norway, have recently faced major cyberattacks targeting government systems, critical infrastructure and private enterprises, attributed to Russia's military intelligence services and Chinese state-linked actors, all of which underline the urgent need to strengthen the EU's collective cyber-resilience and cyber attribution capabilities;

Amendment

AJ. whereas several European countries, including France, Estonia, Germany, **Poland**, Czechia and Norway, have recently faced major cyberattacks **and sabotages**, targeting government systems, critical infrastructure and private enterprises, attributed to **hostile third countries, including** Russia's military intelligence services and Chinese state-linked actors, all of which underline the urgent need to strengthen the EU's collective cyber-resilience and cyber attribution capabilities;

Recital AK

Motion for a resolution

AK. whereas the EU's dependence on foreign actors and foreign-made technologies in critical infrastructure and supply chains remains of major concern, and is one of the EU's most significant vulnerabilities; whereas this is particularly prevalent in the tech and digital sectors, posing a key challenge for cybersecurity;

Amendment

AK. whereas the EU's dependence on foreign actors and foreign-made technologies in critical infrastructure and supply chains, remains of major concern, and is one of the EU's most significant vulnerabilities; whereas this is particularly prevalent in the tech and digital sectors, posing a key challenge for cybersecurity **and the European strategic autonomy**;

Recital AK a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

AKa. Whereas the EU remains heavily dependent on U.S. technology and financial services, exposing European data and digital infrastructure to risks stemming from U.S. legal frameworks such as the CLOUD Act, FISA, and the Patriot Act, which grant U.S. authorities

broad access to data held by U.S.-based companies, even when stored in the EU; whereas the Commission adopted the EU-U.S. Data Privacy Framework in July 2023, allowing for free flow of personal data between the EU and the U.S. under adequate protection rules and providing a mechanism for EU individuals to get access to an independent and impartial redress mechanism regarding the collection and use of their data by US intelligence agencies; whereas Microsoft itself has admitted to the French Senate that it cannot protect EU data from US surveillance;

Recital AK b (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

AKb. whereas Spain has awarded Huawei a contract to manage and store judicially authorized wiretaps used by both law enforcement and intelligence services; whereas the Commission has restricted Huawei from 5G networks across the European Union due to security concerns;

Recital AK c (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

AKc. whereas all U.S. federal government agencies are subject to 'Buy American' requirements, which prioritise the purchase of American-made products; whereas the EU procurement framework differs and may in some cases contribute to dependencies on non-EU products and related risks for European businesses; whereas, despite reasonable European alternatives being available in many cases, the European Parliament and other EU institutions continue to purchase

foreign-made software and hardware products;

Recital AK d (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

AKd. whereas the Commission presented on 20 January 2026 a CSA revision, proposing binding requirements for managing ICT supply chain security in critical infrastructure through systematic risk assessments and restrictions on high-risk vendors from countries posing elevated security risks; whereas this new framework moves beyond the voluntary 2020 5G security toolbox by proposing mandatory compliance obligations on Member States; whereas the proposed CSA revision could significantly expand ENISA's operational mandate and budget by more than 80% to include real-time cyber incident coordination, early warning systems and cross-Member State threat intelligence sharing;

Recital AK e (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

AKe. whereas the DNA, proposed by the Commission on 21 January 2026, establishes EU-level oversight of spectrum allocation, including in relations to satellite service providers, prescribing withdrawal of the right to provide networks and services in cases where the provider is not complying with the ICT supply chain security requirements of the CSA; whereas, among other critical infrastructures, electoral infrastructure increasingly depends on digital networks and diverse communication pathways to avoid single points of failure;

Recital AK f (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

AKf. whereas fossil-free energy is a crucial stepping stone for Europe's energy sovereignty; whereas according to the 2025 Wood Mackenzie analysis, nine of the ten largest global solar inverter suppliers were based in China; whereas hidden communication devices have been discovered in Chinese-made solar power inverters used in Europe and the United States; whereas according to the Czechia's cybersecurity office, there are risks regarding data protection and, in extreme cases, remote manipulation of solar inverters; whereas solar power plants interconnected through a decentralised dense network are susceptible to cyberattacks and therefore require adequate cybersecurity safeguards;

Or. en

COMPROMISE 3

Cooperation in the area of justice and home affairs

Compromise supported by PPE, S&D, Renew, Verts/ALE

and replacing Amendment(s) 668, 685, 704, 721, 749, 753, 768, 836, 1209, 1276, 1282, 1337, 1350, 1351, 1352, 1353, 1354, 1355, 1356, 1357, 1358, 1359, 1360, 1361, 1362, 1365, 1366, 1367, 1368, 1369, 1370, 1371, 1372, 1373, 1374, 1375, 1376, 1377, 1378, 1379, 1380, 1381, 1382, 1384, 1385, 1386, 1387, 1388, 1389, 1390, 1391, 1392, 1393, 1394, 1395, 1396, 1397, 1398, 1403, 1404, 1405, 1469, 1582, 1584, 1585, 1591, 1598, 121, 215, 258, 322, 323, 349, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 592

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 51

Motion for a resolution

51. Takes the view that all criminal law tools available at Member State and EU level should be applied and, where appropriate, further developed to prevent and counter illegal conduct aimed at undermining democratic institutions and processes; supports, in particular, the Commission's commitment to an ambitious overhaul of Europol's mandate, with a view to turning it into a truly operational police agency that better supports the Member States;

Amendment

51. Takes the view that all criminal law tools available at Member State and EU level should be applied and, where appropriate, further developed to prevent and counter illegal conduct aimed at undermining democratic institutions and processes; ***stresses the need for competent national authorities to be equipped with adequate tools and cooperation channels to prevent, investigate, detect and prosecute criminal offences related to foreign interference; considers that corruption and intimidation of elected and public officials by criminal networks should be addressed as part of the Union's response to hybrid threats via strengthened cooperation between specialised anti-corruption agencies, law enforcement authorities and relevant Union bodies; asks the Commission to assess the added value of establishing in Union law minimum rules on the definition and sanctions for the criminal offence of knowingly participating in organised activities of interference on behalf of foreign powers; notes that the forthcoming revision of the mandates of a number of Union bodies in the area of justice and home affairs could provide an***

opportunity to strengthen the operational dimension of the European Democracy Shield; supports, in particular, the Commission's commitment to an ambitious overhaul of Europol's mandate, with a view to turning it into a truly operational police agency that better supports the Member States;

Paragraph 52

Motion for a resolution

52. Welcomes the fact that the joint communication acknowledges the positive contribution of criminal justice and law enforcement cooperation to countering FIMI and disinformation activities; calls on the Commission, when preparing the planned revision of the mandates of Europol and Eurojust, to carefully assess the legal gaps which currently prevent those agencies from providing their full assistance to the Member States confronted with hybrid threats, and to explore ways to overcome them;

Amendment

52. Welcomes the fact that the joint communication acknowledges the positive contribution of criminal justice and law enforcement cooperation to countering FIMI and disinformation activities; calls on the Commission, when preparing the planned revision of the mandates of Europol and Eurojust, to carefully assess the legal gaps ***and limitations*** which currently prevent those agencies from providing their full assistance to the Member States confronted with hybrid threats, and to explore ways to overcome them ***while respecting fundamental rights and Treaty-based competences***; ***considers that the addition of hybrid threats in Annex I to the Europol Regulation would clarify the legal framework and facilitate the agency's work in this area***; ***underlines, moreover, the need to ensure that Europol and Eurojust are provided with adequate financial and human resources to effectively implement the upcoming strengthening of their mandates***;

Paragraph 53

Motion for a resolution

53. Notes with concern the increasing examples of how malicious non-EU-country actors use crime as a service and criminal organisations as proxies within the

Amendment

53. ***Considers transnational repression to be a growing and serious threat to democracy and internal security in the EU***; ***underlines that transnational***

EU to target individuals and entities identified as political adversaries, **posing a grave threat to the EU's internal security**; stresses that such practices constitute an intolerable act of foreign interference, with potentially destabilising effects on our societies; underlines, in this context, the need to further reinforce EU-level coordination in the field of criminal justice and law enforcement;

repression can be perpetrated online, via hate and defamation campaigns and the spreading of illegal content, but can also lead to physical assaults and murder; notes with concern the increasing examples of how malicious non-EU-country actors use crime as a service and criminal organisations as proxies within the EU to target individuals and entities identified as political adversaries; stresses that such practices constitute an intolerable act of foreign interference, with potentially destabilising effects on our societies; underlines, in this context, the need to **close remaining loopholes in Union law and** further reinforce EU-level coordination in the field of criminal justice and law enforcement **through a police and judicial cooperation framework dedicated to transnational repression as part of the European Democracy Shield, while involving individuals and groups targeted and ensuring their protection**; draws attention to the urgency of addressing the abuse of Interpol red notices for politically motivated purposes;

Paragraph 54

Motion for a resolution

54. Strongly condemns the **weaponisation and** instrumentalisation of migration **against the EU**; takes the position that this phenomenon **represents** an unacceptable attempt **by malign non-EU countries to exercise** political pressure on frontline Member States and on the EU; **welcomes** the specific provisions on the instrumentalisation of migration recently included in key pieces of EU legislation **on border management and migration**; **stresses that the Member States affected by such threats should be able to rely on support from specialised EU agencies**; **calls for Frontex's mandate to be strengthened so that the agency has the legal basis and the human, financial and**

Amendment

54. Strongly condemns the instrumentalisation of migration **by third countries or hostile non-state actors with the aim of destabilising a Member State or the Union**; takes the position that this phenomenon **constitutes** an unacceptable attempt **to exert** political pressure on frontline Member States and on the EU; **underlines that such practices also represent a grave abuse of vulnerable persons who may be entitled to international protection and should not adversely affect the right to seek asylum**; **notes** the specific provisions on the instrumentalisation of migration recently included in key pieces of EU legislation; **further welcomes the recent revision of**

technical resources it needs to properly assist the Member States in dealing with such hybrid threats; stresses, in this context, the need to further enhance the EU's capacity to contribute to Member States' border protection efforts through sufficient investment under the 2028-2034 MFF;

the Union legal framework to include hybrid threats among the grounds triggering the Union visa suspension mechanism; underlines that a credible and effective EU response must also be based on close coordination and sincere cooperation between neighbouring Member States and with Union institutions, in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity, and on enhanced technological and operational capabilities in border management, while preserving the integrity of the Schengen area and ensuring full respect for the fundamental values of the Union;

Paragraph 54 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

54 a. *Notes the Commission's announced revision of the mandate of Frontex; underlines that the revision should provide for the necessary legal basis, analytical capabilities, and adequate human, financial and technical resources to enable effective assistance to Member States in the management and protection of the external borders in compliance with relevant Union law, including fundamental rights; stresses, in this context, the need to further strengthen the EU's capacity to support Member States in matters related to Home Affairs under the 2028–2034 MFF, including in responding to threats of a hybrid nature;*

Recital AL

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

AL. whereas criminal law tools can contribute to the European Democracy Shield to the extent that the activities concerned constitute criminal offences;

AL. *whereas hybrid attacks represent a recognised security threat facing the Union and the Member States, with a significant impact on democracy; whereas internal security remains a responsibility*

of the Member States, however the cross-border, interconnected and multi-dimensional nature of those attacks requires strengthened cooperation, systematic information-sharing and coordinated action at EU level, supported by adequate funding; whereas the European Internal Security Strategy of April 2025 underlines that the EU criminal law acquis already covers certain forms of foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) and disinformation activities and that reinforced EU cooperation can contribute to countering that type of conduct more effectively; whereas criminal law tools can contribute to the European Democracy Shield to the extent that the activities concerned constitute criminal offences in accordance with applicable law;

Recital AM

Motion for a resolution

AM. whereas judicial and police cooperation mechanisms and cross-border information exchange tools need to be adjusted and strengthened, in light of the growing challenges posed by foreign interference to the EU's internal security;

Amendment

AM. whereas judicial and police cooperation mechanisms and cross-border information exchange tools need to be adjusted and strengthened, in light of the growing challenges posed by foreign interference to the EU's internal security; ***whereas new strategies developed by terrorist and criminal organisations are increasingly exploited for running and financing foreign interference operations, such as the use of crypto assets and communication via various digital channels, including video games or e-shops, to circumvent sanctions and transfer money illegally; whereas, as a consequence, there is a need to provide adequate training for criminal justice and law enforcement authorities on modern investigative methods and technologies and on the entire value chain of manipulation and interference, to ensure that they can properly collect, process, store and use evidence in criminal***

proceedings; whereas transfers of personal data to third countries or international organisations that are necessary for the purpose of police, criminal justice or border management cooperation are subject to specific conditions under Union law and should only take place when the integrity and security of those data can be ensured;

Recital AN

Motion for a resolution

AN. whereas the EU Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) has warned, in its latest EU Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment report (EU-SOCTA), published in March 2025, about the involvement of criminal organisations in hybrid campaigns; whereas the Commission communication on ProtectEU acknowledges that various factors prevent Europol from fully reaching its operational potential in supporting activities to counter cross-border crime, including gaps in the agency's mandate as regards new security threats, notably sabotage, hybrid threats and information manipulation;

Amendment

AN. whereas the EU Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) has warned, in its latest EU Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment report (EU-SOCTA), published in March 2025, about the involvement of criminal organisations in hybrid **attacks, including disinformation** campaigns; whereas the Commission communication on ProtectEU acknowledges that various factors prevent Europol from fully reaching its operational potential in supporting activities to counter cross-border crime, including gaps in the agency's mandate as regards new security threats, notably sabotage, hybrid threats and information manipulation; **whereas the Joint Communication on the European Democracy Shield announced that the revision of the mandates of both Europol and Eurojust would explore ways to further enhance efforts to counter FIMI and disinformation activities;**

Recital AO

Motion for a resolution

AO. whereas the Commission has committed to launching a reform that will make Europol a truly operational police agency; whereas **police** officers are key partners in safeguarding democratic

Amendment

AO. whereas the Commission has committed to launching a reform that will make Europol a truly operational police agency; whereas **law enforcement** officers are **privileged witnesses of the destabilising effects that FIMI and**

institutions; whereas **this** should be **more clearly recognised in relevant policies**;

disinformation campaigns can have on the communities concerned: whereas, therefore, they can be key partners in safeguarding democratic institutions; whereas **the legal, professional and ethical framework required for the performance of this role** should be **better defined and further harmonised throughout the Union**;

Recital AP

Motion for a resolution

AP. whereas the EU Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation (Eurojust) may be requested by Member States to assist national authorities in dealing with any type of illegal conduct under their jurisdiction; whereas judicial cooperation can prove especially challenging when expanding to new criminal areas, requiring a modernised legal toolbox;

Unchanged text included in the compromise

AP. whereas the EU Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation (Eurojust) may be requested by Member States to assist national authorities in dealing with any type of illegal conduct under their jurisdiction; whereas judicial cooperation can prove especially challenging when expanding to new criminal areas, requiring a modernised legal toolbox;

Recital AQ

Motion for a resolution

AQ. whereas EU agencies **with responsibilities in the area of borders, migration and asylum management, i.e. the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) and the EU Agency for Asylum**, have a key role to play, in cooperation with national authorities, in establishing and maintaining common situational awareness of risks related to **the exploitation of migratory flows for political purposes** and in assisting frontline Member States crisis situations; whereas the Commission has included the strengthening of Frontex in its flagship initiatives for the 2024-2029 legislative term;

Amendment

AQ. **whereas the situation at the external borders of the Member States with Russia and Belarus remains of concern due to persistent hybrid threats**; whereas EU **Justice and Home Affairs (JHA)** agencies have a key role to play, in cooperation with national authorities, in establishing and maintaining common situational awareness of risks related to **such threats** and in assisting frontline Member States **in** crisis situations; whereas the Commission has included the strengthening of Frontex in its flagship initiatives for the 2024-2029 legislative term; **whereas other initiatives such as the “Eastern Flank Watch” may contribute to strengthening the protection of the**

*external borders and enhancing resilience
against hybrid threats;*

Recital AQ a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

AQ a. whereas transnational repression includes systematic intimidation and harassment by third-country authorities, or their proxies, targeting journalists and activists, human rights defenders, political opponents and members of diaspora communities residing within the Union, such as in the case of Russian-led legal harassment against Ukrainian journalists, Turkish and Azerbaijani's attempts at silencing opposition, and attacks planned against the Belarusian diaspora in Lithuania; whereas the growing surveillance of human rights defenders should be considered a form of transnational repression; whereas such practices not only violate the safety and fundamental rights of those targeted, but also undermine Union's and Member States' sovereignty and security, democratic freedoms and the rule of law; whereas victims of transnational repression in the EU should continue to receive protection;

Or. en

COMPROMISE 4

External dimension

Compromise supported by PPE, S&D, Renew, Verts/ALE

and replacing Amendment(s) 884, 927, 1406, 1410, 1408, 1411, 1407, 1409, 1260, 1412, 1414, 1453, 1415, 1344, 677, 663, 1274, 1402, 1416, 1418, 1420, 1422, 1417, 1419, 1421, 1423, 1424, 1426, 1427, 1425, 1428, 1429, 1430, 1432, 1059, 1433, 1436, 1435, 1438, 1437, 1439, 1440, 1383, 1399, 1441, 1445, 1442, 1443, 1444, 1446, 1448, 1447, 1451, 1452, 1454, 1455, 1243, 1456, 1459, 1457, 1458, 1460, 1461, 1462, 1466, 1464, 1465, 1467, 1468, 1470, 1471, 1472, 1476, 1473, 1474, 1475, 1450, 1489, 1431, 640, 1477, 1492, 1449, 1413, 641, 1597, 1478, 1479, 1480, 1483, 1488, 1484, 1485, 1486, 1487, 1482, 1481, 1490, 1491, 1493, 1634, 121, 127, 128, 644, 283, 436, 410, 460, 462, 459, 461, 457, 454, 455, 456, 458, 453, 435, 546, 464, 465, 469, 467, 466, 468, 556, 470, 471, 113, 463, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 480, 483, 479, 478, 481, 482, 485, 529, 273, 426, 544, 548, 239, 200, 489, 490, 492, 493, 123, 124, 427, 531, 537, 538, 494, 495, 573, 574, 575, 497, 502, 499, 501, 500, 498, 496, 400, 491, 487, 504, 527, 594, 484

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 55

Motion for a resolution

55. Underlines the need for the European Democracy Shield **to have a robust external dimension**; welcomes **the inclusion in the joint communication of specific actions aimed at** supporting countries beyond EU **borders**, in particular **by facilitating** capacity-building to **improve** candidate and potential candidate countries' resilience to FIMI **and** hybrid interference, **and by supporting** independent media and journalism, and **increasing their** ability to **monitor** disinformation **on social media** before and during elections;

Amendment

55. Underlines the need for **a strong external dimension of** the European Democracy Shield **and** welcomes actions supporting countries beyond **the** EU, in particular **through** capacity-building to **strengthen** candidate and potential candidate countries' resilience to FIMI, hybrid interference **and transnational repression, support for** independent media and journalism, and **improved** ability to **detect and counter** disinformation before and during elections; **underlines the need for adequate funding, including core funding via the Global Europe instrument, for independent media in neighbouring countries; notes varying capacities and commitments among candidate countries, calling for a differentiated, context-sensitive implementation of the Shield in full respect of EU values; underlines that strengthening democratic resilience is key both for the credibility of enlargement and for the Union's security and stability; calls for the systematic involvement of**

candidate countries in relevant actions, support mechanisms, and expert networks under the external dimension;

Paragraph 55 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

55a. *Calls for the European Democracy Shield to serve as a two-way mechanism for expertise, where the Union integrates the successful rapid-response models, civil-military cooperation frameworks, and real-time detection techniques, and points out to the expertise of frontline partners who are experiencing Russian aggression and interference; emphasises that the EU has a significant amount to learn from the resilience of Moldova and Ukraine;*

Paragraph 55 b (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

55b. *Notes Taiwan's leading role in high-tech development, and its extensive experience in defending itself against China's hybrid attacks and FIMI; calls for regular exchanges on relevant security issues, as well as for stronger cooperation on countering FIMI and sabotage of undersea cables with like-minded partners in East Asia, including Taiwan, Japan and South Korea;*

Paragraph 56

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

56. *Supports the idea of leveraging diplomatic channels to strengthen capacity in priority regions; considers the role of EU Delegations and EU Member States' embassies to be key, in terms of gaining a better understanding of local*

56. *Calls for the development of a comprehensive strategy, in priority regions, whereby EU Delegations and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and operations, in close coordination with the diplomatic missions*

circumstances that may lead to foreign interference, **and of delivering** a tailored response; notes the possibility for EU Delegations and Member States' embassies to support the organisation of awareness-raising campaigns in host countries; **highlights the importance of involving common security and defence policy (CSDP) missions and operations in the actions envisaged in the joint communication; calls on the Member States and the EEAS to integrate capacity-building activities and training on hybrid threats into the individual mandates of missions and operations, in order to increase the preparedness of national counterparts;**

of the EU Member States, are mobilised to enhance understanding of local circumstances that may lead to foreign interference **as well as to deliver** a tailored response; notes the possibility for EU Delegations and Member States' embassies to support the organisation of awareness-raising campaigns in host countries; **considers that enhanced strategic communication and public diplomacy capacities within EU Delegations, with a focus on promoting fact-based narratives, civic engagement and trust-building, particularly among young people and educators, are of vital importance; is therefore concerned by the reports regarding risks of possible down-sizing of the EU delegations and their staffing in particular in the context of the growing international challenges and geopolitical tensions;**

Paragraph 57

Motion for a resolution

57. ***Calls for the development of a comprehensive strategy whereby*** EU Delegations and CSDP missions and operations, in close coordination with the diplomatic missions of the EU Member States, can serve more effectively as a first line of defence against hybrid attacks, including cyber and FIMI operations; ***considers that enhanced strategic communication and public diplomacy capacities within EU Delegations – with a focus on promoting fact-based narratives, civic engagement and trust-building, particularly among young people and educators – are of vital importance;*** calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Council to include ***disinformation*** monitoring and response teams within CSDP missions, ensure FIMI training for all ***mission staff***, and strengthen

Amendment

57. ***Highlights that*** EU Delegations and CSDP missions and operations, in close coordination with the diplomatic missions of the EU Member States, can serve more effectively as a first line of defence against hybrid attacks, including cyber and FIMI operations; ***calls for enhancing the visibility and strategic communication of the benefits, presence and role of CSDP missions and operations around the world, especially in EU's immediate neighbourhood, candidate and potential candidate countries;*** calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Council to include ***FIMI*** monitoring and response teams within CSDP missions, ensure FIMI training for all ***relevant existing and future missions and operations***, and strengthen

coordination between civilian and military operations to counter hybrid influence;

coordination between civilian and military operations to counter hybrid influence;

Paragraph 57 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

57a. *Stresses the importance of joint exercises, capacity-building and technical assistance to partner countries facing persistent hybrid pressure; calls on the Member States and the EEAS to integrate capacity-building activities and training on hybrid threats into the individual mandates of missions and operations, to increase the preparedness of partner countries; welcomes the deployment of EU Hybrid Rapid Response Teams as well as of Cyber Rapid Response Teams as useful instruments in building capacity and resilience in countries targeted by hybrid, cyber and FIMI attacks, as illustrated by the recent example of Moldova; notes in this context the presence of Frontex in several relevant third countries and the potential added value of its capacities in this regard;*

Paragraph 57 b (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

57b. *Stresses that repeated attempts to normalise relations with Russia, without addressing the underlying nature of the Russian state and its imperial strategic objectives, have contributed to increased instability, weakened deterrence, and undermined European and global security; underlines that future EU and Member States policies must be based on a realistic assessment of this historical continuity, prioritising deterrence, resilience, and the security of countries in Russia's neighbourhood over short-term economic or political considerations; welcomes the efforts of the past years to*

decouple the EU economy from dependence on Russian fossil fuels; further stresses that the complete and irreversible phase-out of such dependence should be a strategic priority for the Union and its Member States;

Paragraph 58

Motion for a resolution

58. Welcomes the strengthened commitment in the joint communication to developing **an** offensive information operations **capacity**; notes that such a commitment requires dedicated resources and long-term planning; stresses that the objective should include the EU's strengthening, in its neighbourhood, of proactive information measures to counter **Russia's** destabilising efforts; highlights the need to disseminate factual and trustworthy information to the populations living in authoritarian regimes, notably Russia, in order to reveal their rulers' destructive governance practices, which pose danger to freedom and peace not only in neighbouring countries, but primarily inside their own country; calls for every possible use of the digital and cyber space and its borderless nature to achieve this goal;

Amendment

58. Welcomes the strengthened commitment in the joint communication to developing offensive information operations **capacities**; notes that such a commitment requires dedicated resources and long-term planning; stresses that the objective should include the EU's strengthening, in its neighbourhood, of proactive **and reinforced** information measures to counter destabilising efforts **as well as other hostile state and state-sponsored coordinated information manipulation, cognitive warfare operations, and hostile influence campaigns by authoritarian or malign actors**; highlights the need to disseminate factual and trustworthy information to the populations living in authoritarian regimes, notably Russia **and Belarus**, in order to reveal their rulers' destructive governance practices, which pose danger to freedom and peace not only in neighbouring countries, but primarily inside their own country; calls for every possible use of the digital and cyber space and its borderless nature to achieve this goal;

Paragraph 58 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

58a. Notes with grave concern that, in certain Member States, government actions and strategic decisions have repeatedly served Russian interests; recalls the case of the former Fidesz

government in Hungary as a particularly clear example, including, inter alia, the failure to duly report and investigate intrusions by Russian state-linked cyber actors, the conclusion of long-term gas contracts with Russia at prices above market levels, the systematic obstruction of Union assistance to Ukraine, and alignment with Russian positions in key Union foreign and security policy decisions; calls for the proper reporting and investigation of activities and campaigns that may be linked to foreign influence and interference; calls for increased vigilance, enhanced monitoring, and the full use of Union instruments to protect the Union against internal vectors of foreign influence and interference;

Paragraph 59

Motion for a resolution

59. *Recognises that the EU's immediate neighbours, including the Western Balkans, Moldova and Ukraine, face serious foreign interference; calls for the funding of regional coordination hubs for countering FIMI, boosting support for investigative journalism and media regulators and scaling up fact-based strategic communications via EU Delegations to counter anti-EU disinformation; underlines the need for a specific focus on election integrity assistance in the countries that are candidates for EU membership;*

Amendment

59. *Notes that candidate, potential candidate, and EU's neighbourhood countries, in particular the Western Balkans, Moldova, Ukraine, Armenia and Georgia, have been a clear focal point of Russian FIMI operations, with one of the aims being to discredit the EU and diminish the perceived value of EU integration; calls on the Commission and EEAS to deepen cooperation with relevant actors in these countries on information resilience, cybersecurity and hybrid threats, and to move from ad hoc support to systematic, long-term assistance aimed at building institutional, legal and civic resilience; calls for EU-funding of regional coordination hubs for countering threats to online information integrity and FIMI in relevant parts of the Union's neighbourhood, as well as boosting support for investigative journalism and media regulators; underlines the need for a specific focus on election integrity assistance in the countries that are*

candidates *or potential candidates* for EU membership, *including in the context of the USAID funding withdrawal, affecting, in particular, the Western Balkans;*

Paragraph 59 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

59a. *Underlines that efforts by the European Union to support candidate countries in strengthening their resilience against foreign interference should be accompanied by proven implementation of relevant reforms and tangible results on their part; calls on the European Commission to continue applying a rigorous approach in its examination of candidate countries' progress under accession chapters; stresses that shortcomings in addressing key issues such as corruption, lack of independent media, violations of human rights, and weaknesses in democratic processes undermine citizens' trust in national and EU institutions, thereby creating anti-EU narratives that may be exploited by third countries and actors engaged in FIMI;*

Paragraph 59 b (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

59b. *Calls on the Commission to establish regional hubs of the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO) covering relevant EU candidate, potential candidate and neighbourhood countries, following the model of the existing hub for Moldova;*

Paragraph 60

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

60. Calls on the Commission to make media literacy programmes a permanent part of pre-accession assistance and the European Neighbourhood Instrument, **with dedicated EU grants for supporting investigative journalism in vulnerable regions**;

60. calls on the Commission to make media literacy programmes a permanent part of pre-accession assistance and the European Neighbourhood Instrument; **stresses that cultural cooperation should be an integral component of these instruments, strengthening societal cohesion, shared values and people-to-people engagement in accession and neighbouring countries; highlights that the removal of the thematic programmes and related financial allocations for Human Rights and Democracy, and for Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), as foreseen by the European Commission proposal on the 2028-2034 MFF and by the proposal for a new Global Europe programme, leave significant uncertainty on how these EU Treaty-based obligations will be effectively mainstreamed, operationalised and monitored; reiterates its call on the Commission to strengthen the programmes aimed at meaningfully engaging and supporting civil society, human rights defenders, journalists, and investigative media in third countries; insists that the new MFF provide predictable funding that allows rapid responses to threats against fundamental freedoms and supports local initiatives;**

Paragraph 61

Motion for a resolution

61. Calls for **strengthening current** EU efforts to support partner countries in its neighbourhood, as well as in priority countries in sub-Saharan Africa, the Asia-Pacific region and Latin America, **in building** resilience to FIMI, **strengthening** democratic processes, and **ensuring** electoral integrity; underlines, in particular, the need to continue developing the flagship project EUvsDisinfo;

Amendment

61. **Urgently** calls for EU efforts to support partner countries in its **Eastern and Southern** neighbourhood, as well as in priority countries in sub-Saharan Africa, the Asia-Pacific region and Latin America, **to build** resilience to FIMI, **strengthen** democratic processes, and **ensure** electoral integrity, **including through dedicated funding under the next MFF; emphasises especially that transformations unfolding in North Africa and the Sahel region have a direct impact on the EU's security and democratic resilience, and notes that these**

regions are particularly vulnerable to FIMIs, notably due to political instability and fragile information ecosystems; underlines that Russia and China increasingly cooperate in amplifying revisionist narratives about alleged Western decline and “neo-colonialism” in these regions, revealing a strategic communication gap that undermines the Union’s credibility and influence; underlines, in particular, the need to continue developing targeted FIMI-resilience measures for these regions, including support for independent media, civil society, digital and AI literacy, strategic communication in local languages, and enhanced monitoring and response mechanisms, such as the flagship project EUvsDisinfo, in addition to financial support mechanisms;

Paragraph 62

Motion for a resolution

62. Acknowledges the establishment of EUPM Moldova as a successful example of how the EU can play a decisive role in supporting a partner country’s crisis management structures and enhancing its resilience against hybrid, cyber and FIMI threats; considers that EUPM Moldova should serve as a model for including the countering of hybrid threats in the mandate of existing missions, or the establishment of similar missions in other partner countries; takes note of the parliamentary **election** held in Moldova on 28 September 2025 **and** the strong victory of **the** pro-European **Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS)**;

Amendment

62. Acknowledges the establishment of EUPM Moldova as a successful example of how the EU can play a decisive role in supporting a partner country’s crisis management structures and enhancing its resilience against hybrid, cyber and FIMI threats; considers that EUPM Moldova should serve as a model for including the countering of hybrid threats in the mandate of existing missions, or the establishment of similar missions in other partner countries; **considers that such agreements should be prioritised with countries whose internal instability directly affects the security of the European Union**; takes note of the parliamentary **elections** held in Moldova on 28 September 2025, **as well as the presidential election on 3 November 2024, and of** the strong victory of pro-European **forces, despite significant efforts and resources deployed by Russia to destabilise the situation in Moldova and**

divert it from its European and Euro-Atlantic path;

Paragraph 62 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

62a. Notes with concern that Armenia faced an intensification of Russian-linked hybrid threats aimed at influencing the outcome of June 2026 elections, undermining its democratic processes, social cohesion and peacebuilding efforts, including malign cyber activities, coordinated information manipulation, electoral interference, economic coercion and overt and covert threats by senior Russian officials, as well as the activation of influence networks; recalls that the Armenian Foreign Intelligence Service has reported the use of overt and covert information operations, distortive narratives and efforts to manipulate public discourse in ways detrimental to Armenia's national interests, and stresses that such hybrid pressure may involve both state and non-state actors, including domestic amplifiers such as certain religious actors and oligarchic networks connected to broader Russian influence strategies in the region; welcomes the establishment of the mission EUPM Armenia to provide strategic advice and capacity building to Armenian institutions for countering FIMI, cyber attacks and illicit financial flows; encourages EUMA to strengthen its outreach to local democratic actors, community organisations and independent media as part of its contribution to democratic resilience; reminds that Armenia is still a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation run by Russia and calls on Armenia to fully leave the CSTO;

Paragraph 62 b (new)

62b. *Deeply regrets the decision of 7 January 2026 by the US President to withdraw from, suspend participation in, or terminate engagement with a significant number of international organisations, including numerous UN bodies; expresses its serious concern that such a move will undermine the financial sustainability of the UN system, weaken multilateral cooperation at a time when it is most needed and embolden authoritarian and revisionist actors, who have historically sought to exploit any withdrawal or disengagement by Western powers from international organisations; stresses therefore the need for the EU to reinforce its leadership in supporting and strengthening multilateral organisations, and to uphold democratic institutions; encourages the US administration to reflect on its decision and to reaffirm its commitment to the UN and multilateral cooperation;*

Paragraph 62 c (new)

62c. *Expresses its strong disagreement with the recent National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States of America, in particular its negative characterisation of the EU, its challenges and risks, and the vision of international relations being based on spheres of influence; condemns any attempts to influence or undermine democratic processes in the European Union; stresses the importance of safeguarding the integrity of EU institutions and EU decision-making; expresses concerns about the fact that certain elements of the NSS fall significantly short in adequately addressing the threat posed by Russia, notably for European and hence also*

American security; regrets, furthermore, the NSS's flawed assessment of the EU as a political system and its groundless adversarial stance towards the EU; considers that the NSS further reinforces the imperative for the EU to advance its strategic autonomy, reduce dependencies and diversify partnerships;

Paragraph 63

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

63. *Welcomes the deployment of EU Hybrid Rapid Response Teams, as illustrated by the recent example of Moldova, as a useful instrument in building capacity and resilience in countries targeted by hybrid, cyber and FIMI attacks, on the basis of the specific know-how and expertise of the EU and its Member States;*

deleted

Paragraph 64

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

64. Underlines the importance of prioritising the principles and objectives of the European Democracy Shield in international cooperation with like-minded partners, such as the G7, NATO, the UN, *the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe* and the *Council of Europe*; welcomes the steps already taken *within the framework of* bilateral and multilateral *engagement, notably* the UN Code of Conduct for Information Integrity on Digital Platforms, the *commitment of Council of Europe member states* in the Reykjavik Declaration to safeguard electoral systems against foreign interference, the *Security and Defence Partnerships and the* continued efforts of the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism *to*

64. Underlines the importance of prioritising the principles and objectives of the European Democracy Shield in international cooperation with like-minded partners, such as the G7, NATO, the UN, *OSCE* and the *CoE* ; *encourages the further development of shared open source standards, frontier AI safety frameworks, data models, methodologies, and taxonomies among like-minded partners to enable more effective collaboration; affirms NATO's key role in countering hybrid warfare targeting democratic institutions and recalls its dedicated instruments and strategies in this regard, notably through its Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence; highlights that, following the accession of Finland and Sweden, 23 of the 27 EU Member States are also NATO Allies, and*

foresee and develop collective responses to FIMI;

underlines the need for strong synergy between EU and NATO strategies; welcomes the steps already taken in bilateral and multilateral frameworks, including the UN Code of Conduct for Information Integrity on Digital Platforms, the commitments made in the CoE Reykjavik Declaration to safeguard electoral systems against foreign interference, the continued efforts of the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism, and the establishment of Security and Defence Partnerships, especially those focusing on countering cyber attacks, hybrid threats, FIMI, and protecting critical infrastructure; reiterates, in this context, its sincere appreciation of the United Kingdom's continued engagement in European security;

Paragraph 65

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

65. Welcomes the establishment of a Security and Defence Partnership between the EU and the UK in May 2025; welcomes its focus on, among other things, cooperation in countering cyber issues, hybrid threats and FIMI, and on protecting critical infrastructure;

deleted

Recital AR

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

AR. whereas candidate countries and EU *neighbours*, notably Ukraine, Moldova and the Western Balkans, remain acutely targeted by FIMI and hybrid threats, *and* require EU support to build civic and institutional resilience;

AR. whereas candidate countries and EU *neighbourhood countries*, notably Ukraine, Moldova, *Armenia, Georgia*, and the Western Balkans *countries*, remain acutely targeted by FIMI and hybrid threats; *whereas, in particular, the Republic of Moldova is facing persistent, coordinated and state-sponsored disinformation campaigns aimed at*

undermining democratic institutions, electoral integrity and its EU accession path; whereas these countries require EU support to build civic and institutional resilience and to fight FIMI and hybrid threats, inter alia through the financial support mechanisms of the Ukraine Facility, the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans, and the Reform and Growth Facility for Moldova; whereas the EU should take into account the feedback and experience of these countries, as they have been facing Russian hybrid attacks for many years; whereas the effectiveness of the European Union's efforts to strengthen institutional resilience in candidate countries depends upon their willingness to adopt relevant measures, implement necessary reforms, and cooperate effectively;

Recital AS

Motion for a resolution

AS. whereas Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine and China's assertive geopolitical posture have intensified the use of disinformation, economic coercion and strategic influence, targeting not only the EU, but also vulnerable regions such as the Western Balkans, Eastern Partner countries and the Global South; whereas various sources reveal that Russia's budget for spreading disinformation and propaganda amounts to **between USD 1 billion and USD 2 billion per year**; whereas elections and political events across Europe demonstrate persistent, targeted and sophisticated full-scale offensive hybrid warfare perpetrated by Russia, aiming to destabilise trust in our political systems and institutions, and to create constant confusion between facts and false information; whereas such warfare requires an appropriate response

Amendment

AS. whereas Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine and China's assertive geopolitical posture have intensified the use of disinformation, economic coercion and strategic influence, targeting not only the EU, but also vulnerable regions such as the Western Balkans, Eastern Partner countries and the Global South; whereas various sources reveal that Russia's **annual** budget for spreading disinformation and propaganda amounts to **several billion euro; whereas Russia's disinformation warfare has not been matched from the EU with adequate financing or strategy**; whereas elections and political events across Europe demonstrate persistent, targeted and sophisticated full-scale offensive hybrid warfare perpetrated by Russia, aiming to destabilise trust in our political systems and institutions, and to create constant confusion between facts and false information; whereas such warfare requires an appropriate response

and a shift from a mere defensive strategy to an offensive one;

and a shift from a mere defensive strategy to an offensive one;

Recital AS a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

ASa. whereas Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, as well as its broader hybrid warfare against Europe and interference in the democratic processes of other countries, has been enabled and justified by the nationalist imperialist ideology of 'Ruscism', and forms part of a wider strategy directed against the West and its interests and values, including the international rules-based order, the rule of law, democracy, human rights and common security; whereas the European Parliament has condemned the ideology, policies and practices of the current Russian regime as incompatible with international law and European values;

Recital AT

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

AT. whereas the EU Partnership Mission in the Republic of Moldova (EUPM Moldova) was established on 24 April 2023 with the explicit purpose of supporting the Moldovan authorities in combating FIMI;

AT. whereas Russia employed a multi-layered hybrid interference campaign to disrupt Moldova's 2024 and 2025 elections, combining disinformation, financial manipulation, cyberattacks, and proxy networks; whereas Russia has massively invested in these attempts, which failed thanks to the efficacy of Moldova's defensive policies and the support provided by the EU; whereas the EU Partnership Mission in the Republic of Moldova (EUPM Moldova) was established on 24 April 2023 with the explicit purpose of supporting the Moldovan authorities in combating FIMI;

Recital AT a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

ATa. whereas parliamentary elections were held in Armenia on 7 June 2026 following a period of intensified Russian interference, including through leveraging certain religious actors and the international diaspora to undermine the Armenian democratic institutions, derail peace-talks with Azerbaijan, and reassert Russian influence; whereas, according to the Armenia's Annual Report on external security risks, foreign actors are activating their agents within Armenia;

Recital AT b (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

ATb. whereas Serbia has become a key hub for disinformation and a proxy for Russian and, to a lesser extent, Chinese influence operations; whereas in 2024, according to Moldova's court rulings, Serbia and Bosnia's Republika Srpska hosted a Russia-linked militant training camp that recruited and trained agitators to create mass disorder during Moldova's elections and referendum; whereas Serbian cyber infrastructure was used to launch sophisticated spear-phishing attacks impersonating the Belgrade Security Conference and targeting EU and NATO officials and diplomats; whereas Serbia has become a safe haven for Russian spies and oligarchs who monitor Russian opposition figures and find ways to evade sanctions; whereas Serbian citizens, allegedly connected to Russia, were arrested for carrying out hate-motivated acts in France and Germany, including defacing Jewish sites to sow ethnic and religious discord;

Recital AU

Motion for a resolution

AU. whereas the reduction in US support for international democracy has created a substantial global gap in funding for countering disinformation and authoritarian influence;

Amendment

AU. whereas the **concerning** reduction in US support for international democracy **through the withdrawal from key multilateral and international frameworks** has created a substantial global gap in funding, **including** for countering disinformation and authoritarian influence;

Recital AU a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

AUa. whereas the US National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Defence Strategy (NDS) reflect a shift in long-standing US foreign policy, marked among others by the explicit focus of US interests in the Western hemisphere and downplays the threat posed by Russia and China; whereas the NSS also includes critical references to alleged democratic shortcomings in certain EU Member States and announces actions akin to foreign interference; whereas the NSS frames global developments largely in terms of economic nationalism and strategic interests, revealing a more transactional approach to traditional allies and thus questioning the principles that have underpinned US foreign policy for decades;

Recital AU b (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

AUb. whereas China employs more sophisticated methods compared to other actors to gain influence in the EU including through co-opting political elites, luring former officials with lucrative jobs, building extensive network of students, researchers and business operatives who then push pro-Chinese

narratives and policies; whereas such methods also extend to coordinated information manipulation and disinformation activities in third-country contexts, as illustrated by reports from a bipartisan U.S. commission that China conducted a disinformation campaign to discredit French Rafale fighter jets used by India against Chinese weapons in the 2025 India-Pakistan conflict;

Recital AV

Motion for a resolution

AV. whereas international initiatives, including those by the UN, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, and the G7, have begun to outline principles and frameworks for safeguarding information integrity, anchored in democratic values, media pluralism and human rights;

Amendment

AV. whereas international initiatives, including those by the UN, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, ***the Council of Europe, likeminded countries in East Asia including Japan, South Korea and Taiwan***, and the G7, have begun to outline principles and frameworks for safeguarding information integrity, anchored in democratic values, media pluralism and human rights;

Recital AW

Motion for a resolution

AW. whereas FIMI ***constitutes a growing challenge to the EU's democratic resilience; whereas certain forms of manipulative information*** activities may also arise from actors ***operating*** within the EU; whereas the ***phenomenon of information manipulation and interference in the domestic context should be further examined and understood***, particularly ***in its interaction with FIMI***; whereas ***the measures presented to combat FIMI also contribute to increasing the overall resilience of societies in the domestic context, particularly with regard to enhancing situational awareness, increasing***

Amendment

AW. whereas FIMI ***campaigns and*** activities may also arise from actors within the EU, ***including Member States***; whereas the ***credibility of democratic institutions also depends on their governments refraining from disseminating inaccurate, misleading or politically instrumentalised*** information, particularly ***during natural disasters, health emergencies and humanitarian crises***; whereas ***former high-ranking officials of EU Member States and EU Institutions accepting remunerated positions, advisory roles or other forms of cooperation with authoritarian third-country regimes, or their state-controlled enterprises, risks***

transparency and pluralism, and strengthening media and digital literacy levels across all age groups;

undermining the credibility of the Union and the independence of its domestic decision-making process;

Recital AW a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

AWa. whereas the phenomenon of information manipulation and interference in the domestic context, as well as its impact, should be further examined and understood, particularly in its interaction with FIMI; whereas measures presented to combat FIMI also contribute to increasing the overall resilience of societies in the domestic context, particularly with regard to enhancing situational awareness, increasing transparency and pluralism, and strengthening media, digital, and AI literacy levels across all age groups; whereas effectively disrupting and countering information manipulation activities requires a whole-of-society approach across sectors;

Or. en

COMPROMISE 5

European Centre for Democratic Resilience

Compromise supported by PPE, S&D, Renew, Verts/ALE

and replacing Amendment(s) 649 B, 681, 683, 684, 680, 692, 685, 691, 695, 696, 697, 699, 687, 694, 690, 686, 693, 688, 689, 742, 748, 747, 608, 609, 657, 698, 1643, 700, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 703, 704, 715, 701, 705, 702, 707, 713, 706, 714, 716, 720, 724, 722, 727, 729, 728, 723, 725, 726, 730, 733, 731, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 745, 740, 741, 743, 744, 746, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 766, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 784, 786, 787, 785, 783, 788, 789, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 808, 805, 807, 806, 809, 1035, 790, 1628, 1644, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 101, 102, 104, 105, 106, 100, 111, 107, 108, 109, 110, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 122, 129, 132, 131, 133, 130, 146, 147, 145, 144, 143, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 581

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 5

Motion for a resolution

5. Welcomes the Commission's proposal for a European Centre for Democratic Resilience (the Centre) as a necessary and logical step towards enhanced coordination of efforts to withstand evolving common threats, in particular FIMI and disinformation; notes its approach of a gradual phasing-in of functions and operations, including a gradual increase in Member State participation; welcomes the Commission's assurance that it is already working on setting up the Centre under the leadership of the Commissioner for Democracy, Justice, the Rule of Law and Consumer Protection, with the express aim of ensuring that it is operational in the course of 2026; welcomes the Commission's commitment to regularly update and involve Parliament in the process of implementing the European Democracy Shield and the Centre;

Amendment

5. Welcomes the Commission's proposal for a European Centre for Democratic Resilience (the Centre) as a necessary and logical step towards enhanced coordination of efforts to withstand evolving common threats, in particular FIMI and disinformation; notes its approach of a gradual phasing-in of functions and operations, including a gradual increase in Member State participation; welcomes the Commission's assurance that it is already working on setting up the Centre under the leadership of the Commissioner for Democracy, Justice, the Rule of Law and Consumer Protection, with the express aim of ensuring that it is **fully** operational in the course of 2026; **notes, however, the lack of clarity regarding the timeline and concrete milestones for the progressive roll-out of the Centre's development, as the reference to a "gradual" implementation based on voluntary participation of Member States does not provide sufficient predictability, accountability or operational certainty;** welcomes the Commission's commitment

to regularly update and involve Parliament in the process of implementing the European Democracy Shield and the Centre;

Paragraph 6

Motion for a resolution

6. **Recalls** however, that the proposal lacks **sufficient operational detail**, clear budgetary **allocations**, a specific governance structure, **a concrete mandate** and a timeline; notes that the joint communication on the European Democracy Shield does not explicitly link the centre to any of the actions outlined therein, which remain in different administrative frameworks within the Commission and the EEAS; **expresses concern that if the Centre remains only another hub, network, platform or framework among others this could further reduce the EU's capacity to make efficient use of the full spectrum of tools available at present, and add to the shortcomings identified in the joint communication, including reduced reactivity, fragmentation and stretched budgets;**

Amendment

6. **Regrets**, however, that **the Centre as established by the proposal lacks clear mandate and empowerment through a legal act, coupled with dedicated budgetary resources and personnel**, a specific governance structure, and a timeline; notes that the joint communication on the European Democracy Shield does not explicitly link the centre to any of the actions outlined therein, which remain in different administrative frameworks within the Commission and the EEAS; **stresses that the Centre should add value beyond existing structures and not become another hub, network, platform or framework among others further reducing EU's capacity to make efficient use of the full spectrum of tools available at present, by adding duplication of work and institutional ambiguity, exacerbating fragmentation and stretching budgets; firmly believes that the Centre should serve as an aggregator and consolidator of existing European-level action by assisting, extending, complementing and, whenever feasible, coordinating national actions;**

Paragraph 7

Motion for a resolution

7. Welcomes the fact that the joint communication provides an extensive mapping of existing counter-FIMI and disinformation and resilience frameworks, structures, tools, initiatives and

Amendment

7. Welcomes the fact that the joint communication provides an extensive mapping of existing counter-FIMI and disinformation and resilience frameworks, structures, tools, initiatives and

programmes, and a list of the actions which the Commission and the EEAS have committed to undertake; calls on the Commission and the EEAS to propose a clear timeline for their gradual phasing-in and integration within the Centre, with 2026 to be set as the deadline for such integration; calls for this integration to include *relevant DSA supervisory and enforcement mechanisms, especially with a view to identifying and minimising systemic risk, coordinating efforts to counter information manipulation campaigns, ensuring* operational responsibility for an enhanced Rapid Alert System (RAS) *and the maintenance* and operation of a unified FIMI intelligence database, *and* developing the EUvsDisinfo resource, the ECNE, and the Commission's Task Force on Disinformation and Strategic Communication, among others;

programmes, and a list of the actions which the Commission and the EEAS have committed to undertake; calls on the Commission and the EEAS to propose a clear timeline for their gradual phasing-in and integration within the Centre, with 2026 to be set as the deadline for such integration; calls for this integration to include operational responsibility for an enhanced Rapid Alert System (RAS) *with a capacity to address information manipulation in real time, the deployment* and operation of a unified FIMI intelligence database, *further* developing the EUvsDisinfo resource, *including by mapping platforms used to spread FIMI and disinformation*, the ECNE, and the Commission's Task Force on Disinformation and Strategic Communication, among others; *calls on the Commission to ensure the capacity to assess coordinated attacks on information integrity; emphasises that the Centre must be equipped to trace, monitor, and respond to foreign interference and hybrid threats, while ensuring all affiliated organisations remain independent, particularly from big tech;*

Paragraph 8

Motion for a resolution

8. Welcomes the Commission's recognition of the need to engage with the Member States and Parliament on the Centre's mandate, structure and working methods, and calls on the Commission to *initiate the process by proposing, by Q1 2027, a legal basis for establishing* the Centre as *an* EU entity with a clear institutional statute and positioning, governance structure and parliamentary oversight mechanisms; emphasises that institutional clarity is essential to enable the Centre to act decisively while remaining accountable;

Amendment

8. Welcomes the Commission's recognition of the need to engage with the Member States and Parliament on the Centre's mandate, structure and working methods, and calls on the Commission to *propose as a next step a legal act for the establishment of* the Centre as *a structurally autonomous* EU entity with a clear institutional statute and positioning, governance structure and parliamentary oversight mechanisms; emphasises that institutional clarity is essential to enable the Centre to act decisively while remaining accountable; *considers that the establishment of the Centre as a*

permanent structure by a legal act would represent a qualitative shift from fragmented coordination towards a more integrated, operational and strategic EU-level capacity; stresses that to ensure a coherent and timely action across the Union in view of rapidly changing realities, there should be an ambitious timeline for the establishment of the Centre by a legal act;

Paragraph 8 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

8a. *Calls for a governance of the Centre that includes representatives of each Member State; notes that the voluntary nature of Member State participation, as proposed in the Commission's communication, risks perpetuating an inefficient and fragmented architecture with different levels of protection and responses to common threats faced across the Union; notes that the risk of an architecture, not relying on a governance including all Member States, implies operating on the basis of a lowest common denominator;*

Paragraph 8 b (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

8b. *Stresses that enhanced Union-level action to protect democracy must be accompanied by strong democratic oversight; calls for regular reporting to the European Parliament on the activities of the Centre, including its budgetary, operational and strategic dimensions; stresses that the Centre's governance should include representatives of the European Parliament, strengthening its democratic legitimacy;*

Paragraph 9

Motion for a resolution

9. Calls on the Commission to endow the Centre with a clear mandate **and** decision-making mechanisms, thus allowing it to function as an independent centre of excellence for detecting **and** analysing FIMI and disinformation operations, as a capability-building platform **establishing** common definitions, standards, training and technical tools across the EU, and as an operational backbone providing real-time coordination of technical support in countering active information manipulation campaigns;

Amendment

9. Calls on the Commission to endow the Centre with a clear mandate, decision-making mechanisms **and competence to act**, thus allowing it to function as an independent centre of excellence for detecting, analysing **and combatting** FIMI and disinformation operations **and** as a capability-building platform **contributing to the establishment of** common definitions, standards, training and technical tools across the EU, and as an operational backbone **translating threat analysis and early warning into concrete, timely and evidence-based operational output and** providing real-time coordination of technical support in countering active information manipulation campaigns, **in close cooperation with national authorities and relevant EU bodies; stresses the need for the Centre to have the capacity to act swiftly in crisis situations, particularly in the run-up to and during elections, in order to translate situational awareness into effective action; notes that the interference tactics of malign actors will evolve over time alongside technological progress and the Centre's mandate should allow for flexibility in order to address new challenges; stresses that the Centre must be equipped with stable, multidisciplinary staff, including FIMI analysts, OSINT experts, cybersecurity and financial tracking specialists, and be authorised to coordinate cross-border task forces with the competent authorities of the Member States;**

Paragraph 9 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

9a. Calls on the Commission to ensure that the Centre's analytical and

monitoring capacity is formally structured as a source of independent expert input to the systemic risk assessment processes established under the DSA , including with the Digital Services Coordinators in each Member State, the European Media Freedom Act, the Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising Regulation and the Artificial Intelligence Act by cooperation on collection, preservation and analysis of evidence related to FIMI and disinformation feeding directly into enforcement actions as well as by providing timely threat-intelligence reports, FIMI-pattern analyses and democracy-risk indicators, amongst others; stresses that the Centre's role in these processes must remain advisory and analytical, so as to preserve the independence of regulatory decision-making; stresses that where FIMI and disinformation activities undermine EU law, the Centre's coordination role should ensure a direct link to bodies competent to initiate investigations and judicial proceedings; calls for relevant findings on systemic shortcomings or recurring vulnerabilities to be duly considered and reflected in the Commission's annual Rule of Law Report in a dedicated sub-sections addressing disinformation and media integrity under the media pluralism and freedom pillar, in addition to electoral integrity and safeguards against undue influence under the checks and balances pillar; The Centre could also contribute to the training of Digital Services Coordinators and national media regulators staff, when it comes to FIMI and disinformation;

Paragraph 9 b (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

9b. *Welcomes the concept of a stakeholder platform; notes, however, that its purpose, structure and added value*

remain insufficiently defined including vis-a-vis existing networks and initiatives; acknowledges the added value of input from civil society in the development of the mandate of the Centre; calls on the Commission to ensure that the Centre's coordination encompasses existing efforts by civil society and academia through the proposed platform; insists that the Centre must also provide opportunities for connections and learning between governments and diverse stakeholders across borders;

Paragraph 10

Motion for a resolution

10. Calls on the Commission to ensure that the Centre is mandated with the responsibility to safeguard the integrity of democratic processes at EU level; reaffirms that the Member States' operational structures constitute a first line of defence; stresses, however, that their primary responsibility does not exhaust the EU's legitimate interests with regard to countering FIMI and disinformation; calls on the Commission to clarify that the Centre must serve dual and mutually-reinforcing objectives, namely to coordinate the activities of the Member States in this area and enhance their operational capacity, and to protect the democratic interests of the EU;

Amendment

10. Calls on the Commission to ensure that the Centre is mandated with the responsibility to safeguard the integrity of democratic processes at EU level; reaffirms that the Member States' operational structures constitute a first line of defence; stresses, however, that their primary responsibility does not exhaust the EU's legitimate interests with regard to countering FIMI and disinformation ***and strengthening electoral integrity; notes that coordinated information manipulation campaigns often target the Union information space as a whole, thereby justifying a dedicated EU-level operational capacity to protect democratic processes beyond purely national contexts;*** calls on the Commission to clarify that the Centre must serve dual and mutually-reinforcing objectives, namely to coordinate the activities of the Member States in this area and enhance their operational capacity, and to protect the democratic interests of the EU; ***stresses that working methods and data use must be fully interoperable between existing EU and national structures; underlines in this respect the need for common open source methodologies, and effective collaboration across networks of actors***

including open source intelligence researchers, journalists, communicators, and policy-makers;

Paragraph 11

Motion for a resolution

11. Calls on Member States that lack dedicated operational structures to establish or substantially strengthen dedicated national FIMI and disinformation detection and response institutions with the Centre's support; calls on the Commission to establish a roadmap for Member State capacity development;

Amendment

11. Calls on Member States that lack dedicated operational structures to establish or substantially strengthen dedicated national FIMI and disinformation detection and response institutions with the Centre's support; calls on the Commission to establish a roadmap ***and evaluation process*** for Member State capacity development; ***underlines that such a process would provide a basis for gradually raising the level of ambition of the Centre;***

Paragraph 12

Motion for a resolution

12. Calls on the Commission to assess the feasibility of empowering the Centre to administer ***and allocate*** dedicated EU ***grants*** under relevant EU programmes, ***including the Digital Europe Programme, the Connecting Europe Facility, Horizon Europe, the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values (CERV) programme, and the proposed AgoraEU programme, and to authorise it to issue calls for proposals and to select, oversee and evaluate projects in areas within its mandate, in particular the EDMO, media literacy initiatives and other relevant European, regional and cross-border initiatives devoted*** to countering FIMI, strengthening democratic resilience and promoting information integrity;

Amendment

12. Calls on the Commission to assess the feasibility of empowering the Centre to administer dedicated EU ***funding*** under ***the present and the upcoming Multiannual Financial Frameworks and*** relevant EU programmes ***whenever they relate*** to countering FIMI, strengthening democratic resilience and promoting information integrity; ***calls on the Commission to avoid programming that disperses and fragments efforts, or that creates unsustainable temporary small-scale initiatives, but to focus on coordinated strategic scalable efforts that enable sustainability for all actors involved;***

Paragraph 13

Motion for a resolution

13. Calls on the Commission to provide a dedicated EU budget line for the Centre's operations, with a clear separation between operational funding and general coordination costs; calls on the Commission to secure sufficient human resources and bridge funding from existing budgets to enable preparatory work before the 2028-2034 MFF;

Amendment

13. Calls on the Commission to provide **sufficient and predictable funding for the Centre and its activities, including sufficient staff and financial resources under the next MFF, and** a dedicated EU budget line for the Centre's operations, with a clear separation between operational funding and general coordination costs; **furthermore** calls on the Commission to secure sufficient human resources and bridge funding from existing budgets to enable preparatory work before the 2028-2034 MFF;

Paragraph 14

Motion for a resolution

14. Calls on the Commission to assess the feasibility of establishing a financing mechanism to complement the dedicated budget line for the Centre's operations, **based on contributions from VLOPs; recalls that the banking sector funds banking resolution mechanisms, pharmaceutical companies support safety monitoring, and polluting industries bear environmental costs; calls for a mechanism whereby social media platforms contribute proportionally to the infrastructure required to counter negative external influences and systemic risks related to their services, both as regards FIMI and disinformation and building resilience; underlines that such contributions would not only be in line with established European principles of responsibility and accountability but would also ensure that the costs of protecting democratic discourse are shared by those who profit most from the digital information ecosystem;**

Amendment

14. Calls on the Commission to assess the feasibility of establishing a financing mechanism to complement the dedicated budget line for the Centre's operations; **takes the position that such a mechanism should, within its scope of contributors, include large information society service providers whose activities represent a systemic risk to democratic integrity; stresses that any such mechanism must be accompanied by the strongest possible guarantees of independence and the total absence of conflicts of interest;**

Recital B

Motion for a resolution

B. whereas the European Centre for Democratic Resilience **constitutes the centrepiece of the European Democracy Shield**; whereas both Parliament's Special Committees on Foreign Interference in all Democratic Processes in the European Union, including Disinformation (INGE and INGE 2), had already called for the establishment of an EU structure to counter foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI);

Amendment

B. whereas the **joint communication on the European Democracy Shield contains several positive recommendations and proposals, such as the establishment of an** European Centre for Democratic Resilience, **the extension of its scope to accession countries and EU neighbourhood and the full enforcement of key EU legislation**; whereas both Parliament's Special Committees on Foreign Interference in all Democratic Processes in the European Union, including Disinformation (INGE and INGE 2), had already called for the establishment of an EU structure **similar to the proposed European Centre for Democratic Resilience** to counter foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) **and disinformation**; **whereas such a structure should not duplicate existing tools, capabilities and competences, but instead consolidate them into a single entity with a clear vision, mandate, real powers and financing**;

Recital C

Motion for a resolution

C. whereas recent EEAS reports on FIMI **threats** demonstrate an increasingly granular understanding of malicious actor methodologies, technical infrastructure and intended narratives, yet this situational awareness has not been translated into sustained operational mechanisms that enable the EU to take timely, coordinated countermeasures; whereas the **EU's institutional nexus is a** principal focus of hostile information manipulation campaigns; whereas the EU is suffering from a fragmented approach to countering FIMI and disinformation, with significant variations in Member States' capacities and

Amendment

C. whereas recent EEAS reports on FIMI **attacks** demonstrate an increasingly granular understanding of malicious actor methodologies, technical infrastructure and intended narratives, yet this situational awareness has not been translated into sustained operational mechanisms that enable the **Member States and the** EU to **anticipate, prevent, detect and** take timely, coordinated countermeasures; whereas **national and European elections are** the principal focus of hostile information manipulation campaigns **and other forms of malign attacks**; **whereas these campaigns disparage particular candidates or political parties, attempt to**

no overarching strategic framework linking operational response to threat intelligence;

discredit the electoral process itself, instrumentalise divisive issues and attempt to discredit traditional media; whereas EU and Member States institutions are also intensively attacked; whereas the EU is suffering from a fragmented approach to countering FIMI and disinformation, with significant variations in Member States' capacities and no overarching strategic framework ***or functioning transnational and/or European cooperation mechanisms*** linking operational response to threat intelligence;

Recital D

Motion for a resolution

D. whereas the ECNE, the Rapid Alert System (RAS) and the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO) are valuable components of the EU's overall resilience to FIMI and disinformation, yet their effectiveness is substantially limited by the absence of a dedicated EU operational structure with the authority to coordinate resilience-building activities and rapid response and escalation mechanisms connecting national operational capacities to EU-level coordination;

Unchanged text included in the compromise

D. whereas the ECNE, the Rapid Alert System (RAS) and the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO) are valuable components of the EU's overall resilience to FIMI and disinformation, yet their effectiveness is substantially limited by the absence of a dedicated EU operational structure with the authority to coordinate resilience-building activities and rapid response and escalation mechanisms connecting national operational capacities to EU-level coordination;

Recital E

Motion for a resolution

E. whereas the threats posed by FIMI and disinformation extend beyond individual Member States, to an attack on the very essence of the European project; whereas FIMI operations systematically target the core democratic values of Article 2 TEU and the principle of open, transparent decision-making processes enshrined in Article 1 TEU, in a manner

Amendment

E. whereas the threats posed by FIMI and disinformation extend beyond individual Member States, to an attack on the very essence of the European project; whereas FIMI operations systematically target the core democratic values of Article 2 TEU and the principle of open, transparent decision-making processes enshrined in Article 1 TEU, in a manner that adversely affects the interests of the

that adversely affects the interests of the EU;

EU and democratic processes in its Member States; whereas ultimately European citizens are the primary victims of these practices, as their access to reliable information, capacity to form independent opinions and meaningful participation in democratic life are directly weakened, while public security and societal stability are also put at risk;

Recital F

Motion for a resolution

F. whereas individual Member States that have invested in dedicated operational structures, with clear statutes and mandates, as well as sufficient funding and staffing, demonstrate what is achievable, most notably in the cases of France's VIGINUM and Sweden's Psychological Defence Agency;

Amendment

F. whereas ***some*** individual Member States that have invested in dedicated operational structures, with clear statutes and mandates, as well as sufficient funding and staffing, demonstrate what is achievable, most notably in the cases of France's VIGINUM and Sweden's Psychological Defence Agency, ***which have adopted a fact-based, technical, and non-partisan approach; whereas, while contributing with valuable insights upon request or their own initiative, these institutions are not appropriately interlinked;***

Recital G

Motion for a resolution

G. whereas the rapid advancement of artificial intelligence (AI) and deepfake technologies is outpacing the adaptive capacity of fragmented national institutions; whereas without coordinated EU responses and clear operational capabilities, the technological advantage will increasingly favour attackers over defenders;

Amendment

G. whereas the rapid advancement of artificial intelligence (AI) and deepfake technologies is outpacing the adaptive capacity of fragmented national institutions ***and making old-school solutions, such as transparency or best efforts obligations obsolete;*** whereas without coordinated EU responses and clear operational ***and research*** capabilities, the technological advantage will increasingly favour attackers over defenders ***threatening the core basis of our democracies; whereas some AI companies have scaled back, instead of increased, their safety measures***

to counter the spread and generation of disinformation on their services; whereas, while AI facilitates disinformation campaigns, it also provides tool to improve our capacity to detect, analyse and counter them;

Recital G a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

Ga. *whereas the principle that industries should contribute financially to addressing externalities related to their activities is well-established in Union law and practice; whereas under the Extended Producer Responsibility framework certain producers are required to finance the management of the waste their products generate, in direct application of the polluter-pays principle; whereas under the Single Resolution Mechanism, all banks operating in the Banking Union make annual contributions to the Single Resolution Fund so that the systemic risks related to their activities does not fall on the taxpayer; whereas pharmaceutical companies are required to fund post-authorisation safety studies — on the basis that those who profit from placing a product on the market must contribute to monitoring the harms it may cause; whereas this logic should apply to large information society services providers who benefit from the information ecosystem, while simultaneously create systemic risks to democratic integrity;*

Recital G b (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

Gb. *whereas the Union has, on several occasions, successfully navigated legally contested and emerging policy areas through structured preparatory instruments; whereas notable examples*

include the 1988 Green Paper on Copyright and the Challenge of Technology, the High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence, and the pre-legislative consultation process preceding the General Data Protection Regulation, amongst others; whereas FIMI and disinformation present a comparable challenge related to both technological, international relations, business models, societal and legal phenomena evolving together as well as competing constitutional considerations; whereas a tailored multidisciplinary preparatory process could be critical for robust, court-proof legislative framework related to FIMI and disinformation in full respect of Member States' competences and the powers of EU institutions;

Or. en

COMPROMISE 6

Election systems and electoral resilience

Compromise supported by PPE, S&D, Renew, Verts/ALE

and replacing Amendment(s) 662, 679, 885, 867, 890, 943, 993, 1359, 1363, 1496, 1495, 1497, 1498, 1494, 1499, 1500, 1160, 1266, 1501, 1502, 1504, 1503, 1505, 1507, 1506, 1508, 1509, 1510, 1511, 1512, 1513, 1516, 1515, 1514, 1517, 1518, 1519, 1520, 1521, 1522, 1523, 1524, 1525, 1526, 1527, 1530, 1531, 1528, 1529, 1532, 1533, 1534, 1535, 1238, 1536, 1537, 1538, 1539, 660, 658, 1544, 1541, 1542, 1543, 1545, 1546, 1547, 1548, 1549, 1646, 1651, 1654, 1655, 112, 176, 204, 558, 240, 241, 243, 257, 291, 298, 444, 529, 491, 487, 511, 512, 519, 517, 518, 521, 180, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 484, 530, 528, 557, 590

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 66

Motion for a resolution

66. Underlines that a core objective of the European Democracy Shield should be to protect the integrity of elections at local, regional, national **and EU** levels; calls on the Commission and the Member States to work together, with full respect for the principle of subsidiarity, to implement reforms aimed at strengthening the resilience of electoral processes in Europe, with a particular focus on measures to prevent foreign interference;

Amendment

66. Underlines that a core objective of the European Democracy Shield should be to protect the integrity of elections at local, regional, national, **EU and candidate country** levels; calls on the Commission and the Member States to work together, with full respect for the principle of subsidiarity **and within the scope as defined by the Treaties**, to implement reforms aimed at strengthening the resilience of electoral processes in Europe, with a particular focus on measures to prevent foreign interference; **notes that attacks on election integrity are multi-faceted, integrated, and long-term, as part of an ecosystem of threats that need to be tackled through a whole-of-society approach; proposes that the Democracy Shield initiative should support the coordination of European election-integrity efforts ,both online and offline, including efforts addressing hybrid threats, cyber threats, the financing of interference and information manipulation;**

Paragraph 67

Motion for a resolution

67. Calls on the Member States to step up efforts to implement the Commission's recommendations on inclusive, robust and resilient electoral processes within the EU; underlines, in particular, the importance of establishing national election networks to help national authorities and expert bodies to work in synergy;

Amendment

67. Calls on the Member States to step up efforts to implement the Commission's recommendations on inclusive, robust and resilient electoral processes within the EU; underlines, in particular, the importance of establishing national election networks to help national authorities and expert bodies to work in synergy; ***calls on the Commission and the Member States to work towards the systematic development and expansion of election-focused stress-testing exercises at both national and cross-border levels, drawing on practical experience and lessons learned from previous electoral cycles, in order to better anticipate, simulate and mitigate risks linked to information manipulation, cyber interference and platform-driven amplification;***

Paragraph 68

Motion for a resolution

68. Calls on the Member States to ensure that election authorities or equivalent bodies in charge of well-functioning, free and fair elections are sufficiently funded and equipped with the proper tools to allow them to carry out their functions, be this in terms of providing personnel training and the necessary digital tools, or in terms of ensuring sufficient investment in electoral bodies and election infrastructure;

Unchanged text included in the compromise

68. Calls on the Member States to ensure that election authorities or equivalent bodies in charge of well-functioning, free and fair elections are sufficiently funded and equipped with the proper tools to allow them to carry out their functions, be this in terms of providing personnel training and the necessary digital tools, or in terms of ensuring sufficient investment in electoral bodies and election infrastructure;

Paragraph 69

Motion for a resolution

69. Considers that hate campaigns and violence that make it difficult for candidates to participate in the public debate, or interact with voters, constitute a

Amendment

69. Considers that hate campaigns, ***intimidation*** and violence that make it difficult for candidates to participate in the public debate, or interact with voters,

threat to democracy; underlines that such threats can be fuelled by non-EU countries' attempts to destabilise the EU; welcomes, in this regard, the Commission's commitment to presenting recommendations on safety in politics; calls on the Member States to step up their efforts to protect candidates standing for election and elected representatives;

constitute a threat to democracy; underlines that such threats can be fuelled by non-EU countries' attempts to destabilise the EU, ***including through disinformation tactics such as deepfakes falsely depicting real political candidates and deliberately designed to mislead voters***; welcomes, in this regard, the Commission's commitment to presenting recommendations on safety in politics; calls on the Member States to step up their efforts to protect candidates standing for election and elected representatives;

Paragraph 69 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

69a. Highlights that the safety and security of women in political life are prerequisites for equal representation and resilient democracy; condemns disinformation campaigns, including via deepfakes and non-consensual sexual content, used to harass, threaten and intimidate female candidates; frequently relying on narratives challenging their competence, credibility and moral integrity, thereby discouraging women's political participation and undermining trust in democratic institutions; welcomes the AI Act's targeted ban on 'nudification' applications and recalls that the DSA identifies gender-based violence and the protection of minors as a systemic risk; calls on the Commission to include specific provisions in the forthcoming recommendations on safety in politics regarding monitoring, prevention and countering of disinformation campaigns specifically targeting female candidates;

Paragraph 69 b (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

69b. Condemns fraudulent advertisements that impersonate and misappropriate the identity of politicians, political candidates and other public figures; warns that, although the primary purpose of such scams is often financial gain, the unauthorised use of a public figure's image and likeness manufactured to falsely suggest authenticity or endorsement may cause reputational harm, contributing to the erosion of the boundary between authentic information and fabricated content, and further undermines public trust in democratic processes and political actors; calls upon the Commission and Member States to investigate the compliance of online platforms as regards their removal processes of illegal advertisements;

Paragraph 70

Motion for a resolution

70. Underlines the key role of the ECNE in **ensuring** the exchange of best practices **with regard to** electoral resilience **in** the EU and its Member States; **notes, however, the** current limitations **of its activities; welcomes** the Commission's commitment to strengthening the ECNE, including **reforms such as putting in place a repository of common references and standards for** electoral processes;

Amendment

70. Underlines the key role of the ECNE in **promoting** the exchange of best practices **on** electoral resilience **across** the EU and its Member States, **while noting its** current limitations **and welcoming** the Commission's commitment to strengthening **it; calls for an ambitious reform of** the ECNE, including **a review of its resources and staffing and further development of the joint mechanism for electoral resilience and a stronger involvement of candidate countries; calls on the Commission, within the framework of the ECNE, to establish a permanent monitoring group responsible for overseeing the implementation of the Commission's recommendations on inclusive and resilient** electoral processes **in the EU, and the forthcoming recommendations on the safety of political actors; considers that such a monitoring group should also be mandated to develop proposals for future updates of these recommendations; further calls for the**

Parliament and the Authority for European Political Parties and European Political Foundations (APPF) to be included as permanent partners in all ECNE meetings;

Paragraph 71

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

71. Calls on the Commission to raise its level of ambition with regard to reforming the ECNE, including by reviewing its resources and permanent staff and by further developing the joint mechanism for electoral resilience; stresses the importance of implementing concrete measures to strengthen the involvement of candidate countries in the ECNE's operations; calls on the Commission, within the framework of the ECNE, to establish a permanent monitoring group responsible for overseeing the implementation of the Commission's recommendations on inclusive and resilient electoral processes in the EU, and the forthcoming recommendations on the safety of political actors; considers that such a monitoring group should also be mandated to develop proposals for future updates of these recommendations;

deleted

Paragraph 72

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

72. Calls on the Commission to include Parliament and the Authority for European Political Parties and European Political Foundations (APPF) as permanent partners in all meetings of the ECNE;

deleted

Paragraph 73

Motion for a resolution

73. Welcomes the Commission's objective of strengthening the protection of election-related infrastructure through existing legislation and tools; calls on the Commission to complement these efforts with a targeted revision of the Resilience of Critical Entities Directive, with a view to including electoral infrastructure in the Directive's list of essential public administration services;

Amendment

73. ***Stresses that electoral infrastructure is a fundamental component of the Union's democratic resilience and must be effectively protected against growing threats of physical and cyber nature;*** Welcomes the Commission's objective of strengthening the protection of election-related infrastructure through existing legislation and tools; calls on the Commission to complement these efforts with a targeted revision of the Resilience of Critical Entities Directive, with a view to including electoral infrastructure in the Directive's list of essential public administration services; ***asks the Commission to ensure that this inclusion is then echoed in the NIS2 Directive and ENISA guidelines;***

Paragraph 74

Motion for a resolution

74. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to address the issue of foreign actors' involvement in the party political landscape in Europe; notes with concern various examples of non-EU-country funding of extremist movements within the EU; considers that financial transparency is an important tool for shedding light on this issue and calls for enhanced exchange between private and public entities in this regard; stresses, ***in particular, the need to combat covert political communication, including opaque funding structures and hidden sponsors, in order to safeguard democratic integrity and ensure transparency for citizens;***

Amendment

74. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to address the issue of foreign actors' involvement in the party political landscape in Europe; notes with concern various examples of non-EU-country funding of extremist movements within the EU; considers that financial transparency is an important tool for shedding light on this issue and calls for enhanced exchange between private and public entities in this regard; ***is concerned by continued deficiencies with the functioning registers of Ultimate Beneficial Owners in the Member States, including the quality of data or risk of overly restricted access, for persons with legitimate interests such as journalists or civil society organisations; urges Member States to fully and faithfully transpose the Anti-Money Laundering Directive ("AMLD VI") which harmonises the rules to access to beneficial ownership***

registers; further stresses, that political advertising and political communication in the online environment must be fully transparent regarding the identity of the sponsor and the source of funding in accordance with EU transparency rules; calls for rigorous enforcement of existing measures to prevent the use of proxy financing in politics; underlines the importance of effective EU-wide monitoring and cooperation among authorities to ensure compliance with transparency obligations; invites in this sense the Commission and Member States to look into the options available for improving cooperation between the anti-corruption authorities and the independent election commission in the Member States;

Paragraph 75

Motion for a resolution

75. Notes with concern the growing evidence of foreign interference and espionage *within Europe's political system*; welcomes the *investigative efforts across the Member States that have led* to convictions and ongoing *proceedings related to* bribery, espionage and *the promotion of* foreign state interests; underlines the serious risks posed by *inadequate* safeguards in the recruitment of staff and associates with close links to authoritarian regimes;

Amendment

75. Notes with concern the growing evidence of foreign interference and espionage *targeting political institutions and processes at both EU and Member State level*; welcomes the *investigations in several Member States leading to* convictions and ongoing *cases involving* bribery, espionage and foreign *influence activities*; underlines the serious risks posed by *insufficient* safeguards in the recruitment of staff and associates with close links to authoritarian regimes; *stresses that protecting the integrity and functioning of EU institutions requires robust measures against espionage and infiltration; further highlights the need to investigate the serious and evolving allegations that Hungarian officials, acting under the previous Fidesz-led Hungarian government, conducted espionage activities targeting EU institutions, including reports that sensitive information from EU meetings have been shared with Russian*

counterparts, raising concerns about breaches of confidentiality, intelligence leakage, and the integrity of Union decision-making processes;

Paragraph 76

Motion for a resolution

76. Welcomes the recently adopted regulation on the revised rules for the statute and funding of European political parties and foundations; notes the provisions concerning the financing and participation of parties from non-EU countries; calls on the co-legislators to ensure its full and effective implementation;

Amendment

76. Welcomes the recently adopted regulation on the revised rules for the statute and funding of European political parties and foundations; notes the provisions concerning the financing and participation of parties from non-EU countries, ***in particular regarding the fact that non-EU parties should not have any veto powers nor control over European parties***; calls on the co-legislators to ensure its full and effective implementation;

Paragraph 76 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

76a. Reiterates its call to the Commission to strengthen the annual Rule of Law Report and reinforce democracies against foreign interference, including by addressing free and fair elections, robust legal guarantees, checks and balances, and the functioning of democratic institutions, in order to provide a more complete picture of rule of law standards across the EU;

Paragraph 77

Motion for a resolution

77. Notes that developments in cryptocurrency create a potential vulnerability in terms of both a lack of transparency and of the ability to scrutinise the financing of political parties and movements in Europe; acknowledges the

Amendment

77. Notes that ***rapid*** developments in cryptocurrency, ***including platforms or service providers operating outside the Union***, create a potential vulnerability in terms of both a lack of transparency and of the ability to scrutinise the financing of

Commission's commitment to bring together national experts under the umbrella of the ECNE, in close cooperation with other EU networks and stakeholders, to exchange best practices, prepare possible guidelines and promote joint actions, in this regard; calls on the Commission to continue monitoring the implementation of the anti-money laundering package and the Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation and to address any potential gaps in the legislation that may need to be filled;

political parties and movements in Europe; ***highlights that, given their pseudonymous nature, global reach, and the availability of anonymising techniques and services, crypto-assets can present challenges when it comes to identifying the origin of political donations and for mitigating potential foreign influence in democratic processes; stresses political donations involving crypto-assets should be subject to the know your donor principle, with the same transparency and accountability standards as traditional financial contributions***; acknowledges the Commission's commitment to bring together national experts under the umbrella of the ECNE, in close cooperation with other EU networks and stakeholders, to exchange best practices, prepare possible guidelines and promote joint actions, in this regard; calls on the Commission to continue monitoring the implementation of the anti-money laundering package and the Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation (***MiCA***), ***ensure an effective and consistent enforcement*** and to address any potential gaps in the legislation that may need to be filled; ***notes in this regard that the Market Integration and Supervisory Package includes a proposed revision of the MiCA***;

Paragraph 77 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

77a. Calls on the Member States to exchange best practices on oversight of political party funding; expresses concern that certain financial intelligence units do not possess the requisite mandate to transmit information regarding interference in elections to the competent national and European authorities; calls on the Commission to assess the added value of expanding the role, mandate, and resources of APPF to further enhance coordination of national and European

authorities responsible for the oversight of political party financing; underlines, in this context, the need to strengthen cooperation between APPF and ECNE;

Recital AX

Motion for a resolution

AX. whereas the Commission's recommendations on inclusive and resilient electoral processes in the Union, published in December 2023, have yet to be fully implemented across all of the Member States, including the provisions aimed at strengthening cooperation between national authorities during and ahead of electoral processes through the establishment of national election networks;

Unchanged text included in the compromise

AX. whereas the Commission's recommendations on inclusive and resilient electoral processes in the Union, published in December 2023, have yet to be fully implemented across all of the Member States, including the provisions aimed at strengthening cooperation between national authorities during and ahead of electoral processes through the establishment of national election networks;

Recital AX a (new)

Motion for a resolution

AX a. Whereas FIMI in electoral contexts often follow recurring patterns, including efforts to discredit candidates or political actors, erode trust in electoral processes and exploit societal divisions; whereas election integrity efforts must take a holistic approach;

Amendment

AX a. Whereas FIMI in electoral contexts often follow recurring patterns, including efforts to discredit candidates or political actors, erode trust in electoral processes and exploit societal divisions; whereas election integrity efforts must take a holistic approach;

Recital AY

Motion for a resolution

AY. whereas the ECNE has played an increasingly important role in recent years, but currently lacks the resources and capacity needed to elevate its activities to the next level;

Unchanged text included in the compromise

AY. whereas the ECNE has played an increasingly important role in recent years, but currently lacks the resources and capacity needed to elevate its activities to the next level;

Recital AZ

Motion for a resolution

AZ. whereas candidate countries have been invited to participate in meetings of the ECNE; whereas in addition to such participation, there is still significant potential for further enhancing cooperation with these countries within the context of the network's activities, to learn from each other's experiences when encountering threats, and to exchange best practices in fighting these threats;

Unchanged text included in the compromise

AZ. whereas candidate countries have been invited to participate in meetings of the ECNE; whereas in addition to such participation, there is still significant potential for further enhancing cooperation with these countries within the context of the network's activities, to learn from each other's experiences when encountering threats, and to exchange best practices in fighting these threats;

Recital BA

Motion for a resolution

BA. whereas there is a clear need to strengthen the protection of the electoral infrastructure and that of national political parties that have also been a target of cyberattacks, not least in light of the large-scale cyberattacks targeting the Romanian electoral authorities in autumn 2024;

Amendment

BA. whereas there is a clear need to strengthen the protection of the electoral infrastructure and that of national political parties that have also been a target of cyberattacks ***and other forms of FIMI-operations***, not least in light of the large-scale cyberattacks targeting the Romanian electoral authorities in autumn 2024; ***the annual activity report of ENISA for 2019 already recommended to classify election systems, processes and infrastructures as critical infrastructure so that the necessary cybersecurity measures are put in place;***

Recital BA a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

BAa. Whereas several reports and investigations, including findings related to so-called doppelgänger campaigns impersonating established media outlets, suggest that it is likely that Russia interfered in the 2025 German federal elections by targeting pro-European political parties; whereas it is also

possible that other third country actors engaged in interference activities in relation to the same electoral process, as a part of a broader pattern of interference observed in multiple European countries;

Recital BB

Motion for a resolution

BB. whereas the covert funding of political parties and movements in the EU by non-EU countries poses a threat to the legitimacy of the democratic process;

Amendment

BB. whereas the covert funding of political parties and movements in the EU by non-EU countries, ***as evidenced by existing documented instances of foreign interference by authoritarian regimes through direct or indirect financing of political parties, foundations or affiliated media organisations***, poses a threat to ***democratic resilience, electoral integrity*** and the legitimacy of the democratic process;

Recital BB a (new)

Motion for a resolution

BBa. Whereas the European Parliament has been the target of espionage and foreign interference, including the conviction of an assistant to former MEP Maximilian Krah, a member of the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), for spying on behalf of China; whereas Members and their staff have access to sensitive information and documents within the European Parliament;

Amendment

Recital BC

Motion for a resolution

BC. whereas judicial independence is an indispensable structural component of electoral integrity; whereas electoral integrity depends on the existence of

Unchanged text included in the compromise

BC. whereas judicial independence is an indispensable structural component of electoral integrity; whereas electoral integrity depends on the existence of

accessible and effective remedies against violations of voting rights and electoral procedures, insulated from political and executive pressure;

accessible and effective remedies against violations of voting rights and electoral procedures, insulated from political and executive pressure;

Or. en

Media and information integrity

Compromise supported by PPE, S&D, Renew, Verts/ALE, The Left and replacing Amendment(s) 674, 678, 718, 719, 861, 790, 886, 893, 944, 945, 1007, 1010, 1025, 1026, 1049, 1054, 1057, 1060, 1061, 1062, 1070, 717, 1064, 1063, 1068, 1069, 1065, 1066, 1067, 1074, 1076, 1077, 1078, 1081, 1089, 1071, 1072, 1073, 1079, 1080, 1082, 1084, 1085, 1086, 1087, 1088, 1092, 1096, 1097, 1094, 1091, 1090, 1093, 1095, 1098, 1099, 1100, 1101, 1102, 1103, 1104, 1105, 1109, 1111, 1110, 1108, 1106, 1107, 1112, 1113, 1115, 1114, 1116, 1117, 1118, 1119, 965, 1125, 1120, 1121, 1122, 1123, 1124, 682, 1126, 1127, 1128, 1130, 1131, 1132, 1133, 1134, 1135, 1136, 1137, 1138, 1139, 1140, 1141, 1142, 1143, 666, 667, 669, 1011, 1144, 1146, 1145, 1147, 1161, 1150, 1149, 1153, 1148, 1151, 1152, 1154, 1155, 1156, 1157, 1162, 1174, 1172, 1163, 1164, 1165, 1166, 1167, 1168, 1169, 1170, 1171, 1173, 1177, 1179, 1180, 1181, 1183, 1184, 1187, 1188, 1191, 1175, 1178, 1182, 1185, 1186, 1189, 1190, 1192, 1193, 1194, 1559, 1610, 1650, 1653, 35, 103, 149, 177, 217, 362, 292, 293, 315, 322, 330, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 331, 334, 1075, 337, 341, 332, 335, 336, 338, 340, 344, 342, 343, 345, 346, 347, 348, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 359, 361, 360, 339, 333, 358, 488, 493, 505, 550, 555, 583, 585, 586

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 27

Motion for a resolution

27. Takes the view that measures to promote **free** and editorially independent media are a central part of achieving the objectives set by the European Democracy Shield; **welcomes**, in this **regard**, the ground-breaking common minimum standards on media freedom and pluralism established through the adoption of the EMFA; underlines, however, that the **regulation's** significance can only be assessed on the basis of its implementation in practice **and therefore stresses the importance of strict** enforcement; welcomes the new commitments announced on media support via the Media Resilience Programme and calls **on** matching long-term commitments in the upcoming MFF;

Amendment

27. Takes the view that measures to promote **and support free, credible** and editorially independent media, **including media at local and regional level**, are a central part of achieving the objectives set by the European Democracy Shield; **further stresses that safeguarding the media sector from political, economic, or structural capture is a precondition for ensuring democratic resilience; notes that protecting independent media is vital to counter hybrid threats from hostile actors; further observes**, in this **context**, **that the current digital information environment often disadvantages media actors that assume editorial responsibility and public-interest obligations in favour of intermediaries that do not bear comparable duties; welcomes** the ground-breaking common minimum standards on media freedom and pluralism established through the adoption of the EMFA; **reminds Member States of the obligations**

in the regulation to protect media from undue media market concentrations; underlines, however, that the significance of the EMFA can only be assessed on the basis of its implementation in practice; calls on Member States to swiftly implement the EMFA and on the European Commission to ensure robust enforcement of its provisions, including taking action when obligations, in particular those of VLOPs aimed at protecting editorial content from undue removal or restriction of visibility, are not respected; welcomes the new commitments announced on media support via the Media Resilience Programme and calls for matching long-term commitments in the upcoming MFF; further highlights that the financing crisis facing European media points to the need to explore new funding solutions;

Paragraph 28

Motion for a resolution

28. Emphasises the need to carefully assess the potential impact of EU **legislation** on journalism and editorial media, with particular regard to safeguarding the sustainability **and viability** of media companies' business models;

Amendment

28. Emphasises the need to carefully assess the potential impact of EU **initiatives** on journalism and editorial media, with particular regard to safeguarding **media pluralism as well as** the sustainability of media companies' business models; **calls for evidence-based impact assessments and appropriate consultation of media stakeholders ahead of initiatives that may affect the viability of European media companies; stresses, in this context, the importance of monitoring developments affecting media freedom and pluralism across the Union, and considers the annual Rule of Law Report, with its chapter on media freedom and media pluralism, as a central tool in this endeavour; calls on the Commission to further develop this pillar of the Rule of Law Report to better capture emerging challenges;**

Paragraph 29

Motion for a resolution

29. Underlines, in the context of media companies **selling** subscriptions via apps, the importance of full implementation of the DMA; notes **in this regard** the Commission's non-compliance decision of 23 April 2025 with regard to Apple and Meta; **notes the Commission's** investigations into a potential breach of the DMA by Google in demoting media publishers' content in search results;

Amendment

29. Underlines, in the context of media companies **offering** subscriptions via apps, the importance of full implementation **and effective enforcement** of the DMA; notes the Commission's non-compliance decision of 23 April 2025 with regard to Apple and Meta, **as well as ongoing** investigations into a potential breach of the DMA by Google in demoting media publishers' content in search results; **stresses that robust and timely enforcement of the DMA is essential to ensure fairness, contestability and pluralism in the Union's digital environment and to address structural dependencies and market concentration, including in the context of AI-driven services;**

Paragraph 30

Motion for a resolution

30. Welcomes the fact that the joint communication includes new support actions on promoting digital and media literacy, such as the Media Resilience Programme, the Basic Skills Support Scheme for schools, and the strengthening of the media literacy expert group, including the setting up of a new expert network for media literacy, and updated guidelines for teachers and educators; underlines that the upcoming revision of the Audiovisual Media Services Directive should strengthen the provisions on minimum requirements for Member States' work on media literacy;

Amendment

30. Welcomes the fact that the joint communication includes new support actions on promoting digital and media literacy, such as the Media Resilience Programme, the Basic Skills Support Scheme for schools, and the strengthening of the media literacy expert group, including the setting up of a new expert network for media literacy, and updated guidelines for teachers and educators; **points out that current media literacy initiatives remain fragmented across the Union; calls for more coherent, EU-wide approaches and exploring complementary measures, such as creation of digital tools and platforms at European level; encourages, the systematic exchange of best practices between national authorities, including through the**

reinforced Media Literacy Expert Group and the European Digital Media Observatory; further highlights the role of cultural education in strengthening democratic literacy and resilience against disinformation; underlines that the upcoming revision of the Audiovisual Media Services Directive should strengthen the provisions on minimum requirements for Member States' work on media literacy; stresses the importance of fostering a critical understanding of AI-generated content, as part of broader media and digital literacy efforts;

Paragraph 31

Motion for a resolution

31. Welcomes the announced update of the Commission recommendation on the safety of journalists⁵² and the forthcoming review of the Anti-SLAPP recommendation⁵³ ; underlines that these updates and reviews must take into account **how** threats, violence, sabotage and other actions aimed at hindering journalistic work **impact the protection, safety and empowerment of journalists and other media professionals in the EU;**

Amendment

31. Welcomes the announced update of the Commission recommendation on the safety of journalists⁵² and the forthcoming review of the Anti-SLAPP recommendation⁵³ ; underlines that these updates and reviews must take into account **the evolving and recurring nature of** threats, violence, sabotage and other actions aimed at hindering journalistic work, **including emerging challenges for example identity thefts and coordinated deepfake campaigns, which may undermine journalists' safety and independence; stresses that particular attention should be paid to the chilling effects created by sustained climates of fear, political pressure or undue interference by public or private actors; calls on Member States, in accordance with their national legal frameworks and established practices, to consider introducing specific aggravating circumstances in criminal law for offenses committed against journalists when such acts are motivated by or connected to their professional activities; further notes the potential relevance of developing support measures to assist journalists in dealing with emerging**

issues such as AI-driven impersonation and deepfake content;

⁵² Commission Recommendation (EU) 2021/1534 of 16 September 2021 on ensuring the protection, safety and empowerment of journalists and other media professionals in the European Union (OJ L 331, 20.9.2021, p. 8, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reco/2021/1534/oj>)

⁵³ Commission Recommendation (EU) 2022/758 of 27 April 2022 on protecting journalists and human rights defenders who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded or abusive court proceedings ('Strategic lawsuits against public participation') (OJ L 138, 17.5.2022, p. 30, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reco/2022/758/oj>).

⁵² Commission Recommendation (EU) 2021/1534 of 16 September 2021 on ensuring the protection, safety and empowerment of journalists and other media professionals in the European Union (OJ L 331, 20.9.2021, p. 8, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reco/2021/1534/oj>)

⁵³ Commission Recommendation (EU) 2022/758 of 27 April 2022 on protecting journalists and human rights defenders who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded or abusive court proceedings ('Strategic lawsuits against public participation') (OJ L 138, 17.5.2022, p. 30, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reco/2022/758/oj>).

Paragraph 32

Motion for a resolution

32. Stresses the importance of protecting journalists from abusive lawsuits; welcomes, in this regard, the adoption of the Anti-SLAPP Directive⁵⁴ and the announced update of the mandate and composition of the expert group against SLAPPs; calls on the Member States to be ambitious in the ongoing implementation process and on the Commission to keep providing support; calls on the Commission to draft a comprehensive evaluation report on the effectiveness of the implementation;

Amendment

32. Stresses the importance of protecting journalists from abusive lawsuits; welcomes, in this regard, the adoption of the Anti-SLAPP Directive⁵⁴ and the announced update of the mandate and composition of the expert group against SLAPPs; calls on the Member States to be ambitious in the ongoing implementation process and on the Commission to keep providing support ***to ensure full and timely implementation of the directive as a matter of priority***; calls on the Commission to draft a comprehensive evaluation report on the effectiveness of the implementation; ***further invites the EU and Member States to consider additional measures to complement the directive in order to protect journalists engaged in investigative work, especially in cross-border or sensitive contexts; underlines,***

in this context, the ongoing discussion on the establishment of a European protection status for investigative journalists as a possible avenue to explore;

⁵⁴ Directive (EU) 2024/1069 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 on protecting persons who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded claims or abusive court proceedings ('Strategic lawsuits against public participation') (OJ L, 2024/1069, 16.4.2024, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1069/oj>).

⁵⁴ Directive (EU) 2024/1069 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 on protecting persons who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded claims or abusive court proceedings ('Strategic lawsuits against public participation') (OJ L, 2024/1069, 16.4.2024, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1069/oj>).

Paragraph 32 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

32a. Recognises the essential role of public service media in ensuring that all citizens, including those in remote and minority communities and candidate countries, have access to reliable, impartial, and diverse news across multiple platforms, formats, and languages, thereby contributing to the fight against news desertification; further stresses that access to quality and reliable information is essential in the fight against mis- and disinformation; reaffirms that safeguarding public service media from political interference and capture is fundamental to preserving democratic accountability and the rule of law, stresses that the credibility of public service media depends on full editorial and organisational autonomy in accordance with Article 5 of the European Media Freedom Act, and invites the Commission to actively monitor threats to the independence of public service media and to take effective measures against practices that compromise media freedom; notes, in this context, that attempts to undermine the independence

of public service media can signal early democratic backsliding;

Paragraph 32 b (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

32b. Strongly emphasises the need to guarantee the highest level of protection for journalists and other media actors from illegal spyware, intrusive surveillance technologies and other forms of digital threats; recalls that the EMFA strictly prohibits Member States from deploying intrusive surveillance software on any material, digital device, machine, or tool used by media service providers or their editorial staff with the exception of national security cases; further stresses that the surveillance of journalists constitutes an interference with the rights guaranteed under Articles 7, 8 and 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union; notes that the use of spyware undermines journalists' work by eroding trust with their sources, and that the failure to effectively enforce EU legislation poses a serious threat to freedom of information;

Paragraph 32 c (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

32c. Reaffirms the importance of transparency, fair competition, and the sustainability of European editorial media within the existing legal framework, including the DSA, DMA, EMFA, and TTPA; notes that these instruments address manipulation, foreign interference, and anticompetitive practices while safeguarding editorial responsibility and free expression; calls on the Commission to assess how these instruments can best be used for these purposes; urges VLOPs and VLOSEs not

to unjustifiably delist, demote, or otherwise interfere with the visibility and fair ranking of lawful European editorial media content, and to ensure transparent and non-discriminatory ranking systems;

Paragraph 32 d (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

32d. Calls on the Commission to further study and, where relevant, consider measures to improve competitiveness, accessibility, and fairness in online advertising for all value chain players, including editorial media; notes that editorially independent, high-quality and fact-based journalism faces challenges from VLOPs' engagement-driven recommender systems and AI-based search features, which reduce visibility of high-quality content and limit traffic to the websites of the media; notes with concern that traffic numbers correlating with the roll-out of Google AI-summaries have declined, in one measured case up to 70%; encourages incentives for advertisers to support trusted European media, the use of contextual advertising instead of behavioural targeting, and stronger traceability and transparency in the online ad supply chain to address market distortions and prevent malicious actors monetising disinformation content and purposefully destabilising EU society; calls, in this context, on the Commission to assess possible measures to boost development and uptake of a European infrastructure for contextual online advertising;

Paragraph 33

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

33. Welcomes the *provisional agreement on the* Foreign Direct Investment Regulation⁵⁵, in particular the provisions that include the media sector as a factor to be considered when determining whether an investment is likely to negatively affect security or public order; regrets, however, that the media sector is not listed within the mandatory scope in the Annex to the Regulation;

33. Welcomes the *recently adopted* Foreign Direct Investment Regulation, in particular the provisions that include the media sector as a factor to be considered when determining whether an investment is likely to negatively affect security or public order; regrets, however, that the media sector is not listed within the mandatory scope in the Annex to the Regulation; ***stresses, in this context, the need for more transparency of investment in European news outlets; further points out that audiovisual media based in the EU are subject to stricter requirements than those available to European audiences from a third country through other means of distribution; stresses, the importance of ensuring that media accessible to European audiences respect fair and pluralistic information standards;***

⁵⁵ Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 March 2019 establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union (OJ L 79I, 21.3.2019, p. 1, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2019/452/oj>).

⁵⁵ *Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the screening of foreign investments in the Union and repealing* Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of the European Parliament and of the Council

Paragraph 34

Motion for a resolution

34. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to carefully analyse the consequences of the US administration's shift in aid policy in the context of media pluralism and independent journalism and, if necessary, to act to fill the void left in media markets both within the EU and in the bordering regions; welcomes the EU emergency funding provided to RFE/RL; calls for the development of a solution to provide RFE/RL with stable, long-term funding;

Amendment

34. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to carefully analyse the consequences of the US administration's shift in aid policy in the context of media pluralism and independent journalism and, if necessary, to act to fill the void left in media markets both within the EU and in the bordering regions, ***including via the use of Global Europe***; welcomes the EU emergency funding provided to RFE/RL; calls for the development of a solution to provide RFE/RL with stable, long-term funding; ***invites the Commission to***

explore new ways of supporting free and editorially independent media in the EU neighbourhood, particularly in regions disproportionately affected by Russian disinformation and propaganda such as the Western Balkans;

Paragraph 35

Motion for a resolution

35. Underlines that society-based fact-checking networks can play a role in detecting and combating disinformation campaigns and provide valuable insights for DSA risk assessments; notes that independent fact-checking organisations need stable conditions in which to operate; considers that the European Network of Fact-Checkers, announced by the Commission in 2025, could ***be a tool for achieving*** this; stresses that, to be credible and effective, fact-checking organisations must uphold strict standards of political neutrality, independence and methodological objectivity;

Amendment

35. Underlines that society-based ***independent*** fact-checking networks can play a role in detecting and combating disinformation campaigns and provide valuable insights for DSA risk assessments ***and mitigation***; notes that independent fact-checking organisations need ***technical support and*** stable conditions in which to operate; considers that the European Network of Fact-Checkers, announced by the Commission in 2025, could ***serve as a valuable tool to achieve*** this; stresses that, to be credible and effective, fact-checking organisations must uphold strict standards of political neutrality, independence ***from online platform providers***, and methodological objectivity; ***emphasises the importance of collaboration between fact-checkers, open-source intelligence researchers, journalists, communicators, and policy-makers; further underlines the importance of supporting networks of fact-checkers in candidate and potential candidate countries;***

Recital V

Motion for a resolution

V. whereas the freedom and pluralism of the media are cornerstones of ***the European way of life, embedded*** in Article 11(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union; whereas editorially independent, high-quality journalism ***is a***

Amendment

V. whereas ***the freedom of expression, and information as well as*** the freedom and pluralism of the media are cornerstones of ***democratic and resilient societies, as enshrined*** in Article 11(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union ***and reflected in Article***

powerful antidote to FIMI and disinformation;

10 of the European Convention on Human Rights; whereas editorially independent, high-quality, fact-based, well-funded and commercially viable journalism, including that of journalists in exile, is a key safeguard against FIMI and disinformation and an essential tool for informed decision-making;

Recital V a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

V a. Whereas the term “information integrity” is regularly used by European Union institutions in policy and operational documents, whereas no official or commonly agreed definition of this concept has been established at EU level; whereas this lack of definition may lead to potential ambiguities in its interpretation and application;

Recital V b (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

Vb. Whereas the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA) represents a milestone in promoting an independent and pluralistic media landscape across Europe; whereas media fulfil a democratic function distinct from that of ordinary commercial entities; whereas robust safeguards are necessary to protect editorial independence, particularly in cases of ownership concentration, takeovers, or changes in control, and to ensure transparency, source accountability, and professional standards; whereas the Commission should make an effort to better involve candidate countries in the Unions media policy and whereas this should also entail a corresponding commitment from the candidate countries themselves;

Recital V c (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

Vc. Whereas the digital advertising ecosystem, while enabling new opportunities for media outreach, has also led to market concentration and unfair competition, with a few large online platforms capturing a disproportionate share of advertising revenues; whereas, according to a 2023 report by the French ARCOM and Ministry of Culture, media investing in news content and audiovisual creation received only 40% of advertising revenue in 2022, down from 65% in 2012, and this figure is projected to fall to 29% by 2030; whereas this goes often to the detriment of professional European media companies and the sustainability of independent journalism;

Recital V d (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

Vd. Whereas the abusive practices of dominant online advertising market players, such as those resulting in the European Commission's €2.95 billion fine against Google for distorting competition in online advertising, underscores the need for more structural measures to ensure fair competition, greater transparency, accountability, and safeguards to protect media pluralism, editorial independence, and the integrity of democratic processes; whereas structural deficiencies in the digital advertising market can be exploited by malicious actors, as demonstrated by the so-called Doppelgänger operators using ads on social media to target users and various Russian online campaigns aimed at discouraging Ukrainian men from enlisting;

Recital W

Motion for a resolution

W. whereas under the DMA, app developers ***distributing their apps via app stores should be able to*** inform customers, free of charge, of ***alternative*** offers outside ***of the app store***; whereas the Commission ***has opened an investigation into a*** potential breach ***of the DMA*** by Google in demoting media publishers' content ***in search results***; ***whereas the Commission*** launched its first review of the DMA on 3 July 2025;

Recital X

Motion for a resolution

X. whereas the Audiovisual Media Services Directive requires the Member States to take measures to develop media literacy skills and report their efforts every three years;

Recital X a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

W. ***whereas the DMA is essential to ensure fair digital markets and media pluralism***; ***whereas challenges remain in its implementation***; whereas under the DMA, app developers ***can*** inform customers, free of charge, of offers outside ***app stores***; whereas the Commission ***is investigating*** a potential ***DMA*** breach by Google in demoting media publishers' content ***and*** launched its first review of the DMA on 3 July 2025;

Amendment

X. whereas the Audiovisual Media Services Directive ***regulates audiovisual media services, ensuring consumer protection and fulfilling other public interest objectives in the audiovisual media market***; ***whereas it*** requires the Member States to take measures to develop media literacy skills and report their efforts every three years; ***whereas the European Commission is currently evaluating the Directive and launched a call for contributions in November 2025 in preparation for the renewed assessment scheduled for 2026***;

Amendment

Xa. ***Whereas there is a need to equip children with skills to resist disinformation***; ***whereas hostile actors may intensify targeting of educational systems in order to counter efforts to increase digital literacy in this regard***;

whereas certain groups are particularly vulnerable to misinformation for different reasons, including children and young people due to their high digital exposure; whereas there is a need to foster media literacy and critical thinking from an early age;

Recital X b (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

X b. whereas the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO) plays a crucial role in monitoring and countering disinformation; whereas the mandate of EDMO has been extended to continue its important work; whereas the extension of the mandate is not accompanied by a corresponding increase in financial resources, which may limit EDMO's capacity to fulfil its objectives;

Recital X c (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

Xc. Whereas the temporary nature of the Media Resilience Programme could provide opportunity to consider new innovative approaches to supporting independent local and regional media;

Recital Y

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

Y. whereas the Media Freedom Rapid Response documented ***1 548*** press freedom violations in ***2024, ranging from*** legal, physical and psychological threats ***to*** forms of censorship, ***targeting 2 567 media-related persons or entities in 35 European countries, an alarming increase*** compared to the ***1 153*** violations recorded in ***2023***;

Y. whereas the Media Freedom Rapid Response documented ***1,481*** press freedom violations in ***2025, affecting 2,377 media-related persons or entities across 36 European countries, encompassing*** legal, physical and psychological threats ***as well as various*** forms of censorship; ***whereas this figure, while representing a slight decrease*** compared to the ***1,548*** violations

recorded in 2024, *remains at an alarmingly high level and constitutes a significant increase compared to 2023, thereby underscoring the persistent and systemic nature of threats to media freedom in Europe; whereas there was a widespread public outrage triggered by the murders of investigative journalists such as Jan Kuciak, Giorgos Karavaz, Peter R. de Vries and Daphne Caruana Galizia;*

Recital AA

Motion for a resolution

AA. whereas the work of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) is of strategic interest to the EU; whereas the EU has approved EUR 5.5 million in emergency funding for this work, in the aftermath of the reform of the United States' foreign aid policy; whereas a sustainable funding solution for RFE/RL needs to be developed;

Amendment

AA. whereas the work of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) is of strategic interest to the EU; whereas the EU has approved EUR 5.5 million in emergency funding for this work, in the aftermath of the reform of the United States' foreign aid policy; whereas a sustainable funding solution for RFE/RL, *together with other independent media outlets essential to strengthening democratic resilience in neighbouring countries,* needs to be developed;

Recital AB

Motion for a resolution

AB. whereas new technologies, such as AI, can improve journalistic working conditions and methods, but can also expose journalists to new threats, such as quick and cheap impersonations of existing media, the mass creation of disinformation outlets and coordinated attacks against journalists;

Amendment

AB. whereas new technologies, such as AI, can improve journalistic working conditions and methods, but can also expose journalists to new threats, such as quick and cheap impersonations of existing media, *so-called doppelgänger campaigns,* the mass creation of disinformation outlets and coordinated attacks against journalists; *whereas any impersonation of existing media amounts to identity theft and should be addressed appropriately by the judicial authorities; whereas AI models must comply with Union copyright law in order to ensure the protection of*

rightsholders and legal certainty; whereas the news media sector is facing challenges from the growing influence of AI systems, which is affecting public trust, advertising revenues and copyright protections; whereas the developments in generative AI should be discussed in the context of the upcoming Commission's review of the EU Copyright Directive complemented by a report on the main findings; whereas greater transparency of AI training data is important in the context of media policy;

Recital AB a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

AB a. whereas changes in the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) have affected a number of European media outlets; whereas this highlights the importance of strengthening Europe's own media landscape; whereas EU funding should focus on initiatives with the greatest public impact and include basic operational support;

Recital AB b (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

ABb. whereas measures adopted by the previous Fidesz-led Hungarian government have led the Commission to open an infringement procedure against Hungary for non-compliance with the European Media Freedom Act and the Audiovisual Media Services Directive;

Or. en

Digital resilience

Compromise supported by PPE, S&D, Renew, Verts/ALE, The Left and replacing Amendment(s) 624, 670, 844, 845, 842, 837, 836, 838, 843, 846, 835, 839, 840, 841, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 866, 853, 823, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 862, 863, 864, 865, 867, 868, 880, 877, 882, 871, 881, 878, 870, 869, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 879, 883, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 894, 895, 896, 897, 899, 898, 901, 900, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 913, 917, 918, 910, 914, 916, 911, 912, 915, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 934, 937, 933, 935, 936, 938, 939, 940, 942, 943, 946, 949, 952, 951, 948, 950, 947, 953, 954, 955, 957, 959, 956, 958, 960, 961, 962, 963, 1014, 964, 966, 967, 968, 969, 975, 973, 971, 970, 972, 974, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 989, 990, 991, 992, 994, 995, 996, 997 part 1, 998, 999, 1001, 1002, 1003, 1004, 1005, 1006, 1008, 1009, 1012, 847, 941, 1040, 1041, 1052, 1053, 861, 1083, 1101, 1129, 1011, 1158, 1159, 1176, 1210, 884, 927, 1160, 1550, 1568, 1592, 1594, 1596, 155, 165, 166, 160, 164, 161, 159, 162, 163, 170, 171, 172, 167, 168, 169, 174, 177, 186, 188, 184, 183, 185, 181, 182, 187, 189, 190, 191, 194, 195, 192, 193, 197, 196, 198, 201, 545, 547, 251, 205, 210, 206, 211, 208, 209, 207, 212, 213, 214, 216, 126, 218, 158, 219, 227, 220, 222, 221, 225, 226, 223, 224, 229, 230, 231, 233, 238, 236, 235, 237, 234, 242, 244, 246, 247, 248, 250, 252, 253, 255, 254, 256, 245, 258, 259, 264, 260, 261, 262, 263, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 286, 288, 287, 307, 362, 289, 290, 294, 293, 295, 296, 297, 319, 321, 320, 318, 367, 421, 424, 474, 273, 239, 200, 275, 228, 232, 486

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 15

Motion for a resolution

15. Calls for the full implementation of **key legislation in the digital space**, such as the DSA, the **regulation on transparency and targeting of political advertising and the AI Act**, across all Member States; takes the position that the continued implementation of digital legislation should have a strengthened focus on countering online disinformation, ensuring information integrity and protecting democratic discourse *in election periods; expresses concern, in this regard, that delayed guidelines and technical standards pose an obstacle to the timely implementation of the AI Act; welcomes the fact that in its proposed Digital Omnibus to simplify AI legislation the Commission seeks to address this by linking the implementation timeline for*

Amendment

15. Calls for the full implementation **and effective enforcement of the entire digital-related EU acquis, including key legislations** such as the DSA **and DMA**, the Political Advertising **Regulation**, the AI Act **and the EMFA**, across all Member States **and in full respect of fundamental rights; stresses that rigorous, consistent, systematic and timely enforcement is an essential pillar of European digital sovereignty and deterrence, and must be a precondition for operating in the single market; urges the Commission to report regularly on enforcement and application of EU law, notably the DSA, avoid excessive delays in investigations, and impose strong sanctions for persistent breaches by VLOPs and VLOSEs**; takes the position that the continued

rules on high-risk AI systems to the availability of standards or other support tools;

implementation of digital legislation should have a strengthened focus on countering ***FIMI and*** online disinformation, ensuring information integrity and protecting democratic discourse ***during and outside*** election periods;

Paragraph 15 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

15a. Expresses serious concern that certain VLOPs' engagement-based recommendation systems often cause systemic risk to civic discourse and electoral processes, as they amplify divisive, polarising, or misleading content— often fuelling disinformation by foreign and domestic actors— while disproportionately favouring sensationalist material over fact-based content; recalls that Articles 34 and 35 of the DSA oblige VLOPs to assess and mitigate such risks; maintains that effective risk mitigation measures should also ensure that synthetic or manipulated content, such as deepfakes, can be clearly distinguished from authentic material, and that there is due prominence of editorially independent and pluralistic media and verified sources; calls on the Commission to investigate compliance with DSA obligations in this regard and take appropriate measures, including imposing interim measures; suggests that such interim measures include the limitation of engagement-based recommender systems that pose systemic risk, where necessary; further calls on the Commission to promote greater transparency and accountability in the design of algorithmic recommendation and advertising systems, especially together with other algorithmic systems enhancing user choice and ensuring non-manipulative default settings, all while promoting freedom of expression and

information; reminds, in this context, VLOPs of their obligation to mitigate systemic risks, which may include testing and adapting their algorithmic systems, including their recommender systems, and of their obligation to provide at least one option for each of their recommender systems which is not based on profiling, in line with Articles 35(1)(d) and 38 of the DSA, respectively; further calls on the Commission, in cooperation with the Digital Services Coordinators and with the involvement of independent third parties through public consultations, to ensure that there are up-to-date guidelines for systemic risk mitigation, as well as consistent enforcement and a high level of protection against large-scale manipulation;

Paragraph 15 b (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

15b. *Condemns the targeted sanctions and attempts at coercion by the U.S. administration against European actors involved in shaping and enforcing the DSA and other digital regulations, in particular against a former commissioner; calls for the immediate lifting of these measures; urges the Commission and the Member States to resist such pressure, uphold European legislation, and defend the right to self-governance and digital sovereignty; underlines that freedom of expression is a fundamental right in Europe and a shared core value with the U.S., and across the democratic world among likeminded partners; stresses that political and trade considerations, as well as pressure from third countries or large technology companies, should not unduly influence the enforcement of Union digital legislation; stresses that decisions concerning the application of EU digital rules must be guided solely by Union law*

and the protection of democratic interests, and that the EU, being an open and rules-based single market, retains the sovereign right to regulate its economic activity in line with democratic values and international commitments; calls on the Commission and Member States to ensure that the protective and redress mechanisms of EU digital legislation are shielded from any interference that could compromise their independence or effectiveness, and to establish robust safeguards to prevent such risks;

Paragraph 15 c (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

15c. *Calls on the Commission to increase efforts in promoting and aligning the DSA and other key EU digital legislative acts in candidate and potential candidate countries and ensure that these countries have the support, tools and guidance needed for implementation of such laws, enabling gradual integration into relevant EU enforcement and cooperation mechanisms, where appropriate; stresses that efforts to demonetise disinformation should explicitly include candidate and potential candidate countries, in order to prevent regulatory loopholes and cross-border spill-over effects; stresses the need to take particular note of trends observed in candidate and potential candidate countries when conducting election-related work under the Code of Conduct on Disinformation;*

Paragraph 16

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

16. **Welcomes** the official integration of the voluntary Code of Practice on Disinformation into the framework of the

16. **Notes** the official integration of the voluntary Code of Practice on Disinformation into the framework of the

DSA; considers *the* inauthentic use of *social media*, e.g. through bots, fake accounts, polarising algorithms and artificial engagement and amplification, to be among the most serious risks to free and open discourse online, particularly in election periods; calls urgently on all VLOPs and *very large online search engines* (VLOSEs) operating in the EU to fully adhere to the Code, and urges the platform X to rejoin it;

DSA, *becoming a relevant benchmark for determining DSA compliance regarding disinformation risks, to complement other effective mitigation measures by VLOPs and VLOSEs addressing systemic risks to democratic processes; notes that the implications of potential non-compliance with the Code vis-a-vis DSA compliance and enforcement could be further clarified; underlines that the Code should remain a dynamic instrument following newest trends and that the Commission should continue to oversee the effective implementation by the signatories; considers that the implementation of the DSA should address the coordinated inauthentic use of online platforms, e.g. through bots, fake accounts, polarising algorithms, and artificial engagement and amplification creating the illusion of public support; considers these phenomena* to be among the most serious risks to free, *authentic* and open discourse online, particularly in election periods; *stresses that foreign authoritarian actors, in particular Russia, have developed disinformation playbooks whose effects have become increasingly visible during recent elections across Europe*; calls urgently on all VLOPs and VLOSEs operating in the EU to fully adhere to the Code, and urges the platform X to rejoin it;

Paragraph 17

Motion for a resolution

17. Welcomes the Commission's commitment to draw up a DSA incidents and crisis protocol to further address major incidents and interference in the information environment; considers that this protocol should address, among other things, electoral interference through coordinated inauthentic behaviour in the online space, particularly through bot-driven amplification and engagement that

Amendment

17. Welcomes the Commission's commitment to draw up a DSA incidents and crisis protocol, *including clear processes for coordination between relevant authorities*, to further address major incidents and interference in the information environment; considers that this protocol should *encourage participation of online platforms and online search engines and* address, among other things, electoral interference through

effectively distort genuine public discourse;

coordinated inauthentic behaviour in the online space, particularly through bot-driven amplification and engagement that effectively distort genuine public discourse; ***stresses the need for platforms to respond fast and effectively through preventive and corrective measures against such interference, and for the authorities to react swiftly in cases of non-compliance, rather than relying on ex-post measures and late enforcement; welcomes, in this context, Google's proactive removal of nearly 11,000 YouTube channels and accounts in 2025 linked to state-backed propaganda from China, Russia, and other malicious actors, and urges all platforms to systematically address such threats;***

Paragraph 18

Motion for a resolution

18. ***Notes*** the Commission's finalisation of its investigation into the platform X's breach of transparency obligations under the DSA, followed by the imposition of a fine of EUR 120 million; urges the Commission to accelerate remaining investigations ***into suspected breaches of EU digital legislation, including those involving*** election interference, algorithmic opacity, ***or the*** proliferation of fake accounts and ***bots***; calls, in ***particular***, on the Commission to swiftly conclude investigations into TikTok's compliance with the DSA in the context of the 2024 Romanian presidential elections, including its obligation to mitigate systemic risks to democratic processes;

Amendment

18. ***Welcomes*** the Commission's finalisation of its investigation into the platform X's breach of transparency obligations under the DSA, followed by the imposition of a fine of EUR 120 million, ***as well as the decision of the Commission to start investigations of Grok AI's integration into X and to expand existing investigations into X's recommender systems***; urges the Commission to accelerate remaining investigations, ***including on Meta, particularly in light of preliminary findings on*** breaches of ***transparency and user-protection obligations, and reports indicating persistent issues related to scam advertising and regulatory circumvention; stresses the necessity for enforcement action in cases of*** election interference, ***persistent*** algorithmic opacity, ***large-scale*** proliferation of fake accounts and ***bot networks distorting public discourse***; calls, in ***this context***, on the Commission to swiftly conclude investigations into TikTok's compliance with the DSA in the

context of *foreign interference into* the 2024 Romanian presidential elections, *which highlighted concerning possibilities of exploiting recommender systems and bot networks*, including its obligation to mitigate systemic risks to democratic processes *and to ensure deterrence during electoral periods; further takes note of the Commission's preliminary evaluation indicating that TikTok is in breach of the DSA for its addictive design;*

Paragraph 18 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

18a. *Underlines the need for increased transparency regarding actors behind online content and accounts, particularly for advertising purposes; stresses that measures to combat coordinated inauthentic behaviour without abolishing anonymity online are essential to prevent FIMI, bot farms and covert political campaigning; invites the Commission to explore possible measures that would support online platforms in adopting proportionate steps to verify that a human is behind an account, and thereby countering the activities of bot accounts; calls on platforms to prioritise the development of effective mechanisms to identify, scrutinise and, where necessary, suspend inauthentic accounts, especially those involved in coordinated influence operations; stresses that measures targeting inauthentic accounts must not undermine the ability to remain anonymous online, which is essential for protecting journalists, activists, marginalised communities and individuals in vulnerable situations (such as whistle-blowers, dissidents and political opponents of autocratic regimes), and should continue to allow space for satirical and humorous accounts;*

Paragraph 19

Motion for a resolution

19. Calls on the Commission and relevant regulatory authorities to investigate **and publicly expose** covert disinformation campaigns aimed at exploiting generative AI systems, such as the activities of the Moscow-based ‘Pravda’ network; urges providers of AI systems to duly address and mitigate this phenomenon through their AI risk management systems; calls, furthermore, for the **setting of security standards for large language model (LLM) providers to be coordinated at international level**, ensuring improved transparency with regard to the training of data sources;

Amendment

19. Calls on the Commission and relevant regulatory authorities to **systematically** investigate covert disinformation campaigns aimed at exploiting generative AI systems, **included coordinated propaganda and narrative-laundering networks**, such as the activities of the Moscow-based ‘Pravda’ network **and the explicit manipulation of Grok (xAI) and to expose these campaigns publicly in a way that does not promote their spread; highlights the importance of clarifying the exact obligations of providers and deployers in relation to the ‘AI-generated’ labelling requirements set out in Article 50 of the AI Act and the Code of Practice, and specifying to what extent end-users and platforms are covered under this framework**; urges providers of AI systems to duly address and mitigate this phenomenon through their AI risk management systems; calls, furthermore, for the **AI Office to enhance its efforts in monitoring the security landscape of AI models and aid in developing methodologies for AI, including large language models (LLMs)**, ensuring improved transparency **and respect for personal integrity** with regard to the training of data sources;

Paragraph 20

Motion for a resolution

20. Calls on the Commission to urgently complete its assessment of Telegram’s user base and functionality with a view to determining its classification as a VLOP under the DSA; urges the Commission and relevant authorities to investigate Telegram’s potential role in facilitating criminal activity, election interference and the

Amendment

20. Calls on the Commission, **in cooperation with the Belgian regulator**, to urgently complete its assessment of Telegram’s user base and functionality, **as done with WhatsApp**, with a view to determining its classification as a VLOP under the DSA **and to take into consideration possible new evidence or changes in usage patterns**; urges the

dissemination of disinformation within the EU; **furthermore, strongly encourages the platform to join the voluntary Code of Practice on Disinformation and comply fully with EU** transparency, content moderation and data access requirements to ensure a level playing field and uphold citizens' trust in the digital information space;

Commission and relevant authorities to investigate Telegram's potential role in facilitating criminal activity, election interference and the dissemination of disinformation, **extremism and terrorist content** within the EU, **as well as to clarify its possible links to Russian intelligence services and the security of its servers and data handling practices; stresses the need to take all available enforcement steps to ensure that Telegram fully complies with all applicable EU rules on** transparency, content moderation and data access requirements to ensure a level playing field and uphold citizens' trust in the digital information space; **strongly encourages, furthermore, Telegram to join the voluntary Code of Practice on Disinformation;**

Paragraph 21

Motion for a resolution

21. Recommends further examining the role of influencers, including nano- and micro-influencers, in shaping public discourse and influencing elections, both those countering and those contributing to foreign disinformation campaigns, whether knowingly or unknowingly; stresses, in this regard, the need for robust standards on transparency **and** information integrity for online political content creators, especially influencers operating in a grey area between commercial promotion and political messaging; welcomes existing codes of conduct, training and other initiatives that have been developed to make social media and influencers more responsible and transparent;

Amendment

21. Recommends further examining the role of influencers, including nano- and micro-influencers, in shaping public discourse and influencing elections, both those countering and those contributing to foreign disinformation campaigns, whether knowingly or unknowingly; **welcomes the commitment of the European Commission to assess the role of online influencers in the upcoming evaluation of the Audiovisual Media Services Directive or as part of the forthcoming Digital Fairness Act;** stresses, in this regard, the need for **guidance and** robust standards on transparency, **including on platform-facilitated funding, remuneration and sponsorship arrangements, as well as on the distinction between advertised and organic content, and on** information integrity for online political content creators, especially influencers operating in a grey area between commercial promotion and political messaging; welcomes existing codes of conduct, training and other

initiatives that have been developed to make social media and influencers more responsible and transparent; ***suggests that ethical standards and obligations for journalists could serve as an inspiration for preparing standards for influencers; calls further on the Commission to continue enforcing the TTPA, especially when it comes to online platforms, and to facilitate compliance for influencers via the envisioned EU network of influencers;***

Paragraph 22

Motion for a resolution

22. ***Considers an EU digital infrastructure, including secure local data centres and sovereign EU cloud and edge computing capacities, to be a strategic pillar of digital resilience, ensuring that Europeans' sensitive data is not stored in foreign data centres; calls on the Commission to propose a definition of sovereign cloud and its scope of application in the planned Cloud and AI Development Act; calls on the Commission to reflect on the unsuccessful discussion on the EU cybersecurity certification scheme for cloud services and to propose a tangible solution in the revision of the Cybersecurity Act, taking into account the cybersecurity and sovereignty concerns related to a concentration of power;*** urges the development of regulatory sandboxes and funding mechanisms to support ***innovation by EU tech start-ups, particularly in sectors with critical*** dependencies; further supports the long-term vision of EU social media platforms designed in accordance with EU values of transparency, data protection, freedom of expression and democratic accountability;

Amendment

22. Urges the development of regulatory sandboxes and funding mechanisms to support EU tech start-ups ***and value-driven European alternatives, such as those emerging in the Netherlands based on fair remuneration, to reduce strategic*** dependencies; ***welcomes the Commission's EU Open Source Strategy;*** further supports the long-term vision of EU social media platforms designed in accordance with EU values of transparency, data protection, ***fundamental rights,*** freedom of expression and democratic accountability;

Paragraph 23

Motion for a resolution

23. Calls on the Commission, EU digital regulators and online platforms to ensure transparency in revenue redistribution programmes that could allow FIMI actors or even *sanctions-listed* entities to earn income; considers that the monetisation of FIMI activities under such programmes should be addressed as part of the risk assessment and mitigation obligations under the DSA;

Amendment

23. ***Underlines that advertising and revenue-sharing practices may incentivize the spread of manipulative or harmful content, undermine electoral integrity, and lead to the emergence of new disinformation actors and networks; recalls that disinformation cannot be demonetised without adequate transparency into existing monetisation practices;*** calls on the Commission, EU digital regulators, ***national competent authorities*** and online platforms to ***work together to detect and prevent illicit financing and*** ensure transparency in revenue redistribution programmes, ***advertising policies and other monetization services*** that could allow FIMI actors or even *sanctions-listed* entities to earn income ***or other benefits;*** ***calls on platforms to publicly disclose remuneration flows and their beneficiaries, at least once a year;*** considers that the monetisation of FIMI activities under such programmes should be addressed as part of the risk assessment and mitigation obligations under the DSA; ***considers monetisation of content from sanctioned entities to be a systemic risk, requiring swift corrective action such as suspending revenue-sharing; underlines that genuine creators and media outlets should be compensated for their losses in case of erroneous or unfair demonetization; is concerned by the gradual rollback in corporate commitments to internet-freedom initiatives;***

Paragraph 24

Motion for a resolution

24. Notes with concern the findings of the Dutch data protection authority indicating that AI chatbots may provide

Amendment

24. Notes with concern the findings of the Dutch data protection authority indicating that AI chatbots may provide

biased and unreliable voting advice, thereby posing risks to electoral integrity; calls on the **Commission** to deliver on its commitment to prepare guidance on the **use** of AI in electoral processes in order to ensure the responsible use of AI;

biased and unreliable voting advice, **which are indicative of wider concerns across the Union**, thereby posing risks to electoral integrity; calls on the **AI office to investigate whether such practices breach applicable law, especially the AI Act, and** to deliver on its commitment to prepare guidance on the **application** of AI in electoral processes in order to ensure the responsible use of AI;

Recital H

Motion for a resolution

H. whereas the concurrence of the early stages of the implementation of the Digital Services Act (DSA), the Digital Markets Act (DMA), the Artificial Intelligence Act (AI Act) and the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA) establishes a window of opportunity to build comprehensive FIMI defences;

Amendment

deleted

Recital I

Motion for a resolution

I. whereas democratic societies in the EU are increasingly being targeted by hybrid threats, disinformation and FIMI, with a particular intensity in the digital sphere; whereas the online space enables the proliferation of new manipulation techniques, including: (a) the inauthentic use of social media through automated software programmes, fake social media accounts and the use of troll factories, bot-driven amplification and engagement, (b) the use of astroturfing and flooding techniques to influence online public debate, (c) the personalisation, tracking and micro-targeting of individuals, (d) websites designed to mimic official sources, (e) the artificial amplification of divisive content, (f) the use of synthetic content, such as deepfakes and other AI-generated content,

Amendment

I. whereas democratic societies in the EU are increasingly being targeted by hybrid threats, disinformation and FIMI, with a particular intensity in the digital sphere; whereas the online space enables the proliferation of new manipulation techniques, including: (a) the inauthentic use of social media through automated software programmes, fake social media accounts and the use of troll factories, bot-driven amplification and engagement, (b) the use of astroturfing and flooding techniques to influence online public debate, (c) the personalisation, tracking and micro-targeting of individuals, (d) websites designed to mimic official sources, (e) the artificial amplification **and monetization** of divisive content, (f) the use of synthetic content, such as deepfakes and other AI-

and (g) recommender systems *purposefully* designed to drive engagement through polarisation;

generated content, (g) recommender systems designed to drive engagement through polarisation *and* (h) **LLM grooming and other data poisoning techniques maliciously feeding AI systems with biased, deceptive, or false narratives to influence its training; whereas tools to counter these techniques and negative phenomena have been developed, but remain widely insufficient;**

Recital J

Motion for a resolution

J. whereas online platforms, *when deciding on whether or not to promote content in a user's feed, use their* insights into the preferences and vulnerabilities of each individual user, *making them more influential* than traditional publishers;

Amendment

J. whereas online platforms, *through* insights into the preferences and vulnerabilities of each individual user, *wield greater influence over public discourse* than traditional publishers; *whereas evidence suggests that platforms' algorithms can be manipulated by their owners and shareholders to bring forward certain political content thereby distorting the information environment and undermining possibilities to receive accurate and pluralistic information; whereas very large online platforms (VLOPs) and very large search engines (VLOSEs) have become de facto gatekeepers of the public space, thereby strongly influencing what information citizens encounter, how it is prioritised, and under what conditions it circulates;*

Recital K

Motion for a resolution

K. whereas the EU *has* recently adopted a set of comprehensive legislative acts to establish a safe and transparent online space, including the *DSA*, the regulation on the transparency and targeting of political advertising, and the AI Act; whereas these *laws represent an important step forward* in holding *digital*

Amendment

K. whereas the EU *and its Member States have* recently adopted a set of comprehensive legislative acts to establish a safe and transparent online space, including the *Digital Services Act (DSA)*, *the Digital Markets Act (DMA)*, the Regulation on the transparency and targeting of political advertising (*TTPA*),

platforms accountable and protecting democratic processes, increasing transparency **and** safeguarding freedom of expression; **whereas, at the same time,** their enforcement remains **a challenge**;

the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA), and the Artificial Intelligence Act (AI Act); whereas these acts mark important progress in holding online platforms accountable and protecting democratic processes, increasing transparency, safeguarding freedom of expression, and thus contributing to comprehensive FIMI defences, but their effectiveness depends on full, timely and consistent enforcement, which remains challenging and slow, creating vulnerabilities; whereas structured support for Member States in this regard is therefore particularly important; whereas EU and its Member States should also keep developing non-legislative measures, common approaches and methodologies, to disrupt FIMI and defend democracy; whereas Parliament plays a strong role in scrutinising and reinforcing the Union's digital legislation, which should be complemented by regular reviews of its working methods to ensure effectiveness;

Recital K a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

Ka. whereas evidence demonstrates that the engagement-based recommendation systems of very large online platforms (VLOPs), including X, TikTok, and Instagram, are structurally driven by attention-based economics to amplify divisive, polarising, or misleading content, thereby posing risks to civic discourse and electoral integrity, as evidenced by the amplification of extremist political content during elections across the EU; whereas these systems have undermined the visibility of editorially independent and pluralistic media, and facilitate the rapid spread of AI-generated deepfakes and synthetic or manipulated content, exacerbating challenges for users, in particular

vulnerable groups, to distinguish between true and false information; whereas the AI Act introduced rules on mandatory labelling of AI-generated content; whereas Articles 34 and 35 of the DSA require VLOPs to assess and mitigate systemic risks; whereas the DSA also introduced significant new rules to increase algorithmic transparency and accountability, including the option for users to choose non-personalised feeds, thereby reducing reliance on opaque algorithmic curation; whereas challenges within the implementation and user experience remain; whereas effective enforcement of the DSA and AI Act, supported by up-to-date guidelines and independent oversight, is essential to counter manipulation and safeguard democratic processes;

Recital K b (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

Kb. whereas targeted sanctions, threats of tariffs, visa bans, and personal sanctions have been directed by the U.S. administration against legislators and Commission officials responsible for the DSA and other digital legislations, undermining the integrity of European decision-making and the rule of law; whereas the EU, as an open and rules-based single market, must uphold its sovereign right to legislate in line with democratic values, international commitments, and the protection of fundamental rights, including freedom of expression, which is a shared core value with the U.S. and across the democratic world among likeminded partners; whereas unfounded allegations of censorship undermine these shared values and divert the attention from actual serious free speech violations in countries like Russia, China or Iran; whereas enforcement of Union digital legislation

must resist delays or limitations due to geopolitical considerations, notably in cases involving lobbying of big tech platforms; whereas external pressures, including geo-economic coercion, strategic acquisitions, and support for extremist movements by third-country public or corporate actors, further threaten the Union's decision-making sovereignty and democratic resilience; whereas the enforcement of EU digital rules must remain guided solely by Union law and the protection of democratic interests, free from undue influence by political, trade, or external pressures; whereas unity and political alignment among EU Member States in this regard is key;

Recital L

Motion for a resolution

L. whereas ***the use of AI presents*** new opportunities ***for*** strengthening election management and oversight, ***such as*** through detecting unusual online activity and coordinated manipulative behaviour; whereas the use of AI, including generative models and deepfakes, also presents significant challenges for information integrity and electoral processes; whereas credible reports have exposed the operations of a Moscow-based disinformation network known as 'Pravda', which has deliberately targeted and infiltrated large language models (LLMs) with pro-Kremlin narratives designed to mimic neutral and fact-based outputs; whereas such tactics represent a dangerous evolution of FIMI, as they exploit the opacity and scalability of AI systems to subtly disseminate false or misleading geopolitical messaging under the guise of authoritative language; whereas this form of algorithmic manipulation threatens to erode public trust in AI technologies, distort democratic discourse, and

Amendment

L. whereas ***AI drives innovation, knowledge access, productivity, and new digital industries, presenting*** new opportunities, ***such as*** strengthening election management and oversight through detecting unusual online activity and coordinated manipulative behaviour; whereas the use of AI, including generative models and deepfakes, also presents significant challenges for information integrity and electoral processes, ***thus requiring timely and effective democratic safeguards and regulatory oversight***; whereas credible reports have exposed the operations of a Moscow-based disinformation network known as 'Pravda', which has deliberately targeted and infiltrated large language models (LLMs) with pro-Kremlin narratives designed to mimic neutral and fact-based outputs; whereas such tactics represent a dangerous evolution of FIMI, as they exploit the opacity and scalability of AI systems to subtly disseminate false or misleading geopolitical messaging under the guise of

exacerbate disinformation risks across the EU and globally; whereas this underlines the need for strengthened AI literacy in education, work and society at large;

authoritative language **and undermine democratic discourse and trust in digital technologies**; whereas this form of algorithmic manipulation threatens to erode public trust in AI technologies, distort democratic discourse, and exacerbate disinformation risks across the EU and globally; whereas this underlines the need for strengthened AI literacy in education, work and society at large, **increased transparency on LLM training, as well as adequate research funding; whereas AI outputs may reflect biases introduced through their design;**

Recital M

Motion for a resolution

M. whereas online influencers can play an important role in strengthening the digital resilience of our societies, when raising awareness about media literacy, democratic procedures or contributing to a healthy political debate;

Amendment

M. whereas online influencers can play an important role in strengthening the digital resilience of our societies, when raising awareness about media literacy, democratic procedures, **promoting fact-based content** or contributing to a healthy political debate; **whereas, at the same time, a growing share of citizens, especially minors and young adults, rely extensively on content creators and influencers on social media and video-, gaming- and content-sharing services for news and current-affairs information, thereby exposing them to risks linked to addictive design, harmful content, and manipulative practices; whereas online personalities and influencers can have a significant capacity to shape public opinion and information flows without being subject to standards of accountability comparable to those for media;**

Recital N

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

N. whereas the autumn 2024 presidential elections in Romania exposed significant vulnerabilities in the online information environment, with credible reports indicating the widespread use of fake accounts, bots and algorithmically amplified content to promote specific political narratives; whereas TikTok, one of the most widely used platforms among young voters, claimed to have blocked over 116 000 spam accounts from being created and removed 59 000 fake accounts in a post-election clean-up; whereas the use of influencers, including nano- and micro-influencers, by foreign actors further highlights the fact that low-cost, low-visibility actors can be weaponised to evade detection and influence public opinion, in breach of democratic norms;

N. whereas the autumn 2024 presidential elections in Romania exposed significant vulnerabilities in the online information environment, with credible reports indicating the widespread use of fake accounts, bots and algorithmically amplified content to promote specific political narratives **and distort electoral competition**; whereas TikTok, one of the most widely used platforms among young voters, claimed to have blocked over 116 000 spam accounts from being created and removed 59 000 fake accounts in a post-election clean-up; whereas the use of influencers, including nano- and micro-influencers, by foreign actors further highlights the fact that low-cost, low-visibility actors can be weaponised to evade detection and influence public opinion, in breach of democratic norms; **whereas evidence points to two main operational patterns: coordinated manipulation of recommendation algorithms through networks of synchronised accounts generating artificial traffic and trend amplification, and the covert instrumentalisation of content creators, both showing how technical platform dynamics can be exploited and circumvent democratic safeguards ;**

Recital O

Motion for a resolution

O. whereas Telegram, a messaging platform with a growing user base in the EU, has increasingly been flagged as a conduit for disinformation, foreign interference and illicit activities, including the spread of extremist content **and untraceable** political propaganda; whereas its origins in Russia and lack of meaningful content moderation have raised persistent concerns regarding its role in undermining democratic discourse; whereas Telegram has become a primary channel for

Amendment

O. whereas Telegram, a messaging platform with a growing user base in the EU, has increasingly been flagged as a conduit for disinformation, foreign interference and illicit activities, including the spread of extremist content, **recruitment for sabotage, political propaganda and disinformation against EU and national laws**; whereas its origins in Russia, **opaque ownership structures** and lack of meaningful content moderation have raised persistent concerns regarding

recruiting ‘disposable agents’ and conducting hybrid operations; whereas malicious state actors have been found to exploit the technological skills, financial needs and naivety of Telegram users, especially young people, to conduct espionage and sabotage operations at minimal cost, while maintaining plausible deniability; whereas reports suggest that Telegram meets the user threshold for it to be classified as a Very Large Online Platform (VLOP) under the DSA, making it subject to stricter regulatory obligations and risk-mitigation requirements;

its role in undermining democratic discourse; whereas Telegram has become a primary channel for recruiting ‘disposable agents’ and conducting hybrid operations; whereas malicious state actors have been found to exploit the technological skills, financial needs and naivety of Telegram users, especially young people, to conduct espionage and sabotage operations at minimal cost, while maintaining plausible deniability; whereas reports suggest that Telegram meets the user threshold for it to be classified as a Very Large Online Platform (VLOP) under the DSA, making it subject to stricter regulatory obligations and risk-mitigation requirements; ***whereas the Commission’s long period of assessment has not yet brought a conclusion;***

Recital P

Motion for a resolution

P. whereas the growing influence of non-European technology companies – particularly those based in the United States and China – has highlighted the EU’s strategic dependencies in critical areas such as data infrastructure, cloud services ***and social media*** platforms; whereas fostering home-grown innovation, supporting European start-ups and investing in sovereign digital infrastructure are essential steps towards building a competitive, secure ***and*** resilient EU digital ecosystem; whereas aligning digital innovation with democratic values and fundamental rights offers the EU an opportunity to become a global leader in responsible and human-centred technology;

Amendment

P. whereas the growing influence of non-European technology companies – particularly those based in the United States and China – has highlighted the EU’s strategic dependencies in critical areas such as data infrastructure, ***satellite communication***, cloud services, ***online*** platforms, ***payment solutions and IT software, including in sectors like defence***; whereas fostering home-grown innovation, ***ensuring fair and competitive digital markets, enforcing the digital rulebook***, supporting European start-ups and investing in sovereign digital infrastructure are essential steps towards building a competitive, secure, resilient ***and independent*** EU digital ecosystem, ***while limiting the opportunities for hostile interference, information manipulation and economic coercion***; whereas aligning digital innovation with democratic values and fundamental rights offers the EU an opportunity to become a global leader in responsible and human-centred technology;

whereas AI is reshaping and accelerating globalisation, creating a new phase of strategic competition; whereas EU digital sovereignty is especially difficult to achieve when VLOPs and VLOSEs operate in a de facto state of oligopoly;

Recital Q

Motion for a resolution

Q. whereas research shows a concerning trend in the revenue redistribution programmes of online platforms, revealing that media outlets that are subject to sanctions, such as Sputnik and Russia Today, remained listed as ‘partner-publishers’ on Facebook months after the launch of EU sanctions against Russia – raising questions about whether they have continued to benefit financially; whereas such opaque monetisation mechanisms enable foreign ***state-affiliated*** actors to profit from sharing disinformation, and continue to destabilise EU information spaces despite regulatory measures;

Amendment

Q. whereas research shows a concerning trend in the revenue redistribution programmes of online platforms, revealing that media outlets that are subject to sanctions, such as Sputnik and Russia Today, remained listed as ‘partner-publishers’ on Facebook months after the launch of EU sanctions against Russia – raising questions about whether they have continued to benefit financially; whereas such opaque monetisation mechanisms enable foreign ***state-affiliated*** actors to profit from sharing disinformation, and continue to destabilise EU ***and national*** information spaces despite regulatory measures; ***whereas the non-transparent nature of online advertising allows to funnel large amounts from legitimate brands to disinformation sites, funding polarizing content and undermining quality journalism; whereas Meta is the only major tech company to publish limited monetization data, while others remain intransparent;***

Recital R

Motion for a resolution

R. whereas in a survey held in the run-up to the 2025 parliamentary elections in the Netherlands, 1 in 10 respondents declared that they would be likely to ask AI for voting advice, while another 13 % declared they would maybe use it; whereas

Amendment

R. whereas in a survey held in the run-up to the 2025 parliamentary elections in the Netherlands, 1 in 10 respondents declared that they would be likely to ask AI for voting advice, while another 13 % declared they would maybe use it; whereas

in the Netherlands, the combined ratio for the youngest voters amounts to more than one third of the voters; whereas this trend is consistent with findings across the Member States and globally; whereas a recent study by the Dutch data protection authority demonstrates that voting recommendations generated by AI chatbots often present a highly distorted and polarised view of the political landscape;

in the Netherlands, the combined ratio for the youngest voters amounts to more than one third of the voters; whereas this trend is consistent with findings across the Member States and globally; whereas a recent study by the Dutch data protection authority demonstrates that voting recommendations generated by AI chatbots often present a highly distorted and polarised view of the political landscape; ***whereas investing in development of open-source LLMs is one way to reduce concerns about hidden biases, backdoors, or data misuse in AI chatbots;***

Recital R a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

Ra. whereas FIMI actors exploit technologies to orchestrate coordinated inauthentic disinformation campaigns; whereas these technologies, notably bots and AI-based software programmes, are capable of exhibiting autonomous behaviour, and subsequently distort and destroy genuine public discourse, flooding the expressions of real persons with inauthentic content;

Recital U

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

U. whereas FIMI actors exploit technologies to orchestrate coordinated inauthentic disinformation campaigns; whereas these technologies, notably bots and AI-based software programmes, are capable of exhibiting autonomous behaviour, and subsequently distort and destroy genuine public discourse, flooding the expressions of real persons with inauthentic content;

deleted

COMPROMISE 9

Freedom of expression

Compromise supported by PPE, S&D, Renew, Verts/ALE, The Left and replacing Amendment(s) 1017, 732, 847, 941, 988, 1013, 1015, 1016, 1020, 1023, 1021, 1022, 1019, 1018, 1029, 1030, 1031, 1032, 1033, 1034, 1036, 1037, 1038, 1039, 1042, 1043, 1044, 1045, 1046, 1047, 1048, 1050, 1052, 1055, 1056, 1058, 1246, 1596, 89, 91, 135, 150, 199, 202, 203, 302, 300, 304, 299, 301, 303, 305, 306, 309, 312, 311, 310, 313, 308, 314, 316, 317, 365, 504, 588, 589

Motion for a resolution

Subheading 4

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

Freedom of *speech*

Freedom of *expression*

Paragraph 25

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

25. Underlines that the European Democracy Shield must protect and uphold freedom of expression and information as a fundamental right applicable to both offline and online spaces; highlights that human rights protections in the EU are among the strongest worldwide, and that companies wishing to operate in the EU environment and attract European customers **have a shared** responsibility to safeguard those protections; stresses, **however**, that the freedoms of expression and information have been designed to protect human beings, not machines or software that exhibit inauthentic behaviour, such as AI and bot-driven amplification and engagements, and automated software programmes performing repetitive tasks over a network with the aim of imitating real users;

25. Underlines that the European Democracy Shield must protect and uphold freedom of expression and information as a fundamental right applicable to both offline and online spaces; highlights that human rights protections in the EU are among the strongest worldwide, and that companies wishing to operate in the EU environment and attract European customers **share a responsibility to respect and** safeguard those protections; **therefore underlines that VLOP:s and VLOSE:s must acknowledge and effectively address the broader societal and democratic consequences of their services, including through robust systemic risk assessment and mitigation measures, in accordance with Union law; notes in this regard that the amplification of certain content or opinions, and the silencing of others, may constitute systemic risk to a civic discourse and electoral processes or a breach of freedom of expression, in particular to freely receive and impart information and ideas; calls on the**

Commission to ensure that platforms are held accountable in this regard under the DSA; underlines, in this context, that the EU must continue to actively counter false narratives claiming that its digital and democratic legislation undermines freedom of expression; stresses that the freedoms of expression and information have been designed to protect human beings, not machines or software that exhibit inauthentic behaviour, such as AI and bot-driven amplification and engagements, and automated software programmes performing repetitive tasks over a network with the aim of imitating real users; further emphasizes that the commitment to freedom of expression must not be used as a pretext for tolerating illegal content, or hybrid operations of authoritarian regimes aiming to destabilise the EU and its democratic processes;

Paragraph 26

Motion for a resolution

26. Recognises the importance of effective safeguards for users when exercising their democratic rights, including the ability to challenge platforms' content moderation decisions **and** platforms' obligations to inform users when their content gets removed or restricted; recalls the obligation under the DSA for platforms to provide a separate complaint-handling mechanism for this purpose; highlights that safeguarding the fundamental rights of individual users also involves conducting thorough assessments and mitigating systemic risks affecting the integrity of the information space;

Amendment

26. **Recalls that online platforms play an essential role in enabling open public debate, journalistic activity and political pluralism;** recognises **therefore** the importance of effective safeguards for users when exercising their democratic rights, including the ability to challenge platforms' content moderation **and monetization** decisions, **including before administrative and judicial authorities and to enforce online** platforms' obligations to inform users when their content gets removed or restricted; **underlines, in this context, the importance of ensuring access to high-quality content moderation across all European Union languages;** recalls the obligation under the DSA for **online** platforms to provide **full transparency and** a separate complaint-handling mechanism for this purpose **and to ensure that notice, reporting and**

possibility of redress remain easy to access and user-friendly; notes that not all online platforms have implemented such mechanism in accordance with the provisions of the DSA and urges the Commission and the Member States to complete enforcement actions; highlights that safeguarding the fundamental rights of individual users also involves conducting thorough assessments and mitigating systemic risks affecting the integrity of the information space;

Recital S

Motion for a resolution

S. whereas the fundamental right to freedom of expression and information, as enshrined in Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, is a cornerstone of democracy; whereas the EU's commitment to freedom of expression represents a coherent and principled counter-FIMI strategy, in clear contrast with the restrictions that authoritarian actors systematically impose on their populations; whereas the freedom and pluralism of the media, and the existence of a vibrant civic space, empower societies to detect, expose and reject manipulative narratives through democratic deliberation;

Amendment

S. whereas the fundamental right to freedom of expression and information, as enshrined ***in Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as*** in Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, is a cornerstone of democracy; whereas the EU's commitment to freedom of expression represents a coherent and principled counter-FIMI strategy, in clear contrast with the restrictions that authoritarian actors systematically impose on their populations; whereas the freedom and pluralism of the media, and the existence of a vibrant civic space, empower societies to detect, expose and reject manipulative narratives through democratic deliberation;

Recital T

Motion for a resolution

T. whereas freedom of expression and information is a fundamental right designed to protect humans, not machines, bots and AI;

Amendment

T. whereas freedom of expression and information is a fundamental right designed to protect humans, not machines, ***algorithms***, bots and AI;

Recital T a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

Ta. Whereas authoritarian regimes have used social media platforms to undermine freedom of expression; whereas users expect transparency, due process and the protection of freedom of expression, which must be upheld due to requirements under the DSA; whereas full enforcement of European digital legislation is therefore necessary to safeguard these principles;

Or. en

COMPROMISE 10

The EU's preparedness

Compromise supported by PPE, S&D, Renew, Verts/ALE and replacing Amendment(s) 1331, 1329, 1599, 1600, 1601, 1602, 1627, 1603, 1604, 1605, 1606, 1607, 1608, 1609, 1610, 1611, 1612, 1613, 1614, 1615, 1617, 1618, 1619, 1616, 1620, 1621, 1622, 1625, 1626, 1624, 1623, 1628, 1629, 1631, 1630, 1632, 1633, 1636, 1635, 1637, 1638, 1639, 1641, 1642, 1645, 1647, 1648, 1649, 1652, 178, 366, 421, 510, 520, 551, 552, 553, 550, 549, 559, 560, 561, 562, 565, 563, 567, 566, 564, 568, 569, 570, 572, 576, 577, 578

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 83

Motion for a resolution

83. Welcomes the EU Preparedness Union Strategy and underlines that the objectives set out in the strategy are closely interconnected with those of the European Democracy Shield; further emphasises that democratic resilience requires societies to be able to function under exceptional or disruptive conditions, and that reforms aimed at strengthening preparedness should therefore form an integral part of the European Democracy Shield;

Amendment

83. Welcomes the EU Preparedness Union Strategy and underlines that the objectives set out in the strategy are closely interconnected with those of the European Democracy Shield; further emphasises that democratic resilience requires societies to be able to function under exceptional or disruptive conditions, and that reforms aimed at strengthening preparedness should therefore form an integral part of the European Democracy Shield; **welcomes Member State initiatives, such as those in Sweden and Finland, to strengthen societal preparedness, cooperation, and clear communication on citizens' responsibilities; underlines that an effective preparedness policy must be based on inclusion across all ages, communities, and social and economic groups; highlights, in this context, the role of companies, associations, and skilled individuals in supporting essential services and care; stresses that effective civil resilience requires engaging and educating citizens on how and when to contribute;**

Paragraph 83 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

83a. Calls for the establishment of an annual, publicly accessible EU activity report on the overall state of preparedness across the Union with a comprehensive structured overview per each Member State; emphasises that such a report may set out, inter alia, institutional readiness, state of civil-military cooperation, strategic capabilities, preventive measures, response mechanisms, vulnerabilities and key trends, while respecting national security considerations; underlines that such a report may contribute to the exchange of best practices and serve as a guidance and advisory instrument for the implementation of Member States' preparedness strategies; notes that consideration should be given to whether the European Centre for Democratic Resilience could play a coordinating role in the preparation of such a report;

Paragraph 84

Motion for a resolution

84. Calls for the swift development and deployment of an EU-wide, interoperable crisis-alert application, providing real-time, reliable, multilingual information to **citizens** during emergencies; recommends that this app be integrated into national and EU early warning systems, accessible to vulnerable groups, and regularly updated with technological advancements and best practices in crisis management;

Amendment

84. Calls for the swift development and deployment of an EU-wide, interoperable crisis-alert application, providing real-time, reliable, multilingual information to **residents** during emergencies; recommends that this app be integrated into national and EU early warning systems, **be** accessible to **all persons, with a special focus on availability for** vulnerable groups, and regularly updated with technological advancements and best practices in crisis management;

Paragraph 85

Motion for a resolution

85. Welcomes the initiatives in several Member States to distribute a household preparedness booklet, offering clear,

Amendment

85. Welcomes the initiatives in several Member States to distribute a household preparedness booklet, offering clear,

practical guidance tailored to Europe's diverse social and geographic realities to help citizens prepare for emergencies; calls on the Commission to produce an EU-level booklet reflecting the cross-border and multinational context, including recommended emergency supplies, practical self-sufficiency instructions for **at least** 72 hours, basic first aid advice and specific guidance for vulnerable groups, including elderly people, people with disabilities and families with children;

practical guidance tailored to Europe's diverse social and geographic realities to help citizens prepare for emergencies; calls on the Commission to produce an EU-level booklet reflecting the cross-border and multinational context, including recommended emergency supplies, practical self-sufficiency instructions for **a minimum of** 72 hours, basic first aid advice and specific guidance for vulnerable groups, including elderly people, people with disabilities and families with children;

Paragraph 86

Motion for a resolution

86. Calls for the organisation of regular large-scale, EU-coordinated preparedness exercises involving EU institutions, Member States, regional and local authorities, the private sector and civil society; recommends that these exercises simulate complex, realistic scenarios, including cyberattacks, critical infrastructure **disruptions**, coordinated disinformation and hybrid crises, in order to assess response capacities, improve interoperability across governance levels and promote a culture of preparedness at all levels; **calls, to this end**, for the establishment of a European Preparedness Day; considers that the date for this event should be 24 February, the date of Russia's unprovoked full-scale military invasion of Ukraine in 2022, as a symbol of the EU's solidarity with Ukraine and a stark reminder of the necessity for strengthened civilian and defence preparedness against growing threats from authoritarian regimes;

Amendment

86. Calls for the organisation of regular large-scale, EU-coordinated preparedness exercises involving EU institutions, **EU agencies**, Member States, regional and local authorities, the private sector and civil society; **considers that preparation for scenarios ranging from floods, forest fires, earthquakes, medical emergencies as well as chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) incidents, may also contribute to strengthening Europe's capacity to prevent, withstand and respond to threats, such as those demonstrated in Russia's aggression against Ukraine and hybrid attacks against Europe as a whole;** recommends that these exercises simulate complex **and** realistic scenarios, including cyberattacks, **disruptions to** critical infrastructure, coordinated disinformation **campaigns** and hybrid crises, in order to assess response capacities, improve interoperability across governance levels, **share best practices** and promote a culture of preparedness at all levels; **underlines, in this context, that Union initiatives on military mobility are also highly relevant with regard to civilian preparedness and the ability to transport relief supplies in case of emergency;** **further calls** for the establishment of a European Preparedness

Day; considers that the date for this event should be 24 February, the date of Russia's unprovoked full-scale military invasion of Ukraine in 2022, as a symbol of the EU's solidarity with Ukraine and a stark reminder of the necessity for strengthened civilian and defence preparedness against growing threats from authoritarian regimes;

Paragraph 87

Motion for a resolution

87. Calls on the Commission to examine the possibility of expanding Erasmus+ or similar programmes to include cross-border initiatives on preparedness training for workers in critical sectors, such as firefighters, healthcare workers, civil protection volunteers, public servants and representatives of civil society organisations and the public at large; recommends that these programmes promote cross-border and cross-sectoral knowledge exchange, joint exercises and training on hybrid threats and emergencies, and strengthen local preparedness capacities across all Member States, with a special focus on vulnerable regions;

Unchanged text included in the compromise

87. Calls on the Commission to examine the possibility of expanding Erasmus+ or similar programmes to include cross-border initiatives on preparedness training for workers in critical sectors, such as firefighters, healthcare workers, civil protection volunteers, public servants and representatives of civil society organisations and the public at large; recommends that these programmes promote cross-border and cross-sectoral knowledge exchange, joint exercises and training on hybrid threats and emergencies, and strengthen local preparedness capacities across all Member States, with a special focus on vulnerable regions;

Paragraph 88

Motion for a resolution

88. Calls for the accelerated implementation of secure communication systems such as IRIS² and the European Critical Communications System; stresses that these initiatives ensure telecommunications resilience, the continuity of essential services during crises, reduced external dependencies in

Amendment

88. Calls for the accelerated implementation of secure communication systems such as IRIS² and the European Critical Communications System, ***while building upon already existing systems at Member State level***; stresses that these initiatives ensure telecommunications resilience, the continuity of essential services during crises, reduced external dependencies in strategic sectors, and

strategic sectors, and reinforced cybersecurity for these infrastructures;

reinforced cybersecurity for these infrastructures *through harmonized spectrum authorization, cybersecurity certification and ICT supply chain security measures in line with the Commission's DNA and CSA proposals;*

Paragraph 89

Motion for a resolution

89. Calls for enhanced coordination between EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, the Member States and international partners through shared situational awareness platforms, common methodologies and rapid, secure information-sharing mechanisms; stresses that these tools enable a coherent, agile and coordinated response to hybrid threats, improve risk anticipation and strengthen the EU's collective preparedness and resilience;

Amendment

89. Calls for enhanced coordination between EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, the Member States and *like-minded* international partners through shared situational awareness platforms, common methodologies and rapid, secure information-sharing mechanisms; stresses that these tools enable a coherent, agile and coordinated response to hybrid threats, improve risk anticipation and strengthen the EU's collective preparedness and resilience; *emphasises, in this context, that preparedness and resilience are collective responsibilities requiring societal participation;*

Paragraph 90

Motion for a resolution

90. Highlights the need to mainstream preparedness within the 2028-2034 MFF, in order to build credible resilience and achieve a sufficient level of civilian and defence preparedness; urges the Commission to develop targeted financial instruments combining relevant defence and civil security instruments, such as the Defending Europe Facility and the Securing Europe Facility, in order to provide sufficient and stable funding for resilience-building projects, technological innovation and dual-use capabilities, civil preparedness initiatives, critical infrastructure protection, and efforts to strengthen the EU's industrial and

Amendment

90. Highlights the need to mainstream preparedness within the 2028-2034 MFF, in order to build credible resilience and achieve a sufficient level of civilian and defence preparedness; urges the Commission to develop targeted financial instruments combining relevant defence and civil security instruments, such as the Defending Europe Facility and the Securing Europe Facility, in order to provide sufficient and stable funding for resilience-building projects, technological innovation and dual-use capabilities, civil preparedness initiatives, critical infrastructure protection, and efforts to strengthen the EU's industrial and

technological sovereignty; notes that dedicated funding streams should also prioritise local preparedness efforts, particularly in territories most exposed to vulnerabilities and hybrid threats;

technological sovereignty; notes that dedicated funding streams should also prioritise local preparedness efforts, particularly in territories most exposed to vulnerabilities and hybrid threats, ***in particular information warfare***;

Paragraph 91

Motion for a resolution

91. Recommends that the EU's decision-making institutions review and optimise their strategies and contingency plans in case of an open military conflict against one or more Member States and similar crisis scenarios; stresses, furthermore, the need to ensure the highest levels of safety and security in all EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, including in the area of cybersecurity and the security and integrity of information, and to create the necessary conditions in this regard, including ensuring accredited secure communication channels and adequate meeting rooms for 'in camera' meetings; underlines the need to strictly enforce rules on breaches of information security and confidentiality, in particular in the context of a heightened risk of espionage and sabotage; stresses that, even outside of open military conflict, hybrid threats continue to pose ever higher risks to the daily functioning of the EU;

Amendment

91. Recommends that the EU's decision-making institutions review and optimise their strategies and contingency plans in case of an open military conflict against one or more Member States and similar crisis scenarios, ***including in the cases of activation of Article 42.7 TEU***; stresses, furthermore, the need to ensure the highest levels of safety and security in all EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, including in the area of cybersecurity and the security and integrity of information, and to create the necessary conditions in this regard, including ensuring accredited secure communication channels and adequate meeting rooms for 'in camera' meetings; underlines the need to strictly enforce rules on breaches of information security and confidentiality, ***including through effective investigation and prosecution of such breaches***, in particular in the context of a heightened risk of espionage and sabotage; ***calls in this regard for regular auditing of vulnerabilities and dependencies, particularly in the digital space, in all EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies***; stresses that, even outside of open military conflict, hybrid threats continue to pose ever higher risks to the daily functioning of the EU;

Paragraph 92

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

92. Welcomes the Commission's efforts to strengthen physical and information security within the EU institutions, as outlined in the Corporate Management Board note of October 2025, including plans for secure meeting rooms, enhanced security clearance procedures for staff handling classified information, and the establishment of the Security College to ensure regular updates on threat developments; notes that these measures respond to heightened risks from espionage, foreign interference and hybrid threats targeting EU decision-making processes; stresses, however, that physical security upgrades must be complemented by robust cybersecurity protocols and counter-intelligence capabilities to address the full spectrum of infiltration risks; calls for the swift adoption of the Commission proposal for a regulation on information security in the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union (COM/2022/0119); recalls that the Cybersecurity Regulation for the EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies recommends a cybersecurity budget of 10 % of the overall information and communications technology budget for EU entities;

92. Welcomes the Commission's efforts to strengthen physical and information security within the EU institutions, as outlined in the Corporate Management Board note of October 2025, including plans for secure meeting rooms, enhanced security clearance procedures for staff handling classified information, and the establishment of the Security College to ensure regular updates on threat developments; notes that these measures respond to heightened risks from espionage, foreign interference and hybrid threats targeting EU decision-making processes; stresses, however, that physical security upgrades must be complemented by robust cybersecurity protocols and counter-intelligence capabilities to address the full spectrum of infiltration risks; calls for the swift adoption of the Commission proposal for a regulation on information security in the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union (COM/2022/0119); recalls that the Cybersecurity Regulation for the EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies recommends a cybersecurity budget of 10 % of the overall information and communications technology budget for EU entities; **welcomes the activities of CERT-EU and insists on the need to ensure its sufficient budget and proper staffing;**

Paragraph 93

Motion for a resolution

93. Recommends **that** further measures **be taken to increase** Parliament's security **and** resilience to foreign interference, **and its preparedness for**, and ability to **function, during** crises; **calls, in this regard, for** reinforced support for **its** Members, **including** IT and security checks, training **and specific** briefings **ahead of missions, and enhanced** interdisciplinary **training and other** resilience-building activities **combining**

Amendment

93. Recommends further measures **to strengthen the** Parliament's security, resilience to foreign interference and ability to **operate effectively in** crises, **including** reinforced support for Members **and staff through** IT and security checks, **targeted** training, **pre-mission** briefings **and** interdisciplinary resilience-building activities **integrating** physical **security**, information security and cybersecurity; **stresses the need to further enhance the**

physical *and* information security, *safety*, and cybersecurity; *calls for further targeted training for Parliament staff to prevent information manipulation; recommends strengthening its cybersecurity environment in compliance with the Cybersecurity Regulation, and increasing its operational maturity to further enhance its cybersecurity resilience and improve its threat-detection capacities in the context of a dynamic cybersecurity threat landscape and rapidly changing technological environment;*

Parliament's cybersecurity framework in line with the Cybersecurity Regulation, improve operational maturity and strengthen threat detection capabilities in an evolving technological and threat landscape, while also providing more targeted training for staff to counter information manipulation and applying stricter security clearances for sensitive meetings and missions; notes that the use of private mobile devices and laptops for parliamentary work constitutes a potential vulnerability and underlines that Members and staff should be equipped with secure institutional devices; welcomes existing voluntary spyware screening and calls for its systematic extension to all devices used for parliamentary business; further calls on the Commission and the EEAS to systematically involve Parliament in preparedness activities and exercises, such as the EU Integrated Resolve;

Paragraph 94

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

94. *Notes, in the context of Parliament's internal security, that the use by Members and staff of private mobile phones and other devices such as laptops for business purposes constitutes a vulnerability that could be exploited to attack the institution; underlines that Members and staff should be equipped with the necessary IT devices, such as mobile phones and laptops, to perform their tasks; welcomes, in this context, the security screenings offered to Members and staff, upon request, to detect potential spyware on private devices; calls on the administration to extend and systematise this screening to cover all devices used for Parliament-related work; calls for clearer rules and systematic and appropriate guidance to Members and staff, and for*

deleted

safeguards to mitigate these risks, especially during missions;

Paragraph 95

Motion for a resolution

95. Calls on the Commission and the EEAS to involve Parliament in its preparedness activities and exercises, such as the EU Integrated Resolve, as a matter of course;

Amendment

deleted

Recital BG

Motion for a resolution

BG. whereas hybrid threats, foreign interference and disinformation campaigns have evolved into complex, full-scale and cross-sectoral crises with detrimental effects on safety and security, the well-being of citizens, and the functioning of society and the economy as a whole, constituting a key challenge to the EU's internal affairs and destabilising democratic institutions across the Member States, as has been seen throughout Russia's aggression against Ukraine;

Amendment

BG. whereas hybrid threats, foreign interference and disinformation campaigns have evolved into complex, full-scale and cross-sectoral crises with detrimental effects on safety and security, the well-being of citizens, and the functioning of society, ***institutions*** and the economy as a whole, constituting a key challenge to the EU's internal affairs and destabilising democratic institutions across the Member States, as ***well as threatening the future of the whole of Europe***, as has been seen throughout Russia's aggression against Ukraine;

Recital BH

Motion for a resolution

BH. whereas effective civilian and defence preparedness requires a comprehensive, whole-of-society, whole-of-government and all-hazards approach that ***integrates the*** national authorities of the Member States with EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, as well as businesses, academia, civil society and individual citizens; whereas this effort needs to be accompanied by long-term

Amendment

BH. whereas effective civilian and defence preparedness requires a comprehensive, whole-of-society, whole-of-government and all-hazards approach that ***facilitates the cooperation and integration of*** national authorities of the Member States with EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, as well as businesses, academia, civil society and individual citizens; whereas ***the European***

investment, strategic foresight and the embedding of resilience into policymaking, infrastructure development, education systems and supply chains;

Democracy Shield is a unique opportunity to establish this approach; whereas this effort needs to be accompanied by long-term investment that realistically matches the scale of the challenge, as well as effective coordinated deployment of funds, strategic foresight and the embedding of resilience into policymaking, infrastructure development, education systems and supply chains; whereas Union defence and preparedness initiatives should be aligned and work in synergy;

Recital BI

Motion for a resolution

BI. whereas empowering citizens is key to societal resilience, **and** preparedness must include practical tools such as an EU-wide crisis alert app, a household preparedness booklet, and wide-reaching awareness campaigns promoting self-sufficiency and crisis readiness;

Amendment

BI. whereas empowering citizens **through knowledge, education, and media and digital literacy, critical thinking, and access to reliable information** is key to societal resilience, **ensuring all citizens can anticipate risks, recognise manipulation, respond appropriately during emergencies, and actively contribute to the collective resilience of democratic societies; whereas terrestrial broadcast radio is present all across the EU and provides a reliable and stable means to inform citizens in case of man-made or natural disaster, particularly in the event of outage of internet and other communication tools; whereas** preparedness must include practical tools such as an EU-wide crisis alert app, a household preparedness booklet, and wide-reaching awareness campaigns promoting self-sufficiency and crisis readiness **for groups of all ages and social backgrounds;**

Recital BJ

Motion for a resolution

BJ. whereas civil-military cooperation, dual-use capabilities and the integration of

Amendment

BJ. whereas civil-military cooperation, dual-use capabilities and the integration of

preparedness into educational programmes are essential for enhancing defence readiness through targeted training not only for workers in critical sectors, such as firefighters, healthcare workers and public servants, but also civil society actors and the public at large;

preparedness into educational programmes, ***along with practical skills and knowledge in the field of civil defence***, are essential for enhancing defence readiness through targeted training not only for workers in critical sectors, such as firefighters, healthcare workers and public servants, but also civil society actors and the public at large; ***whereas there is a need to promote civic responsibility, awareness of threats, and understanding of the role of citizens in ensuring security***;

Recital BK

Motion for a resolution

BK. whereas technological sovereignty and secure digital ecosystems, including projects such as IRIS² and the European Critical Communication System, are key to maintaining control over essential communication channels and strengthening critical infrastructure;

Amendment

BK. whereas technological sovereignty and secure digital ecosystems, including projects such as IRIS² and the European Critical Communication System, are key to maintaining control over essential communication channels and strengthening critical infrastructure; ***whereas European telecommunications companies have been a target of cyberespionage, as confirmed by the recent examples attributed to China-linked group Salt Typhoon; whereas the telecommunications sector, as a cornerstone of these ecosystems, requires robust cybersecurity and resilience measures to remain secure and operational***;

Recital BL

Motion for a resolution

BL. whereas preparedness depends on seamless cooperation between EU institutions, agencies, Member States and international partners, supported by joint exercises and training, shared situational awareness platforms and rapid information exchange;

Amendment

BL. whereas preparedness depends on seamless cooperation between EU institutions, agencies, Member States and ***like-minded*** international partners, supported by joint exercises and training, shared situational awareness platforms and rapid information exchange; ***whereas Taiwan, as a leading partner in terms of situational awareness, has been***

organising extensive civil defence and resilience exercises aiming to combat China's increasing grey-zone warfare tactics, complementing its military drills; whereas Taiwan's whole-of-society approach and best practices can contribute to developing the concept of preparedness in the EU, strengthening shared situational awareness, early-warning capacities and the overall effectiveness of the European Democracy Shield;

Recital BM

Motion for a resolution

BM. whereas building credible resilience and achieving a sufficient level of civilian and defence preparedness requires massive investment, boosting Europe's technological and industrial base and reducing strategic dependencies; whereas this effort requires the exploration of new targeted funding mechanisms;

Amendment

BM. whereas building credible resilience and achieving a sufficient level of civilian and defence preparedness requires massive investment, boosting Europe's technological and industrial base and reducing strategic dependencies, ***particularly in the digital field***; whereas this effort requires the exploration of new targeted funding mechanisms;

Or. en

COMPROMISE 11

Civil society

Compromise supported by PPE, S&D, Renew, Verts/ALE and replacing Amendment(s) 623, 627, 629, 630, 642, 645, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 1051, 1195, 1196, 1197, 1201, 1198, 1199, 1200, 1202, 1203, 1204, 1205, 1206, 1207, 1208, 1209, 1211, 1212, 1213, 1217, 1218, 1214, 1215, 1216, 1219, 1221, 1220, 1222, 1271, 1223, 1224, 1225, 1227, 1226, 1024, 1228, 1232, 1400, 1233, 1229, 1231, 1234, 1235, 1401, 1230, 1236, 1237, 1239, 1240, 1241, 1242, 1244, 1245, 1247, 1248, 1249, 1250, 1251, 1252, 1253, 1254, 1256, 1257, 1255, 1258, 1259, 1260, 1261, 1262, 1263, 1264, 1265, 1268, 1267, 1269, 1270, 1272, 1273, 1275, 1276, 1346, 1347, 1349, 1429, 1536, 92, 134, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 179, 368, 249, 276, 277, 280, 285, 354, 363, 364, 369, 371, 370, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 387, 384, 385, 386, 388, 389, 391, 476, 503, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 513, 514, 515, 516, 536, 554, 571, 579, 587, 595

Motion for a resolution

Subheading 6

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

Civil society

Civil society, ***academia, culture and civic participation***

Paragraph 36

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

36. Stresses the crucial role that civil society plays in defending our democracy, not only in acting as a watchdog by exposing and actively combating ***foreign attempts to interfere with*** democratic processes, but also in serving as a fundamental force in the long-term effort to build stronger and more resilient societies; underlines, in particular, the important role of civil society in upholding the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU;

36. Stresses the crucial role that ***an active, vibrant and independent*** civil society plays ***as one of the core pillars*** in defending our democracy, not only in acting as a watchdog by exposing and actively combating ***malicious interference in*** democratic processes, but also in serving as a fundamental force in the long-term effort to build stronger and more resilient societies; underlines, in particular, the important role of civil society in upholding the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU;

Paragraph 37

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

37. Welcomes the Commission's EU Strategy for Civil Society, published alongside the communication on the European Democracy Shield; welcomes the Commission's approach of linking this strategy to its work on the Shield, as a tool to further bolster civic engagement;

37. Welcomes the Commission's EU Strategy for Civil Society, published alongside the communication on the European Democracy Shield; welcomes the Commission's approach of linking this strategy to its work on the Shield, as a tool to further bolster civic engagement; ***considers the strategy an important first step, as it represents the EU's first comprehensive approach to civil society, while noting the need for the next steps to include a more ambitious approach, encompassing measures to effectively safeguard the role of civil society in democratic processes; highlights that future initiatives in this area should address the shrinking of civic space, while also recognizing that civil society organisations and human rights defenders are particularly vulnerable, and emphasizes that this is especially true for organisations working on specific topics, such as LGBTIQ+, gender equality, and anti-racism issues;***

Paragraph 38

Motion for a resolution

38. Calls on the Commission to strengthen its work on civil dialogue and to establish new tools for this purpose; welcomes, in this context, the Commission's commitment to establishing an operational Civil Society Platform by 2026 to support a more systematic approach that will be used to strengthen dialogue in line with the EU's values; considers that the announced online Knowledge Hub on Civic Space may contribute to the coordination of the activities of civil society organisations in the area of protecting democracy and countering hybrid threats ***and FIMI, and improve*** situational awareness;

Amendment

38. Calls on the Commission to strengthen its work on civil dialogue and to establish new tools for this purpose; welcomes, in this context, the Commission's commitment to establishing an operational Civil Society Platform by 2026 to support a more systematic approach that will be used to strengthen dialogue in line with the EU's values; considers that the announced online Knowledge Hub on Civic Space may contribute to the coordination of the activities of civil society organisations in the area of protecting democracy and countering hybrid threats, ***FIMI and transnational repression as well as improving*** situational awareness; ***underlines, in this context, the importance of diaspora-focused civic engagement;***

further reminds that parts of civil society have extensive experience with foreign interference and should, within the context of civil dialogue, be involved in shaping policy to address it;

Paragraph 38 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

38 a. *Highlights the role and responsibility that civil society has shouldered in democratic processes in candidate countries; calls on the Commission to liaise, where possible, with civil society organisations from candidate and potential candidate countries on current and future initiatives from the EU Strategy for Civil Society, particularly those consistently engaged in fostering digital alignment, information integrity, election integrity and democratic resilience;*

Paragraph 39

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

39. Stresses the importance of concrete funding programmes such as the CERV programme; welcomes the Commission's **idea of maintaining** the CERV programme **and** incorporating it into the new AgoraEU programme for 2028-2034; calls on the **Commission** to ensure **that the** funding for this strand of AgoraEU meets the needs of civil society organisations and is implemented under the direct management of the Commission;

39. **Calls on the Member States to ensure sustainable and diversified funding, including stable operating support and capacity-building measures, for civil society organisations, recognising their essential role in upholding democratic values and enabling them to operate effectively and independently;** stresses the importance of concrete **EU** funding programmes **to complement these efforts**, such as the CERV programme; **and** welcomes the Commission's **intention to maintain** the CERV programme **by** incorporating it into the new AgoraEU programme for 2028–2034; calls on the **co-legislators** to ensure **ambitious and predictable** funding for this strand of AgoraEU, **which** meets the needs of civil society organisations and is implemented

under the direct management of the Commission;

Paragraph 39 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

39 a. Emphasises that culture constitutes a strategic pillar of the European project, as cultural freedom, heritage and creativity foster democratic participation, critical thinking and trust in institutions; highlights that programmes such as AgoraEU can play a key role in translating these values into tangible support; notes with concern that attacks on liberal democracy are increasingly targeting cultural actors and institutions, in particular through various forms of political pressure; underlines, therefore, that safeguarding artistic freedom and cultural institutions is essential to the defence of democracy in the Union;

Paragraph 39 b (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

39b. Emphasises the importance of preserving Europe's cultural history and collective memory, and of countering the manipulation and falsification of historical facts in order to strengthen democratic resilience; underlines, in this regard, the need to reinforce a common European culture of remembrance and reiterates its support for a pan-European memorial to the victims of 20th-century totalitarian regimes, as well as for a Commission report on European remembrance by early 2027; condemns the Russian regime's historical revisionism and its use of distorted narratives to deny the sovereignty of formerly subjugated nations and to justify external interference;

Paragraph 40

Motion for a resolution

40. ***Underlines the need for increased financial transparency regarding the funding of civil society organisations in general, and in the context of support from non-EU countries in particular; recalls that civil society organisations can be, and have been, used as tools by malicious non-EU-country actors to illegitimately influence democratic processes in the EU and its Member States; stresses that as an institution Parliament has a special responsibility to contribute to reforms in this area, in the light of the so-called Qatargate scandal; highlights, however, that measures to address this issue should be designed in a way that prevents them from being misused to stigmatise the legitimate activities of civil society as such;***

Amendment

40. ***Recalls different interest representative actors, including civil society organisations, think tanks and umbrella organisations can be, and have been, used as tools by malicious non-EU-country actors to illegitimately influence democratic processes in the EU and its Member States; emphasizes that, if appropriately designed and with safeguards taking into account the size of organisations, financial transparency measures can help mitigate the risk of future undue influence from authoritarian states; stresses that as an institution Parliament bears a particular responsibility to strengthen integrity, transparency and accountability standards in the light of lessons learned from past cases of corruption and foreign interference; highlights, however, that measures to address this issue should be designed in a way that prevents them from being misused to stigmatise the legitimate activities of civil society and their decisive role in strengthening our democracies;***

Paragraph 41

Motion for a resolution

41. ***Welcomes the Commission's proposed directive on interest representation carried out on behalf of third countries as an important part of the Defence of Democracy package, aiming to lay down harmonised requirements for economic activities relating to interest representation carried out on behalf of a third-country entity; stresses that common rules in this regard would constitute an important building block in terms of transparency regarding non-EU-country***

Amendment

41. ***Highlights the importance of the Commission's proposed directive on interest representation carried out on behalf of third countries as a central part of the Defence of Democracy package, aiming to lay down harmonised requirements for economic activities relating to interest representation carried out on behalf of a third-country entities; stresses that common rules in this regard can contribute to accountability and trust in EU decision-making by introducing***

influence; calls on the co-legislators to finalise the legislative process without delay;

transparency *with regards to* non-EU-country influence; calls on the co-legislators to finalise the legislative process without delay; ***underlines that Member States should ensure that compliance with this Directive should not lead to any restriction of fundamental rights;***

Paragraph 42

Motion for a resolution

42. Underlines the importance of citizens' engagement in democratic processes; urges the Commission to ensure, in cooperation with the Member States, the clear and effective communication of the initiatives it develops to promote and enhance the use of its citizen engagement tools; welcomes the Commission's strengthening of such tools, notably the European Citizens' Initiative, the European Citizens' Panels and the Citizens' Engagement Platform, and the proposal to strengthen the network of national authorities on citizen participation;

Amendment

42. Underlines the importance of citizens' engagement in democratic processes; urges the Commission to ensure, in cooperation with the Member States, the clear and effective communication of the initiatives it develops to promote and enhance the use of its citizen engagement tools ***that are accessible, user-friendly, multilingual, and capable of reaching citizens at scale;*** welcomes the Commission's strengthening of such tools, notably the European Citizens' Initiative, the European Citizens' Panels and the Citizens' Engagement Platform, and the proposal to strengthen the network of national authorities on citizen participation; ***highlights, in this context, the importance of actively engaging young people in democratic life, recognising them as key actors in strengthening civic and political participation, including through the development of participatory digital platforms and youth councils to ensure meaningful involvement in decision-making processes at local, national, and European levels;***

Paragraph 42 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

42 a. Stresses that academic freedom, including the freedom of research, teaching and scholarly expression, constitutes a fundamental pillar of

democratic societies; condemns attacks on academic freedom and stresses the need to strengthen Europe's research independence and resilience to foreign interference; warns, in particular, against the manipulation of history by external actors; reiterates its call on the Commission to put forward a legislative proposal protecting the fundamental freedom of scientific research, including minimum standards for researchers' rights, ethical conduct, integrity and institutional independence, and supported by effective monitoring mechanisms;

Recital AC

Motion for a resolution

AC. whereas the ongoing Russian war of aggression against Ukraine illustrates the vital role that civil society plays when communities are in crisis situations, particularly when it comes to providing humanitarian aid, securing basic needs and ensuring the continuation of the everyday lives of affected populations;

Amendment

AC. whereas the ongoing Russian war of aggression against Ukraine illustrates the vital role that civil society plays when communities are in crisis situations, particularly when it comes to providing humanitarian aid, securing basic needs and ensuring the continuation of the everyday lives of affected populations ***and in responding to threats related to sabotage and espionage;***

Recital AD

Motion for a resolution

AD. whereas civil society also plays an essential role in contributing to policymaking, delivering social and community services, raising awareness of important social issues, representing diverse groups in vulnerable situations, ***and*** promoting and protecting the fundamental rights of citizens;

Amendment

AD. whereas civil society also plays an essential role in contributing to policymaking, delivering social and community services, raising awareness of important social issues, ***enhancing resilience,*** representing diverse groups in vulnerable situations, promoting and protecting the fundamental rights of citizens ***as well as ensuring that governments remain transparent and accountable through public scrutiny and democratic oversight;***

Recital AE

Motion for a resolution

AE. whereas the Commission has published its EU Strategy for Civil Society, which is said to complement the actions set out in the joint communication on the European Democracy Shield; whereas the EU Strategy for Civil Society confirms that the Civil Society Platform, which the Commission has announced will be established as part of the implementation of the strategy, will aim to provide a regular and structured framework for the protection and promotion of EU values and the streamlining and strengthening of engagement on fundamental rights, democracy, equality and the rule of law, and will become operational in 2026; whereas the strategy also includes the creation of an online Knowledge Hub on Civic Space, which should document existing civic-space monitoring initiatives, reports and protection resources, at national, EU and international level, in cooperation with the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights;

Recital AF

Motion for a resolution

AF. whereas the AgoraEU programme, proposed by the Commission for the 2028–2034 multiannual financial framework (MFF), constitutes an important step forward in strengthening EU support for culture, media and civil society, with an ***anticipated*** budget of EUR 9 billion;

Unchanged text included in the compromise

AE. whereas the Commission has published its EU Strategy for Civil Society, which is said to complement the actions set out in the joint communication on the European Democracy Shield; whereas the EU Strategy for Civil Society confirms that the Civil Society Platform, which the Commission has announced will be established as part of the implementation of the strategy, will aim to provide a regular and structured framework for the protection and promotion of EU values and the streamlining and strengthening of engagement on fundamental rights, democracy, equality and the rule of law, and will become operational in 2026; whereas the strategy also includes the creation of an online Knowledge Hub on Civic Space, which should document existing civic-space monitoring initiatives, reports and protection resources, at national, EU and international level, in cooperation with the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights;

Amendment

AF. ***whereas funding for democratic resilience should be strengthened and used in a coordinated and effective manner aiming for maximum impact, while respecting the independence of the entities concerned;*** whereas the AgoraEU programme, proposed by the Commission for the 2028–2034 multiannual financial framework (MFF), constitutes an important step forward in strengthening EU support for culture, media and civil society, with an ***proposed*** budget of EUR 9 billion;

Recital AF a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

AF a. whereas societies that invest effectively in human capital and education are among the most competitive, resilient, and economically robust; whereas programmes such as Erasmus+ foster European values and strengthen youth democratic engagement and societal resilience across the EU;

Recital AF b (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

AFb. Whereas malicious third-country actors have sought to interfere with, and exert undue influence over, the European Parliament, including through illicit lobbying and corrupt practices, as evidenced by cases such as the so-called ‘Qatargate’; whereas these developments underscore the need to further strengthen the resilience and integrity of the Union’s decision-making processes;

Recital AF c (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

AFc. Whereas the French Ministry of the Interior has published a report on the Muslim Brotherhood addressing concerns relating to covert influence activities and entryism; whereas similar concerns have also been raised regarding other religious actors, such as the Russian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate);

Or. en

Introduction

Compromise supported by PPE, S&D, Renew, Verts/ALE and replacing Amendment(s) 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 625, 626, 628, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 643, 647, 648, 649 A, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 659, 661, 664, 665, 671, 672, 673, 675, 676, 679, 1027, 1028, 1277, 1282, 1345, 1561, 1599, 1640, 86, 87, 88, 90, 121, 125, 127, 128, 175, 390, 399, 410, 580, 584, 590, 591

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 1

Motion for a resolution

1. Welcomes the joint communication ***from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy*** on the ***establishment of a*** European Democracy Shield and the continued efforts to build on the work already undertaken under the European democracy action plan and the Defence of Democracy package; is of the view that the core mission of the European Democracy Shield should be to protect European democracy ***from external threats***, and ultimately contribute to safeguarding the ***European way of life, the rule of law and the*** values enshrined in Article 2 TEU;

Amendment

1. Welcomes the joint communication on the European Democracy Shield and the continued efforts to build on the work already undertaken under the European democracy action plan and the Defence of Democracy package; is of the view that the core mission of the European Democracy Shield should be to protect European democracy ***amid an ever-evolving threat landscape*** and ultimately contribute to safeguarding the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU; ***takes the view that the measures set out in the communication do not fully reflect the level of ambition, foresight and capacity required and should be further developed and progressively strengthened over time, with a view to ensuring the effective establishment of robust and binding actions to protect democracy, in line with the scale of the challenges identified, while respecting the EU's Treaty-based division of powers; stresses that soft policy measures are often insufficient where democratic values are deliberately undermined and that the fight against foreign interference, hybrid threats and disinformation requires ambition and strong action; takes the position that the credibility of the European Democracy Shield also depends on the will and determination to enforce existing Union***

law relevant to the defence of democracy; further reminds that the fragmentation of the European Union remains a vulnerability in the defence of democracy;

Paragraph 2

Motion for a resolution

2. Notes with concern the increasingly complex and evolving threat landscape ***faced by*** the EU and its Member States, characterised by FIMI, hybrid attacks and disinformation campaigns conducted by malicious third-country actors; stresses that ***these are hostile actions that undermine the democratic foundations of the EU by fomenting division, diminishing public trust in institutions and exploiting societal vulnerabilities, frequently leveraging advanced digital technologies;***

Amendment

2. Notes with concern the increasingly complex and evolving threat landscape ***undermining democratic processes and institutions in*** the EU and its Member States, characterised by FIMI, hybrid attacks and disinformation campaigns conducted by malicious third-country actors ***and their proxies inside the Union;*** stresses that ***hybrid warfare goes beyond cyber or information attacks alone, and encompasses the economic, technological and societal dimensions of strategic confrontation; underlines that this reality is shared by many of the Union's like-minded partners in its neighbourhood and worldwide;***

Paragraph 2 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

2a. Emphasises that social cohesion and trust in public institutions constitute cornerstones of democratic resilience; stresses that rule of law weaknesses, notably in areas such as judicial independence, media pluralism and the effectiveness of anti-corruption frameworks, risk undermining public confidence and being instrumentalised by both internal and external actors with a view to weakening democratic consensus and exacerbating societal polarisation; highlights the need for a comprehensive approach aimed at addressing rule of law concerns and reinforcing social cohesion, democratic legitimacy and societal trust across the EU and its Member States;

further recalls that strengthening rule of law in candidate countries is key to supporting their alignment with Union values and enhancing overall European democratic resilience;

Paragraph 3

Motion for a resolution

3. Considers Russia as the primary external threat to Europe's democratic integrity; reiterates its view that Russia is a state sponsor of terrorism; underlines the **urgent** need for a comprehensive, **coherent** and forward-looking strategy to **effectively address these challenges and** safeguard European democracy;

Amendment

3. Considers Russia as the primary external threat to Europe's **security and** democratic integrity **and** reiterates its view that Russia is a state sponsor of terrorism; underlines the need for a comprehensive and forward-looking strategy to safeguard European democracy;

Paragraph 4

Motion for a resolution

4. **Reiterates its conviction** that the key policy priorities outlined in the European Democracy Shield initiative – including combating FIMI and hybrid threats, strengthening electoral resilience, enhancing cybersecurity, supporting civil society and promoting independent and investigative journalism – must be **firmly embedded and** sufficiently funded within the upcoming MFF;

Amendment

4. **Insists** that the key policy priorities outlined in the European Democracy Shield initiative – including combating FIMI and hybrid threats, strengthening electoral resilience, enhancing cybersecurity, supporting civil society and promoting independent **media** and investigative journalism – must be sufficiently funded within the upcoming MFF; **underscores that investment in democratic resilience is crucial for the EU security, sovereignty and prosperity; expresses its support for the Commission's commitment to mainstreaming democratic resilience across EU funding programmes; underlines, in that context, the need for various aspects of hybrid defence to be integrated into EU defence initiatives; stresses, however, that clear goals with measurable actions and outcomes are needed to use EU and national resources**

effectively and avoid waste or fragmented funding;

Recital A

Motion for a resolution

A. whereas on 12 November 2025, the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy presented a joint communication on the establishment of the European Democracy Shield, setting out a series of measures to empower, protect and promote strong and resilient democracies across the EU;

Amendment

A. whereas on 12 November 2025, the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy presented a joint communication on the establishment of the European Democracy Shield, setting out a series of measures to empower, protect and promote strong and resilient democracies across the EU; ***whereas this initiative provides a unique opportunity to build an effective, whole-of-society approach to the protection of European democracy, freedom and prosperity; whereas democratic resilience and European security are increasingly inseparable;***

Recital A a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

Aa. whereas poverty, socio-economic deprivation and marginalisation can leave certain segments of society particularly exposed and vulnerable to external interference and hostile information operations;

Recital A b (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

Ab. whereas the threat posed by Russia to Europe's security and democratic integrity remains at unprecedented levels; whereas other actors, including China and Iran, also pose significant challenges; whereas it is necessary to adopt a principle of information deterrence and, where appropriate, apply

*restrictive measures against actors
responsible for FIMI;*

Or. en

COMPROMISE 13

Citations

Compromise supported by PPE, S&D, Renew, Verts/ALE, The Left and replacing Amendment(s) 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 173

Motion for a resolution

Citation 1

Motion for a resolution

– having regard to its decision of 18 December 2024 on setting up a special committee on the European Democracy Shield, and defining its responsibilities, numerical strength and term of office¹,

¹ OJ C, C/2025/1981, 11.4.2025, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/1981/oj>.

Unchanged text included in the compromise

– having regard to its decision of 18 December 2024 on setting up a special committee on the European Democracy Shield, and defining its responsibilities, numerical strength and term of office¹,

¹ OJ C, C/2025/1981, 11.4.2025, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/1981/oj>.

Citation 2

Motion for a resolution

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 12 November 2025 entitled ‘European Democracy Shield: Empowering Strong and Resilient Democracies’ (JOIN(2025)0791),

Unchanged text included in the compromise

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 12 November 2025 entitled ‘European Democracy Shield: Empowering Strong and Resilient Democracies’ (JOIN(2025)0791),

Citation 3

Motion for a resolution

– having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), and in particular

Amendment

– having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), and in particular

to Article 2 thereof on the *EU's* founding values, Article 10 thereof on democratic life and Article 21 thereof on external action,

to Article 2 thereof on the *EU* founding values, **Article 5 thereof on EU competences**, Article 10 thereof on democratic life and Article 21 thereof on external action,

Citation 4

Motion for a resolution

– having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular to Article 114 thereof on the internal market and Article 222 thereof on solidarity,

Unchanged text included in the compromise

– having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular to Article 114 thereof on the internal market and Article 222 thereof on solidarity,

Citation 4 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

– having regard to the Charter of the United Nations,

Amendment

– **having regard to the Charter of the United Nations,**

Citation 4 b (new)

Motion for a resolution

– having regard to the provisions on freedom of expression set out in Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), and Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,

Amendment

– **having regard to the provisions on freedom of expression set out in Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), and Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,**

Citation 5

Motion for a resolution

– having regard to the Charter of the United Nations,

Unchanged text included in the compromise

– having regard to the Charter of the United Nations,

– having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,

– having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,

Citation 6

Motion for a resolution

– having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2025/2445 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2025 on the statute and funding of European political parties and European political foundations²,

² OJ L, 2025/2445, 8.12.2025, ELI:
<http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/2445/oj>.

Unchanged text included in the compromise

– having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2025/2445 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2025 on the statute and funding of European political parties and European political foundations²,

² OJ L, 2025/2445, 8.12.2025, ELI:
<http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/2445/oj>.

Citation 7

Motion for a resolution

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence and amending Regulations (EC) No 300/2008, (EU) No 167/2013, (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1139 and (EU) 2019/2144 and Directives 2014/90/EU, (EU) 2016/797 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Artificial Intelligence Act)³,

³ OJ L, 2024/1689, 12.7.2024, ELI:
<http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1689/oj>.

Unchanged text included in the compromise

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence and amending Regulations (EC) No 300/2008, (EU) No 167/2013, (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1139 and (EU) 2019/2144 and Directives 2014/90/EU, (EU) 2016/797 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Artificial Intelligence Act)³,

³ OJ L, 2024/1689, 12.7.2024, ELI:
<http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1689/oj>.

Citation 8

Motion for a resolution

Unchanged text included in the compromise

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2024 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing⁴ ,

⁴ OJ L, 2024/1624, 19.6.2024, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1624/oj>.

Citation 9

Motion for a resolution

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1083 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 establishing a common framework for media services in the internal market and amending Directive 2010/13/EU (European Media Freedom Act)⁵ ,

⁵ OJ L, 2024/1083, 17.4.2024, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1083/oj>.

Citation 10

Motion for a resolution

– having regard to Directive (EU) 2024/1069 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 on protecting persons who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded claims or abusive court proceedings ('Strategic lawsuits against public participation')⁶ ,

⁶ OJ L, 2024/1069, 16.4.2024, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1069/oj>.

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2024 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing⁴ ,

⁴ OJ L, 2024/1624, 19.6.2024, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1624/oj>.

Unchanged text included in the compromise

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1083 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 establishing a common framework for media services in the internal market and amending Directive 2010/13/EU (European Media Freedom Act)⁵ ,

⁵ OJ L, 2024/1083, 17.4.2024, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1083/oj>.

Unchanged text included in the compromise

– having regard to Directive (EU) 2024/1069 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 on protecting persons who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded claims or abusive court proceedings ('Strategic lawsuits against public participation')⁶ ,

⁶ OJ L, 2024/1069, 16.4.2024, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1069/oj>.

Citation 11

Motion for a resolution

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/900 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 March 2024 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising⁷,

⁷ OJ L, 2024/900, 20.3.2024, ELI:
<http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/900/oj>.

Unchanged text included in the compromise

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/900 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 March 2024 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising⁷,

⁷ OJ L, 2024/900, 20.3.2024, ELI:
<http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/900/oj>.

Citation 12

Motion for a resolution

– having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2023/2841 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2023 laying down measures for a high common level of cybersecurity at the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union⁸,

⁸ OJ L, 2023/2841, 18.12.2023, ELI:
<http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/2841/oj>.

Unchanged text included in the compromise

– having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2023/2841 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2023 laying down measures for a high common level of cybersecurity at the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union⁸,

⁸ OJ L, 2023/2841, 18.12.2023, ELI:
<http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/2841/oj>.

Citation 13

Motion for a resolution

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/1114 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2023 on markets in crypto-assets, and amending Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 1095/2010 and Directives 2013/36/EU and (EU) 2019/1937⁹ (Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation),

Unchanged text included in the compromise

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/1114 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2023 on markets in crypto-assets, and amending Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 1095/2010 and Directives 2013/36/EU and (EU) 2019/1937⁹ (Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation),

⁹ OJ L 150, 9.6.2023, p. 40, ELI:
<http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/1114/oj>.

⁹ OJ L 150, 9.6.2023, p. 40, ELI:
<http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/1114/oj>.

Citation 14

Motion for a resolution

– having regard to Directive (EU) 2022/2557 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on the resilience of critical entities and repealing Council Directive 2008/114/EC¹⁰,

¹⁰ OJ L 333, 27.12.2022, p. 164, ELI:
<http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/2557/oj>.

Unchanged text included in the compromise

– having regard to Directive (EU) 2022/2557 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on the resilience of critical entities and repealing Council Directive 2008/114/EC¹⁰,

¹⁰ OJ L 333, 27.12.2022, p. 164, ELI:
<http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/2557/oj>.

Citation 15

Motion for a resolution

– having regard to Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union, amending Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 and Directive (EU) 2018/1972, and repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148 (NIS 2 Directive)¹¹,

¹¹ OJ L 333, 27.12.2022, p. 80, ELI:
<http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/2555/oj>.

Unchanged text included in the compromise

– having regard to Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union, amending Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 and Directive (EU) 2018/1972, and repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148 (NIS 2 Directive)¹¹,

¹¹ OJ L 333, 27.12.2022, p. 80, ELI:
<http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/2555/oj>.

Citation 16

Motion for a resolution

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and

Unchanged text included in the compromise

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and

amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act)¹² and to Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2022 on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector and amending Directives (EU) 2019/1937 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Digital Markets Act)¹³,

¹² OJ L 277, 27.10.2022, p. 1, ELI:
<http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj>.

¹³ OJ L 265, 12.10.2022, p. 1, ELI:
<http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/1925/oj>.

amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act)¹² and to Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2022 on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector and amending Directives (EU) 2019/1937 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Digital Markets Act)¹³,

¹² OJ L 277, 27.10.2022, p. 1, ELI:
<http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj>.

¹³ OJ L 265, 12.10.2022, p. 1, ELI:
<http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/1925/oj>.

Citation 16 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

– ***having regard to the 2024 European Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA),***

Citation 16 b (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

– ***having regard to joint communication (2025/977) to the European Parliament and the Council on Strengthening EU economic security,***

Citation 17

Motion for a resolution

Unchanged text included in the compromise

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/692 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 establishing the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values Programme and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1381/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/692 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 establishing the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values Programme and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1381/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council

and Council Regulation (EU) No 390/2014¹⁴ ,

and Council Regulation (EU) No 390/2014¹⁴ ,

¹⁴ OJ L 156, 5.5.2021, p. 1, ELI:
<http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/692/oj>.

¹⁴ OJ L 156, 5.5.2021, p. 1, ELI:
<http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/692/oj>.

Citation 18

Motion for a resolution

– having regard to Directive (EU) 2019/1937 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2019 on the protection of persons who report breaches of Union law¹⁵ ,

Unchanged text included in the compromise

– having regard to Directive (EU) 2019/1937 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2019 on the protection of persons who report breaches of Union law¹⁵ ,

¹⁵ OJ L 305, 26.11.2019, p. 17, ELI:
<http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2019/1937/oj>.

¹⁵ OJ L 305, 26.11.2019, p. 17, ELI:
<http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2019/1937/oj>.

Citation 19

Motion for a resolution

– having regard to Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2010 on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive)¹⁶ ,

Unchanged text included in the compromise

– having regard to Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2010 on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive)¹⁶ ,

¹⁶ OJ L 95, 15.4.2010, p. 1, ELI:
<http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2010/13/oj>.

¹⁶ OJ L 95, 15.4.2010, p. 1, ELI:
<http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2010/13/oj>.

Citation 20

Motion for a resolution

Unchanged text included in the compromise

– having regard to Council Decision 2014/145/CFSP of 17 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine¹⁷, and to Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 of 17 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine¹⁸,

¹⁷ OJ L 78, 17.3.2014, p. 16, ELI: [http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2014/145\(1\)/oj](http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2014/145(1)/oj).

¹⁸ OJ L 78, 17.3.2014, p. 6, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/269/oj>.

Citation 21

Motion for a resolution

– having regard to Council Decision 2014/119/CFSP of 5 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Ukraine¹⁹, and to Council Regulation (EU) No 208/2014 of 5 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Ukraine²⁰,

¹⁹ OJ L 66, 6.3.2014, p. 26, ELI: [http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2014/119\(1\)/oj](http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2014/119(1)/oj).

²⁰ OJ L 66, 6.3.2014, p. 1, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/208/oj>.

Citation 22

– having regard to Council Decision 2014/145/CFSP of 17 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine¹⁷, and to Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 of 17 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine¹⁸,

¹⁷ OJ L 78, 17.3.2014, p. 16, ELI: [http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2014/145\(1\)/oj](http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2014/145(1)/oj).

¹⁸ OJ L 78, 17.3.2014, p. 6, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/269/oj>.

Unchanged text included in the compromise

– having regard to Council Decision 2014/119/CFSP of 5 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Ukraine¹⁹, and to Council Regulation (EU) No 208/2014 of 5 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Ukraine²⁰,

¹⁹ OJ L 66, 6.3.2014, p. 26, ELI: [http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2014/119\(1\)/oj](http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2014/119(1)/oj).

²⁰ OJ L 66, 6.3.2014, p. 1, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/208/oj>.

Motion for a resolution

– having regard to Council Decision 2014/512/CFSP of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine²¹ , and to Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine²² ,

²¹ OJ L 229, 31.7.2014, p. 13, ELI:
<http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2014/512/oj>.

²² OJ L 229, 31.7.2014, p. 1, ELI:
<http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/833/oj>.

Citation 23

Motion for a resolution

– having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/266 of 23 February 2022 concerning restrictive measures in response to the recognition of the non-government controlled areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts of Ukraine and the ordering of Russian armed forces into those areas²³ , and to Council Regulation (EU) 2022/263 of 23 February 2022 concerning restrictive measures in response to the recognition of the non-government controlled areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts of Ukraine and the ordering of Russian armed forces into those areas²⁴ ,

²³ OJ L 42 I, 23.2.2022, p. 109, ELI:
<http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2022/266/oj>.

²⁴ OJ L 42 I, 23.2.2022, p. 77, ELI:
<http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/263/oj>.

Unchanged text included in the compromise

– having regard to Council Decision 2014/512/CFSP of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine²¹ , and to Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine²² ,

²¹ OJ L 229, 31.7.2014, p. 13, ELI:
<http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2014/512/oj>.

²² OJ L 229, 31.7.2014, p. 1, ELI:
<http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/833/oj>.

Unchanged text included in the compromise

– having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/266 of 23 February 2022 concerning restrictive measures in response to the recognition of the non-government controlled areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts of Ukraine and the ordering of Russian armed forces into those areas²³ , and to Council Regulation (EU) 2022/263 of 23 February 2022 concerning restrictive measures in response to the recognition of the non-government controlled areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts of Ukraine and the ordering of Russian armed forces into those areas²⁴ ,

²³ OJ L 42 I, 23.2.2022, p. 109, ELI:
<http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2022/266/oj>.

²⁴ OJ L 42 I, 23.2.2022, p. 77, ELI:
<http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/263/oj>.

Citation 23 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

- **having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 of 8 October 2024 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s destabilising activities^{24a} and Council Regulation (EU) 2024/2642 of 8 October 2024 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s destabilizing activities^{24b},**

^{24a} OJ L 2643 9.10.2024, p. 1, ELI:
<http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2024/2643/oj>

^{24b} OJ L 2642 9.10.2024, p. 1, ELI:
<http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2642/oj>

Citation 24

Motion for a resolution

Unchanged text included in the compromise

- having regard to Council Decision 2012/642/CFSP of 15 October 2012 concerning restrictive measures against Belarus²⁵, and to Council Regulation (EC) No 765/2006 of 18 May 2006 concerning restrictive measures against President Lukashenko and certain officials of Belarus²⁶,

²⁵ OJ L 285, 17.10.2012, p. 1, ELI:
<http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2012/642/oj>

²⁶ OJ L 134, 20.5.2006, p. 1, ELI:
<http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2006/765/oj>

- having regard to Council Decision 2012/642/CFSP of 15 October 2012 concerning restrictive measures against Belarus²⁵, and to Council Regulation (EC) No 765/2006 of 18 May 2006 concerning restrictive measures against President Lukashenko and certain officials of Belarus²⁶,

²⁵ OJ L 285, 17.10.2012, p. 1, ELI:
<http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2012/642/oj>

²⁶ OJ L 134, 20.5.2006, p. 1, ELI:
<http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2006/765/oj>

Citation 25

Motion for a resolution

Unchanged text included in the compromise

- having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1532 of 20 July 2023

- having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1532 of 20 July 2023

concerning restrictive measures in view of Iran's military support to Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine²⁷, and to Council Regulation (EU) 2023/1529 of 20 July 2023 concerning restrictive measures in view of Iran's military support of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine²⁸,

²⁷ OJ L 186, 25.7.2023, p. 20, ELI:
<http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2023/1532/oj>.

²⁸ OJ L 186, 25.7.2023, p. 1, ELI:
<http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/1529/oj>.

Citation 26

Motion for a resolution

– having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/1603 of 31 May 2024 amending Decision (CFSP) 2016/849 concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea²⁹, and to Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1602 of 31 May 2024 implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/1509 concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea³⁰,

²⁹ OJ L, 2024/1603, 31.5.2024, ELI:
<http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2024/1603/oj>.

³⁰ OJ L, 2024/1602, 31.5.2024, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2024/1602/oj.

Citation 27

Motion for a resolution

– having regard to the Commission proposal of 16 July 2025 for a Council regulation laying down the multiannual

concerning restrictive measures in view of Iran's military support to Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine²⁷, and to Council Regulation (EU) 2023/1529 of 20 July 2023 concerning restrictive measures in view of Iran's military support of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine²⁸,

²⁷ OJ L 186, 25.7.2023, p. 20, ELI:
<http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2023/1532/oj>.

²⁸ OJ L 186, 25.7.2023, p. 1, ELI:
<http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/1529/oj>.

Unchanged text included in the compromise

– having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/1603 of 31 May 2024 amending Decision (CFSP) 2016/849 concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea²⁹, and to Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1602 of 31 May 2024 implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/1509 concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea³⁰,

²⁹ OJ L, 2024/1603, 31.5.2024, ELI:
<http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2024/1603/oj>.

³⁰ OJ L, 2024/1602, 31.5.2024, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2024/1602/oj.

Unchanged text included in the compromise

– having regard to the Commission proposal of 16 July 2025 for a Council regulation laying down the multiannual

financial framework for the years 2028 to 2034 (COM(2025)0571),

financial framework for the years 2028 to 2034 (COM(2025)0571),

Citation 27 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

- ***having regard to the Commission proposal of 21 January 2026 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Digital Networks Act (COM(2026) 16),***

Citation 27 b (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

- ***having regard to the Commission proposal of 20 January 2026 for a regulation on the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA), the European cybersecurity certification framework and ICT supply chain security, repealing Regulation (EU) 2019/881 (revised Cybersecurity Act),***

Citation 27 c (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

- ***having regard to the Commission proposal of 3 June 2026 for a regulation on a framework of measures for strengthening Europe's semiconductor ecosystem (Chips Act 2.0) (COM(2026) 504),***

Citation 27 d (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

- ***having regard to the Commission proposal of 3 June 2026 for a regulation establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe's cloud and AI***

Citation 28

Motion for a resolution

– having regard to the amendments adopted by the European Parliament on 27 November 2025 on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing harmonised requirements in the internal market on transparency of interest representation carried out on behalf of third countries and amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937 (COM(2023)0637 – C9-0464/2023 – 2023/0463(COD))³¹,

³¹ Texts adopted, P10_TA(2025)0306.

Unchanged text included in the compromise

– having regard to the amendments adopted by the European Parliament on 27 November 2025 on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing harmonised requirements in the internal market on transparency of interest representation carried out on behalf of third countries and amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937 (COM(2023)0637 – C9-0464/2023 – 2023/0463(COD))³¹,

³¹ Texts adopted, P10_TA(2025)0306.

Citation 29

Motion for a resolution

– having regard to its resolution of 9 October 2025 on a united response to recent Russian violations of the EU Member States' airspace and critical infrastructure³²,

³² *Texts adopted, P10_TA(2025)0230.*

Amendment

– having regard to ***its previous resolutions on the Russian Federation and its aggression against Ukraine, as well as its hostile actions against the Member States, including*** its resolution of 9 October 2025 on a united response to recent Russian violations of the EU Member States' airspace and critical infrastructure,

Citation 30

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

– having regard to its resolution of **18 June 2025** on the Commission’s **2024** Rule of Law Report³³ ,

³³ **OJ C, C/2025/6259, 19.12.2025, ELI:**
<http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/6259/oj>.

Citation 31

Motion for a resolution

– having regard to its resolution of 7 May 2025 on a revamped long-term budget for the Union in a changing world³⁴ ,

³⁴ Texts adopted, P10_TA(2025)0090.

Citation 31 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

– having regard to its resolution of **29 April 2026** on the Commission’s **2025** Rule of Law Report³³,

³³
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-10-2026-0147_EN.html

Unchanged text included in the compromise

– having regard to its resolution of 7 May 2025 on a revamped long-term budget for the Union in a changing world³⁴

³⁴ Texts adopted, P10_TA(2025)0090.

Amendment

– **having regard to its resolution of 20 January 2025 on Russia’s disinformation and historical falsification to justify its war of aggression against Ukraine ^{34a} and having regard to its resolution of 22 October 2025 on the Council’s position on the draft general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2026, which mentions the memorial project in Brussels ^{34b},**

^{34a} **Texts adopted: P10_TA(2025)0006**

^{34b} **Texts adopted: P10_TA(2025)0244**

Citation 32

Motion for a resolution

Unchanged text included in the compromise

– having regard to its resolution of 13 July 2023 on recommendations for reform of European Parliament’s rules on transparency, integrity, accountability and anti-corruption³⁵,

³⁵ OJ C, C/2024/4011, 17.7.2024, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/4011/oj>.

Citation 32 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

– having regard to its resolution of 13 July 2023 on recommendations for reform of European Parliament’s rules on transparency, integrity, accountability and anti-corruption³⁵,

³⁵ OJ C, C/2024/4011, 17.7.2024, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/4011/oj>.

Amendment

– ***having regard to its resolution of 13 November 2025 on addressing transnational repression of human rights defenders,***

Citation 32 b (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

– ***having regard to its resolution of 21 January 2026 on Addressing impunity through EU sanctions, including the EU Global Human Rights sanctions regime (so-called “EU Magnitsky Act”),***

Citation 33

Motion for a resolution

Unchanged text included in the compromise

– having regard to its resolution of 1 June 2023 on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation³⁶,

³⁶ OJ C, C/2023/1226, 21.12.2023, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2023/1226/oj>.

– having regard to its resolution of 1 June 2023 on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation³⁶,

³⁶ OJ C, C/2023/1226, 21.12.2023, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2023/1226/oj>.

Citation 34

Motion for a resolution

– having regard to its resolution of 15 December 2022 on suspicions of corruption from Qatar and the broader need for transparency and accountability in the European institutions³⁷,

³⁷ OJ C 177, 17.5.2023, p 109.

Unchanged text included in the compromise

– having regard to its resolution of 15 December 2022 on suspicions of corruption from Qatar and the broader need for transparency and accountability in the European institutions³⁷,

³⁷ OJ C 177, 17.5.2023, p 109.

Citation 35

Motion for a resolution

– having regard to its resolution of 23 November 2022 on recognising the Russian Federation as a state sponsor of terrorism³⁸,

³⁸ OJ C 167, 11.5.2023, p. 18.

Unchanged text included in the compromise

– having regard to its resolution of 23 November 2022 on recognising the Russian Federation as a state sponsor of terrorism³⁸,

³⁸ OJ C 167, 11.5.2023, p. 18.

Citation 36

Motion for a resolution

– having regard to its resolution of 9 March 2022 on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation³⁹,

³⁹ OJ C 347, 9.9.2022, p. 61.

Unchanged text included in the compromise

– having regard to its resolution of 9 March 2022 on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation³⁹,

³⁹ OJ C 347, 9.9.2022, p. 61.

Citation 37

Motion for a resolution

– having regard to its resolution of 8 March 2022 on the shrinking space for civil society in Europe⁴⁰,

⁴⁰ OJ C 347, 9.9.2022, p. 2.

⁴⁰ OJ C 347, 9.9.2022, p. 2.

Citation 38

Motion for a resolution

– having regard to its resolution of 20 October 2021 on Europe’s Media in the Digital Decade: an Action Plan to Support Recovery and Transformation⁴¹ ,

⁴¹ OJ C 184, 5.5.2022, p. 71.

Unchanged text included in the compromise

– having regard to its resolution of 20 October 2021 on Europe’s Media in the Digital Decade: an Action Plan to Support Recovery and Transformation⁴¹ ,

⁴¹ OJ C 184, 5.5.2022, p. 71.

Citation 39

Motion for a resolution

– having regard to its resolution of 23 November 2016 on EU strategic communication to counteract propaganda against it by third parties⁴² ,

⁴² OJ C 224, 27.6.2018, p. 58.

Unchanged text included in the compromise

– having regard to its resolution of 23 November 2016 on EU strategic communication to counteract propaganda against it by third parties⁴² ,

⁴² OJ C 224, 27.6.2018, p. 58.

Citation 40

Motion for a resolution

– having regard to its recommendation of 15 June 2023 to the Council and the Commission following the investigation of alleged contraventions and maladministration in the application of Union law in relation to the use of Pegasus and equivalent surveillance spyware⁴³ ,

⁴³ OJ C, C/2024/494, 23.1.2024, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/494/oj>.

Unchanged text included in the compromise

– having regard to its recommendation of 15 June 2023 to the Council and the Commission following the investigation of alleged contraventions and maladministration in the application of Union law in relation to the use of Pegasus and equivalent surveillance spyware⁴³ ,

⁴³ OJ C, C/2024/494, 23.1.2024, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/494/oj>.

Citation 41

Motion for a resolution

– having regard to its recommendation of 23 November 2022 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the **Commission** / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning the new EU strategy for enlargement⁴⁴ ,

⁴⁴ OJ C 167, 11.5.2023, p. 105.

Amendment

– having regard to its recommendation of 23 November 2022 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the **Commission** / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning the new EU strategy for enlargement⁴⁴ ,

⁴⁴ OJ C 167, 11.5.2023, p. 105.

Citation 42

Motion for a resolution

– having regard to its recommendation of 13 March 2019 to the Council and the Vice-President of the **Commission** / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning taking stock of the follow-up taken by the EEAS two years after the European Parliament report on EU strategic communication to counteract propaganda against it by third parties⁴⁵ ,

⁴⁵ OJ C 23, 21.1.2021, p. 152.

Amendment

– having regard to its recommendation of 13 March 2019 to the Council and the Vice-President of the **Commission** / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning taking stock of the follow-up taken by the EEAS two years after the European Parliament report on EU strategic communication to counteract propaganda against it by third parties⁴⁵ ,

⁴⁵ OJ C 23, 21.1.2021, p. 152.

Citation 43

Motion for a resolution

– having regard to the Commission's follow-up to Parliament's recommendations in its resolutions,

Unchanged text included in the compromise

– having regard to the Commission's follow-up to Parliament's recommendations in its resolutions,

Citation 44

Motion for a resolution

- having regard to the Commission communication of 12 November 2025 entitled ‘EU Strategy for Civil Society’ (COM(2025)0790),

Citation 44 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Citation 44 b (new)

Motion for a resolution

Citation 45

Motion for a resolution

- having regard to the Commission communication of 1 April 2025 on ProtectEU: a European Internal Security Strategy (COM(2025)0148),

Citation 46

Motion for a resolution

- having regard to the Commission communication of 24 July 2024 entitled

Unchanged text included in the compromise

- having regard to the Commission communication of 12 November 2025 entitled ‘EU Strategy for Civil Society’ (COM(2025)0790),

Amendment

- ***having regard to the communication from the Commission of 3 June 2026 on European Tech Sovereignty, accompanied by an EU Open Source Strategy (COM(2026) 503),***

Amendment

- ***having regard to the Commission communication of 3 June 2026 entitled "Strategic Roadmap for Digitalisation and AI in the Energy Sector" (COM(2026)0501),***

Unchanged text included in the compromise

- having regard to the Commission communication of 1 April 2025 on ProtectEU: a European Internal Security Strategy (COM(2025)0148),

Unchanged text included in the compromise

- having regard to the Commission communication of 24 July 2024 entitled

‘2024 Rule of Law Report – The rule of law situation in the European Union’ (COM(2024)0800),

‘2024 Rule of Law Report – The rule of law situation in the European Union’ (COM(2024)0800),

Citation 47

Motion for a resolution

– having regard to the Commission communication of 8 July 2025 entitled ‘2025 Rule of Law Report – The rule of law situation in the European Union’ (COM(2025)0900),

Unchanged text included in the compromise

– having regard to the Commission communication of 8 July 2025 entitled ‘2025 Rule of Law Report – The rule of law situation in the European Union’ (COM(2025)0900),

Citation 48

Motion for a resolution

– having regard to the Commission communication of 12 December 2023 on Defence of Democracy (COM(2023)0630),

Unchanged text included in the compromise

– having regard to the Commission communication of 12 December 2023 on Defence of Democracy (COM(2023)0630),

Citation 49

Motion for a resolution

– having regard to the Commission communication of 3 December 2020 on the European democracy action plan (COM(2020)0790),

Unchanged text included in the compromise

– having regard to the Commission communication of 3 December 2020 on the European democracy action plan (COM(2020)0790),

Citation 50

Motion for a resolution

– having regard to the joint communications from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 5 December 2018 entitled ‘Action Plan against Disinformation’ (JOIN(2018)0036)

Unchanged text included in the compromise

– having regard to the joint communications from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 5 December 2018 entitled ‘Action Plan against Disinformation’ (JOIN(2018)0036)

and of 14 June 2019 entitled ‘Report on the implementation of the Action Plan Against Disinformation’ (JOIN(2019)0012),

and of 14 June 2019 entitled ‘Report on the implementation of the Action Plan Against Disinformation’ (JOIN(2019)0012),

Citation 51

Motion for a resolution

– having regard to the Security and Defence Partnership between the European Union and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, established on 19 May 2025,

Unchanged text included in the compromise

– having regard to the Security and Defence Partnership between the European Union and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, established on 19 May 2025,

Citation 51 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

– ***having regard to the National Security Strategy of the United States of America of November 2025, and to the National Defense Strategy of January 2026,***

Citation 52

Motion for a resolution

– having regard to the political guidelines for the 2024-2029 Commission term, presented by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen on 18 July 2024, entitled ‘Europe’s Choice’,

Unchanged text included in the compromise

– having regard to the political guidelines for the 2024-2029 Commission term, presented by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen on 18 July 2024, entitled ‘Europe’s Choice’,

Citation 53

Motion for a resolution

– having regard to the Commission Implementing Decision of 28 March 2025 on the financing of the Digital Europe Programme and the adoption of the

Unchanged text included in the compromise

– having regard to the Commission Implementing Decision of 28 March 2025 on the financing of the Digital Europe Programme and the adoption of the

Citation 53 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

- ***having regard to the preliminary findings of the Commission of 6 February 2026 regarding TikTok's failure to comply with the Digital Services Act with regards to risk assessments in relation to its recommender systems and addictive design features,***

Citation 54

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

- having regard to the Code of Conduct on Disinformation,

- having regard to the Code of Conduct on Disinformation ***(2018, strengthened in 2022) endorsed by the European Commission and the European Board for Digital Services on 13 February 2025 as a code of conduct pursuant to Article 45 of Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 (Digital Services Act), with the conversion taking effect on 1 July 2025,***

Citation 55

Motion for a resolution

Unchanged text included in the compromise

- having regard to the report by the Network and Information Systems Cooperation Group of 23 January 2020 entitled ‘Cybersecurity of 5G networks – EU Toolbox of risk mitigating measures’,

- having regard to the report by the Network and Information Systems Cooperation Group of 23 January 2020 entitled ‘Cybersecurity of 5G networks – EU Toolbox of risk mitigating measures’,

Citation 56

Motion for a resolution

Unchanged text included in the compromise

– having regard to the report of 30 October 2024 by Sauli Niinistö, former President of the Republic of Finland, in his capacity as Special Adviser to the President of the European Commission, entitled ‘Safer Together – Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’,

– having regard to the report of 30 October 2024 by Sauli Niinistö, former President of the Republic of Finland, in his capacity as Special Adviser to the President of the European Commission, entitled ‘Safer Together – Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’,

Citation 57

Motion for a resolution

– having regard to Commission Recommendation (EU) 2023/2829 of 12 December 2023 on inclusive and resilient electoral processes in the Union and enhancing the European nature and efficient conduct of the elections to the European Parliament⁴⁶,

⁴⁶ OJ L, 2023/2829, 20.12.2023, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reco/2023/2829/oj>.

Unchanged text included in the compromise

– having regard to Commission Recommendation (EU) 2023/2829 of 12 December 2023 on inclusive and resilient electoral processes in the Union and enhancing the European nature and efficient conduct of the elections to the European Parliament⁴⁶,

⁴⁶ OJ L, 2023/2829, 20.12.2023, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reco/2023/2829/oj>.

Citation 58

Motion for a resolution

– having regard to Commission Recommendation (EU) 2023/2836 of 12 December 2023 on promoting the engagement and effective participation of citizens and civil society organisations in public policy-making processes⁴⁷,

⁴⁷ OJ L, 2023/2836, 20.12.2023, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reco/2023/2836/oj>.

Unchanged text included in the compromise

– having regard to Commission Recommendation (EU) 2023/2836 of 12 December 2023 on promoting the engagement and effective participation of citizens and civil society organisations in public policy-making processes⁴⁷,

⁴⁷ OJ L, 2023/2836, 20.12.2023, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reco/2023/2836/oj>.

Citation 59

Motion for a resolution

- having regard to the establishment of the European Cooperation Network on Elections (ECNE) in 2019 by the Commission,

Unchanged text included in the compromise

- having regard to the establishment of the European Cooperation Network on Elections (ECNE) in 2019 by the Commission,

Citation 60

Motion for a resolution

- having regard to the Commission press release of 13 November 2025 on its opening of an investigation into a potential Digital Markets Act breach by Google in demoting media publishers' content in search results,

Unchanged text included in the compromise

- having regard to the Commission press release of 13 November 2025 on its opening of an investigation into a potential Digital Markets Act breach by Google in demoting media publishers' content in search results,

Citation 61

Motion for a resolution

- having regard to the Council conclusions of 21 May 2024 on the Future of Cybersecurity: implement and protect together,

Unchanged text included in the compromise

- having regard to the Council conclusions of 21 May 2024 on the Future of Cybersecurity: implement and protect together,

Citation 62

Motion for a resolution

- having regard to the Council conclusions of 17 October 2022 on ICT supply chain security,

Unchanged text included in the compromise

- having regard to the Council conclusions of 17 October 2022 on ICT supply chain security,

Citation 63

Motion for a resolution

Unchanged text included in the compromise

– having regard to the Council Recommendation of 8 December 2022 on a Union-wide coordinated approach to strengthen the resilience of critical infrastructure⁴⁸ ,

⁴⁸ OJ C 20, 20.1.2023, p. 1.

Citation 64

Motion for a resolution

– having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/855 of 24 April 2023 on a European Union Partnership Mission in Moldova (EUPM Moldova)⁴⁹ ,

⁴⁹ OJ L 110, 25.4.2023, p. 30, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2023/855/oj>.

Citation 65

Motion for a resolution

– having regard to the action plan entitled ‘Strategic Compass for Security and Defence – For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security’, approved by the Council on 21 March 2022 and endorsed by the European Council on 25 March 2022,

Citation 66

Motion for a resolution

– having regard to the information from Lithuania, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Slovenia and Spain for the meeting of the Transport,

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– having regard to the Council Recommendation of 8 December 2022 on a Union-wide coordinated approach to strengthen the resilience of critical infrastructure⁴⁸ ,

⁴⁸ OJ C 20, 20.1.2023, p. 1.

Unchanged text included in the compromise

– having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/855 of 24 April 2023 on a European Union Partnership Mission in Moldova (EUPM Moldova)⁴⁹ ,

⁴⁹ OJ L 110, 25.4.2023, p. 30, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2023/855/oj>.

Unchanged text included in the compromise

– having regard to the action plan entitled ‘Strategic Compass for Security and Defence – For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security’, approved by the Council on 21 March 2022 and endorsed by the European Council on 25 March 2022,

Unchanged text included in the compromise

– having regard to the information from Lithuania, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Slovenia and Spain for the meeting of the Transport,

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Telecommunications and Energy Council on 6 June 2025 calling for common actions in response to Global Satellite Navigation Systems (GNSS) jamming and spoofing threats,

Telecommunications and Energy Council on 6 June 2025 calling for common actions in response to Global Satellite Navigation Systems (GNSS) jamming and spoofing threats,

Citation 67

Motion for a resolution

– having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 20 May 2021 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on a mandatory transparency register⁵⁰,

⁵⁰ OJ L 207, 11.6.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_interinstit/2021/611/oj.

Unchanged text included in the compromise

– having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 20 May 2021 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on a mandatory transparency register⁵⁰,

⁵⁰ OJ L 207, 11.6.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_interinstit/2021/611/oj.

Citation 68

Motion for a resolution

– having regard to special report 05/2022 of the European Court of Auditors of 29 March 2022 entitled ‘Cybersecurity of EU institutions, bodies and agencies – Level of preparedness overall not commensurate with the threats’,

Unchanged text included in the compromise

– having regard to special report 05/2022 of the European Court of Auditors of 29 March 2022 entitled ‘Cybersecurity of EU institutions, bodies and agencies – Level of preparedness overall not commensurate with the threats’,

Citation 69

Motion for a resolution

– having regard to the UN Global Principles for Information Integrity – Recommendations for Multi-stakeholder Action, published on 24 June 2024,

Unchanged text included in the compromise

– having regard to the UN Global Principles for Information Integrity – Recommendations for Multi-stakeholder Action, published on 24 June 2024,

Citation 70

Motion for a resolution

- having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in particular Article 20 thereof,

Unchanged text included in the compromise

- having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in particular Article 20 thereof,

Citation 71

Motion for a resolution

- having regard to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, which entered into force on 16 November 1994,

Unchanged text included in the compromise

- having regard to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, which entered into force on 16 November 1994,

Citation 72

Motion for a resolution

- having regard to the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, adopted in November 2001,

Unchanged text included in the compromise

- having regard to the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, adopted in November 2001,

Citation 73

Motion for a resolution

- having regard to the Reykjavik Declaration, adopted at the 4th Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Council of Europe, held from 16 to 17 May 2023,

Unchanged text included in the compromise

- having regard to the Reykjavik Declaration, adopted at the 4th Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Council of Europe, held from 16 to 17 May 2023,

Citation 74

Motion for a resolution

Unchanged text included in the compromise

– having regard to the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism, established at the G7 Summit in Charlevoix, held from 8 to 9 June 2018,

– having regard to the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism, established at the G7 Summit in Charlevoix, held from 8 to 9 June 2018,

Citation 75

Motion for a resolution

– having regard to the working paper presented on 13 June 2025 to the International Civil Aviation Organization by Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Sweden on the recurring GNSS radio frequency interference in the Baltic, eastern and northern European regions and its implications on the safety and security of international civil aviation,

Unchanged text included in the compromise

– having regard to the working paper presented on 13 June 2025 to the International Civil Aviation Organization by Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Sweden on the recurring GNSS radio frequency interference in the Baltic, eastern and northern European regions and its implications on the safety and security of international civil aviation,

Citation 76

Motion for a resolution

– having regard to the report on the final outcome of the Conference on the Future of Europe, published on 9 May 2022, and, in particular, to proposals 27 and 37 thereof,

Unchanged text included in the compromise

– having regard to the report on the final outcome of the Conference on the Future of Europe, published on 9 May 2022, and, in particular, to proposals 27 and 37 thereof,

Citation 77

Motion for a resolution

– having regard to the study requested by Parliament’s Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield entitled ‘Strengthening Resilience – Towards the European Democracy Shield’, published by its Directorate-General for Citizens’ Rights, Justice and Institutional Affairs in October 2025⁵¹,

Unchanged text included in the compromise

– having regard to the study requested by Parliament’s Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield entitled ‘Strengthening Resilience – Towards the European Democracy Shield’, published by its Directorate-General for Citizens’ Rights, Justice and Institutional Affairs in October 2025⁵¹,

⁵¹ Study – ‘Strengthening Resilience – Towards the European Democracy Shield’, European Parliament, Directorate-General for Citizens’ Rights, Justice and Institutional Affairs, Policy Department for Justice, Civil Liberties and Institutional Affairs, October 2025.

⁵¹ Study – ‘Strengthening Resilience – Towards the European Democracy Shield’, European Parliament, Directorate-General for Citizens’ Rights, Justice and Institutional Affairs, Policy Department for Justice, Civil Liberties and Institutional Affairs, October 2025.

Citation 77 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

– ***having regard to the European Parliament Eurobarometer Autumn 2025 Survey published in February 2026, outlining public concerns about security risks,***

Citation 77 b (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

– ***having regard to the Commission Special Eurobarometer 568 on Protecting and Promoting democracy, published in May 2025,***

Citation 78

Motion for a resolution

Unchanged text included in the compromise

– having regard to the 1st, 2nd and 3rd reports by the European External Action Service (EEAS) on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Threats,

– having regard to the 1st, 2nd and 3rd reports by the European External Action Service (EEAS) on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Threats,

Citation 78 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

– ***having regard to the report of the Council of Europe on “Safety of Journalists platform 2024 report: serious***

concern about the use of spyware against journalists, abusive lawsuits and journalists in exile”,

Citation 79

Motion for a resolution

– having regard to the report by the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) of 1 October 2025 entitled ‘ENISA Threat Landscape 2025’,

Unchanged text included in the compromise

– having regard to the report by the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) of 1 October 2025 entitled ‘ENISA Threat Landscape 2025’,

Citation 80

Motion for a resolution

– having regard to the report by Europol entitled ‘EU Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment – The changing DNA of serious and organised crime’, published in 2025,

Unchanged text included in the compromise

– having regard to the report by Europol entitled ‘EU Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment – The changing DNA of serious and organised crime’, published in 2025,

Citation 81

Motion for a resolution

– having regard to the report of the Dutch data protection authority’s Department for the Coordination of Algorithmic Oversight of October 2025 entitled ‘AI chatbots as voting aid’,

Unchanged text included in the compromise

– having regard to the report of the Dutch data protection authority’s Department for the Coordination of Algorithmic Oversight of October 2025 entitled ‘AI chatbots as voting aid’,

Citation 82

Motion for a resolution

– having regard to the measures adopted by Italy’s communications

Unchanged text included in the compromise

– having regard to the measures adopted by Italy’s communications

regulatory authority (AGCOM) on 3 September 2025 regarding influencers,

regulatory authority (AGCOM) on 3 September 2025 regarding influencers,

Citation 83

Motion for a resolution

– having regard to the Code of Conduct for Influencer Advertising, adopted by AUTOCONTROL in Spain on 7 July 2025,

Unchanged text included in the compromise

– having regard to the Code of Conduct for Influencer Advertising, adopted by AUTOCONTROL in Spain on 7 July 2025,

Citation 84

Motion for a resolution

– having regard to the warning issued by Czechia’s National Cyber and Information Security Agency (NÚKIB) on 3 September 2025 regarding cybersecurity threats associated with the transfer of data to and remote administration from the People’s Republic of China and its special administrative regions,

Unchanged text included in the compromise

– having regard to the warning issued by Czechia’s National Cyber and Information Security Agency (NÚKIB) on 3 September 2025 regarding cybersecurity threats associated with the transfer of data to and remote administration from the People’s Republic of China and its special administrative regions,

Citation 85

Motion for a resolution

– having regard to the report entitled ‘Manipulation d’algorithmes et instrumentalisation d’influenceurs: enseignements de l’élection présidentielle en Roumanie & risques pour la France’, published by the French Government’s Service for Vigilance and Protection against Foreign Digital Interference (VIGINUM) in February 2025,

Unchanged text included in the compromise

– having regard to the report entitled ‘Manipulation d’algorithmes et instrumentalisation d’influenceurs: enseignements de l’élection présidentielle en Roumanie & risques pour la France’, published by the French Government’s Service for Vigilance and Protection against Foreign Digital Interference (VIGINUM) in February 2025,

Citation 86

Motion for a resolution

- having regard to the Influencer Handbook, produced by Finland’s Mediapooli in 2020,

Unchanged text included in the compromise

- having regard to the Influencer Handbook, produced by Finland’s Mediapooli in 2020,

Citation 87

Motion for a resolution

- having regard to the report by the US Department of State of August 2020 entitled ‘Pillars of Russia’s Disinformation and Propaganda Ecosystem’,

Unchanged text included in the compromise

- having regard to the report by the US Department of State of August 2020 entitled ‘Pillars of Russia’s Disinformation and Propaganda Ecosystem’,

Citation 88

Motion for a resolution

- having regard to the joint cybersecurity advisory by the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, the US National Security Agency, the FBI and international partners of August 2025 entitled ‘Countering Chinese State-Sponsored Actors Compromise of Networks Worldwide to Feed Global Espionage Systems’,

Unchanged text included in the compromise

- having regard to the joint cybersecurity advisory by the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, the US National Security Agency, the FBI and international partners of August 2025 entitled ‘Countering Chinese State-Sponsored Actors Compromise of Networks Worldwide to Feed Global Espionage Systems’,

Citation 89

Motion for a resolution

- having regard to the report by Reporters Without Borders of 25 September 2025 entitled ‘The Propaganda Monitor: The Russian Edition’,

Unchanged text included in the compromise

- having regard to the report by Reporters Without Borders of 25 September 2025 entitled ‘The Propaganda Monitor: The Russian Edition’,

Citation 90

Motion for a resolution

- having regard to the article published by the Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom at the having regard to the article published by the Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom at the European University Institute on 1 November 2025 entitled ‘Influencers as news creators: implications for media regulation’,

Citation 91

Motion for a resolution

- having regard to the article published by the AlgoSoc Consortium on 28 October 2025 entitled ‘1 in 10 Dutch citizens are likely to ask AI for election advice. This is why they shouldn’t’,

Citation 92

Motion for a resolution

- having regard to the report by What to Fix of June 2025 entitled ‘Bankrolling Sanctioned Entities: How Meta Platforms Ireland Ltd. May Have Violated EU Sanctions and Channeled Money To RT, Sputnik and Other EU-Sanctioned Entities via Facebook’s Revenue Redistribution Programs’,

Citation 93

Motion for a resolution

- having regard to the special report by NewsGuard of 6 March 2025 entitled ‘A Well-funded Moscow-based Global

Unchanged text included in the compromise

- having regard to the article published by the Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom at the having regard to the article published by the Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom at the European University Institute on 1 November 2025 entitled ‘Influencers as news creators: implications for media regulation’,

Unchanged text included in the compromise

- having regard to the article published by the AlgoSoc Consortium on 28 October 2025 entitled ‘1 in 10 Dutch citizens are likely to ask AI for election advice. This is why they shouldn’t’,

Unchanged text included in the compromise

- having regard to the report by What to Fix of June 2025 entitled ‘Bankrolling Sanctioned Entities: How Meta Platforms Ireland Ltd. May Have Violated EU Sanctions and Channeled Money To RT, Sputnik and Other EU-Sanctioned Entities via Facebook’s Revenue Redistribution Programs’,

Unchanged text included in the compromise

- having regard to the special report by NewsGuard of 6 March 2025 entitled ‘A Well-funded Moscow-based Global

“News” Network has Infected Western Artificial Intelligence with Russian Propaganda’,

“News” Network has Infected Western Artificial Intelligence with Russian Propaganda’,

Citation 94

Motion for a resolution

– having regard to the report by Media Freedom Rapid Response entitled ‘Mapping Media Freedom – Monitoring Report 2024’, published in February 2025,

Amendment

– having regard to the report by Media Freedom Rapid Response entitled ‘Mapping Media Freedom – Monitoring Report 2025’, published in February 2026^{51a},

^{51a} <https://www.mfrr.eu/monitoring-report-2025>

Citation 95

Motion for a resolution

– having regard to the report by the World Economic Forum of January 2025 entitled ‘Global Cybersecurity Outlook 2025’,

Unchanged text included in the compromise

– having regard to the report by the World Economic Forum of January 2025 entitled ‘Global Cybersecurity Outlook 2025’,

Citation 96

Motion for a resolution

– having regard to the investigative report published by VSquare, Delfi Estonia and partner media organisations on 26 February 2024 entitled ‘Kremlin Leaks: Secret Files Reveal How Putin Pre-Rigged his Reelection’,

Unchanged text included in the compromise

– having regard to the investigative report published by VSquare, Delfi Estonia and partner media organisations on 26 February 2024 entitled ‘Kremlin Leaks: Secret Files Reveal How Putin Pre-Rigged his Reelection’,

Citation 97

Motion for a resolution

Unchanged text included in the compromise

– having regard to the Ethical Code of Conduct for Social Media Influencers and Content Creators, published by the Aspen Institute Germany in 2024,

– having regard to the Ethical Code of Conduct for Social Media Influencers and Content Creators, published by the Aspen Institute Germany in 2024,

Citation 98

Motion for a resolution

– having regard to the article published by Debunk.org on 4 May 2023 entitled ‘Kremlin spent 1.9 billion USD on propaganda last year, the budget exceeded by a quarter’,

Unchanged text included in the compromise

– having regard to the article published by Debunk.org on 4 May 2023 entitled ‘Kremlin spent 1.9 billion USD on propaganda last year, the budget exceeded by a quarter’,

Citation 99

Motion for a resolution

– having regard to the statement by the Russian Federation’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 28 December 2024 on measures in response to the EU’s 15th sanctions package against Russia, in which it announced the expansion of the list of EU officials and citizens prohibited from entering the country,

Unchanged text included in the compromise

– having regard to the statement by the Russian Federation’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 28 December 2024 on measures in response to the EU’s 15th sanctions package against Russia, in which it announced the expansion of the list of EU officials and citizens prohibited from entering the country,

Citation 100

Motion for a resolution

– having regard to the article by the Russian News Agency TASS of 28 December 2024 entitled ‘Russia substantially expands blacklist of EU officials in response to sanctions – MFA’,

Unchanged text included in the compromise

– having regard to the article by the Russian News Agency TASS of 28 December 2024 entitled ‘Russia substantially expands blacklist of EU officials in response to sanctions – MFA’,

Citation 100 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

- *having regard to the Commission press release of 18 December 2023 on its opening of formal proceedings under the Digital Services Act against X to assess possible breaches of its obligations, in particular as regards the mitigation of systemic risks linked to the design and functioning of its recommender systems, as well as obligations related to risk assessment, content moderation, advertising transparency and access to data for researchers,*

Citation 100 b (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

- *having regard to a range of academic and investigative studies on social media recommender systems in the context of the German federal elections, which indicate algorithmic bias and amplification of polarising or partisan content, thereby shaping users' political information environment,*

Citation 100 c (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

- *having regard to the Commission press release of 30 April 2024 on its opening of formal proceedings under the Digital Services Act against Meta platforms, in particular as regards its handling of political content on its online platforms,*

Citation 101

Motion for a resolution

Unchanged text included in the compromise

- having regard to the statement by TikTok of December 2024 on continuing

- having regard to the statement by TikTok of December 2024 on continuing

to protect the integrity of TikTok during Romanian elections,

to protect the integrity of TikTok during Romanian elections,

Citation 102

Motion for a resolution

– having regard to the statement issued by the European Solar Manufacturing Council on 30 April 2025 entitled ‘Restrict Remote Access of PV Inverters from High-Risk Vendors’, in which it warned of the risks to Europe’s energy sovereignty due to unregulated and remote-control capabilities of PV inverters from high-risk, non-European manufacturers,

Unchanged text included in the compromise

– having regard to the statement issued by the European Solar Manufacturing Council on 30 April 2025 entitled ‘Restrict Remote Access of PV Inverters from High-Risk Vendors’, in which it warned of the risks to Europe’s energy sovereignty due to unregulated and remote-control capabilities of PV inverters from high-risk, non-European manufacturers,

Citation 102 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

– ***having regard to the White Paper for European Defence - Readiness2030 and the Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1106 of 27 May 2025 establishing the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) through the Reinforcement of the European Defence Industry Instrument,***

Citation 102 b (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

– ***having regard to the Council conclusions of 28 November 2025 on access to reliable news as part of the European Democracy Shield,***

Or. en